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OF SOVIET RUSSIA

BY

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To
M. C. D.
E. D. S.
AND
L. C. D.

PREFACE

THIS is a pioneer attempt to tell the story of the international relations of Soviet Russia, 1917-1923. It would have been impossible for me without the generous permission of Professor Samuel N. Harper, of the University of Chicago, to make such use as I wished of his translations and notes regarding Russian affairs. He is, however, in no way responsible for any opinions that I may have expressed.

My thanks are also due to Mr. Emanuel Aronsberg for his able translations from the Russian and to the many others in all parts of the world who as "post-horses of literature" have given me the benefit of their knowledge of the languages. To the editors of *Soviet Russia*, to Mr. Alexander Gumberg, to Mr. Walter Pettit, and to Professor R. H. Lord, of Harvard University, I am also indebted. Professor James Mavor, of the University of Toronto, Mr. M. Karpovich, and Mr. Tyler Dennett have painstakingly read the manuscript and each has made many useful suggestions. Several members of the staffs of Embassies and Legations at Washington have kindly shown an interest in my work and have materially assisted me. I wish also to thank those who, both at home and abroad, have given me the benefit of their knowledge and judgment but who perforce remain anonymous.

The book, however, remains my own and none of its faults can be accredited elsewhere. In substance I attempted to conduct what was really an "undress rehearsal" of the main points of the book in my Round Table on the "Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia" at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown in the summer of 1922. Later at Clark University in

thanks are also due to the editors of the *North American Review*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, *Current History*, *Our World*, the *International Interpreter*, and the *New York Times* for permission to make use of portions of articles which have appeared in their pages. The assistance of my wife, who has typed the entire book, and of my daughter, who has assisted in the preparation of the index, are also gratefully acknowledged. The skillful maps are, with the exception of the map on propaganda routes of the Third Internationale, the work of Col. Lawrence Martin, to whose energy and unfailing good nature so many of us are indebted.

Throughout the book the attempt has been made to deal exclusively with the international problems of Soviet Russia. Internal conditions in Russia arising from the establishment of Bolshevik rule have been intentionally neglected, for I do not pretend to be an expert on Russia. I use the plural form in the title, "The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia," because of the confusion existing between the Soviet Government and the Third Internationale, which is in fact a part of the Soviet régime, and also because, as the reader will discover, the foreign policies of Russia since 1917 have been varied. Gradually, as time has gone on, the elements of Russian geography and the historic traditions of Russian politics have emerged with compelling force from the neglect which temporarily obscured them during the war and early period of the Bolshevik revolution. The quality and interest of the story have been relieved by the liberal use of quotations from notes, speeches, and articles by Soviet leaders and from the official Bolshevik press. These at least have the merit of reality.

In particular this book does not deal with the policies pursued by other countries toward Soviet Russia but with the policies which the revolutionary government has followed toward these foreign governments and peoples. Inevitably the short-

sighted or selfish mistakes of other countries have appeared. In the case of the final chapter, however, the emphasis has shifted. There I have tried to explain American policy in objective fashion by quotation and summary. Thus appear in simple way the spirit and the principles of American policy toward Russia. This is persistent across two administrations. In its final form it is defended by the *New Republic* which writes regarding the conditions required for recognition of Soviet Russia: "These requirements are reasonable. They are requirements that the Soviet republic should have met on its own initiative."

It is, however, a healthy sign of an awakening interest in American foreign policy that there should be agitation regarding the situation. The more talk and argument there is the better for all of us. The issues of trade, and policy that are involved are not remote from us. In this picture and record of Russian foreign policies it has been necessary to survey the entire international situation. At every turn the importance of Russia is clear and the effect of the Bolshevik revolution is apparent in every stage of the history of the past six years. American interest in Russia has increased and our good will toward the Russian people has been manifest in many ways. In the last speech prepared by President Harding, which was given to the press August 1, 1923, the President said:

"It has been urged that we ought to grant recognition to the present Russian régime because the destitution of the Russian people would thereby be put in the way of alleviation, and that this humane appeal is so urgent that other considerations should be put aside, but the fact remains that the establishment of a basis of permanent improvement in Russia lies solely within the power of those who govern the destinies of that country, and political recognition prior to correcting the fundamental error tends only to perpetuate the ills from which the Russian people are suffering."

These ills are not entirely of their own making. American

policy has not been based on indifference but on a real belief in the future of Russia. It is not due to American opposition to any particular form of government in Russia. It is due simply to the belief that international intercourse must depend on international morality. Trade with Russia is entirely possible today; it is independent of recognition. When Russia is ready and willing to observe the ordinary standards of international relations recognition should follow.

A. L. P. D.

Woods Hole, Mass.

Sept. 1, 1923.

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THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF SOVIET RUSSIA

CHAPTER I

THE WORLD WAR AND THE REVOLUTION

The German Kaiser, covered with the blood of millions of dead people, wants to push his army against Petrograd. Let us call to the German workmen, soldiers, and peasants, who want peace not less than we do, to . . . stand up against this damned war!—*Rabotchi i Soldat*, Oct. 17, 1917.¹

The army of the Russian Revolution derives its strength from countless reserves. The oppressed nations of Asia (China, India, Persia) are just as eager for the fall of the régime of capitalistic oppression as are the oppressed proletarian masses of Europe. To fuse these forces in a world revolution against the imperialistic bourgeoisie is the historical mission of the Workers' and Peasants' Russia. The flame of the Petrograd November Revolution will inevitably grow into a fiery hurricane that will strike to the ground the sword of this piratic war and turn the dominion of capital to ashes—*Petrograd Pravda*, Nov. 19, 1917.²

THIS "Petrograd November Revolution" was the revolt, which placed the Bolsheviks in power in Russia. It was furthermore a revolution within a revolution. A handful of desperate and fanatical leaders with a determined program seized control of a vast national government which had already brushed away the government of the Tsar. In March this Russian Revolution had begun. For eight months the struggle for control among the leaders of revolutionary parties had failed to produce either a stable government or a convincing program of military and economic policy.

In the face of realities of political disorganization and

military demoralization, the whole nation characteristically stopped to talk. The ship of state was practically derelict when a small crew of international zealots boarded it. They at once set a new course on the perilous sea of foreign relations in the face of a storm that was sweeping the world. Their opportunity came because of Russian collapse. This had been hastened by the international typhoon which was raging. From the first, therefore, the energetic ambitions of Bolshevik policy were in the field of international affairs. Indeed, it has been said "the history of the Bolshevik régime is to be found in its foreign policy."³

After nearly six years this new Soviet government of Russia remains a marvel and a mystery. It has defied every prophecy of collapse and continues in somewhat lurching fashion to direct the affairs of a large part of what was once the Russian Empire. Soviet Russia today has a population of more than 131,000,000 and an area of 8,166,130 square miles. This vast Eurasian region has in the meantime endured war, famine, and plague. Ancient foundations of economic organization have been wrecked. Terror and murder have swept through the land; and there has been added the efficient savagery of class revenge and of class fear.

To Russia from the ends of the earth came men without a country, bred in the philosophies of internationalism, to assist native radicals in the establishment of new forms of national organization and in the preaching of a new gospel of world revolution. This "victory of the proletariat" was, however, not a democratic movement. In Russian politics it was merely the exchange of one tyranny for another, as "Russia passed from Tsarist despotism to Bolshevik despotism almost without transition."⁴

As a revolutionary movement it was a challenge to historic Western civilization. Nor could the religious and social systems of Asia give roorage to the theories of Bolshevism. Thus at a stroke the revolt at Petrograd and later the government set up at Moscow were a defiance to every established policy in the world.

Nevertheless, across all international frontiers came the call to the "sons of Martha." In the language of Marx, the prophet of modern Socialism: "Workers of the World unite; you have a world to win and nothing to lose but your chains." Behind such creeds of class and beyond the crude formulas of revolt there were also "the voices of humanity that are in the air" expressing "instinctive judgment as to the rights of plain men everywhere."⁵ Only the din of war prevented such appeals from reaching the ears of untold millions as in visible fashion the gospel of the proletarian revolution won its first great victory on the banks of the Neva.

A vision of the future was thus voiced by Trotsky on October 30, 1917:

At the end of this war I see Europe recreated; not by the diplomats, but by the proletariat. The Federated Republic of Europe—The United States of Europe—that is what must be. National autonomy no longer suffices. Economic evolution demands the abolition of national frontiers. If Europe is to remain split into national groups, then Imperialism will recommence its work. Only a Federated Republic of Europe can give peace to the world: . . . But without the action of the European masses, these ends cannot be realized—now.⁶

In the meantime, the practical question for the new government of Russia was, how to stop "this damned war."

THE WAR AND RUSSIAN PARTIES

Already the problem of the war had become the shibboleth of the revolution. Political leaders and party organizations had from the first risen to power and had in turn been wrecked by the War. One reason for this was the fact that to the various Russian political groups the outbreak of war in 1914 had presented a domestic question as well as a diplomatic and military problem. At Petrograd, in the autumn of 1914, it had been obvious that while Russia had been united for the war, each political party was in favor of the War because each expected during the War to secure its own political objects.

As opportunity afforded, talks with leaders of every section of opinion revealed the fundamental diversities of the Russian

political situation. Each was confident that the War would bring his particular group to the top to work out the future salvation of Russia. The reactionary Monarchists gloried in the fusion of national feeling which they expected would strengthen the Tsar's government and put the Liberals back in their proper place. The Constitutionalists, foreseeing the inevitable collapse of the inefficient and corrupt Tsarist bureaucracy, hoped that liberal organizations would win favor; they also counted much on the influence of contact with the Allies to secure a victory for parliamentary institutions. Proceeding to the left in the scale of political parties, red revolution was finally found as the end of the War.

Meanwhile, outside of Russia, among the band of revolutionary exiles in Switzerland and elsewhere, there had also been sharp division. Lenin, in particular, when he learned that German, Belgian, and French Socialists had voted for the war credits in their respective countries, promptly declared the bankruptcy of the Second Internationale which was the existing international Socialist federation. A new international Socialist organization was needed which would be entirely free from bourgeois influence. In 1915 he wrote: "The working class and the Socialist worker's party of Russia have been prepared by their entire history to assume an internationalistic, that is, a really consistent revolutionary attitude." Russia therefore was to head this new movement.

He pointed out that the European war had definitely assumed the character of a bourgeois war. It was "imperialistic, predatory, anti-proletarian." The real sole purpose of such a war was plunder, for imperialism was "the struggle of a perishing, rotting, decrepit bourgeoisie for the partition of the world and the enslavement of small nations." As the war progressed, Lenin began to reckon on the possibility that the suffering which the War would entail on the proletariat would lead to the overthrow of capitalistic society. Thus in characteristic language he declared:

The European war of 1914-15 is beginning to bring undoubted benefit, in revealing to the most advanced class of civilized countries that in its parties has ripened a sort of disgusting, purulent

abscess, and from somewhere there is being emitted an unbearable, cadaverous odor.”⁹

In view of this putrescent state of Europe, he again urged at Berne in March, 1915, the establishment of a Third Internationale. This, as a matter of fact, was to take place at Moscow exactly four years later. At the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences of radical Socialists in 1915-16, he also proclaimed a policy of general strikes, (of sabotage) and of domestic civil war in each of the belligerent countries to stop the World War by means of revolution. Thus the way would be cleared for the new international Socialist federation and thus would Russian workers take the lead in ending the war by “the greatest proletarian revolution in history.”¹⁰

With such ideas in his baggage, small wonder that the German General Staff sent him in a special car from Switzerland across Germany to Russia to begin there his program of stopping the war by wrecking Russia. They felt confident that, while he was setting up the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in Russia, Germany would win the War.¹¹

THE VICTORY OF THE BOLSHEVIKI

Thus the War lay across the threshold of the Russian Revolution. Following the revolt of March, 1917, individuals here and there and whole parties tried to rally the spent forces of the country to stem the German advance. With Slavic devotion, bands of gallant Russian officers sacrificed themselves in the endeavor to stop the disarray of the Russian army. (Party caucuses vainly sought successive coalitions which could attempt a constructive program.) In the midst of such confusion of men and things lay the opportunity which Lenin and other leaders had long been waiting.

The March revolution had been begun by factory hands in Petrograd. These working men, united with other elements, had organized a Council or Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies which at first exercised an amazing influence. It is also worth noting that the Soviet was a repetition of the similar council formed in St. Petersburg in 1905-06.

This Petrograd Soviet of about one thousand members was in turn led in rather uncertain fashion by an executive committee of about one hundred. [By its famous Order No. 1 of March 15, it had recommended the organization of other councils or committees in the army, most of them composed only of soldiers. The movement spread and in a short time all Russia was a vast collection of Soviets all talking at once.

The Petrograd Soviet, however, was not the government of Russia or even of Petrograd. Indeed, at first it refused to co-operate with the attempt to organize the Provisional government. Later, there was a reorganization of the temporary Cabinet to include members from the Soviet. [In the meantime, however, that body began to lose its influence and importance particularly as the fundamental question of foreign policy came to the front. [In June and July the last attempts at a renewed Russian offensive finally ended. The army began to crumble away in the field. In Petrograd also a change took place in the control of the Soviet. More extreme elements gained in power and by their promises of peace and of land won to their support the weary soldiers.

While the enfeebled Provisional government spent its time in debate or abortive plans, the Petrograd Soviet gradually acquired its power. By October the Soviet was manned by a belligerent crew. The Bolsheviki, who were the extreme left wing of the Social Revolutionary party, had vainly attempted an armed revolt in July, but three months later they had talked themselves into control. [Their parliamentary skill and their determination led first to their capture of the Petrograd Soviet, then to the organization of a new All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and finally to seizure of the government itself.] Behind this success lay the compact Military Revolutionary Committee of the Bolsheviki; to this body on October 30 representatives of the Petrograd regiments had declared their obedience:

The Petrograd garrison no longer recognizes the Provisional Government. The Petrograd Soviet is our Government. We will obey only the orders of the Petrograd Soviet, through the Military Revolutionary Committee.¹²

Alongside of this movement there was the rapid and extraordinary organization of the Red Guards who became the revolutionary police and militia of the Petrograd Soviet. Force, however, was not really needed to carry out the revolution of November 7-8. The Provisional government simply melted away. On the morning of November 7, Kerensky, its (nominal head) left Petrograd in a motor car to hunt for an army. He never came back. At the Winter Palace the forces left on guard surrendered that night and the rest of the Ministry were arrested. A few days later the Petrograd Duma, the last remaining legally elected organization, was dispersed. The revolution was a fact but just at first it almost stopped in surprise at the ease of its victory. Thus the months of talk had their result. The war weariness of the people and the whole course of events had doomed the Provisional government. The way was now clear for drastic action by the small faction who had by their personal initiative seized control of the situation. The radical oligarchy of the "soap box" had won.

THE FORMULAS OF PEACE

Foremost stood the problem of the war. Immediately the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which had gathered in Petrograd, met on the very night of the revolution and was pushed to the front by the Bolshevik leaders of the Petrograd Soviet. Lenin proposed, on November 8, and the Congress unanimously adopted a "Decree of Peace."¹³ This document proposed to "all warring peoples and to their governments a just and democratic peace." The first act of the new authorities, preceding even the decree on land, which abolished all private ownership, was an international document. The decree of peace, involving as it must a plan of foreign policy, became, (therefore,) the corner-stone of the new edifice.

For this reason it is important to examine the previous revolutionary proposals for peace. By this method are also possible both a review of previous events and a definition of the program of world-revolution. These lay back of the de-

cree of peace and thus depended in turn on the declaration of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" as asserted by the Bolsheviki in their November revolution.

In March, as the dust of the crumbled Tsarist régime cleared from the air, it was evident to the impartial observer that the conduct of the War had received a great shock. That blow had been impending for many months. The administration of the War by the government of the Tsar had gradually removed Russia as one of the Allies from effective co-operation in the struggle against the Central Powers. Though by virtue of sheer numbers as well as of equipment the mere existence of the Russian army still detained the forces of the Central Powers on the eastern front. The outbreak of the revolution in Russia made the situation plain. For the United States the possibility that a new and liberal government in Russia might now develop was a welcome factor in removing previous American hesitation at association with a Russian government which we had rightly judged to be tyrannical and corrupt. This change, however, only emphasized the American task which was to become clear in April as we entered the war. We had to try to take the place which Russia had failed to fill in economic affairs, and also, in spite of our defenseless position and almost criminal lack of military preparation, to despatch an immense army overseas. This army was eventually to meet the shock of German troops hitherto employed on the eastern front.¹⁴

The March revolution, therefore, did not change the war. In spite of encouragement by the Allies, it only made evident that Russia was for all practical purposes out of the conflict. There might be a moderate revival of interest and feeble, sporadic attempts to return. The main difficulty, however, was too deep seated for new generals or fresh supplies to remedy. The trouble was psychological. (The Russian people were tired of the War) and they now had in the revolution a subject of overpowering domestic interest to attract them. This situation does not in the least reflect on the bravery and devotion which had been shown by the millions of patient patriots who had already borne the full burden of the day. It

serves, however, to bring into relief the almost Oriental fatalism which is also an important element in Russian character.

Under such circumstances, the pledge given to the Allies by Miliukov, the new Foreign Minister in the Provisional government, that Russia "will fight by their side against the common enemy until the end, without cessation and without faltering"¹⁵ was not in accord with the real sentiment of the great mass of the people.

A few days later a "Proclamation by the Petrograd Soviet to the Peoples of the World"¹⁶ gave a strong hint of other sentiments which by increasing ways were soon to sweep through Russia. This manifesto declared in vivid fashion the success of the Russian Revolution and continued:

The time has come for the peoples to take into their own hands the decision of the question of war and peace. . . . Refuse to serve as an instrument of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, landowners, and bankers. . . . Laboring peoples of all countries! We are stretching out in brotherly fashion our hands to you over the mountains of corpses of our brothers, across rivers of innocent blood and tears, over the smoking ruins of cities and villages, over the wreckage of treasures of culture,—we appeal to you for the re-establishment and strengthening of international unity. . . . Proletarians of all countries, unite!

As we review the successive statements by the Provisional government of Russian aims in the War, we find particularly that the support given to Russian claims for the control of the Dardanelles aroused definite criticism in the Petrograd Soviet.¹⁷ Early in May a vote of confidence in the government was passed by the Soviet by the narrow margin of thirty-five votes out of many hundreds. Guchkov, the Minister of War, and Miliukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, resigned. The Petrograd Soviet resolved independently to call an International Socialist Congress to meet at Stockholm during the summer and on May 15 issued an appeal to the Socialists of all countries.¹⁸

This appeal is of prime importance, for it contained the famous formula, "peace without annexations or indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples." At the same time a strong stand was taken against a separate peace with

the Central Powers which "would be a betrayal of the cause of the worker's democracy of all countries." It was the duty of all proletarians to unite in "the first victory of the toilers over the Internationale of the Imperialists." For the "Russian Revolution was born in the fires of the World War. This war is a monstrous crime on the part of the imperialists of all countries." Because of the gains to imperialism through the war, "the toilers of all the countries are equally defeated in the war." The Russian Revolution is, therefore, "not only a national revolution—it is the first stage of the world revolution, which will end the baseness of war and will bring peace to mankind."

Three days later, on May 18, the Provisional government also issued a declaration which adopted the same historic peace formula, but appealed to the army for renewed efforts against the common enemy.¹⁹ A new Ministry had been organized which included representatives of the Petrograd Soviet, and for the moment it seemed as though a real coalition of forces might restore Russia and preserve the better results of the revolution. This second stage of the revolution, from May to July, was, however, to end in gloom and disaster.

Early in July the Russian army resumed the offensive but within a fortnight its power was gone. On July 16 an attack directed toward Lemberg failed miserably, and on July 23 the enemy captured Tarnopol. During the same week there was an uprising in Petrograd led by the Bolsheviki which was put down only after serious street fighting.

Furthermore, in the Ukraine there were signs of disintegration and of separation from Russia. By early August the Central Powers could have seized Odessa had they wished. In the army, whole regiments began to desert; its condition was a study in military pathology; and the result was the collapse of the second Ministry of Petrograd. Thus Kerensky finally became Prime Minister with a practically Socialist Cabinet. But the news from the front also encouraged the Bolshevik leaders who still regarded Kerensky as too conservative and feeble.

To continue our review, the third stage of the revolution,

from August to November, was marked by further demoralization and disunion in Petrograd. An attempt by General Kornilov to appear as the "man on horseback" was a failure. The Provisional government became a mere figurehead, a helpless specter of power yet garrulous to the end. Meantime, the Petrograd Soviet gradually recovered from its temporary unpopularity which had resulted from its association with the ineffective attempt to restore the offensive power of the army. The Bolshevik campaign for control of the army Soviets and the fiery eloquence of Trotsky gained in power. Persistent propaganda among the troops did much; and Lenin came back from his temporary exile in Finland to plan the *coup d'état* of November. Thus the stage was set at home.

In the field, as all Russia continued to attend committee meetings and to babble of peace, the Germans captured Riga on September 3 and, as a preliminary to closing in on Petrograd, landed troops on the coast of Esthonia on October 21. Their advance was only a matter of time, for the Russian army was now in a condition of utter confusion. This state of affairs played directly into the hands of the Bolshevik leaders who everywhere were preaching their own particular gospel of salvation by "dictatorship of the proletariat" and by "world-revolution" which would end forever all imperialist wars.

Ever since Trotsky had returned to Petrograd in May, he and his comrades had practised a policy of sniping. Later in the open, their slogans of "Down with the War," "Peace and the Land," and "the Victory of the Exploited over the Exploiters" sounded "a clear and certain note which went straight to the hearts of the people."²⁰ Their program, as stated in the "Decree of Peace" of November 8 and in later documents, was now to meet the test of constructive application. In common with the experience of other opposition parties, the advent of the Bolsheviks to power was both to define and eventually seriously to limit their party objectives. To criticize them unduly on this score would be unfair. It remains, however, to analyze their policies.

THE BOLSHEVIK PEACE PROGRAM

On November 6, 1919, Chicherin, who had directed the foreign policy of Soviet Russia for nearly two years, wrote:

The November Revolution, the first act of the world social revolution, at once placed the Russian Soviet Government at the front of the revolutionary movement of the world as the herald and inspiration of the proletarian revolution.²¹

This was true enough; but in 1917 no one outside of Russia believed it and even in Petrograd the other revolutionary parties confidently looked for the rapid collapse of the Bolshevik movement. Indeed, the Decree of Peace of November 8 was ignored by every government in the world. It had been sent broadcast by wireless, but there was no reply.

This Trotsky explained by saying that the Decree "ushering a new epoch, came as a complete surprise to the routine mind of the ruling classes of Europe."²² The Decree itself differed somewhat from the language used by the Bolsheviks in the weeks immediately preceeding the *coup d'état*. During the spring and summer, when they had been in a small minority in the Petrograd Soviet, they had either voted against or abstained from voting for the successive manifestos or proposals regarding an international program. Trotsky, however had abandoned this merely obstructive policy in a pamphlet which appeared shortly before the November revolt. Criticizing the formula of "no annexations," he had urged as the only positive constructive solution of the problem of the War—"the interference of the revolutionary proletariat; which interrupts by force the development of military events."

This solution he said:

Presupposes that while the War is still on, the international proletariat rises with force sufficient to paralyze and finally to stop from the bottom up, the War. Obviously, in this most favorable case the proletariat having been powerful enough to stop the progress of the War would not be likely to limit itself to that purely conservative program which goes no further than the renunciation of annexations.²³

Thus the War augmented by a world-revolution "was destined to do away ruthlessly with existing frontiers between the states, establishing upon their ruins the United States of Europe."²⁴ This federation, however, could succeed and develop only as a general European one. "This would be the next task of the triumphant revolutionary proletariat." Under such circumstances the "Salvation of the Russian Revolution lies in its propagation all over Europe."²⁵ Furthermore, as the War had developed from imperialism, this spread of the revolution proposed that "India, Morocco, and Egypt were to be liberated, along with all the colonies in general." Thus the cardinal doctrine of Bolshevist international relations rested on the program of liberating the proletariat of the world. The proclamation of the world-revolution was, therefore, part and parcel of the foreign policy of Soviet Russia.²⁶

This formula of peace by revolution had previously been stated as "peace over the heads of the governments with the nations revolting against them." However, as the Bolshevik leaders made their first contact with the actual realities of power, they promptly altered their tactics, for the Decree of Peace was addressed to governments as well as to peoples. Moreover, it included the "conservative" formula of "no annexations" which Trotsky had previously criticized. A still more striking fact was that the Soviet government declared that this decree was not "in the nature of an ultimatum, that is, it is ready to consider any other terms of peace" provided those terms were open and provided all secret diplomacy was barred. Finally, there was not a word as to the "world-revolution" or as to the "dictatorship of the proletariat."²⁷

Why was this? In the first place, as the newly organized cabinet or Council of People's Commissars,²⁸ took stock of the situation, it was apparent that the domestic problems of the conquest of power, the organization of food supply, and the control of the army which was practically in a state of "decomposition" required an immediate peace. Already a compromise in tactics might be required if the peace were to come.

Furthermore, "peace" to Russia meant only one thing—the cessation of fighting on Russian territory. The War on the western front, campaigns in the Near East, or submarine warfare in the Atlantic were remote affairs. Even Trotsky had privately said that without the co-operation of the European masses the great objective of the revolution could not be realized *now*. It was an "immediate peace" that the Soviet government required. If the Allies should not agree to a discussion of peace terms, there remained the hope that the Central Powers might accept the proposal of an armistice. Time in any case was an important element. Under such circumstances, why unnecessarily affront the world with a proclamation of revolt?

Thus ten days passed while with feverish activity the Bolsheviks consolidated their power in Petrograd and won control at Moscow after several days of really desperate fighting. On November 22, Trotsky, as Foreign Secretary, addressed a note to the Allied Ambassadors in Petrograd proposing "an immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations,"²⁹ This proposal reversed Tsarist foreign policy, and that of Miliukov, which was pledged by the agreement among the Allies of September, 1914, not to make a separate peace. It was forwarded to the Central Powers by neutral channels; but it met with no direct response from the Allies. Instead, the Military Attachés of the Allied Powers and later General Berthelot, the Chief of the French Military Mission in Russia, sent notes to Russian G.H.Q. protesting against the possibility of a separate peace. The French, in particular, refused to recognize the Soviet government.³⁰

This step had been provoked by the news that in the interval, on November 20, G.H.Q. had been instructed "to propose to the enemy military authorities immediately to cease hostilities, and enter into negotiations for peace."³¹ General Dukhonin, as Commander-in-Chief, had refused to do this. He was promptly superseded by a Bolshevik appointee, Ensign Krylenko, and paid for his refusal with his life. An infuriated mob rushed into his railway car "and falling upon the old General dragged him out and beat him to death on

the platform.”³² Such evidence of the attitude of the army regarding peace left small chance for further delay.

The Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet had also issued a manifesto declaring that by the tactics of the government the “governments of the warring imperialistic countries are placed in a position in which the beginning of immediate peace negotiations will be irresistably forced upon them.”³³ Unfortunately for this prophecy, the Allied governments remained obstinately silent. The Central Powers also waited the further developments of the situation.

Under these circumstances, an order was issued to the army for “compulsory fraternization and peace with the Germans by squads and companies.” This was the last stage in the demoralization of the army. Now at last Krylenko would be able to report “the inability of our soldiers to go into battle.” Such policies, however, carried with them a threat for, as the Moscow correspondent of the *Pravda* reported: the soldiers are following us in the firm conviction that the decrees of the government will be realized. The Bolsheviki now had no choice. “They had conjured up evil spirits by the magic words of a promise of immediate ‘peace and bread.’ It was now necessary to start out upon an expedition to find these things.”³⁴

At last, after an anxious week, the Central Powers sent word on November 28 that they were ready to consider armistice proposals. Hostilities ceased on the Russian front as preparations were made for the start of negotiations on December 2.³⁵ Trotsky, meanwhile, still asserted that fear of the German proletariat had forced the Kaiser to consent to these preliminaries and that in allied countries “the masses” would still compel their governments to join in them.³⁶ How far he was sincere in this belief is doubtful. The fact remains, that in the coming negotiations he made a desperate but naturally an unavailing fight. The story of the negotiation of the Brest-Litovsk peace is a disappointing tragedy.

In spite of all their exultation at the initial success of their revolt, the Bolsheviki were now face to face with grim facts. They had protested that they did not wish a separate peace.

Yet this was to be their first experience. They had written of world-revolution and of the power of the proletariat. They now negotiated directly with the most autocratic government in Europe.

Nevertheless, the creed of Bolshevism had taken its place among the constitutions of the world. That declaration, as finally given to the world in 1919,⁸⁷ read as follows:

1. The present is the period of destruction and crushing of the capitalistic system of the whole world. . . .

2. The aim of the proletariat must now be immediately to conquer power. To conquer power means to destroy the governmental apparatus of the bourgeoisie and to organize a new proletarian governmental apparatus.

3. The new apparatus of the Government must express the dictatorship of the working class. . . .

4. The dictatorship of the proletariat must be the occasion for the immediate expropriation of capital and the elimination of the private right of owning the means of production, through making them common public property. . . .

5. In order to protect the Socialist revolution against external and internal enemies, and to assist the fighting proletariat of other countries, it becomes necessary to entirely disarm the bourgeoisie and its agents and to arm the proletariat.

6. The world-situation demands immediate and as perfect as possible relations between the different groups of the revolutionary proletariat and a complete alliance of all the countries, in which the revolution has already succeeded.

7. The most important method is the mass action of the proletariat, including armed struggle against the Government power of capitalists.

Here certainly was no formula of peace! In 1917-18 the tactics of Bolshevism and the collapse of Russia may have required the compromise of peace. The foundation and adoption of this creed of Communism, however, meant that Soviet Russia had taken as one of her foreign policies a system which was then confessedly based on the overthrow of international society as we know it.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Quoted in Reed's *Ten Days that Shook the World* (New York, 1919), p. 31. The Bolshevik newspaper press suddenly expanded during October. This newspaper, *Rabotchi i Soldat* (*The Worker and Soldier*), made its appearance at this time as a special organ of the party. Later, over the futile attempt to suppress it by the Provisional government, came the first clash of authority with the Petrograd Soviet. Reed's book, written from a point of view friendly to the Bolsheviks, contains in text and appendices a remarkable and invaluable collection of documentary material for the November Revolution.

Throughout, the dates are given by the Gregorian calendar. Thirteen should be subtracted to give the date by the Julian calendar, which was in use till Feb. 1, 1918. Then the change from old style to new style, or Gregorian, was officially made, Feb. 1 becoming automatically Feb. 14.

2. Quoted in *Bolsheviki u Vlasti* (*The Bolsheviks in Power*) (Petrograd, 1918), p. 35. Chernov, who writes on foreign policy, is critical of the Bolsheviks, but as a participant in events of 1917 he is a valuable source.
3. Buchan, *History of the World War* (London, 1922), 4 vols., iv, p. 134.

The Russian Revolution really began in 1905-7. The events which then occurred showed the Revolutionary parties that a small determined force could seize power and might be able to retain power long enough to effect a change in the political situation. To begin with, the various discordant voices of the revolution joined in chorus in 1917. They thus appeared to have learned the lesson of the revolutionary movement of 1905-7. Later, having power in their hands, they split into factions. In a sense, therefore, the revolution was sacrificed to their party quarrels. The success of the Bolsheviks, or extreme left wing of the Social Revolutionary Party, was due, however, in 1917, to their capture of the Russian army. This made possible their *coup d'état* and their successful seizure of power. The creation of the Red army has enabled them at critical moments to retain control. Cf. Mavor, *Economic History of Russia* (London, 1914), 2 vols., ii, pp. 490, 509-10, 519, 427, 534-41, 563-67, 596-98.

4. Antonelli, *Bolshevik Russia* (New York, 1920), p. 3. The author, a Frenchman, was attached to the French Mission in Russia.
5. *President Wilson's Message to Congress*, Dec. 4, 1917.
6. Reed, p. 52.

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7. Lenin, *Socialism and the War*, published in Lenin's and Trotsky's, *The Proletarian Revolution in Russia* (edited by Fraina) (New York, N. D.), p. 135. This essay was written in 1915.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 95. Cf. also for a convenient summary of such views, *Report of the Committee to Collect Information on Russia* (Russia, No. I, 1921, Cd. 1240) (London, 1921), pp. 11 *et seq.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
11. The so-called "Sisson Documents," which were published in 1918 by the Committee on Public Information at Washington relate to the alleged bribery of the Bolsheviks by German authorities. They do not seem to be sufficiently authenticated or pertinent to warrant their use in this connection.

If the Germans supplied funds, the Bolsheviks could, from their point of view, have received the money for their own purposes. On the issue of the War this would not have seemed immoral to them, for the Bolshevik leaders were entirely sincere in their hatred of German as well as Allied "capitalistic imperialism." They made peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk because of their own necessities. If this were helpful to the Central Powers that was, from the Bolshevik point of view, unfortunate; but it did not prevent the treaty. As they planned eventually to destroy all the governments of the world, the receipt of funds from the German authorities to assist their first endeavors would have given a grim, if humorous, zest to the situation. In such matters they were unmoral.


The sardonic flavor of the episode of Lenin's trip across Germany in March, 1917, is indicated by an anecdote reported by Zinoviev, who accompanied Lenin, regarding the attempt of a prominent German Socialist, who had supported the imperial government during the war, to interview Lenin while passing through Germany. "When a prominent member of Scheideman's party wanted to enter our carriage (which as a matter of fact was not sealed) in order to welcome us the gentleman was told purposely by Lenin that we had no inclination to talk with traitors, and would give him a thrashing if he came to us." By "traitor" Lenin, of course, meant a traitor to the proletarian revolution and to the cause of world-revolution as advocated by the Bolsheviks. Zinoviev, *Nicolai Lenin* (a pamphlet reprint of an address of Sept., 1918), Cleveland, N. D.

12. Reed, p. 54.
13. *Russian-American Relations* (compiled and edited by C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Petit), New York, 1920, p. 41. This

collection of documents (hereafter to be cited as *R. A. R.*) is indispensable to any student of Russian affairs, 1917-20.

14. This view of the military situation in Russia does not agree with much that was written during 1917. It is, however, my original view expressed in the early part of 1917 and I have seen no reason to change it. This may be due in part to the unfavorable impression created in my mind at Petrograd early in the War. I doubted then the reality of Russian power in a long war which was to tax industrial efficiency and which would test the stability of the Russian administration. The lack of single-mindedness and of candor shown in intimate conversations with public men, particularly by Sazonov, was evident. Yet Sazonov was looked on by many as one of the best of the officials.
15. *Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of the Allies, March 18, 1917, in R. A. R., p. 2.*
16. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-12.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
20. *Report of the Committee to Collect Information on Russia, p. 17.*
21. Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy* (Soviet Russia Pamphlets No. 3), (New York, 1920), p. 3.
22. Chernov, p. 35.
23. This pamphlet on a "Peace Program" is reprinted in Lenin's and Trotsky's, *The Proletarian Revolution in Russia*, p. 336.
24. Chernov, p. 33.
25. Lenin and Trotsky, p. 345.
26. *Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia* (published by the Department of State), Washington, 1920. *Section III. Bolshevik Program of World Revolution.* This was republished by the American Association for International Conciliation, New York, 1920. It is a valuable collection of documents.
27. *R. A. R.*, p. 41.
28. On Nov. 8, a cabinet consisting of a Council of People's Commissioners, or Commissars, was constituted to act under the authority of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies and its Central Executive Committee of about one hundred members. The new Council consisted of: President of the Council, Vladimir Ulianov (Lenin); People's Commissioner of the Interior, A. I. Rykov; People's Commissioner of Agriculture, V. P. Miliutin; People's Commissioner of Labor, A. G. Shliapnikov; People's Commissioners of War and Navy, a committee com-

- posed of V. S. Ovsienko (Antonov) N. V. Krylenko, F. M. Dybenko; People's Commissioner of Commerce and Industry, V. P. Noghin; People's Commissioner of Public Instruction, A. V. Lunacharsky; People's Commissioner of Finance, I. I. Skvortzov (Stepanov); People's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, L. D. Bronstein (Trotsky); People's Commissioner of Justice, G. I. Oppokov (Lomov); People's Commissioner of Posts and Telegraphs, N. P. Avilov (Glibov); People's Commissioner of Nationalities, I. V. Djugashvili (Stalin). The position of People's Commissioner of Railways was filled later.
29. *R. A. R.*, p. 44. A note of Nov. 23 to the representatives of neutral countries expressed the hope that these proposals would be brought officially to the attention of the enemy governments. p. 45.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 50-51. The United States took separate action by a protest against a separate peace, p. 53.
 31. Reed, p. 289.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
 33. *Izvestia*, Nov. 12. This was to become the official bulletin and newspaper of the Soviet government.
 34. Chernov, pp. 35-40.
 35. *R. A. R.*, p. 51.
 36. *Izvestia*, Nov. 29.
 37. *Proclamation calling the First Congress of the Communist International*. Rosta (Official Telegraph Agency of the Bolsheviks), Feb. 24, 1919, quoted in *Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia*. App. I. Cf. for the entire chapter the remarkable article—"The Spirit of the Russian Revolution," in *The Round Table*, Sept., 1918. This article, however, leaves out of consideration the fundamental point of "world-revolution" as the motive and policy of the Bolsheviks. Cf. also Eckhardt, "Russlands auswärtige Politik, 1917-1923" in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* (April, 1923); Dennis, "Characteristics of Bolshevik Diplomacy," in *North American Review*, November, 1923.



CHAPTER II

BREST-LITOVSK

If, in awaiting the imminent revolutionary flood in Europe, Russia should be forced to conclude peace with the present-day Governments of the Central Powers, it would be a provisional, temporary, transitory peace, with the revision of which the European revolution will have to concern itself in the first place.—TROTSKY, *Preface to A Peace Program*.¹

The Brest treaty contains no provision binding Germany to respect the integrity and inviolability of the territory left to Soviet Russia after all the slashings and occupations, and the treaty, therefore, could serve as a basis for a policy of gradual encroachment and infiltration by Germany into the depths of Russia, particularly to the east; in which Germany aimed to occupy strategical points to meet the eventual advance of the Entente from Siberia, and in Caucasia through which new roads appeared to open for the Asiatic plans of German imperialism.—CHICHERIN, "Two Years of Foreign Policy," in *Izvestia*, Nov. 6, 1919.²

We were compelled to sign a "Tilsit" peace. We must not deceive ourselves. We must have courage to face the unadorned, bitter truth. We must size up in full, to the very bottom, the abyss of defeat, partition, enslavement, and humiliation into which we have been thrown.—LENIN, *The Soviets at Work*, 5th ed. (New York, 1919), p. 45.

THEORETICALLY, the Bolsheviki did not care about geographical frontiers. In any case, they were apparently to disappear with the projected downfall of national states founded on "capitalistic imperialism." As Antonelli, in his admirable little book, points out: to the Bolsheviki "it makes little difference, for instance, whether Lithuania is ceded or is not ceded to Germany. That which matters is the struggle of the Lithuanian proletariat against the Lithuanian capitalist."³ So also Lenin declared:

He is no Socialist who does not understand that the victory over the bourgeoisie may require losses of territory and defeats. He is

no Socialist who will not sacrifice his fatherland for the triumph of the social revolution.⁴

It is for such reasons that one is tempted to throw ordinary geography and political science out of the window when facing the treaties of Brest-Litovsk. They do not seem to be of this world as we watch their genesis and negotiation. Yet for this very reason geography and political science are fundamental to their study. That the treaties have since disappeared in the chaos of the general armistice and the struggle for peace does not for our purposes affect their importance. In 1918 they were the visible signal for the dread German advance which began in March on the western front. Today it is easy to reason of the inevitable collapse of the Central Powers. Yet who can blot from his mind the memory of that awful fortnight till the British held firmly at Amiens in early April? Shall we be so base as to forget the Frenchmen and the Americans who died at Mount Kemmel? Can we ever again reach the thrill we felt as our troops in bloody fashion, foot by foot, took back Belleau Wood? Yet that agony was ours because of Brest-Litovsk. The miles on miles that were given up to German control in the east were paid for by the Allied and American troops in the west as they wore their red path of torture and of death to the victory of November, 1918.

Nevertheless, it is a mistake to blame only the Bolsheviki for the consequences of Brest-Litovsk. M. Recouly, on his return from Russia in 1917, clearly reported to Marshal Foch in early August that the Russians were "done for." Foch asked: "We have nothing more to expect from them?" And Recouly answered by one word "Absolutely."⁵ In view of such testimony, it is high time that the treaties of Brest-Litovsk were placed in their proper light and that their relation to the Russian Revolution become clear. (The margin by which the World War was won was so slight that it is difficult to estimate the changes involved had not the Russian Revolution taken place. The treaties of Brest-Litovsk were themselves the logical result of the revolution; they were the open mark on the page of history that the collapse of Russia in the great struggle was complete. But that collapse, in a military

sense, preceded the November revolt which placed the Bolsheviks in power.) What followed was therefore inevitable. There remains, however, the question of Bolshevik sincerity. Did the leaders foresee the tragedy of these treaties? Did they, from the first, understand that peace with Germany was to be bought only at a desperate price? The answers to such questions may become clearer as we trace the course of Bolshevik foreign policy.

NEGOTIATION OF THE ARMISTICE

On December 3, 1917, negotiations for an armistice began between representatives of Soviet Russia and of the Central Powers to whom were added representatives of Turkey and Bulgaria. These negotiations had been arranged by a Russian delegation which had crossed the German lines on November 27, to take the preliminary steps.⁶ As a result there was signed on December 15 an armistice for four weeks which was to continue "automatically in force until one of the contracting parties gives seven days' notice." In these preliminary stages it was clear that the Central Powers were masters of the situation, for they swept aside the wishes of the Russian delegates for a six months' armistice, stating that as military men they could not deal with political questions and were empowered to sign only a separate armistice. They agreed, however, that troops should not be transferred from the eastern to the western front.⁷ This provision the Germans promptly violated, for between December 16 and 31, six divisions were moved from the Russian front to France.⁸

The Russians sought throughout to draw negotiations to a political head and commented that unfortunately there was no formal adhesion from Berlin or Vienna to the idea of a general peace based on the Russian principles of self-determination, no annexations, and no contributions. The reply of Count Czernin for Austria had declared Austria's readiness to conclude peace "without territorial and economic coercion"; this evasive reply, however, was practically all that the Russians had so far secured.⁹ To meet the inquiry of the Central Powers as to whether the Russians had received any

fuller statements from the Allied governments in response to the Decree of Peace of November 8 and to the note, which had been addressed to the Allies on November 22, an adjournment of a week was taken. This gave opportunity for Trotsky to send a second note, of December 6, to the Allied Powers, stating the progress of the armistice negotiations and inquiring definitely as to "their readiness or their refusal to participate in the negotiations for an armistice and for peace." In the event of their refusal, he asked what were their war aims for which "the people of Europe must bleed during the fourth year of the War?"¹⁰ To this inquiry there was no immediate reply; and the Russian delegation renewed negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. Trotsky in the meantime lashed out in an article in the *Izvestia* declaring that the Allied governments alone were responsible for the state of affairs.¹¹

Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities made every preparation to pursue an aggressive campaign for "world revolution."¹² Tons of propaganda were prepared. A special paper—the *Fakel* (*Torch*)—was printed for distribution in Germany. Zinoviev headed a delegation to promote social revolution in Central Europe; and Trotsky and Lenin wrote an appeal to German soldiers which was to be distributed by groups of Russian soldiers along the lines. All of this, however, was stopped by strict orders from Berlin. Zinoviev was turned back; a carload of copies of the *Torch* was burned as were Lenin's appeals.¹³ Such measures showed that the notion of the world-revolution would have a hard time penetrating Germany as long as the General Staff was in control. Indeed, passports were refused German independent Socialists to visit Russia. This led to the Russian proposal that the peace negotiations should be transferred to Stockholm, which was rejected by the Central Powers. Russian delegates were also disturbed by the appearance at Brest-Litovsk of delegates from the Ukrainian Rada or local parliamentary council. These came to negotiate peace independently with the Central Powers.¹⁴ The general result, therefore, of the first fortnight of negotiations which began on December 22 was very distasteful to the Soviet authorities.

This was reflected in the Soviet press which after January 10 suddenly became very sarcastic at the expense of the Germans. The inspired articles were the first direct sign that all was not going well with the negotiations. The official communiqués had given little news of what was really taking place, for real representatives of the press were carefully kept away from Brest-Litovsk. Trotsky might declaim against secret diplomacy and publish to the world the old secret treaties of the Tsar's government; but a censorship had been established and about Brest-Litovsk there was at first a cordon of secrecy. Attention, furthermore, was naturally fixed chiefly on the main negotiations as to political and territorial questions. Meanwhile, side by side, there proceeded the definition of the economic and commercial terms which were also to be embodied in a treaty and which were to be of immense importance. Add to this treaties with Turkey and Bulgaria and the negotiations between the Central Powers and the Ukraine delegates. Thus the month of January was packed.¹⁶

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Meanwhile at Petrograd a last scene of the revolutionary drama was briefly played. This was the meeting of the Constituent Assembly and its rough dismissal by order of the Bolsheviks. On March 15, 1917, the Provisional government had pledged itself: "To proceed forthwith to the preparation and convocation of a Constituent Assembly based on universal suffrage which will establish a stable government."¹⁷

There were repeated references to the Constituent Assembly during the next eight months by all factions; and the Petrograd Soviet endorsed it by saying:

The people of Russia will express their will in the Constituent Assembly, which will be called as soon as possible on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And already it may be said without a doubt that a Democratic Republic will triumph in Russia.¹⁸

The delays in calling for the election of this Assembly were originally criticized by the Bolsheviks; but Kerensky on the eve of his downfall, in spite of these delays declared that "the

Constituent Assembly begins a new chapter in the history of the revolution. Its voice certainly will be the most important factor in the future of Russia.”¹⁹ On November 25 the elections took place, showing that the Social Revolutionaries had a large majority. The Bolsheviks, though now in control of the government, had elected only 168 deputies out of 703.²⁰ The problem for the Soviet authorities was, therefore, to control or to disperse the Assembly which finally met on January 18, 1918. The Social Revolutionaries were themselves to become stubborn and desperate opponents of Bolshevik rule. One of them, Dora Kaplan, was to shoot Lenin during the coming summer; and the recent trial of the Social Revolutionary leaders at Moscow is still in our minds. Such elements, however, in January of 1918, were helpless in the Assembly which, it was reported, dispersed at the remark of a drunken guard: “I am tired and want to go to bed. If you don’t get out I will turn out the lights.”²¹

Outside on the streets there had been sharp fighting; and the Bolshevik authorities issued a decree declaring that “the Central Executive Committee resolves the Constituent Assembly is disbanded.” In the judgment of Col. Raymond Robins, who was head of the American Red Cross in Russia at this time, (the dissolution of the Assembly left the Soviet government stronger than ever, for he declared that the Social Revolutionaries had an industrial and social program not essentially different from that of the Bolsheviks.) In foreign affairs the Social Revolutionaries fired their only shot in a resolution begging the Allies to define their war aims, criticizing the Bolshevik program of a separate peace with Germany, and declaring their readiness “to work towards a general democratic peace, at the same time protecting the interests of Russia.”²² (They also proclaimed Russia to be a “Democratic Federated Republic” and declared all the land to be “the property of the nation.”)

In the face of such language and the dismissal of the Assembly, Colonel Robins nevertheless urged prompt American recognition of Bolshevik authority.²³ This of course, would have tacitly given our approval to the steady Ger-

man pressure at Brest-Litovsk which was breaking down even Soviet opposition to Prussian imperialism. The "generous and sympathetic co-operation" of America, for which Colonel Robins and Mr. Sisson then begged for Bolshevik Russia, would have split the Allied cause wide open on the very eve of the transfer from the Russian front to the western front of one hundred German divisions to begin the onslaught on our troops in March. In such matters Colonel Robins was to expose his subservience to the Bolsheviks; and his acquiescence in the rude dispersal of the patriotic Socialist forces of the Constituent Assembly.

A final commentary on the situation comes from Eduard Bernstein, the German Socialist, who contributed an article for Russian readers which was printed in a Russian paper edited by Gorky. He exposed his puzzled and sarcastic disgust at Bolshevik tactics by writing:

Oh, the German officers are enthusiastic over these glorious revolutionists. Laughing merrily, General Hoffman, who had been in charge of the first negotiations for an armistice, told us how he had jauntily remarked in reply to the long-winded expatiations of the Bolshevik delegates about their principles; "But, pray dear sirs, what do we care for your principles!" If the Bolsheviks not only sacrifice their principles, but, exactly like their recent friend Scheideman, pretend, in addition to this heresy, that Prussian-German militarism has, under their pressure, gone over to the side of their own social-Democratic revolutionary principles,—once they are acting in this manner, immaterial whether deliberately or foolishly—their rôle becomes identical with that played by those German agents for whom countless millions are being spent that they may spread among allied and neutral nations ideas of pacifism, anti-militarism, anti-capitalism, and revolution. . . . In German army circles the success of the negotiations with the Russians is quite openly being explained by the fact that all those whom it was necessary to "oil" had been "oiled." [i.e. bribed.] But as far as German Socialists are concerned, being convinced, by many years of contact with Lenin and Trotsky, of their personal honesty, we stand before an insoluble riddle. Some people are trying to find a solution of this riddle in the theory that the Bolsheviks may, perhaps, purely from business considerations at first, have accepted German money to further their own propaganda and that they have now become the slaves of this heedless step. German Socialists are forced to entertain such a notion because no one in Ger-

many could believe that the Bolsheviks are sincerely convinced of the revolutionary consistency of their tactics.²⁴

Those tactics had begun with the firm assurance to the Central Executive Committee in December that the Bolsheviks would have preferred a "trench peace" to a diplomatic peace, that they would rather have negotiated "with Liebknecht, Klara Zetkin, and Rosa Luxemburg" than with the officials of the Central Powers. That could not be; nevertheless, the Soviet envoys had "spoken to the Kuehlman's and Czernins as to enemies"; and revolutionary propaganda was to go on in Germany in spite of peace negotiations with the German government.²⁵ The Central Executive Committee declared in a proclamation to the "toiling masses of all countries": "We want a peace of the peoples . . . but this we shall obtain only if the people . . . will dictate its conditions by a revolutionary struggle."²⁶ Trotsky in belligerent tone declaimed, "if necessary we will shed the last drop of blood in the struggle for our revolutionary honor, our dignity, peace, liberty, and the brotherhood of all nations."²⁷ He boasted that Russia, thanks to the revolution, was no longer "a miserable tail end of the imperialistic West," that they had made "the Russian Revolution a tremendous attractive force which more and more hypnotizes the proletarian masses."²⁸ In particular, he appealed to these masses to compel the Allied Powers to come out for all-round self-determination. Otherwise, the Allies would "stand for a program of the most undisguised, most cynical imperialism."

Kamenev, in a bitter article of January 11, said that the Soviet delegation had had two purposes: (1) to "break the vicious circle of the imperialist war . . . and thereby to set ablaze the proletarian movement in all countries in favor of peace and against their own imperialist governments," and (2) to "reveal clearly German peace conditions and German annexationist plans."²⁹ Already Trotsky had complained that the German interpretation of the principle of self determination was "entirely fictitious";³⁰ and on all hands the sharp criticism of sincere Soviet followers rose against the German demands. Such language, however, did not carry far

at Brest-Litovsk. The Constituent Assembly had been swept aside; and the Bolsheviki were alone to face the German and Austrian bayonets that stood behind the peace terms. In less than two months Bolshevik formulas were to be transformed into an imperialistic, tyrannical, peace treaty.

THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY

Mstislavsky, one of the delegates in the earlier negotiations, has left a picture of the helplessness of the Bolsheviki at Brest-Litovsk:

Gathered together in a hurry, composed of elements by no means unanimous in their tactical views, and—worst of all—having had no opportunity at all to come to an understanding among themselves, and without experience in the art of diplomatic deceit in a place where every word was literally to be weighed in the balance, this [Bolshevik] delegation was to be pitted against an experienced adversary who had mapped out all his moves beforehand. Not in vain the Germans and their associate delegates have before them on the table neatly lithographed [?] little sheets with instructions, remarks, memoranda, while we had before us only the clean sheets of blank paper in neat little blue covers, prepared by the Germans themselves. . . .³¹

These negotiations fall naturally into four stages. First on December 22 the delegates met with cordiality and the Russians stated the six points on which the peace should be based:

- (1) No forcible union of territories conquered during the war and the withdrawal of troops in occupied territory within a brief time.

- (2) The political independence of peoples that have lost that independence during the war shall be restored in its fullest extent.

- (3) The groups of different nationalities which did not enjoy political independence before the war shall have guaranteed to them the right of deciding freely the question of whether they shall belong to one state or another or shall enjoy national independence by means of a referendum.

- (4) In territories inhabited by different nationalities, the rights of minorities shall be guaranteed.

- (5) No belligerent country shall pay an indemnity. In regard to so-called costs of war, payments already made shall be returned.

As for indemnities levied on private persons, special funds shall be constituted by proportional payments from belligerent countries.

(6) Colonial questions shall be settled in conformity with the above clauses 1-4.³²

This program the delegates of the Central Powers accepted with two important reservations: (1) "All the Powers now participating in the War must within a suitable period, without exception and without reserve bind themselves to the most precise adherence to conditions binding all nations in the same manner"; (2) With respect to point No. 3 of the Russian proposal, "the question of the state allegiance of national groups which possess no state independence can not, in the opinion of the Quadruple Alliance, be regarded as between states, but is, if required, to be solved by every state with its peoples independently in a constitutional manner."³³ The reservations made as to colonial referendums and for the expenses of war prisoners do not concern us at present. On December 28 there came the first formal proposal from the Central Powers stating that the Russians must accept the alleged expressed desires of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and parts of Esthonia and Livonia for self-determination outside of the former Russian Empire. The time of evacuation of these territories by German troops was to be settled later by a Commission.³⁴

There followed a ten days' interruption of the sessions during which the Soviet authorities tried to transfer the negotiations to a neutral country.³⁵ In this they failed, and on January 8 the second stage of the Conference began. Ten days had passed without any news of acceptance of the principles of the first Russian proposals by the Allied Powers, and consequently the Central Powers declared that their acceptance of the Russian proposals was now null and void.³⁶ From this point on, there was much rough give and take in the negotiations. In particular the appearance of a delegation from the Ukrainian Rada and their claim to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers provoked much angry discussion.³⁷ In vain the Russian authorities produced delegates from the Ukrainian Soviet as the proper government of

the Ukraine. A separate treaty with the Rada delegates was signed on February 9 which gave the Central Powers great economic advantages. This entire question of the relation of the Ukraine to the Soviet authorities at Petrograd will come up later for special treatment. At the moment, however, it was utilized cleverly by the Central Powers to split the Russian opposition. Much time was wasted in fruitless discussion in committees on political and territorial questions without modifying the essential terms of the Central Powers.³⁸ Finally on January 22 an adjournment took place till January 30.

This second stage in the negotiations was also complicated by charges and counter-charges as to falsification in the press of reports from the Conference. At this time, however, the news did not leak out that at Petrograd, on January 8, a secret conference of sixty leading Soviet authorities had been held. To this meeting Lenin read the twenty-one theses which were afterwards published in the *Izvestia* of March 8 in defence of the signing of the peace treaties.³⁹ In these theses Lenin took the position that the safety of the social world revolution depended on the state of affairs in Russia in the immediate future. "The success of the Russian Revolution requires, at least for some months, that the Russian Government shall have a free hand, in order to conquer the bourgeoisie in its own country, in order then to undertake the general task of reconstruction." Consequently, "the question of the present possibility of waging a revolutionary war can be decided only from the standpoint of its material possibility, and from the standpoint of the Russian Revolution that has already begun." That revolution requires peace at once, and "furthermore, there is no doubt that the majority of the peasants in our army would now be in favor of a peace of annexations by the Germans and not a revolutionary war, while the organization of a revolutionary army and the forming of a Red Guard have hardly been begun." Under such circumstances it is "intolerable thus to jeopardize the fate of the Russian Revolution."

"The international policy of the Soviets must be based chiefly on the condition of the revolution in Russia, for the

international situation, in the fourth year [of war] is such that in general it is not possible to fix a time for the overthrow of imperialistic powers (including the German government). There is no doubt that revolution must and shall break out in Europe. All our hope in a *decisive victory* of Socialism is based on this conviction, on this scientific hypothesis." Yet it would be a mistake to assume that the "European Revolution, particularly the German, will take place within a few months." All efforts in that direction "would be a mere gamble." The military authorities in Germany are in control of affairs and they present us with an ultimatum—"either the continuation of the war or the conclusion of a peace by annexation, i.e., the Germans will retain all the districts occupied by them, while we must give up the districts occupied by Russian troops, and an indemnity will be imposed upon us (under the guise of a compensation for the maintenance of prisoners) of nearly three milliards, to be paid in a few years." We have therefore this immediate problem: "Must this annexation peace be accepted at once, or must the revolutionary war be waged at once?"

A truly revolutionary war would have as its object the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in other countries. "But we cannot at present attack this object." We should be fighting for Livland, Courland, Lithuania, and Poland. There is no question that "the interests of Socialism transcend the right of self-determination of a nation." The existence of the Russian Socialist Republic is threatened in such a war and those interests "transcend all other considerations." We are not enthusiastic, Lenin declared in conclusion, about a peace "making German Imperialism *stronger* as opposed to England, Belgium, Serbia, etc. The peace based on the liberation of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland would be a patriotic peace from the standpoint of Russia, but it would none the less be a peace with the German annexationists and imperialists." Thus in cold-blooded fashion Lenin argued in early January for the acceptance of a crushing, separate peace with the Central Powers,

Under these circumstances, having been admitted behind

the Bolshevik screen by these secret theses of January 8 we can pass hurriedly to the third stage of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. This was occupied by a desperate defiance by Trotsky and Joffe with Radek in support. Meanwhile, committees worked on the commercial treaties and on the peace treaty with Turkey.⁴⁰ On January 23 the Russian official wireless service gave to the world the news that "the conditions of peace as proposed at Brest-Litovsk are nothing less than a demand for a most monstrous annexation. They demand the annexation of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Riga, parts of Livonia, Moon Sound and the islands—the Gibraltar of the Baltic Sea—with the purpose of the complete economic and political suffocation of Russia."⁴¹ Naturally, with the press under government control in the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, such appeals to the working classes had practically no effect. The disputes with the Ukrainian Rada likewise were unproductive. But almost for the first time, full stenographic reports of the sessions were sent out by Russian wireless. Finally, on February 10, Trotsky announced:

In the name of the Council of the Peoples Commissaries, the Government of the Russian Federal Republic informs the Governments and peoples involved in war against us, the Allied and neutral countries, that in refusing to sign a peace of annexation, Russia declares, on its side, the state of war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria as ended. The Russian troops are receiving at the same time an order for a general demobilization on all lines of the fronts.⁴²

This amazing declaration was apparently a last defiance on the part of Trotsky. His personal feelings had been so outraged during the sessions that he undertook in this way to escape from the shameful duty of signing the treaty. He also apparently thought he saw in this formula of "no war, no peace," a way out from the *impasse* in which the growing popular demand for peace and the stubborn attitude of the Germans had placed the Bolsheviks. He was wrong. For nearly a week the Central Powers were silent, striving to digest this extraordinary maneuver. Then on February 17 Berlin issued a statement declaring the armistice at an end;

and German troops were ordered to advance on February 18 as a week had passed since the Russian declaration of February 10.⁴³ Trotsky himself described the situation:

The new German invasion developed under circumstances almost fatal for Russia. Instead of the week's notice agreed upon, we received notice of only two days in advance. This circumstance intensified the panic in the army which was already in a state of chronic dissolution. Resistance was almost unthinkable. The soldiers could not believe that the Germans would advance after we had declared the state of war at an end! The panicky retreat paralyzed the will even of such individual detachments as were ready to make a stand. . . . The old army had long ago been hopelessly defeated and was going to pieces, blocking all the roads and byways. The new army, owing to the country's general exhaustion, the fearful disorganization of industries, and the means of transportation, was being got together too slowly. Distance was the only serious obstacle in the way of German invasion.⁴⁴

On February 19 the Soviet Government gave in; and on February 28 negotiations were renewed at Brest-Litovsk. This is the fourth and final stage. Lenin's theses had at last carried the day; Trotsky gave up the Foreign Office and was succeeded by Chicherin, a Russian who was in closer harmony with Lenin's mind. On March 3 the peace treaties were signed.⁴⁵ This result had been inevitable for many weeks; but on March 9 the Soviet wireless service sent out a world-wide protest. (This read in part as follows:

The peace which is being concluded here at Brest-Litovsk is not a peace based upon a free agreement of the peoples of Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey but a peace dictated by force of arms. This is the peace which Russia, grinding its teeth, is compelled to accept. This is the peace which, whilst pretending to free Russian border provinces, really transforms them into German provinces and deprives them of the right of free self-determination, such as was recognized by the Workmen's and Peasants' Government of Revolutionary Russia, as due them. This is a peace which whilst pretending to restore order gives armed support in these regions to exploiting classes against the working-classes, and is helping again to put upon them the yoke of oppression which was removed by the Russian Revolution. This is a peace which gives back the land to the landlords, and again invests the workers into the serfdom of the factory owners. This is the peace which for a long time to come imposes upon the workers of Russia in a

still more aggravated form the old commercial treaty which was concluded in 1904 in the interest of the German agrarians, and which is at the same time guaranteeing to German and Austro-Hungarian capitalists interest on the debts of the Tsarist Government, which have been repudiated by Revolutionary Russia. Finally, as if it was the purpose explicitly to emphasize the character of the German armed offensive, the German ultimatum is attempting to muzzle the Russian Revolution by forbidding all agitation against the Governments of the Quadruple Alliance and their military authorities. . . . Under the present conditions the Soviet Government of the Russian Republic, being left to its own forces, is unable to withstand the armed onrush of German imperialism, and is compelled, for the sake of saving Revolutionary Russia, to accept the conditions put before it.⁴⁶

Such was the melancholy result of these weeks of delay, of hot debate, and of weary, theoretical discussion. The sword had won. The Russians retired to lick their wounds and to give away again and again before German pressure during the next six months. Meanwhile, the Allies at London, on March 19, issued a declaration attacking Germany for her violation of the terms of the armistice whereby her troops *en masse* had been transferred to the western front. The "German peace" was found to "involve the invasion of Russian territory, the destruction or capture of all Russia's means of defense, and the organization of Russian lands for Germany's profit—a proceeding which did not differ from 'annexation' because the word itself was carefully avoided." The Russians "in a mood of singular credulity" had made military defense impossible and now found "diplomacy impotent" before the "brutal realities of war and the untempered rule of a lawless force."⁴⁷ The ink was scarce dry on this document when the German advance of March 21 burst forth in France.

THE TREATIES OF BREST-LITOVSK

There was good reason for this final attempt of the Central Powers to break through the Allied lines to victory. The treaties signed at Brest-Litovsk not only gave freedom on their eastern front from any military danger, but also promised them much needed supplies. The Allies had been fighting Germany by arms and by blockade. Now by the treaties

with Russia. Germany had broken that blockade. Furthermore, who could suppose, if they succeeded in hammering down the western defences, that the Allies would be in a position to dispute the rich treasures acquired in the east? The political and territorial settlements in the vast regions that they now held at their will could be shaped successfully to pay the cost of their infernal struggle of the last three years and a half. The gains, actual or potential, at Brest-Litovsk could then be digested at their leisure. At least such was the reasoning of the German General Staff. What, therefore, in brief form were the changes arising from the group of treaties signed at Brest-Litovsk?

The treaties with the Ukraine signed in February were supplemented by other agreements made during the spring and summer. Together they constituted a recognition of independence for the government of the Rada and a declaration of German dominance in the political and economic future of the rich territories of Southwestern Russia. The new Ukrainian frontiers, as drawn at Brest-Litovsk, are indicated on map facing page 21, together with the frontiers later drawn between Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine. For the time being the previous commercial treaties between the Central Powers and Russia were with minor changes embodied in the new treaties between them and the new state of the Ukraine. There remained, however, the heavy requirements of food supplies, materials for textiles, iron ores, etc., which were laid on the Ukraine by supplementary agreements. These practically compelled the establishment of a far-reaching national monopoly for the purchase and disposal of these materials to the Central Powers. Naturally, the operation of such extensive purchases involved also German supervision. This combined with continued domestic confusion led to the presence of German troops in the Ukraine during the summer of 1918. The exchange of war prisoners also bid fair to involve a heavy payment for the cost to the Central Powers of the larger number of prisoners held by them. The full effect of these treaties was of course swept away in November, 1918, by the collapse of the imperial governments. But for the time, the net result

left the Ukraine apparently a neutral state in the World War while it actually became a granary and storehouse for Germany and Austria. From eggs to manganese the long list of requirements reads like the inventory of a sublimated "mail order" house.⁴⁸

The treaties between Soviet Russia and the four Allies are likewise supplemented by additional agreements which carried with them economic burdens. The treaties with Bulgaria need no special explanation; those with Turkey will be taken up later in the chapter on the Near East. Austria, by the new frontier arrangements, ceased to be an immediate neighbor of Russia, and consequently the treaties to which Germany was a partner are of major and immediate importance. The territorial changes can be followed better by a study of the map facing page 21. Their significance, however, is at once proclaimed in Appendix 1, as provided for in Article 3, of the main peace treaty. That article read:

The territories lying to the west of the line agreed upon by the contracting parties which formerly belonged to Russia, will no longer be subject to Russian sovereignty. . . . Germany and Austria-Hungary purpose to determine the future status of these territories in agreement with their populations.

Furthermore, Russian troops were at once to evacuate Esthonia, and Livonia, Finland and the Aland Islands. Esthonia and Livonia were to be occupied by a German police force until "proper national institutions and until public order has been established." Russia was to recognize the new Ukrainian frontiers and to conclude a peace treaty with the Rada, which had become practically a protectorate of the Central Powers.⁴⁹ Thus at a stroke, from the Arctic Ocean on the north to the Black Sea on the south, Soviet Russia surrendered control of territories which were later to be known as Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland while the Ukraine, stretching into the interior, included the richest lands in Russia. Likewise, on the Caucasian frontier the districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum were to be evacuated by Russian troops and the Russo-Turkish frontier of 1877 was restored.

Later, on August 27, 1918, was signed a supplementary agreement which in many ways was if anything more important. Territories east of the Beresina, still in German occupation, were to be evacuated "even before the conclusion of a general peace in proportion as Russia makes the cash payments" which were required by the financial agreement of August 27. Germany was to remain neutral as regards the formation of independent states in Russian territories. Russia, on the other hand, was to renounce sovereignty over Esthonia and Livonia "as well as all interference in their internal affairs. Their future fate shall be decided in agreement with their inhabitants." In the south the military grip of Germany in the Ukraine had extended beyond its borders, and provision was made for slow evacuation and also for the shipment of fuel supplies. Nothing perhaps better illustrates the degree and character of German economic control in the south and southeast than the agreement as to oil from Baku and coal from the Donetz basin in the Ukraine. Thus we read:

So long as the Donetz Basin is occupied by German troops . . . Russia shall receive monthly, from the quantities of coal extracted there a three-times greater number of tons than it lets Germany have of crude oil or crude oil products from the Baku district . . . and a four-times greater number of tons for the consignment of benzine contained therein. . . .

Russia will do her utmost to further the production of crude oil and crude oil products in the Baku district, and will supply to Germany a quarter of the amount produced.⁵⁰

Such an agreement coming fast on the heels of the treaty between Rumania and Germany, which was known popularly in Germany as the "treaty of oil and wheat," showed clearly that Germany was stretching out to draw on the vast oil resources of Southeastern Europe.⁵¹ Indeed, Germany was developing a Caucasian policy at this time. Thus Russia agreed "to Germany's recognizing Georgia as an independent state." Germany also undertook to protect the Baku oil district by preventing "the military forces of any third Power in the Caucasus from overstepping" the frontiers of this district. These matters, however, belong more properly to the chapter on the Caucasus.

Other articles of the main treaty signed on March 3 bound Russia to demobilize her army and to detain her warships in port until the conclusion of a general peace. Meanwhile, the zone barred by German naval proclamation continued in the Arctic Ocean. Compensation for war losses and expenses was mutually renounced; consular and diplomatic relations were to be renewed; and war prisoners were to be exchanged. Special provision was also made regarding propaganda:

The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation against the Government or the public or military institutions of the other party. In so far as this obligation devolves upon Russia, it holds good also for the territories occupied by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.⁵²

How lightly this provision rested on the Soviet authorities may be guessed by the bitter official attacks and protests against the treaties which were immediately sent broadcast. Later the intrigues and propaganda set loose in Berlin by Joffe, the first Soviet Ambassador in Germany, led to his expulsion.

The commercial treaty signed at Brest-Litovsk did not renew the commercial treaty of 1894-1904 but repeated the tariffs of 1903. This treaty, however, was only provisional till the conclusion of a general peace or in any case up to the end of 1919. In the meantime, each country was to enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in the territory of the other. Furthermore, Russia was not to prohibit the export of, nor to levy an export tax on, lumber or ores.⁵³ Later, by the supplementary agreement of August 27, the transport of goods to and from Russia through Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania was not to be "subject to any transit duties or general transport dues." Freight charges on railways connecting Russia with Reval, Riga, and Windawa were "to be kept as low as possible"; and Russia was to be assigned free port duties in each of these terminals.⁵⁴

This later treaty also declared that: "Russia shall pay Germany six billion marks as compensation for losses sustained by Germans through Russian measures." This, of course, was in addition to payments due on exchange of war

prisoners whereby "each contracting party will reimburse the expenses incurred by the other party for its nationals who have been made prisoners of war."⁵⁵ This final extortion of the German Government was due to the harassing, hectoring policy which had been pursued during the summer. Count Mirbach, the German Ambassador, had been assassinated at Moscow in July, 1918; and the demands of the German Government had become both petulant and exorbitant. Meanwhile, one of the Soviet wits acknowledged the desperate state of affairs by the mordant remark: "We are a corpse, but there is no one to bury us!"

The net result of these treaties had been to reduce the territory of Russia in Europe, with the exception of Petrograd, practically to the area controlled three hundred years earlier in the reign of the first of the Romanovs. As Buchan puts it:

They [the Bolsheviks] lost for Russia 26 per cent of her total population, 27 per cent of her arable land, 32 per cent of her average crops, 26 per cent of her railway system, 33 per cent of her manufacturing industries, 73 per cent of her total iron production, and 75 per cent of her coal fields. So much for the policy of "no annexation." They had saddled themselves with a gigantic but as yet unassessed payment by way of war tribute, and had been compelled to grant free export of oils and a preferential commercial treaty. So much for "no indemnities." They had placed under German rule fifty-five millions of unwilling Slavs. So much for "self determination."⁵⁶

The Bolsheviks, in order to save the embers of the revolution, had brought riot, ruin, and German domination into the interior of Russia. Only the Allied victory in France could save Russian civilization as well as our own souls from the heel of the Kaiser and the meticulous tyranny of the German General Staff.

THE AFTERMATH OF BREST-LITOVSK

A year and a half later in November, 1919, Chicherin, describing the six months which followed the signature of the treaties of March, 1918, said:

The Soviet Government consciously faced the severe trials resulting from the Brest treaties, knowing that the Workers' and Peas-

ants' Revolution would prove stronger than imperialism and that a respite would insure victory.⁵⁷

That victory, however, did not come. The relief from the German menace was not due to the Socialist revolution but to the success of the Allied armies in France. Germany, until October, 1918, pursued a policy of "masked encroachment." "This," to quote Chicherin again,

based on the vagueness of the Brest treaty, enabled Germany to threaten continually during the following half year the Soviet régime and the very existence of the Soviet Republic. The complete indefiniteness of the frontiers of Ukraine, which by the treaty became a mere mask for the German military machine, gave Germany the opportunity to continue from this direction its advance towards Moscow. Before the question of the Ukrainian frontier was definitely settled a similar vagueness and indefiniteness in the financial and economic provisions of the Brest supplementary treaties opened for Germany the possibility of the most extensive exploitation of Russia.⁵⁸

Such matters as the relations of Soviet Russia to the Baltic region and to the Ukraine will be taken up in later chapters. There remains at present the tragic picture of Soviet foreign policy toward Germany; finally in October the collapse of the Central Powers took Russia by surprise, but loosed again the feverish activity of revolutionary propaganda. In March the leaders had been prepared for the dire results by a study during two months of Lenin's theses. These were now printed in the *Izvestia* of March 8. Even Trotsky, who had refused to sign the treaties and who had been transferred to the War Office, published two pamphlets which advocated temporary acceptance of the peace. At a Fourth Congress of Soviets, held to ratify the treaty, Chicherin, the new Commissar for Foreign Affairs, declared that "the extraordinarily harsh peace terms, the ratification of which is being proposed to this Assembly, were literally dictated to us by German imperialism."⁵⁹

Lenin, at the same meeting, spoke strongly along the lines of his theses:

The road of our revolution—from the end of February, 1917, to the 11th of February [Feb. 24, new style] of this year—has

been a road of easy and swift success. . . . It is [now] necessary for us to realize . . . that we have entered upon a period of crushing defeats administered to us from the outside by world imperialism. . . . The continuation of this war will bring us to an utter downfall. . . . At a moment of incredible defeats and retreats . . . revolutionary phrases are the ruin of our cause.⁶⁰

Soviet Russia no longer had an army and the peace terms must be accepted. The vote after this appeal was 724 in favor of ratification, 276 opposed, and 204 not voting. Ratifications were exchanged at Berlin on March 29.⁶¹

Popular indignation in Petrograd was intense at this result. There began, therefore, a rapid series of notes of protest by the Soviet Foreign Office against successive violation of the treaty by the German authorities. In similar fashion the German Government protested against Allied intervention on the Murmansk coast and against the language used by Ambassador Francis in statements in the official Soviet press seeking to encourage resistance to the Central Powers. With the arrival at Moscow, on April 23, of Count Mirbach, as German Ambassador, and of Joffe at Berlin, as Soviet Ambassador, these mutual recriminations became almost chronic.⁶²

Lenin, in a review of the foreign situation on May 14, 1918, deprecated too much attention being paid to these disputes. "For the present, our Socialist Republic remains an oasis in the raging sea of imperialistic predatoriness." The great advantage of Russia lay in the fact that for the time "the surging waves of imperialistic reaction . . . are time and again breaking against each other." Thus a united imperial front against Soviet Russia is impossible for the present. He concluded:

Our task consists in strengthening the Soviet power against the capitalistic elements which are striving to swallow it up. . . . From the experience of the Revolution we have learned that it is necessary to follow tactics of relentless pushing forward whenever the situation permits it. But when there is no possibility of offering unsparing resistance one has to apply tactics of waiting and of slow accumulation of forces.⁶³

This was Lenin's philosophy of diplomatic retreat and compromise. By it he sought to nurse the revolution through

the existing desperate situation. For the Czechoslovak movement was soon to bring new problems. Civil war was raging in the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Finland, and Siberia. The Allies were to land troops at Vladivostok as well as at Murmansk and Archangel. How long would Soviet Russia remain an "oasis" with social revolutionary plots and attempted assassinations on every hand? The attempt to kill Lenin came in the end of August; and many others were marked for death. As a result the Bolshevik Terror was intensified. This was to cost thousands and thousands of lives. By their policy of bloodshed the Soviet leaders showed themselves determined by every means to maintain themselves in power in what was left of Russia. The advance of the Czechoslovak troops on Ekaterinburg led, on July 16, to the murder of the Tsar and the entire party of royal prisoners. In this fashion the Bolsheviks burned their bridges as far as Russia was concerned. From this time on, in ruthless ways they clung to their position and by desperate means sought to annihilate their domestic opponents. Such was the natural result of "betting on the world-revolution" at a period when "revolutions did not travel on scheduled time."⁶⁴

At the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on July 4, impassioned appeals from Ukrainian Soviet delegates to oust the Germans from control were hailed by shouts of "Down with the Germans!"⁶⁵ Trotsky endeavored to restrain this outbreak which had been fostered by members of the Social Revolutionary Party. Two days later, however, the German Ambassador was killed by a bomb. It was a gesture of protest against German repression and requisition. This event terrified the Soviet authorities who knew how helpless were their forces. Their relief was correspondingly great when the German Government did not take drastic action and recognized that the murder was probably due to internal factional strife in Russia. At the same time, the Soviet Government refused to admit German troops to Moscow to guard the German Embassy. This was withdrawn to Petrograd and later to Pskov as reports of other impending attacks became known.⁶⁶ These events also led the Soviet authorities

to beg the Allied Ambassadors, who had moved to Vologda in the previous February, to come to Moscow where they might be better protected.

The government itself had decided to move from Petrograd to Moscow, as the ancient historical capital of Russia, early in March. This, however, was due to the rapid and threatening advance of German troops at the time when the ratification of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk was still uncertain. To the urgent requests of Chicherin in July and early August, Ambassador Francis, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, returned a negative. He proposed to move from Vologda, but not to Moscow. Instead, he journeyed north to Archangel to keep in touch with the American and Allied troops who were guarding the supplies that were there assembled.⁸⁷

Another reason why Chicherin was probably anxious for the presence in Moscow of the Allied Ambassadors during August, was the approaching negotiation of the supplementary treaty with Germany which was signed on August 27. This document, as we have seen, laid heavy economic burdens on Russia; and it is probable that the Soviet authorities imagined that the Allied representatives might offer some help in blocking the more extravagant demands of the Central Powers. The result of these negotiations, while harsh was, nevertheless, received thankfully by the Soviet government because by promising to pay a fixed sum of six billion marks as a ransom they retained the right to establish and maintain their own economic system even at the expense of German investors in Russia. Thus Chicherin defended the new treaty before the Central Executive Committee by saying:

The conclusion of the new treaties . . . was demanded in order to put an end to the uncertain situation created by the Brest-Litovsk treaty, which situation left a wide field open for a policy of seizures in Russia. In the case of the temporarily occupied territories lying to the east of the regions which have been finally lost to Russia by the Brest-Litovsk treaty, this treaty not only failed to establish boundaries but did not even provide for a method of establishing them. . . . Of all capitalist countries whose interests are hurt by the anti-capitalist policy of the Soviet Government, Germany would be the only one capable of putting an end to

this policy by direct attack, and we had to guarantee ourselves against this peril by paying so to speak, ransom to German capitalism.⁶⁸

Radek also, in a speech which was reported more fully, explained to the Moscow Soviet Factory Committees, and Trade Unions, on September 3, 1918:

. . . As to the financial side of the agreement, we must pay five billion marks, because during the last four years the Germans gave our prisoners crusts of bread, though the exploitation of these prisoners now serves to a considerable degree as the basis of German industry. We must pay this sum because the German capitalists suffered losses as a result of the legislation of the Tsar, though the enormous losses inflicted on the Russian population even after the conclusion of the Brest peace are not reckoned in.

But however heavy is the burden of the financial agreement, it contains a provision very important for us. Until now Germany has been able to interfere in our social legislation by defending the interests of German subjects affected by this legislation. Whenever we nationalized a factory, immediately the representatives of the German authorities would appear and declare: "Excuse us, German capitalists are interested in this factory and please do not disturb them." It is easy to understand that this made it possible for new German participants in Russian industries constantly to turn up, and that thus half of the Russian factories might have become protected against nationalization.

There will be no more of this practice. The five billions which we pay include the reimbursement of German stockholders in all enterprises nationalized up to June 28th, that is, in all the principal branches of Russian industry. We shall no longer have to reckon with each German capitalist, or with the Russian capitalist taking cover behind a German firm. This fact is of enormous economic significance, and also political. By interfering in our economic life, and by assuming the protection of interests of Russian capitalists, the German Government became the *center* of Russian counter-revolution, and under such circumstances there could be no question of any peace.

When the German Embassy came to Russia, the Russian bourgeoisie expected it to play precisely this rôle. You will recall the pro-Germanism that blossomed in the hearts of the Russian bourgeoisie . . . and everyday in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs we saw behind the Germans, protected by the German representatives, our old friends the Russian bourgeoisie.

. . . But with the new orientation toward the Allies of our bourgeoisie, Germany should know that the overthrow of the

Soviet Government would mean an attempt on the part of the Allies and the Russian bourgeoisie to re-establish a new eastern anti-German front. We are now struggling against such a possibility, for such a front would be at the same time an anti-Soviet front. Any weakening on our part . . . not only will contradict the Brest agreement and our interests, but will help the plans of the Allies, to support which would not seem to be the aim of the German bourgeoisie.

What I have said shows the stupidity of the slanderous statements in the Allied press with regard to our alliance with Germany, to the effect that we have sold out to German imperialism. A workmen's state, fighting for the liberation of the workman class—the advance guard of the world-revolution—cannot be the ally of any imperialism; for all imperialisms rest on the enslavement of the toiling masses within their own countries and on the exploitation of other peoples. An alliance would demand the presence of common aims—a solidarity of interests—which do not exist; an alliance would lead to common military actions on Russian territory which would mean the destruction of the Soviets.

It will be enough, in view of the profound difference in their social structure, if both Governments understand that it is against their interests to enter into conflict with one another; and the German interests, to speak of them, do not require the re-establishment of an eastern front. If under these circumstances, both countries arrange certain commercial relations mutually profitable, one will have reached the full extent of actual German-Russian interests. . . .⁶⁹

The profits Germany had hoped to gain through these final treaties were, however, soon dissipated. Apparently the Soviet authorities were ignorant of the imminence of German collapse and had agreed to these payments and to the territorial terms out of fear. Their satisfaction at gaining for themselves a free hand in their policy of nationalization was unnecessary. For the war was coming to an end. On October 3 the government of Prince Max of Baden made its appeal to the United States, and five weeks later a revolution broke out in Germany. The German Empire was done for. Such events were directly stimulating to the attacks on German policy which during September and October had flamed forth in the Soviet press.⁷⁰ Propaganda was turned loose and the machinery of revolution once more set afoot in the hope that as the Empire fell the chance might come for the success of the

world-revolution. To this end Joffe and the Staff of the Soviet Embassy bent every effort in Germany. The failure of this endeavor belongs in another place. A year of relations with imperial Germany had already cost Russia so dearly that the recovery of her power seemed now almost impossible. Brest-Litovsk remained a badge of national shame. Only the safety of the Bolshevik Revolution had been preserved, and this hung as though by an eyelash.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. This preface was written February, 1918, for the re-publication in pamphlet form of a series of articles, originally written for *Nasht Slovo*, which Trotsky published in Paris, 1915-16. In Petrograd the pamphlet was published by the Bureau of International Propaganda of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.
2. Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy (Soviet Russia Pamphlets No. 3)* (New York, 1920), p. 6. This pamphlet contains in translation the series of four articles published in the *Izvestia*, Nov. 6-13, 1919, to commemorate the second anniversary of the founding of the Soviet government.
3. Antonelli, *Bolshevik Russia*, p. 178.
4. Lenin, Open Letter to American Workmen, Moscow, August 20, 1918, quoted by Antonelli, *op. cit.* Published in *Class Struggle*, Dec., 1918.
5. Recouly, "The Russian Revolution." Lecture in August, 1922, at the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass.
6. *R. A. R.*, p. 51. Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference (a pamphlet issued by the Department of State) Washington, 1918, pp. 8-12.
7. Proceedings, pp. 12-36. Cf. also *Gazette*, Dec. 6 and 9, 1917. The text of the armistice is in texts of the Russian "Peace" (a pamphlet issued by the Department of State) Washington, 1918, pp. 1-10.
8. Buchan, *History of the Great War*, IV, p. 135.
9. Petrograd *Pravda*, Dec. 4, 1917. In *Pravda*, Dec. 9, Czernin is reported as saying in a speech in the Austrian Parliament that Austria is ready for a peace without annexations and indemnities. Then he adds: "We have definite information that the Western Powers will by all means try to oppose Russia's peaceful intentions."
10. *R. A. R.*, p. 56.
11. *Izvestia*, Dec. 13, 1917. Later in a speech at a meeting of Soviets, Labor Organizations, and of the Central Executive Committee, Trotsky delivered a fine, fighting speech in which he declared his own personal desire to continue the struggle if necessary. "We speak to the Kaiser as to an enemy retaining all our ruthless hatred for this tyrant."—*Izvestia*, Dec. 23.
12. *Gazette*, Dec. 23, 1917. Trotsky declares that propaganda is to go on in Germany in spite of peace negotiations with the German Government. *Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1918. Two million gold rubles were appropriated for world revolutionary propaganda. Cf. "Overman Report," p. 1185.

13. Antonelli, pp. 181-82. Bullard, *The Russian Pendulum* (New York, 1919), p. 104. Bullard was in Russia in connection with the Committee on Public Information. His book is an excellent series of notes made by an eye-witness who could not be accused of being a Tory.
14. Radek in *Izvestia*, Jan. 11, 1918.
15. *Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 16, 18, 23, 1918.
16. Antonelli, p. 188.
17. *R. A. R.*, p. 1.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 8. Cf. Francis, *The Russian Revolution from the American Embassy*, pp. 196-200.
19. *R. A. R.*, p. 41.
20. Francis, p. 201.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 202-5.
22. *R. A. R.*, p. 75.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
24. Chernov, *Bolsheviki u Vlasti*, p. 42, quoting from *Novaia Zhizn* of Jan. 24, 1918. Cf. Bullard, chap. xiv., "German Gold."
25. Chernov, p. 49, quoting the daily press.
26. *Gazette*, Dec. 23, 1917.
27. *Izvestia*, Dec. 25, 1917.
28. *Pravda*, Dec. 30, 1917.
29. "German Peace Terms and the Program of the Russian Proletariat," by Kamenev in *Izvestia*, Jan. 11, 1918.
30. *Gazette*, Jan. 5, 1918.
31. Chernov, p. 40, quoting from Mstislavski, "*The Brest Negotiations*"—*From my Diary* (Petrograd, 1918).
32. Proceedings, p. 39.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
35. During this period Trotsky also addressed to the Allies in Dec. 29 his longest and most impassioned note describing the course of events and begging them not to "sabotage the cause of a general peace." *Izvestia*, Dec. 30, 1917. Press reports of importance were in *Gazette*, Dec. 29, Jan. 1; *Izvestia*, Jan. 2, 3, and 4.
36. Proceedings, p. 52.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 57, 89. Chernov, pp. 62-63.
38. Proceedings, pp. 50-121. The daily press contained an increasing amount on the peace. Cf. *Gazette*, Jan. 10; *Izvestia*, Jan. 14, 16, 18.
39. Lenin and Trotsky, *Proletarian Revolution in Russia*, pp. 355-60.
40. Proceedings, pp. 121-71. *Izvestia*, Jan. 16, 23, 28, 31, Feb. 14, 15, 17. As the change in the calendar from old style to new

style took place Feb. 1, Feb. 14 was in reality the day after Jan. 31.

41. Proceedings, pp. 121-2
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 172-3.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 174-8.
44. Trotsky, *From October to Brest-Litovsk* (New York, 1919), pp. 96-97.
45. Proceedings, pp. 178-185. *Izvestia*, Feb. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, March 5, 6, 7, 1918.
46. Proceedings, pp. 185-86.
47. *R. A. R.*, p. 93.
48. The English and German translations of these Ukrainian treaties and allied documents is in "Texts of the Ukraine Peace." (A pamphlet issued by the Department of State, Washington, 1918, pp. 9-158.)
49. The translation is in *Russian "Peace,"* pp. 13-21
50. The translation is in *Ibid.*, pp. 179-189 and also in *Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia*, Appendix XX.
51. "Texts of the Rumanian 'Peace.'" (A pamphlet issued by the Department of State, Washington, 1918, pp. 31-56.)
52. Art. II of treaty of March 3, 1918.
53. The translation is in *Russian "Peace,"* pp. 26-28.
54. The translation is in *Ibid.*, pp. 179-89 and also in *Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia*, Appendix XX.
55. The translation is in *Russian "Peace,"* pp. 191-202 and also in *Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia*, Appendix XXI. This supplementary financial agreement provided for the actual payment of only five billion marks, as one billion was reserved for final settlement on Finland and the Ukraine. In case they did not assume responsibility, Russia and Germany reserved the right to enter into a special agreement.
56. Buchan, IV, pp. 148-49. These figures are a moderate version of the official statistics given out on April 10, 1918, by the Soviet Commissar of Commerce, Current History, VIII, p. 236.
57. Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy*, p. 7.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
59. *Izvestia*, March 15, 1918.
60. *Ibid.*, March 16, 1918.
61. *Ibid.*, March 31, 1918.
62. Bullard, p. 109. The record of diplomatic notes between Moscow and Berlin is too full to give here. The following papers refer, however, to the more important of these exchanges. *Izvestia*, March 31, April 5, 9, 16 (cf. *R. A. R.*, p. 149), 17, 19, 23, 24, 26; May 13, 14, 15, 1918.
63. *Ibid.*, May 15, 1918.

64. The latter part of May and June were crowded with Russo-German diplomatic exchanges. The more important are noted as follows: *Izvestia*, May 17 (Mirbach calls on Lenin for first time); May 18 (this issue contains the text of four separate Soviet notes to Berlin complaining of violations of the treaty); May 19, 21 (four wireless messages to and from Joffe); May 22, 23, 25, 28 (this issue includes six separate Soviet notes to Mirbach on various treaty violations); June 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 (these issues contain many notes on economic questions); June 13, 15, 16, 18, 19 (a vigorous exchange on alleged military violations of the treaty); June 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30 (mutual protests regarding treatment of prisoners); July 4 and 5 (beginning of economic negotiations). This foot-note is illustrative of the entire period.
65. *Izvestia*, July 5, 1918. Kamkov, representing the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, speaking at the opening session of the Fifth Soviet Congress of disaffection among the Red troops near the German occupation boundaries over the refusal of the Soviet Government to permit them to attack Germans across the line to avenge ill-treatment of peasants and workers by Germans, said (pointing at the box in the theatre which was occupied by a group of German Embassy officials) that the Red troops "will not be blind witnesses as by the hand of the German robber, by the hand of those hangmen who have appeared here, by the hand of those scoundrels, those thieves and robbers . . . (tumult, shouts—'Down with Mirbach')."
66. *Izvestia*, July 7, 8, 9, 17, 27 and 30, 1918. These papers contain essential news and notes on the Mirbach murder. *Ibid.*, Aug. 9, 10, 13 report the removal of the German Embassy from Moscow.
67. Francis, pp. 246 *et seq.*
68. *Izvestia*, Sept. 4, 1918.
69. *Ibid.*, Sept. 6, 1918.
70. German protests against Russian propaganda are in *Ibid.*, Sept. 21, Oct. 27, and Nov. 1, 1918. On Dec. 16, 1918, in Moscow there was held a large meeting of German and Austro-Hungarian war prisoners at which Soviet representatives preached Bolshevism and world-revolution preparatory to setting these prisoners loose in Central Europe.

CHAPTER III

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE ALLIES, 1917-18

The Soviet Government was striving for peace but the Governments of France and England were attempting to put a sword into its hands; it asked for assistance in its work of reconstruction, but they gave it the hydra of anarchy.—RADEK in *Izvestia*, Sept. 6, 1918.

By agreeing to recognize the Bolshevik Government we should give the lie to the policy—which the Allies have not ceased to sustain in agreement—of furnishing at all accessible points of Russia all the aid and succor which it is possible to give to help them escape from the bloody and disorderly tyranny of the Bolsheviks and to reconstitute a regular Government by themselves.—S. PICHON, "Note to Great Britain," published in *L'Humanité*, Jan. 11, 1919.

It is time now to examine the policies of Soviet Russia toward the Allies. The treaties of Brest-Litovsk created horror and consternation in the minds of Allied statesmen. They promptly denounced the foreign policy which led to a separate peace with the Central Powers. In doing so, however, they were careful to leave a way open to the continuance of negotiations in Russia, for it was by no means part of their diplomacy, in March, 1918, to abandon Russia to German control. Happily, it is not our duty to analyze in detail the various methods and plans which they pursued in the crowded months following Brest-Litovsk. We are not at present chiefly concerned with the policies of the Allies toward Soviet Russia, but rather with the policies which the Soviet authorities themselves pursued toward the Allies.

This in itself is fortunate, for the Allies from the first were much confused. Nothing in the history of international relations had prepared them to face the war-like, contemptuous diatribes which were now the common talk of Soviet officials.

Many of the Allied representatives at first contented themselves with thinking that the Bolsheviki would not last—that this November revolt would soon pass—and that some semblance of order and unity in Russia would again assert itself, restoring the eastern front against the Central Powers. However, such misguided hopes faded as the months went by.

Slowly the facts became clearer—Soviet Russia was out of the War. The Allies, therefore, had a fresh problem to face. How was Soviet Russia to be included in the general peace? Could the Western capitalistic world make terms with authorities who had failed them during the great struggle and who now threatened a staggering world with the hot blast of world-revolution? These were difficult matters. Their settlement was not made easier by the gradual divisions which spread among the Allies nor by the persistent, belligerent, even bombastic, attitude of Soviet Russia. Furthermore, the behavior of Anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia gave pause. In some cases their truculence and stupidity spelled rapid disaster. In other instances the shock of the revolution twisted political judgment and gave false measure to their advice and appeals. The results of such confusion and misunderstanding were apparent as time advanced, for the relations of Soviet Russia to the Allies is another melancholy story as disastrous in some ways as the tragedy of Brest-Litovsk. Such matters must now become clear as we trace the conduct of affairs by the Soviet government.

PRELIMINARY MOVES TO APRIL, 1918

The first communications of Trotsky to the Allies announcing the proposals for a general peace and later the establishment of the preliminary armistice with the Central Powers had remained unanswered. On December 29, 1917, came a final statement to the "Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries regarding Peace Negotiations." This was issued "in order to give the last opportunity to the Allied countries to take part in further negotiations, and by doing this to secure themselves from all consequences of a separate peace between Russia and the enemy countries." In parrot-like

fashion, Trotsky chose to state that the Central Powers had announced "their renunciation of new forcible annexations and indemnities." He denounced, however, the fact that "the enemy governments base their conclusions on the idea that old annexations, old violations by the strong of the weak, are hallowed by historic remoteness." He appealed, therefore, to the Allies to repudiate such a program of "most open cynical imperialism," to give the "right of self-determination to the peoples of Ireland, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Indo-China, etc." Thus the contradictory program of the Central Powers "would appear in all its inconsistency and would be overcome by the pressure of the peoples concerned." Will the Allies give a "clear, definite, categorical answer" to such proposals?

Trotsky continued:

The Russian Revolution opened the door to an immediate general peace by agreement. . . . The success of our program will depend on to what degree the will of imperialistic classes will be paralyzed by the will of the revolutionary proletariat in each country. If the Allied Governments in the blind stubbornness which characterizes decadent and perishing classes, once more refuse to participate in the negotiations, then the working class will be confronted by the iron necessity of taking the power out of the hands of those who cannot or will not give the people peace.¹

This statement, in view of the facts as they were known to the inner circles, was mere clap-trap. The Germans had no intention of relaxing the military grip they had established over the Russian territories which they then occupied. A few days later they explained as much. Lenin's twenty-one theses in support of a separate and prostrating peace were privately read in spite of the highly colored stories of revolutionary movements in Austria and Germany which were circulated in the Russian press. Naturally, the Allied governments did not return any reply to Trotsky's statement. It remained only for President Wilson to announce in a speech to Congress his famous Fourteen Points. The introduction to this message of January 8, 1918, dealt largely with Russian affairs.² It followed promptly cabled appeals by Sisson of the Committee on Public Information who was then in Petrograd, that the President should "restate anti-imperialistic war aims and

democratic peace requisites of America [in] thousand words or less, short almost placard paragraphs, short sentences . . .”³ The entire subject of Russo-American relations awaits later review; and it remains at present only to point out the irony of the coincidence of dates. On January 8 Lenin also gave out to a group of sixty Bolshevik adherents his notorious defence of a separate peace with the Central Powers. The President’s message, which was placarded on the walls of Petrograd on January 13,⁴ had no effect in restraining the course of events in Russia; and these preliminary proposals by the Soviet authorities ran counter both to the facts in the case and to the fundamental conceptions of society which were maintained by the Allies.

The conservative views of the Allies naturally colored much of the intercourse with Soviet authorities. The war was also responsible for the clash of interests which soon became evident. Thus, as Bullard cleverly puts it, the British “seemed to take the social point of view. . . . None of the Bolsheviks were on their calling lists. . . . They were contented to cut them dead.” This differed greatly from the attitude taken by the British toward the revolution in the previous March. Then in view of the danger that the Tsar’s government might conclude a separate peace with Germany early in 1917, the British had heartily sympathized with the March revolution. Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, was popularly spoken of as “the god-father of the Revolution.”

The French view of the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, “was purely military. . . . Their one object was to defeat Germany”; and they, therefore, thought of the Bolshevik program of peace with the Central Powers first of all as a menace to France. The Bolsheviks were now “open enemies” and the French leaders in Russia were bent “on making war on the Soviet leaders.” The American attitude will be taken up later; but because of ignorance of Russia which many of the American staff exhibited they did not appreciate the Russian point of view. Their predisposition toward democracy made it impossible for them to understand Bolshevik despotism. The ordinary practical American has scarcely anything in common

with the Slav, especially with the revolutionary, garrulous, type.⁵

Under such conditions, there were soon almost daily disputes among the Allies and between the Soviet authorities and the various Allied representatives. One of these flared in angry fashion in early January. It arose from the violation of diplomatic immunity by the arrest of the Rumanian Minister at Petrograd, Count Diamandi, by the Soviet government. The full account of Soviet relations with Rumania belongs in another chapter; but this arrest touched the position of the entire Diplomatic Corps. They, therefore, united to protest. This they did without reference to the seizure of Rumanian gold in Russia and purely on the technical ground of the immunity of the Rumanian Minister under the practices of international law. Thus the members of the Diplomatic Corps called in a body on Lenin to declare that they were

profoundly insulted by the arrest of the Rumanian Minister, and in confirmation of our solidarity, regarding this violation of diplomatic immunity recognized for centuries by all Governments, state the necessity of immediately liberating M. Diamandi and the members of his legation.⁶

This sound position, to which Ambassador Francis materially contributed as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, led to the release of the Rumanian Minister, though he was shortly expelled from Russia. The decision of the Soviet authorities was probably due to their desire to secure diplomatic facilities abroad. They had already won the release of Chicherin from his imprisonment in England by refusing passports for British citizens to leave Russia.⁷ Litvinov, who was acting as a Soviet representative in England, was also permitted to remain and move about in England for many months. The British refused to recognize him, but maintained intercourse with him unofficially through a special official of the Foreign Office.⁸ This continued until his arrest on charges of fomenting mutiny among Russians in England brought about his expulsion during the late summer of 1918. The British formed so bad an impression of Litvinov's character that he has since been refused admission to England in any capacity. In gen-

eral, however, there were frequent disputes as to diplomatic couriers, as to freedom of cable communications, and as to immunity from arrest of consular officials of the Allies.

The French military officers in Russia also soon were entangled in these disputes, especially as their status in the Ukraine was doubtful.⁹ As was noted in the previous chapter and as we shall see later, the developments of the Rada government in the Ukraine, the treaty with the Central Powers, and the civil war with the Soviet led to a confused condition of affairs in Southwestern Russia. As early as December 18, 1917, Trotsky, at an interview with Ambassador Noulens, protested against assistance to the Rada army which he alleged was being given by French officers.

The attitude of Noulens was especially offensive to the Soviet authorities who finally in April requested his withdrawal as Ambassador.¹¹ Gradually, other foreign missions, including those of neutral states, withdrew from Russia. Some went first to Vologda and then to Archangel. Others made their way, after serious delays and hardships, across Finland to Sweden. The consular officials remained longer; but these also left Moscow ~~by the end of 1918.~~ Thus Soviet Russia drifted into a position of diplomatic isolation.

ALLIED INTERVENTION, 1918

Three steps tended strongly to keep up friction between Soviet Russia and the Allies. These were the Japanese landing of marines at Vladivostok in April and later the Allied Expeditionary Force in Siberia; the Czechoslovak movement and Allied support of these forces; and Allied occupation of Murmansk and Archangel during the spring and summer of 1918. The course of affairs in Siberia can be followed later, and the Czechoslovak military adventure belongs mainly to the story of Allied policy in the Far East. There remains, therefore, the course of events on the Arctic coast and the general policies pursued by Soviet Russia as between the Allies and the Germans in 1918. In these matters the special relations with the United States are reserved for fuller treatment in a separate chapter.

The fact that the Bolsheviki continued in power was in itself awkward and surprising to the Allied diplomats. They had at first adopted the theory of the non-existence of the Soviet régime.

As Antoneli, who was in Petrograd during these months, describes the situation:

So they proceeded to consider Russia as a land without a head, as a territory internationally colonized. They addressed the people as a Bougainville would address the South Sea Island tribes; they dealt with the people direct. They landed expeditionary forces. They waged war. But they did not consider themselves in a state of war. Never was an international situation between civilized nations more singular or more false. Russia to the Entente was neither an ally nor an enemy, nor yet a neutral. . . .¹²

Bullard suggests the general situation by noting that "if you wanted to drive an Allied diplomat into a rage, all you had to do was to ask: 'Has your Government intervened in Russia? If so, when?'"¹³ The Bolsheviki, on the other hand, were equally furious in their attacks on the Allies. Thus even in the hard February days of the German ultimatum and their threatened advance on Petrograd, the *Izvestia* declared that "the Allies are abusing our patience." An editorial stated that "after the October [November] revolution the Allied Embassies did everything in their power to call forth against themselves the harshest reprisals by the Soviet authorities." A long bill of grievances was cited which ended by declaring that "there has not been a single counter-revolutionary conspiracy in which Allied agents and Embassies have not participated and which they have not financed." The conclusion was a threat of "certain practical measures" against them unless they kept their hands off Russian domestic affairs.¹⁴

Lenin, on April 29, declared "our purpose is to hold on until the imperialists destroy each other still more. For this end there is but one policy, to tack, to draw back, to wait. . . . Our chief motto for May 1 should be 'We have conquered capital; we shall conquer our own disorganization.'"¹⁵

Such statements were directly in the face of British offers to assist the Bolshevik government as far as possible in any resistance which might be set up against the Germans. Of

what service were Soviet notes of protest or proclamations? They did not inspire the Russians to activity nor did they compel the Germans to retire. Nevertheless, in spite of the signature of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk, the Allies still continued to attempt military co-operation and good though informal relations were inaugurated. On March 11, 1918, a small number of British marines were landed at Murmansk. This was at the request of the local Soviet, and there was no hard feeling at the time on this account even on the part of Moscow.¹⁶ The British felt that it was essential, from the point of view of safety, to prevent the Germans from extending their power throughout Russia, along the Siberian Railway to the Pacific where immense supplies had already been landed by the Allies for Russian use. They therefore welcomed the Czechoslovak revolt against the Soviet authorities and protested vigorously against Russian hostilities which they believed were directed by pressure from Berlin. This they knew was also responsible for the belated protests against their occupation of Murmansk which began to appear after May. Speaking on May 14, Lenin grimly explained the situation:

Still greater trouble has been caused by the question of Murmansk, which is claimed by the British and French, because they have invested tens of millions in building the port in order to safeguard their rear in the imperialist war against Germany. They respect neutrality so splendidly that they are making use of everything that is not nailed down tightly, and a sufficient ground for their seizures is the fact that they have a battleship, while we have nothing with which to chase it off. . . . The British have landed their military forces at Murmansk but we had no opportunity to prevent it by armed force. The result has been that the Germans have presented to us demands which are in the nature of an ultimatum: If you cannot maintain your neutrality we shall fight on your territory.¹⁷

Later co-operation between the Allies and the Soviet authorities thus broke down in the early summer of 1918. This was due in the first place to the effect of the Japanese landing at Vladivostok and the outbreak of real war along the line of the trans-Siberian Railway where the Czechoslovaks held their long and fantastic front stretching across the continent. In the

second place the British landing at Murmansk was followed by Allied occupation of Archangel on August 2. This aimed to stop the movement of supplies from Archangel southward to regions where they might be passed on for German use. The Bolsheviki had sent a party of Kronstadt revolutionary sailors to Archangel in early March to remove the vast stores which had been gathered there by the Allies for Russian use and which had been paid for by Allied funds, the obligations arising out of which had recently been repudiated by the Soviet government. This denunciation both of Tsarist debts and of loans to the Provisional government had taken place on February 8, 1918. The decree read in part:

1. All loans contracted by former Russian Governments which are specified in any special list are cancelled as from December 1, 1917. The December coupons will not be paid.
2. All the guarantees for these loans are cancelled.
3. All loans made from abroad are cancelled without exception and unconditionally.

Such language included even the most recent debts; it struck at the United States as well as at the thrifty French peasant. From an economic point of view it was a complete break with the past, for it wiped the slate clean at a stroke. Naturally, it also materially affected Allied policy, but the Bolsheviki cared for none of these things.

The Allies at once protested against the step in vigorous language:

All Allied and neutral ambassadors and ministers accredited to Petrograd, herewith inform the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that they consider all decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Government regarding the repudiation of state debts, confiscation of property, etc., in so far as they concern the interests of foreign subjects, as non-existent. At the same time the ambassadors and ministers state that their Governments reserve to themselves the right at any time when they consider it necessary, to insistently demand the satisfaction and replacement of all damage and all losses which may be caused by the operation of these decrees to foreign states in general and to their subjects who live in Russia in particular.¹⁸

The prospect of seeing supplies, for which they had originally paid, slipping into German hands after Soviet authorities

had refused to settle for them, prompted the Allied action at Archangel, as it assisted it at Vladivostok. This was done after the Social Revolutionary Party had declared its opposition to Soviet foreign policy and after their outburst at Moscow had led to the assassination of the German Ambassador. Indeed, it was reliably reported in early May, at a secret meeting of Social Revolutionary leaders, that a resolution in the following sense was passed:

In view of the daily increasing absorption of Russian vital resources by Germany, there are two courses for Allied armed intervention: one, with the consent of the present government, or two, considering Russia a country without a government or as having abdicated its sovereignty in favor of Germany, to have recourse to the occupation of certain Russian territory in order to prevent German imperialism utilizing it for its military purposes. This second course, which is not only acceptable but even desirable for Russia, has been proposed by the Allies to the Bolshevik Government several times and has been stubbornly refused. . . .

Considering that the Bolshevik policy has drawn upon Russia danger of complete loss of independence and a division into spheres of influence for the benefit of powerful neighbors, the Eighth Congress is of the opinion that this danger can not be avoided except by ending immediately the Bolshevik dictatorship and revesting power in a government based on universal suffrage, a government which in the war with Germany can accept the military aid of the Allies under such conditions and in such forms as will not violate the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Russia. For a government of the organized democracy based on a Constituent Assembly the appearance of Allied troops on Russian territory will be acceptable for purposes purely strategic, but not political, with the consent of Russia and will not omit a guarantee of non-interference by the Allied forces in the settlement of internal political questions and the conservation of Russian territorial integrity.¹⁹

Such a resolution is concrete evidence of opinions held quite generally in practically all circles of Russian political thought. Coupled with the urgent necessity of saving the supplies at Archangel, it led naturally to wider discussion of plans for military intervention in Russia during the summer of 1918. There was sharp street fighting in Moscow following the assassination of Count Mirbach, incident to an attempted *coup d'état* by the Socialist Revolutionaries; and the Bolsheviks,

now thoroughly aware of the danger of Allied occupation of the Arctic ports, turned on the Allied representatives in Moscow. All British and French civilians in Moscow, together with their Consuls, were arrested. Eventually, many were released, but delays in permitting the British and French Consuls-General to leave Moscow were clear evidence of Bolshevik bad faith and cynical disregard of international law. The Italian, Japanese, and American Consuls also decided to leave their posts; and finally during September and October all got away from Moscow. This unlawful seizure of the persons of Allied representatives, of the archives of the consulates, and interference with their functions were all directly due to the occupation of Archangel.²⁰

These attacks on Allied representatives were related, in modified form, to the drenching of Russia with blood by the Bolshevik terror. The Social Revolutionary Party was beaten in its attempt to promote Allied intervention. The Allies themselves were too few in number to penetrate Russia from Archangel; and as we shall see, the plans for the Allied troops in Siberia to force their way westward were to be blocked by opposition in Washington in October, 1918. Under the circumstances the Allies were ineffective in their policies because of their own divisions and uncertainties and because there was no efficient body of native Russians ready to fight the Bolsheviks at this time. "Mass terror" was the Soviet reply to all such attempts.

In the meantime, Ambassador Francis and the Diplomatic corps had abandoned Vologda for Archangel.²¹ The Soviet authorities in their search for proofs of Allied plots seized the British Embassy at Petrograd and shot Captain Cromie, a British naval officer; and the life of Lockhart, the British High Commissioner in Moscow, was spared only in exchange for the release of Litvinov, the Soviet delegate in London. In general, therefore, while a state of war did not exist between the Allies and Soviet Russia, a condition of brigandage on a large scale developed. In any case, the intelligence officers on both sides were really fighting a dangerous contest.

In the midst of such confusion what was the attitude of the

Soviet Foreign Office? The *Izvestia* had spoken editorially in June of the "tragic character" of the misunderstandings between the Allies and Soviet Russia.²² Soon notes of protest began which rapidly increased in the violence of their tone. The decision of the Czechoslovak forces to fight along the line of the trans-Siberian Railway was the signal for renewed armed activity by Soviet troops. Likewise, the agreement between the Allies and the local Murmansk Soviet; and the practical co-operation thus established led Trotsky to declare the local president of the Soviet at Murmansk to be an outlaw "who has gone over to the side of the Anglo-French imperialists." He issued orders to resist all further Allied landings at White Sea points, and said that the only object of the Allies was to plunge Russia again into the horrors of war against the Central Powers. This, he flatly stated, Soviet Russia would not do.²³

At the same time, Chicherin protested against French encouragement and orders given to the Czechoslovak troops. Meanwhile, in his very lengthy review of the international situation, made to the Fifth Soviet Congress on July 5, there was little that was hostile to the Allies and the situation in Northern Russia was merely mentioned.²⁴ This was probably due to the endeavors which were soon to be made to persuade the Allied diplomats at Vologda to come to Moscow. On their departure for Archangel, Chicherin still hoped that this did not mean the rupture of diplomatic relations;²⁵ but the *Izvestia*, caustic in tone, referred contemptuously to their refuge "under the hospitable shade of Anglo-French bayonets."²⁶ An article also declared that the political and economic reasons for the toleration of the Allied diplomats were the desire of Soviet Russia to avoid being used as a "tool of one imperialist coalition against another" and the expectation of economic assistance from the Allies for exhausted Russia.²⁷

Then in early August came the news of Allied intervention at Archangel. There a friendly revolt had taken place under the guidance of Social Revolutionary leaders, who had been members of the Constituent Assembly.²⁸ They organized, under the protection of Allied troops, the Provisional govern-

ment of the Country of the North, and unwarrantably stated that "the power of the Bolsheviki is ended."²⁹ At the same time, the British government declared that "we wish to assure you that while our troops are entering Russia to assist you in your struggle against Germany, we shall not retain one foot of your territory. . . . Our one desire is to see Russia strong and free, and then to retire to watch the Russian people work out their own destinies."³⁰ This was followed by a friendly appeal to the Russian people which was signed by all the Allied diplomats now gathered at Archangel.³¹

Such language was naturally brushed aside by the Soviet officials and press. The *Izvestia* burst out against "the devilish plan of the Anglo-French bourgeoisie" and declared that "between us and the robbers of the Allied capitalist camp everything is finished. . . . Whoever stands for Soviet Russia is against the Allies."³² A solemn proclamation signed by Lenin, Chicherin, and Trotsky appealed for support against Allied intervention.³³ Chicherin also sent a note to the American Consul-General in Moscow saying:

Despite the existing state of peace, Anglo-French armed forces have invaded our territory, taken our towns and villages by force, dissolved our workers' organizations, imprisoned their members and driven them from their homes without any reason possibly warranting these predatory acts. Without a declaration of war and without the existence of a state of war, hostilities are opened against us and our national property is pillaged. Toward us no justice is observed and no law acknowledged by those who sent these invading troops against us, for we are the first in the world to establish a government for the oppressed poor. Barefaced robbery is held permissible against us.³⁴

There was no comment on the fact that the Allied troops at Archangel were to guard supplies for which Allied money had paid and which were in danger of being turned over to the Germans after Soviet Russia had repudiated Allied financial claims. The whole question, however, was now to be broadened by the discovery of the plot at Moscow against the Soviet régime. Dora Kaplan attempted to kill Lenin; and Uritzky, chairman of the Commission Extraordinary for Combating the Counter Revolution, was murdered at Petrograd.³⁵ The

British under General Poole at Archangel were ordered to co-operate in restoring Russia with the object of resisting German influence and to enable Russians to take the field again with the Allies against the Central Powers. To aid in this, communications were to be established with the Czechoslovaks and, with their assistance, to control the Archangel-Vologda-Ekaterinburg railway line. But it was not possible, in view of the demands of the French front, to send any more fighting troops to Russia. Under such circumstances and in view of the discovery of the plots at Moscow, the Anglo-French task at Archangel was impossible of success.

Soon friction developed at Archangel among the Allies, for General Poole and his subordinates, both French and Russian, were ill fitted for their responsibilities. The entire expedition could do little except protect the supplies and make occasional raids to the south. This continued under General Ironside, the able successor of General Poole; but even the Allied and American troops began to chafe under the hardships and because of uncertainties. As the short Arctic summer closed, they were doomed to a long stay, frozen in at Archangel. Thus this Allied intervention, while it disturbed the Germans and compelled them to retain troops on the eastern front, failed materially to alter the situation and locked up 12,000 troops in the north of Russia.³⁶

THE SOVIET PROGRAM FOR WORLD PEACE

Meanwhile, during September and October, the Allied forces in Belgium, France, Italy, and the Near East hammered at the crumbling lines of the enemy. In doing so, they quickened once more the hopes of Soviet Russia for a world-revolution which might sweep the Communists into power. More particularly, the Soviet authorities sought to test out the proclamation of the Allies and the peace program of President Wilson. How far would the radicals of Western Europe go in their program for a new world? What would America bring to the coming congress of the nations? What chance did Soviet Russia have at the council table in Paris? These were some of the difficult questions that faced the Soviet lead-

ers at Moscow in the autumn of 1918. At all events, the peace conference itself might serve as a sounding-board for communist doctrines.

The full organization of the Third Internationale had not taken place. Some of its program was to be flung into Central Europe with the brief rising of German Communists and later by the bloody revolt led by Bela Kun at Budapest in March, 1919. The negotiations with the German Spartacists also led to an abortive attempt at revolution. These affairs, however, belong to a later chapter where they can be considered in connection with the full tide of revolutionary plot and counter plot. At present, the official authorities of Soviet Russia were concerned as to the immediate future and as to their relations with the victorious Allies. The first step, therefore, was a speech by Lenin, before the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee on October 22, 1918, which met with "tremendous enthusiasm."

This appeal declared "first, that we never before stood so near to the proletarian revolution as at present; second, that we on the other hand never found ourselves in a more dangerous position than now." Germany was seething with revolt against the Kaiser; in the course of "a few months Germany has changed from a mighty empire to a rotten tree trunk." The Allies were, however, eager to use their victory over the Central Powers to crush the Bolsheviki. We must now maintain ourselves "against the whole Anglo-French Imperialism, against the most important opponent we have in the world." The danger is that we may miss the chance to profit by the world-trend toward Bolshevism. We must, therefore, "develop and solidify the Red army. We must make it ten times as strong and large as it is. Our forces must grow every day; and this constant growth will give us the guarantee as before that international Socialism will be the victor."³⁷

Two days later Chicherin addressed a long letter to President Wilson as the high-priest of Allied statesmanship. This was first a truculent indictment of Allied and American policies in Russia, of their support of the Czechoslovak forces, and of their occupation of territories in the north and in the Far

East. Then turning to the plans for the League of Nations, Chicherin proposed "the annulment of war loans as the basis of the League of Nations" and joint restoration of countries laid waste by war. Self-determination should be applied everywhere. The League should "make impossible any wars in the future" by "the expropriation of the capitalists of the world" in order "to destroy the principle source of new wars." Disarmament would follow with the removal of "all economic barriers" in order that the League of Nations "should not turn out to be a league of capitalists against the nations." What, therefore, were to be the demands of the Allies against Russia? What did they wish for as "your troops and their troops are trying to advance on our territory with the evident object of seizing and enslaving our country?" The failure to reply to this letter would prove that the "demands of your Government and of the Governments of your Allies are so severe and so vast that you do not even want to communicate them to the Russian Government." To such an outburst there was obviously no reply. In fact it would appear to have been intended as an appeal to restless classes everywhere rather than as a vigorous diplomatic document. Yet from the point of view of style and as a document for debating purposes, it is one of the most characteristic of Chicherin's notes.³⁸

Later in celebration of the anniversary of the revolution Lenin, on November 8, declared that:

The international revolution is near, but there is no schedule according to which revolutions travel. Imperialism cannot prevent the international revolution; but the defeat of individual countries and heavy sacrifices are possible. We, however, can resist yet and must not fall a prey to pessimism. The imperialists will only set the whole world aflame; and perish themselves if they attempt to suppress revolutions.³⁹

In similar, if cruder fashion, the *Trud* appealed to internationalism as the great force in the world:

The great capitalist international League of Nations with the German Junkers sitting in at the left hand and the London bankers sitting on the right hand of the central figure, Mr. J. Pierpont

Morgan, of Wall Street, New York, will be completed very shortly. Then the combined power of all capital will be centered on the destruction of the Workers' Internationale which now holds Russia and is fast capturing Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, England, Italy, and France.

There is no more patriotism, no more nationalism! Only one world!

You have but two sides to choose from, the Capitalist Internationale and the Workers' Internationale.⁴⁰

With the collapse of the Central Powers, the prospect of further Allied intervention in Russia, especially in the south, became greater. The possibility of such intervention winning through to a connection with the Provisional government at Ufa and thus to a combined Allied front from the Black Sea to Vladivostok was a very real anxiety to Soviet authorities.⁴¹ They did not appreciate the war weariness of the Allies nor the unwillingness of Allied leaders to sink all differences before the dangers of Bolshevism in 1919. Under such circumstances, Chicherin sent a wireless note of protest to the United States and to the Allied European Powers. He denounced "the dark subterranean conspiracies" which Allied officers directed against Soviet Russia and declared:

At the moment when the Entente armies are crossing the borders and the Entente fleets nearing the shores of what was previously the Russian Empire, the Government of the Soviet Republic protests once more solemnly before the deluded soldiers and sailors of their fleets, before the toiling brothers all over the world against this wanton aggression, against this act of sheer violence and brutal force, against this attempt to crush the liberty, the political and social life of the people of another country.⁴²

A more moderate statement of the Russian case was made by Litvinov in a letter to President Wilson of December 24, 1918.⁴³ In this he begged that the Soviet Republic be given a chance to argue its case. He stated that only two courses were possible—either to continue open or disguised intervention which meant prolongation of the war, or to investigate the situation while assisting Russia economically and withdrawing all foreign troops from Russia. This was along the lines of a request for peace negotiations made earlier in No-

vember. It was followed by a note from Chicherin of January 12, 1919, which rehearsed the course of events and asked directly that the United States should "name a place and a time for opening of peace negotiations with our representatives." ⁴⁴

By this time Ambassador Francis, who had left Archangel, was in London. From his bed in a hospital he protested against Chicherin's offer, concluding:

I think, furthermore, that if peace is consummated with the disorder prevailing in Russia or if the Bolsheviks are permitted to dominate there, that Russia will be exploited by Germany so completely as to effectually recoup her losses by war and become again a menace to civilization.⁴⁵

The American Consul-General at Moscow, and who was now at Archangel, also criticized Chicherin's offer "because of the impediment of complete and proven bad faith on their part. . . . The futility of Bolshevik engagements is due, not only to the dishonesty of their leaders, but to the natural disorderliness of a loose-knit Government, many of whose most active members are anarchists by temperament." ⁴⁶

The net result of the three months since Chicherin's first haughty note to President Wilson was a request for peace negotiations. To this there were vigorous criticisms from men of practical experience. In the meantime, the Allies at Paris had been discussing a plan for a "*cordon sanitaire*" against Bolshevik Russia which would exclude Soviet authority from the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Siberia.⁴⁷ Soviet representatives declared in reply that:

The only demand the Soviet Republic has to put to the Allies is, that they should discontinue all direct or indirect military operations against Soviet Russia, all direct or indirect material assistance to Russian or other forces operating against the Soviet Government, and also every kind of economic warfare and boycott.⁴⁸

The proposal to negotiate for peace was, therefore, part of a demand for "hands off Russia." However, the British government had anticipated Chicherin's proposals by a private inquiry made to the other Allied governments and to the United States in early December. This plan involved a gen-

eral truce in Russia among all parties and an opportunity for the various Russian governments, including the Soviet authorities, to send delegates to the Peace Conference. To this suggestion the French government thus declared its opposition:

The criminal régime of the Bolsheviks which does not represent in any degree that of a democratic government, or furnish any possibility whatever of developing into a government, since it is supported solely by the lowest passions of anarchical oppression, in negation of all the principles of public and private right, cannot claim to be recognized as a regular Government. . . . The French Government, so far as it is concerned, will make no contract with crime. . . . Method and patience, combined, together with the impossibility that any régime can last without a regular organization for maintaining, provisioning, transport, order, credit, etc., will in the end, overcome internal Russian anarchy.⁴⁹

Here was a definite rejection by France of a proposal to parley with the Bolsheviks at Paris. Nevertheless, out of the discussions as to this plan there came a suggestion from President Wilson for a conference elsewhere. This has often led to the assumption that he was the author of the plan for a conference at Prinkipo. The truth is, that the first step in that direction came from Lloyd George and later was strongly supported by him in private conferences. The facts can tell the story.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. *Izvestia*, Dec. 30, 1917.
2. *R. A. R.*, pp. 68 *et seq.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 74
5. Bullard, pp. 113-14.
6. *R. A. R.*, p. 75. Cf. Francis, chap. xv.
7. *Gazette*, Dec. 13, 1917; *Izvestia*, Dec. 14.
8. *Ibid.*, Jan. 23 and 24, 1918.
9. *Ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1917; Jan. 3, 10, 31; and Feb. 17, 1918.
10. *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1917.
11. *Ibid.*, March 30, April 24 and 28, 1918.
12. Antonelli, pp. 190-91.
13. Bullard, p. 125.
14. *Izvestia*, Feb. 17, 1918.
15. *Ibid.*, April 30, 1918.
16. Francis, p. 265.
17. *Izvestia*, May 15, 1918.
18. *R. A. R.*, p. 78.
19. This statement is made on what I believe is adequate authority.
20. *Izvestia*, August 10 and 20, 1918.
21. Francis, pp. 246-60.
22. *Izvestia*, June 19, 1918.
23. *Ibid.*, July 2, 1918. Cf. for some of these notes *ibid.*, June 13, 15, 28, 30; July 2, 3, 4, 5, 1918; also *R. A. R.*, pp. 226-27.
24. Lenin and Trotsky, pp. 409-27.
25. *Izvestia*, July 25, 1918.
26. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1918.
27. *Ibid.*, July 27, 1918; an article by "Viator," whose identity is not revealed.
28. *Ibid.*, July 14, 1918. *R. A. R.*, p. 232, gives the date as July 17.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 243-44. Cf. *Izvestia*, Aug. 18, 1918.
31. *R. A. R.*, p. 244.
32. *Izvestia*, Aug. 1 and 13, 1918. Previous notes of protest and editorials are to be found in *ibid.*, July 13, 14, 16, 17, 25, 26 and 30, 1918. Cf. also *R. A. R.*, p. 229.
33. *Izvestia*, Aug. 1, 1918, and Lenin and Trotsky, p. 428.
34. *R. A. R.*, p. 247. This note was dated Aug. 6, 1918, but four days later a semi-official communication from the Foreign Commissariat denied that a state of war existed between Soviet Russia and the Allies. *Izvestia*, Aug. 10, 1918.
35. *R. A. R.* pp. 250-55. "A Collection of Reports on Bolshevism in Russia," *Parl. Papers, Russia*, No. 1 (1919), 6d. 8, (Lon-

don, 1919), pp. 1-7. Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy*, p. 19. On the "British Embassy plot," cf. also *Izvestia*, Sept. 7; on Sept. 5 the Diplomatic Corps, under the Swiss Minister as Dean, protested against the "Red Terror"; and on Sept. 21 the United States sent a note of protest against Soviet practices, *R. A. R.*, p. 256. This note stated in part: "This Government is in receipt of information from reliable sources revealing that the peaceable Russian citizens of Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities are suffering from an openly avowed campaign of mass terrorism and are subject to wholesale executions. Thousands of persons have been shot without even a form of trial; ill-administered prisons are filled beyond capacity; and every night scores of Russian citizens are recklessly put to death; and irresponsible bands are venting their brutal passions in the daily massacre of untold innocents."

361 Francis, ch. xviii. Cf. also "The Evacuation of North Russia," *Parl. Papers*. Cd. 818 (London, 1920); *Times* (London), April 8, 1920.

371 Lenin and Trotsky, pp. 449-53. Cf. "Bolshévik," *La politique extérieure de la Russie des Soviets*, Berne, 1918 (pamphlet); *Washington Post*, Aug. 5, 1919 (a wireless interview with Lenin).

381 *R. A. R.*, pp. 258-66.

391 *Izvestia*, Nov. 9, 1918.

401 *Trud*, Nov. 18, 1918.

411 "The Conspiracy of Imperialists against Soviet Russia," in *Izvestia*, Nov. 1, 1918.

421 *R. A. R.*, pp. 269-70.

431 *Ibid.*, pp. 270-73.

441 *Ibid.*, pp. 282-84.

451 Francis, p. 314-18.

461 *Ibid.*, p. 320.

471 *R. A. R.*, p. 273.

481 *Ibid.*, p. 276.

491 *Ibid.*, pp. 280-81. This document, published in *L'Humanité*, Jan. 11, 1919, gave the date of the British proposal as of Jan.

5. In reality, it was made more than a month before. Its publication in January by the French was an attempt to stir up discord among the Allies regarding Russia, for this British proposal was only one of a number of plans for the handling of Russian affairs. However, it gave a clue to subsequent British policy toward Russia, which was to be in line with the policy that permitted Litvinov to remain so long in England during 1918.

CHAPTER IV

SOVIET POLICIES AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Our Russian counter-revolutionaries, such as Miliukov, Savinkov, and Chaikovski, understood very well that concessions to the Allies are purely of a sham character. That is why, on every occasion, they try to persuade the Allies not to conclude peace with the Bolsheviks, pointing out that the Bolsheviks cannot give any guarantees. Of course we shall not give any guarantees!—ZINOVIEV in *Severnaya Communa*, Feb. 25, 1919.

Soviet Russia demands but one thing: that she be permitted to live in peace. She does not menace anybody, she has always sought the friendship of all peoples. The invasion of her territory by the Allied armies was provoked by no act on her part. Since then the Soviet government has repeated many times its peace proposals. . . —Soviet Note to Italy, Feb. 14, 1919, in *Russian-American Relations*, p. 309.

We are sure of our victory over the international imperialists, and this for two reasons. First, because they have taken to fighting among themselves; and, second, because the Soviet movement is growing rapidly throughout the world. . . . The imperialists are digging their own graves and there are plenty of people in their own countries who will bury them and pack the ground solid over their coffins.—LENIN in *Izvestia*, April 5, 1919.

By January, 1919, all the European states had broken diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. The sole foreign representatives in Russia were the Danish Red Cross, which left Russia in the summer of 1919. This isolation of the Soviet régime emphasized the complete break with the constitutional world.) Lenin's hatred of parliamentary institutions and of democracy, his unswerving devotion to internationalism, and his profound conviction that the dictatorship of the proletariat gave the only safe way out for Communism in Russia had all combined to bring this about.¹

Nevertheless, the Soviet régime was anxious to negotiate for peace in order to win further opportunity for the con-

solidation of their power in Russia and on the chance that revolutionary movements might develop elsewhere in the world. As Chicherin wrote: "Against us world-imperialism was literally mobilizing."² If now by clever diplomatic retreats, by bargaining, a respite might be gained to secure relief from the economic boycott by Europe and to break through the blockade, the revolutionary cause might be saved for Russia and thus for all the world. Under such circumstances a conference would be worth while for Soviet Russia.

In the second place, there was, unfortunately for the Soviet régime, no mutual representative to act for the Allies and for Russia. The Allies thought of the Bolsheviki as only one of several Russian parties. They never understood that Bolshevism was a real principle maintained by autocratic party leaders. They did not appreciate the flame of revolutionary ardor that had now fused the leaders and their small but compact band of followers into a determined force. Furthermore, there was the unreasoning memory of Russian betrayal during the war. The attention of the ruling class was now drawn chiefly by the tales of Bolshevik atrocities and of murder which swept through Europe and America. In their reception of these stories, too many of which were unfortunately true, the Allies forgot the callous régime which had dominated Russia for centuries.

Above all, the Allies did not perceive that the revolution, which had begun as an industrial revolt, had spread in Russia into an agrarian convulsion. The Russian peasant had at last received his land; the great estates were now broken up. This had taken place in spite of the fact that the Russian peasants were at heart indifferent to Bolshevik doctrines. To suppose that the military, land-owning, capitalistic officers of the Tsar's day could now win the peasants to their side was absurd. Yet intervention must in the main depend on such elements, for none of the Allied governments had a serious thought of sending its own troops in a large expedition into Russia. Had there been Russian statesmen available to act as a political general staff, the situation might have been different. The outstanding fact, however, was that

except for the Bolsheviks, Russia was politically bankrupt. Her middle class had collapsed; and her leaders to oppose the Bolsheviks were, with a few notable exceptions, feeble politicians, quarrelsome doctrinaires, or mere militarists. Not many of these could even combine steadfastly on a common program.

There was also a third factor in the situation. This was the state of affairs at Paris. The world already knows enough of the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the peace treaty of Versailles to appreciate the enormous task which faced the delegates in January, 1919. The affairs of the world, both domestic and international, were dumped on the council table. From the mass, Russia, by virtue of her size and because of her tragedy, emerged quite early. For a short time there was much chatter. A peace proposal was made and hastily adopted. Later, after its final rejection by anti-Bolshevik elements, an ill-considered American mission was sent to Russia with the unofficial approval of Britain. The report of this Bullitt mission had no effect. Already, other matters held the platform. National animosities flamed. The entire program of the conference tottered as spring came on. Finally, there was the quasi-recognition of Admiral Kolchak's government in western Siberia. That step came too late to accomplish its purpose, especially as the European governments were themselves alarmed by the progress of social discontent within their own boundaries. No country would think of embarking on a Russian venture at that late day. Thus a solution of the Russian problem failed at Paris. The Red army gained strength in Russia. Kolchak himself failed. The Peace Conference had talked about Russia and had made a few gestures. Nothing happened. The result was an immense relief to Soviet authorities, especially as Lloyd George now was to revert to his more friendly attitude, the economic blockade was to be given up, and separate trade negotiations were to begin early in 1920. But a fuller review of such events and the course of Soviet diplomacy will clarify the situation.

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chak, or the Czechoslovaks to overthrow the Bolsheviki "they were building on quicksand." (3) The plan of calling the chieftains of Russia to a conference to adjudicate the question of the future of Russia. "If a military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviks, that would make England Bolshevik, and there would be a Soviet in London." The third alternative was therefore, to his mind, the best, "to summon these people to Paris to give an account of themselves to the Great Powers, not to the Peace Conference."

President Wilson agreed to this view as it was impossible "to controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George."⁵ They "would be playing against the free spirit of the world if they did not give Russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom." Moreover, "if the Bolsheviks were assured that they were safe from foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement." It was, therefore, agreed at the next meeting on January 21, that President Wilson should draft the proposal for such a meeting. This, however, was not to meet at Paris but at his suggestion, at Salonika, or Lemnos, or on one of the Princes Islands in the Sea of Marmora.⁶ This draft was adopted the next day naming the Princes Islands and fixing the date for February 15, when representatives of the Associated Powers should meet the representatives of each of the governmental factions in Russia.⁷

Then vials of wrath were poured out. For while the Bolsheviki returned a favorable reply to the invitation, but with conditions; the representatives of the other Russian national groups refused it. The governments of Siberia, Archangel, and southern Russia stated:

There cannot be any question of an exchange of ideas on this subject with the participation of the Bolsheviki, whom the conscience of the Russian people sees as traitors because they have betrayed the Russian cause and the cause of the Allies in negotiating with the enemy; they have fomented anarchy, trampled the democratic principles which govern civilized countries, and maintained their power exclusively by terror. There is no conciliation possible between them and the Russian national group. Any meeting would not only remain without effect, but might possibly cause to the Russian patriots as well as to the Allied nations, an irreparable moral prejudice.⁸

Nabokov, who had been Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London, in his interesting *apologia* declares that the invitation to Prinkipo was "the most pitiable act that ever disgraced the pages of world-history." Sazonov, who was in Paris, acting as Foreign Minister for the Kolchak government, stated that it was "inacceptable and insulting." His feeble star, however, was soon to set. More important than such outbursts was the attitude of the leading newspapers of Western Europe most of whom denounced the invitation. For such reasons the entire plan collapsed. There remains, nevertheless, the attitude of the Soviet government and press.⁹

This was frankly exposed in an article by Rakovsky, of the Ukrainian Soviet. He began by declaring that the "organic incompatibility between the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia and the actual dictatorship of imperialism throughout the rest of the world" made "real peace" between the two impossible. He concluded by hoping for an early, though transitory, peace with the Allies. For such "a temporary and purely external peace" should be "extremely useful and profitable to us since it would allow the Soviet government to consolidate its position in anticipation of the struggle of the Allied imperialists against their own revolutions."¹⁰

So also Zinoviev, who was to be the president of the Third Internationale, in a speech after the text of President Wilson's son's invitation to Prinkipo was known in Moscow, declaimed against the Allies:

They wish to find a form of help which the Russian people desire. Very well, we tell them in a word that the best form of help is for them to take away their bloody hands and go home, as soon as possible. These gentlemen have the impudence to write that the Allied Governments recognize the unconditional right of the Russian people to settle their own affairs without any interference or instructions from outside. . . . They have not got strength enough to crush us and have, therefore, to try by some means or other to draw out our fangs. . . . For that reason they have begun to wheedle us and to wag their tail; but we, who do not hope in God so much as in the sweat of our brow, have created under extraordinarily difficult circumstances a Red Army. . . . The Soviet Government will not lay down its arms at the present moment. . . . We must continue to form our army, to safeguard

every acre of our territory, and then not even the devil himself will be able to alarm us.¹¹

Such belligerent language, however, was modified as soon as the Soviet authorities recovered from their surprise at the mild tone of President Wilson's offer.¹² The *Izvestia* thus defended Chicherin's acceptance of the invitation in spite of the fact that it was picked up in the air by Soviet wireless and was without an address. "'Dignity,' just as all other fine bourgeois fetiches, like 'honor,' 'justice,' and similar things, may be understood in different ways." The duty of the government is to disregard mere forms and to act for the people.¹³ So Chicherin himself defended the decision by an analysis of Allied politics. In particular he pointed out that "America is most, of all countries, interested in preserving one undivided Russian economic organization and is by no means interested in weakening Russia." England was now taking the American point of view as opposed to France. The present circumstances, therefore, warranted Soviet acceptance.¹⁴

The Soviet note of February 4, was consequently a conciliatory one stating Bolshevik willingness to make concessions as to Russian loans, "to guarantee the payment of interest on its loans by a certain amount of raw materials" and to make to the Entente Powers "concessions in mines, forests, and other resources."¹⁵ It required the withdrawal of Allied troops and emphasized the success of its own armies. Nevertheless, in view of anxiety as to propaganda, it was ready to include a general agreement "not to interfere in the internal affairs" of the Allies, but could not "limit the freedom of the revolutionary press." The Soviet government was so anxious to "put an end to hostilities, that it is ready to enter at once into negotiations to this end."

Ten days later a long special note was sent to Italy. This reviewed the history of the past year and ended with a special plea to Italy to exercise "her influence in the international deliberations of the Powers in order to aid us in the re-establishment of normal and peaceful relations with all peoples and their governments, which is the object of our desires.

What we wish is peace and we hope that the Entente Powers will at last accede to our desires." ¹⁸ Under such circumstances, it was perhaps natural that liberal spirits in Paris should once more venture another and more direct approach to Soviet officials. Thus came the Bullitt mission to Russia.

FURTHER PEACE MOVES

British policies toward Russia lacked unity. On the one hand were men like Winston Churchill who had not had enough of war and were thinking of further armed intervention. To this group Lord Northcliffe, in his devastating feud with Lloyd George, gave a support, not because he was in favor of a Russian expedition, but because by marshalling the elements who were still aggressive he could further check the Prime Minister's hopes of settling the Russian problem. On the other hand was Lloyd George, who was sensitive as to his Conservative supporters in the House of Commons and who dreaded the clamor of disappointed labor and the uneasiness of revolutionary elements in England. These latter were talking loosely of "direct action" in case England should fall in with the aggressive tendencies of France. Under the circumstances Lloyd George's policy was as usual in difficult political times. He tried to be many things to as many different sorts of men and gave the impression of mere opportunism. That he was able to hold his majority in the House of Commons and to steer his major policies to success at Paris is evidence of his consummate ability as a politician if not as a statesman. In the course of his tacking, he threw overboard for the time his original Russian program and thereby completed the wreck of the Bullitt mission to Russia.

This expedition was born of a resolute and restless desire of an American parlor radical to make history. Later, Bullitt's violation of the ethics of confidential conversation showed that he was temperamentally unfitted for the tasks to which he sincerely devoted himself. During the early weeks of the Peace Conference when there were frequent private conversations regarding the Russian situation, Bullitt, who was attached to the American delegation, was *au courant*

with the course of events. As February 15 approached and as the rejection of the invitation to the Prinkipo conference by anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia became evident, he had frequent talks with Colonel House and with Secretary Lansing regarding Russian affairs. The Soviet reply to the Prinkipo invitation was deemed somewhat evasive; and the decision was made, on the initiative of Colonel House, to send Bullitt to Russia to obtain if possible from the Soviet government "an exact statement of the terms on which they were ready to stop fighting."¹⁷

Haste was important as the President was to return from the United States early in March. The French Foreign Office had already shown its opposition to any meetings with the Bolsheviks and secrecy was necessary. Only the British knew of the plan. Kerr, who was in an influential position as confidential secretary to Lloyd George, discussed the entire plan with Bullitt and sent him, following conversations with the Prime Minister and with Balfour, a memorandum as to the conditions for the restoration of normal relations with Soviet Russia. These Kerr explained had "no official significance and merely represent suggestions of my own opinion." The circumstances, however, were such that Bullitt felt "he had a fair idea of what conditions the British were ready to accept."¹⁸

These conditions were very close to those which Colonel House had indicated as American ideas. Bullitt left Paris on February 22, 1919. He was in Russia exactly a week and received on March 14, in Moscow, the proposals of the Soviet government. These the Soviet government undertook to accept, provided the Allied and Associated governments made them not later than April 10.¹⁹ In this fashion the responsibility for renewal of any peace offer was placed on the governments represented at Paris.

Bullitt returned to Paris *via* London, where the British Admiralty courteously offered to send him to France in one of their boats, as they had also offered to send him to Helsingfors on a British cruiser. Bullitt had already telegraphed the basis of the Soviet statements.²⁰ He alleges that Colonel

House was in favor of peace on the Bolshevik terms and that other American delegates were also in favor of bringing about "peace on that basis."²¹ Lloyd George spoke highly of the plan, but "said that he did not know what he could do with British public opinion." The Northcliffe press was in violent opposition on Russian affairs; and Lloyd George indicated that some conservative Englishman was needed to bring back a similar report from Russia in order to have it "go down with British public opinion." Then he agreed to leave the preparation of the entire proposal to Colonel House, who tried to take the matter up with President Wilson.²² This failed as the President was "occupied with Germany at present and he could not think about Russia."²³ Meanwhile April 10 was approaching.

The document which Bullitt had brought back from Russia was, therefore, gradually pushed into the background, particularly as the President refused to permit its publication and did not present the matter to the Peace Conference. This fact enabled Lloyd George to state in the House of Commons that the Allies had received no approach from Russia, that no member had presented Soviet proposals to the Conference, and in the case of "a young American [who] had come back from Russia with a communication" it was not for him "to judge the value of this communication, but if the President of the United States had attached any value to it he would have brought it before the Conference, and he certainly did not."²⁴ This was undoubtedly true.

It was the *coup de grace*. It was very possibly due to the fact that strong conservative opposition to Lloyd George's original views on Russia had developed in the House of Commons and that he might have been defeated if he had spoken his mind at that time. Bullitt was, therefore, in the position which any secret agent of a government may find himself. Under pressure of circumstances he was discarded. Unfortunately, this was not to his taste. He revealed the entire story and much besides to the Senate Committee on September 12, 1919. To that indiscretion the student of history is now indebted.

A contributing factor to the entire situation was news that Kolchak's forces in western Siberia had made a rapid advance during the first part of April. The press in Paris was, therefore, jubilantly declaring that "he would be in Moscow within two weeks." There would consequently be no need of making peace with Soviet Russia. Under these circumstances it had seemed wiser to the American delegation to wait and watch the course of events.²⁵

However, the proposals of the Soviet government deserve brief analysis for the light they may cast on the course of Soviet diplomacy. The document which was given to Bullitt contained a pledge that the Soviet authorities would accept these proposals by the Powers if they were made by April 10, 1919. This was in the face of opposition by Trotsky and the Soviet generals, who prided themselves on their new Red army and who frankly expected that, owing to food shortage, there would soon be social revolts in different parts of Europe which would embarrass the Allies. Then they counted on popular opposition to active intervention in Russia to paralyze armed intervention. Lenin, Chicherin, and Litvinov, however, were apparently unwilling to take this chance or at least they were willing to try out the Allies by means of these new peace proposals. At all events, "it would benefit the revolution but little to conquer all Europe if the government of the United States replies by starving all Europe." For such reasons they claimed that they were willing to compromise in order to conciliate America.²⁶

The projected peace terms provided for an armistice of two weeks with privilege of extension pending a conference which was to begin not later than a week after the armistice, preferably in a neutral country. The conference was to discuss peace on the basis of the following fixed principles:

1. All existing *de facto* governments in Russia and Finland were to remain in control of territories in their possession except as the conference might direct until "the peoples inhabiting the territories controlled by the *de facto* governments shall themselves determine to change their governments." There was to be a complete mutual agreement not

to use force to upset any of these governments including Finland, Poland, Galicia, Rumania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan.

2. The economic blockade was to be raised and mutual trade relations were to be re-established.

3. The Soviet governments were to be allowed unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports which belonged to the former Russian Empire and to Finland.

4. The citizens of the countries involved were to have the reciprocal right of free entry "of sojourn, of circulation, and of full security provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of other countries." There was to be reciprocal right to send official representatives, who were not necessarily to be full diplomatic officials but who were to enjoy rights of immunity.

5. There was to be a general amnesty to all political opponents, offenders, and prisoners in Russia and for all such who have been or might be prosecuted outside of Russia for giving help to Soviet Russia. All prisoners of war were to be repatriated.

6. Immediately after the signing of this agreement, all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Russia and all military assistance to anti-Soviet governments was to cease. All armies left in Russia were to be proportionally reduced to a peace footing.

7. The governments in Russia and Finland "shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Empire, to foreign states parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states." Other provisions in this project were subordinate to these main principles.²⁷

This was the plan on which the majority of the American delegates had apparently looked with interest in March, 1919. However, alongside of its discussion in Paris there ran another plan. This was suggested in the office of Hoover and dealt almost exclusively with food supply. Bullitt had been unable to reconcile this plan with his own document; but it was finally proposed by Nansen, the Norwegian, in a letter of April 13 to the Allied and American representatives in

Paris.²⁸ In this he outlined a plan for a relief commission along the lines of the Belgian Relief Commission to be managed by neutral representatives in order to alleviate "this gigantic misery" in Russia "on purely humanitarian grounds." To this reply was sent on April 17 approving the general plan. However, the problems both of finance and transport in Russia, it was pointed out, must be met in Russia; and distribution must be under neutral supervision. "That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within definite lines in the territory of Russia is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would necessarily involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within Russian territory. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would be impossible to consider." With this conclusion the governments at Paris gave the plan their blessing.²⁹

On May 7 the Soviet Foreign Office replied, welcoming the proposal but rejecting the plan for the cessation of hostilities unless the Allied and Associated Powers meant again to propose a real peace conference.³⁰ This now seemed scarcely likely, as assistance for anti-Bolshevik forces had begun to come in from abroad. By this time, however, the material plans of the Bolsheviki for revolt in European countries had also developed. Even while Bullitt was on his way back from Russia, Bela Kun's revolution in Budapest had begun. That, as we shall see, was directly planned from Moscow. Italy was to have been the next country, after Hungary, in which revolt was to flame out. Indeed, the program of revolution was well under way. In such circumstances and in view of the temporary success of Kolchak's forces, the moment for negotiations with Soviet Russia passed.

Now the Allies were to bet on Kolchak. Their support was based on faulty intelligence work and on the obstinacy with which the French Foreign Office and similar elements in England and Italy clung to the belief that the days of the Bolsheviki were numbered. In America and elsewhere there swept fear of social unrest. The whole world was in travail and its

cries spread alarm and consternation in all directions. Meanwhile, in the hurry and confusion of the Peace Conference the Russian problem was lost sight of. Later, it was to lie across the road to European peace and world-reconstruction.

All this was in the face of Lloyd George's secret memorandum circulated at Paris on March 25 under the title, "*Some Considerations for the Peace Conference Before They Finally Draft Their Terms.*" This dealt with a number of matters; but in the course of the discussion as to German reparations the British Prime Minister stated:

The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw her lot with the Bolsheviki and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of revolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms. . . . If Germany goes over to the Spartacists, it is inevitable that she should throw in her lot with the Russian Bolsheviki. Once that happens, all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of near 300,000,000 people organized into a vast Red Army under German instructors and German Generals, equipped with German cannon and German machine guns and prepared for the renewal of the attack on Western Europe. . . . [The peace must] constitute an alternative to Bolshevism. . . . [The Conference must deal with the Russian situation for] Bolshevik imperialism does not merely menace the States on Russia's borders; it threatens the whole of Asia and is as near to America as it is to France. It is idle to think the Peace Conference can separate, however sound a peace it may have arranged with Germany, if it leaves Russia as it is today.³¹

Yet that is exactly what happened.

KOLCHAK AND DENIKIN

The decision of the governments at Paris to support the anti-Bolshevist forces under Admiral Kolchak was taken after careful pledges had been given by him. These were contained in an exchange of notes May 26-June 12, 1919. His position in Siberia, as we shall see more fully in chapters on the Far East, had arisen directly from the *coup d'état* of November 18, 1918, by which he became the head and director of the anti-

Soviet Russian forces that had gathered in western Siberia during 1918. This step had followed the union at Ufa in the summer of that year of several local governments which had come into existence through Siberian efforts and through the stream of refugees fleeing along the line of the trans-Siberian Railway during 1917-18. This union had gathered about Social Revolutionary elements who represented the Constituent Assembly which, as we have seen, had been dispersed by the Bolsheviks in January, 1918.

To this group Kolchak came from eastern Siberia where he had been well received by General Horvath and other former Russian officers who were trying to organize counter-revolutionary or anti-Bolshevik resistance to the threatening domination of the Soviet authorities in the Far East. The radical elements in this strange grouping of forces were driven out by the *coup d'état* of November. Some of them went back to support the Bolsheviks; others drifted helplessly about still proclaiming their theories and denouncing all who would not agree with them. Meantime, at Omsk, under Kolchak, both moderate socialists and reactionary military officers temporarily combined against the Bolsheviks. A final element in this *mélange* was the Czechoslovak Legion who at first made up almost the only armed and disciplined body of troops which was available. Their story, however, also belongs to a later section.³²

Kolchak was a Russian naval officer with a distinguished professional reputation. He was reported to be a liberal and had been permitted to escape from his Black Sea command when the revolution first struck the navy. He had been called to the Far East by officers who thought he could act as a leader in the attempt to stay the progress of Bolshevik power. About him had gathered a miscellaneous lot of former Tsarist officers. Many of these now really took charge of affairs and were by their administration to wreck the chances of success. That, however, was not apparent to the Allied representatives at Paris.

Meanwhile, in the south, General Denikin, of the former Russian army, had also gathered a force which was preparing

to try to recover Russian territory from the Caucasus northward. He was first of all a military leader of no small ability; but as in the case of Kolchak his staff was not able to conceal its real character. They were at heart Monarchists who could not reconcile themselves to the idea that the old days were gone forever. The lack of satisfactory political elements in the situation, therefore, made the success of Denikin's force a liability rather than an asset in the recovery of Russia to a liberal constitutional status. As even Nabokov comments—"the Kolchak and Denikin Governments and armies *defeated themselves*." ³³

The main point now is the decision to give effective material support to Kolchak and Denikin, to strengthen them so that their far-distant lines might, if possible, approach each other and then sweep northward and westward toward Moscow. The appeal was now to shift from diplomacy to arms. This step was to be fraught with disaster. Defeat was due first of all to the failure at Paris to realize the utter moral collapse of constitutional Russia; secondly, to the failure to realize the vigor of revolutionary, if not of Bolshevik, sentiment in Russia; and thirdly, to the real failure of the line of supplies for Kolchak's forces along the trans-Siberian Railway. Here robbery and corruption were rife. In particular, the independent and selfish attitude of Semenov, who was astride the line of communications at Chita, was responsible in large measure for delay and theft. It was too late in the end of 1919 when Semenov finally accepted and obeyed orders from Kolchak. ³⁴

All of this débâcle was still in the future when the decision was made at Paris. Then reports were current of Kolchak's successful advance. This, indeed, had been decided and material. Acting on incomplete intelligence reports and on information of the Russian political group in Paris, the United States and the Allies sent a note to Kolchak on May 26. This stated in part:

It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allies and Associated Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia. . . . They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on

the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it will really help the Russian people to liberty, self-government, and peace. . . . They are convinced by their experiences of the last twelve months that it is not possible to attain these ends by dealing with the Soviet Government of Moscow. . . .

They, therefore, asked for pledges from Kolchak that as soon as he reached Moscow he would summon a Constituent Assembly, that in the areas now under his control local governments should function, that he would approve "no attempt to revive the special privilege of any class or order in Russia," that he would not restore the former land system, that he would recognize the independence of Finland and Poland, that the future of other border regions should be settled with the League of Nations which the new Russia was to join, that he recognize the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of Bessarabia, and that he maintain the obligation of Russia to pay her national debt.³⁵

To this Kolchak replied in terms which were considered sufficiently satisfactory. The Powers, therefore, stated that they were willing "to extend to Admiral Kolchak and his associates the support" which they had offered of "munitions, supplies, and food." This was actually not a formal recognition of his government, but a pledge to help him and his associates "to become the Government of all Russia."³⁶ President Wilson also explained in a message to Congress on July 23 that American troops in Siberia were acting as guards on the railway lines which were under an Inter-Allied Board. He stated that:

The purpose of the continuance of American troops in Siberia is that we, with the concurrence of the great Allied Powers, may keep open a necessary artery of trade, and extend to the vast population of Siberia the economic aid essential to it in peace time, but indispensable under the conditions which have followed the prolonged and exhausting participation by Russia in the war against the Central Powers.³⁷

Immediately following these notes came the defeats of Kolchak forces on the Ufa front, which, however, was largely balanced by the rapid advance of Denikin's forces to a point

only 250 miles south of Moscow. This was made possible largely by the supplies and munitions furnished by the British. Denikin in July also formally adhered to Kolchak's government. Unfortunately, the defeats of Kolchak's troops continued during the summer. A period of confusion followed. The reports of observers did not lead to American recognition of Kolchak as his lines were being forced back to Irkutsk. The Czechoslovak troops in particular were being alienated from the Russian bureaucratic régime which surrounded the Admiral; and disaster overwhelmed his forces at the end of 1919. In January he fell into the hands of the Soviet authorities and was shot with many of his headquarters staff on February 7.³⁸

On the other hand, the acquisition of so large an area in southern Russia by Denikin's forces laid political functions on a staff that was largely military in spirit and reactionary in tendencies. The result was that when the Red army began a vigorous attack in the late autumn, his lines also broke and the countryside turned against him. By the first of 1920, Denikin's forces were hemmed in the Crimea and his entire program was torn to pieces. The recapture of Odessa by the Red army in January finished his affair.³⁹ In the panic of retreat and evacuation, "what was still good" among the anti-Bolshevik Russians, "was nearly drowned in the flood of selfishness, cowardice, treachery, and incompetence."⁴⁰

Thus both in the Far East and in the south of Russia the collapse of the forces to whom the Allies had given support six months earlier was almost complete. Along the line of the Baltic provinces General Yudenitch, who at one time had threatened Petrograd, was also beaten; an armistice was signed with Esthonia; and a beginning made at the restoration of a peaceful frontier. Meanwhile, in the north, at Archangel and Murmansk, American troops had been withdrawn in August; the British and other Allied forces soon followed.⁴¹ Peace was not finally restored to Russia by all these events, but the steady gain in Soviet power was marked. The Allies had "backed the wrong horses" in their choice of June, 1919.

SOVIET POLICIES IN ACTION

This digression from the main story has shown how fatal were the endeavors of the Allies to help anti-Bolshevik Russia. The internal divisions of the Russians, their mistaken policies, and their inefficiency combined to ruin the efforts made to assist them. The desperate endeavors of the Red army against their opponents had naturally taxed the Soviet government to the utmost. In this struggle, however, the Soviet authorities had been reinforced by the practical development of the Third Internationale. The result was as Chicherin said, in November, 1919. "We write fewer notes to governments, but more appeals to working classes."⁴² The fuller development of this most important stage in Soviet diplomacy will shortly become apparent. For the present it remains to note the beginnings of this attack and to conclude the general course of relations with the Allies till the end of 1919.

The Soviet authorities, even during the months of February and March, 1919, when the Allied policy toward Russia was on the verge of peace negotiations, kept up a brisk fire of comment and protest as to the affairs of the world. This later rose to a defiance or to a burst of enthusiasm. Thus Trotsky proclaimed:

To carry out our international duty we must first of all break up the bands of Kolchak in order to support the victorious workmen of Hungary and Bavaria. In order to assist the uprising of workmen in Poland, Germany, and all Europe, we must establish definitely and irrefutably the Soviet authority over the whole extent of Russia.⁴³

In the *Izvestia*, Steklov, the editor, maintained that the Allies would not avoid recognizing the Soviet government if they were to start economic relations with Russia. It was essential, furthermore, since they now no longer talked of actual armed intervention in Russia, that they should stop their "indirect attack" by the supply of munitions and of technical experts to the anti-Bolshevik forces. They were actually waging war against Soviet Russia "through their vassal States." This, of course, must stop if peace negotiations

were to get anywhere.⁴⁴ At the same time an appeal by Chicherin to the Workers of the Entente countries barely mentioned the world-revolution and emphasized the economic needs of Russia.⁴⁵ This protest against blockade became more urgent as time went on. Thus on May 31 he said by wireless:

"The abolition of the blockade—that is the only means to make an end of the hunger in Russia. Force your rulers to discontinue their devilish play and their attempts with the hands of the counter-revolutionaries to stop freedom from all exploitation which has been won by the revolution."⁴⁶

As spring came on the determination of the leaders was stung by the prospect of bitter fighting. Trotsky wrote: "The decisive weeks in the history of mankind have arrived." This is "the spring that decides."⁴⁷ On all sides the enemies of Soviet Russia sprang up. Its foreign policy, therefore, became more belligerent. As the *Frankfurter Zeitung* described the situation: "In the Utopian future there will be no foreign policies; but for the present the Bolsheviks are the most active people in the world in pursuing foreign policies. Lenin, Trotsky, and Radek preach a revolutionary foreign policy of the utmost vigor."⁴⁸ In the press, by resolutions and appeals of various organizations, and by speeches every effort was made to increase the efficiency of the Red army, to spread propaganda, and to unite the peasantry against the forces of Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch.⁴⁹ In similar fashion, while the terms of the treaty of Versailles were being discussed in Germany, came messages of sympathy and denunciation of the harshness of the new treaty. Thus "it is not an attempt at peace, but a practical continuation of war which will be achieved by the Versailles treaty." The League of Nations is "essentially a coalition and presupposes another coalition opposing it." A touch of reality will dissolve it.⁵⁰

During the course of the summer Bolshevik propaganda became more vigorous. It was evident that drastic measures would be necessary to stop this evil, especially as wartime legislation was soon to be repealed. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, had no intention of dropping their propaganda

or of ceasing to preach their doctrines for the regeneration of society. At all costs and by whatever means, the social order throughout the world was to be changed. In the progressive states of the West, they hoped, by inculcating with their views the extremists of the Labor movement, they would, by means of industrial strikes, hamper and eventually destroy the machinery of government. In the more backward states, in order to make moderate democratic rule impossible, they hoped, by more direct means, to promote revolutions and to continue the racial differences which the war had brought to the surface or accentuated. In the East, generally, by fostering native sentiment and religious bigotry, they proposed to incite native populations against the European races, which had established their influence in the various countries. Such in general was the program of revolt.

Alongside of this propaganda was the natural desire for peace, particularly in order to make themselves more secure in Russia. To obtain it they were ready to negotiate with imperialistic governments. In particular, the Soviet authorities looked to voluntary agents like Goode, of the *Manchester Guardian*, to spread their ideas. His arrest on coming out of Russia and the impounding of his papers by the Esthonian government gave small encouragement for the spread of this desire. Likewise, there was the endeavor of the Allied governments to tighten up the blockade by their appeal to Germany and to neutral states to assist along these lines. Thus a joint note of the Allies was despatched which read in part as follows: "The avowed hostility of the Bolsheviks toward all Governments and their international program of revolution which they are spreading abroad constitute a grave danger for the national security of all Powers."

Consequently, the neutrals and Germany were asked to co-operate in making it virtually impossible for anyone to have private traffic with Russia. The German government refused on the ground that such a policy would only produce favorable ground for the growth of Bolshevism both in Russia and outside. The United States, in reply stated that "no blockade" exists; but that it was the present policy of the govern-

ment "to refuse export licenses for shipments to Russian territory under the Bolshevik control and to refuse clearance papers to American vessels seeking to depart for Petrograd, the only remaining Bolshevik port." The chances that important stores of food might be used for the support of the Red Army had led to restriction of such a character as to prevent its import into Russia. It was also important that Russian gold should not be placed in circulation in such fashion as "to sustain their propaganda of violence and unreason." For it was the "declared purpose of the Bolsheviks in Russia to carry revolution throughout the world. They have availed themselves of every opportunity to initiate in the United States a propaganda aimed to bring about the forcible overthrow of our present form of Government."⁵¹

Such endeavors were, however, to go by the board within a few months. Whisperings of doubt were already heard as to the wisdom of the policy. The failure of the anti-Bolshevik governments in Russia was already evident; and the year was to end with the reversal of the policy of blockade. On January 16, 1920, the Supreme Council at Paris announced its decision. The last two months of the year, 1919, were, therefore, to be marked by renewal of the program of peace negotiations. There was on the part of the Russian official press a marked desire to discuss the entire matter with calmness and care. This was far contrary to previous exhibitions.

Already on July 17, Chicherin had addressed by wireless a reasoned appeal for peace to the "Working Class Organizations of France, England, and Italy," begging them to "develop sufficient strength to compel their governments" to put an end to the struggle, to lift the blockade, and to enter into normal relations with Soviet Russia.⁵² During November and December, Litvinov and O'Grady who was a member of the House of Commons, were in official relations at Copenhagen, where arrangements were made for the repatriation of British prisoners who were held in Russia. Out of these conversations much developed, as we shall see later.

While these negotiations were taking place, Joffe wrote an article which figured as a gesture. But this time there was

meaning back of the gesture.⁵³ He spoke of peace with Soviet Russia as a means of self-preservation. The meaning of that became apparent in the course of the Anglo-Russian trade negotiations which rested at the outset, as we shall see, mainly on the idea that Russia was in reality what it had been in time past—a granary for all of Europe.

Still another idea was put out by the meeting of the Communist Party in Petrograd. This held that either the international weather was soon to change for the better or that they must be ready to defend Petrograd against all comers. Only by strengthening the Red Army could they talk as equals.⁵⁴ So Zinoviev declared that, "they [the Allies] must forever abandon their dream of making Russia a vassal colony of Western Europe or of America." To match this statement, the *Pravda* said editorially: "In order to prove to the workers of the West and America that Soviet Russia desires neither war nor bloodshed, the Soviet Government can make economic concessions."⁵⁵

Lenin, in his speech before the Seventh All-Russian Congress on December 5, analyzed the situation. He said that the troops of the Entente had shown that they would not attack Russia, that the smaller states of Europe had refused to fight for the Allies, and finally that the "peasantry, small bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia" of the rest of the world had turned against the plan of war. In doing this he took a fling at other governments: "One can see there exposed in all its nakedness the excuse of so-called 'democracy' which is rotten, lying, and deceitful, without the courage to tell the truth at the time." Nevertheless, a peace resolution was carried.⁵⁶ This was in anticipation of the peace proposals which Litvinov was then making to Allied representatives at Copenhagen. Their reply was that they had not been authorized to do anything but discuss the repatriation of prisoners. Lloyd George's proposals for peace with Kolchak and Denikin likewise made no way at Moscow.⁵⁷ Steklov declared that

Soviet Russia can have only one agreement with counter-revolution, namely, absolute destruction. We shall come to an agreement with Kolchak when he shall be driven out to Japan and with

Denikin when he will be thrown into the Black Sea. . . . From the Entente we wish just one thing, that it leave us in peace and allow the Russian people itself to organize its own fate and nothing more.⁵⁸

Thus for the time ended the public discussion of peace. Again we hear the revolutionary chant in Moscow: "The future belongs to the proletariat of all countries. We shall finish our struggle beyond the Red frontier and then we shall merge in the general civil war of the toilers of all countries against the imperialists of the whole world." But General Smuts in his farewell to the British people also planted a seed which was destined to grow. His message was: "Leave Russia alone, remove the blockade, adopt a policy of Gallio-like impartiality to all factions. It may well be that the only ultimate hope of Russia is a sobered, purified Soviet system; and that may be far better than the Tsarism to which our present policy seems inevitably tending."⁶⁰ That was to be seen; but at all events peace, if it were to come, must be a real peace. So far Soviet Russia had shown only a plan in which the advantages lay on her side.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. The effect of Lenin's theories is seen in section 65 of the Russian Constitution which states: "The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor the right to be voted for even though they belong to one of the categories enumerated above [people who work and soldiers and sailors] namely: (a) Persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an increase in profit. (b) Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as interest from capital, receipts from property, etc. (c) Private merchants, trade and commercial brokers. (d) Monks and clergy of all denominations." Also persons who were formerly in the Tsarist police and secret service, mentally deficient persons, and persons deprived of citizenship because of offenses, during the period of their sentence are deprived of the vote.
2. Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy*, p. 26. Cf. Rakovsky in *Izvestia*, Jan. 10, 1919.
3. *R. A. R.*, p. 290.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 284-89.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 289-96.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 297-98. This appeal began by stating that, "the single object the representatives of the Associated Powers have had in mind in their discussion of the course they should pursue with regard to Russia has been to help the Russian people, not to hinder them, or to interfere in any manner with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way." Unless relief is provided, the state of affairs will become worse. "They recognize the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation of any kind from the outside. They do not wish to exploit or make any use of Russia in any way. They recognize the revolution without reservation, and will in no way and under no circumstances aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution. . . . They are keenly alive to the fact that Europe and the world cannot be at peace if Russia is not." They therefore ask the various Russian governments to come to a conference provided there is a truce declared in the meantime. They wish to bring about, "if possible, some understanding and agreement by which Russia may work out her own purposes and happy co-operative relations be established between her people and the other peoples of the world."
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 305-6. The Latvian and Esthonian delegates accepted with reservations as to their own national independence.

Chaikovsky, head of the North Russian government, rejected the plan. (*Struggling Russia*, I, p. 6.) A minority group of the deputies of the Constituent Assembly who had taken a part in the organization of the Provisional government at Ufa in the spring of 1918, but who had been driven out by Kolchak's *coup d'état* of November, 1918, had declared for union with the Bolsheviks against Kolchak. The Menshevik party at Moscow soon issued an appeal to the international Socialists and to trade unions that they work for an agreement between Lenin and the Entente. *R. A. R.*, pp. 301-4.

9. Nabokoff, *The Ordeal of a Diplomat* (London, 1922), pp. 286-7.
10. *Izvestia*, Jan. 18, 1919.
11. *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1919.
12. Speeches by Litvinov and Zinoviev before the Petrograd Soviet in Petrograd *Pravda*, Feb. 5, 1919.
13. *Izvestia*, Feb. 5, 1919.
14. *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1919. Cf. Chicherin in *Soviet Russia*, "What divided Great Britain and Russia." Jan. 16, 1919, published Nov. 8, 1919.
15. *R. A. R.*, pp. 298-303.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 306-317. This note to Italy is very moderate in tone; it is in fact one of the best specimens of propaganda that the Bolsheviks had put out. Undoubtedly they were sincere in their desire to start peace negotiations for the advantages it would give them. However, their account of the history of the past year gives pause; and actually at this time, in spite of the friendly tone toward Italy, there were preparations being made in Russia for the extension and expansion of hot revolutionary propaganda in Italy.
17. *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*. (*Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of William C. Bullitt*.) (New York, 1919), pp. 32-34.
18. Bullitt, pp. 35-37. The probable British terms were as follows: "1. Hostilities to cease on all fronts. 2. All *de facto* governments to remain in full control of the territories which they at present occupy. 3. Railways and ports necessary to transportation between Soviet Russia and the sea to be subject to the same regulations as international railways and ports in the rest of Europe. 4. Allied subjects to be given free right of entry and full security to enable them to enter Soviet Russia and to go about their business there provided they do not interfere in politics. 5. Amnesty to all political prisoners on both sides; full liberty to all Russians who have fought with the Allies. 6. Trade relations to be restored be-

tween Soviet Russia and the outside world under conditions which, while respecting the sovereignty of Soviet Russia insure that Allied supplies are made available on equal terms to all classes of the Russian people. 7. All other questions connected with Russia's debt to the Allies, etc., to be considered independently after peace has been established. 8. All Allied troops to be withdrawn from Russia as soon as Russian armies above quota to be defined have been demobilized and their surplus arms surrendered or destroyed." The American position was not so well or so clearly stated; but it was apparently similar, pp. 34-35.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-48.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-55; cf., however, Lenin's Theses of March in *New Europe*, May 29 and June 5, 1919.
27. Bullitt, pp. 39-43 and *R. A. R.*, pp. 317-320. Cf. *Ekonomicheskaya, Zhizn*, May 22, 1919.
28. Bullitt, pp. 74-87.
29. *R. A. R.*, pp. 329-31.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 332-6.
31. This secret document was published as a British White paper in March, 1922, on the eve of the Genoa Conference. *Memorandum circulated by the Prime Minister on March 25, 1919*. Cd. 1614. London, 1922, pp. 4-7. Cf. *New York Times*, March 26, 1922.
32. For a discussion of the Kolchak movement Cf. "Auster," "Admiral Kolchak and the Peasants," in *New Europe*, xi, p. 90, and "Admiral Kolchak and the Allies," in *Ibid.*, xi, pp. 220, 287; and a symposium on the "Recognition of Kolchak," in *The Nation* (N. Y.) May 31, 1919.
33. Nabokoff, p. 243. He adds: "Their collapse was not due to prowess of the Red army but to defects of policy and organization which alienated the population instead of driving it into the anti-Bolshevik ranks wholesale." This seems to be the opinion of nearly every American and Allied officer who had opportunity for observation and who has talked with me about his experiences.
34. Cf. chapter xi, "The Period of Confusion, 1919."
35. *R. A. R.*, pp. 337-9.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 340-43.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 343-6.
38. Cf. (New York Times), *Current History*, (The European War), X, Part I, pp. 265, 478; Part II, pp. 88, 261, 500; XI, Part I, pp. 118, 298, 500; Part II, pp. 93, 95, 297, 455. *Springfield Republican*, Aug. 24, 1919. Cf. for an account of the retreat of Kolchak's forces, McCullagh, *A Prisoner of the Reds* (London, 1921), Chaps. i-iv.
39. *Current History*, XI, Part I, pp. 298, 499; Part II, pp. 296, 454.
40. Bechhofer, *In Denikin's Russia and the Caucasus, 1919-20* (with an introduction by A. E. Zimmern) (London, 1921), p. 219. This is an interesting book by a British journalist who is both a trained observer and a student.
41. *Current History*, XI, Part I, pp. 115-16, 295. The decision to evacuate the British troops had been made in February, 1919; but the news of Kolchak's advance in April had led to the adoption of an ambitious plan for union with his forces. That was now impossible, so the orders to withdraw were issued in September. General Maurice, the British military expert, said on September 11: "All these plans have broken down from one and the same cause—the incompetence of the various anti-Bolshevist forces which have been supported and the impossibility of organizing any effective military forces from the elements which the British have tried to rally around them." *Current History*, XI, Part I, p. 115. This may be quite true, but an important element in the situation was the character of the Russian officers whom the British tried to use for the purpose of winning local support. Cf. Francis, pp. 273-4.
42. Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy*, p. 35.
43. *Petrograd Pravda*, April 23, 1919.
44. *Izvestia*, April 5, 1919.
45. *Pester Lloyd*, April 22, 1919.
46. *Wireless News*, May 31, 1919. A similar propaganda message was reported in *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 30, 1919.
47. *Petrograd Pravda*, April 23, 1919.
48. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 8, 1919.
49. By way of illustration the *Pravda*, April 16, 1919, contains a typical attack on Kolchak: "Kolchak is only a name, the banner; around him have gathered the old tsar's parasites, factory and shop owners, ex-landlords, gendarmes who have taken flight, policemen, detectives, court prodigals, and loose women, noble drunkards with red noses, and pops [an insulting name for priests], grafters of all sorts and ranks, in a word, all those who are eager to get back land, capital, factories, shops, rank, orders, and privileges, in order to land

on the backs of the laboring class and plunge their paws into the government coffers." Similar appeals are to be found in *Petrograd Pravda*, May 4, Nov. 4 and 19, 1919; *Olonetz Kommuna*, June 25; *Wireless News*, Aug. 6 and 28.

50. *Izvestia*, May 13, 1919 (Chicherin's comments); May 15 (manifesto of the Communist Internationale); *Wireless News*, May 21; *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 17, 1919. Cf. *Weekly Bulletin of the Bureau of Information of Soviet Russia*, May 12, 1919.
51. *R. A. R.*, pp. 349-352. Chicherin's note of protest to the neutral governments anticipated the decision of the Entente Powers, *Wireless News*, Oct. 20, 1919. Cf. *Soviet Russia*, January 10, 1920.
52. *Ibid.*, No. 15, 1919.
53. *Petrograd Pravda*, Nov. 18, 1919. Translated in *Soviet Russia*, March 13, 1920.
54. *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Nov. 26, 1919.
55. *Wireless News*, Dec. 3, 1919.
56. *Petrograd Pravda*, Dec. 6, 1919.
57. *Wireless News*, Dec. 13, 1919. *Soviet Russia*, Jan. 3, quoting the *Springfield Republican*, Dec. 21. Litvinov at Copenhagen gave an interview to Reuter's correspondent on Nov. 29. In this he denied that Colonel Malone, M.P., had been authorized or requested by the Soviet Government to transmit the terms proposed to Bullitt and stated that the date of Nov. 15 as given by Malone for the expiration of such a proposal and their transmission instead to the Central Powers was a mistake. *Soviet Russia*, Jan. 3, 1920, quoting the *Manchester Guardian*, Nov. 30. Cf. Malone, *The Russian Republic* (London, 1920), pp. 84-87. Cf. *Manchester Guardian*, Dec. 4, 1920, for a letter of Colonel Malone stating the exact opposite. This was characteristic of both Colonel Malone and Litvinov.
58. *Izvestia*, Dec. 19, 1919.
59. *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 20, 1919.
60. *Times* (London), July 18, 1919.

CHAPTER V

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC REGION

Up to the present Russian emigrés have been regarded as the saviors of Russia, and hope centered in reactionary Russian Generals. Now the hope and anticipation of building up "a new and indivisible great Russia" has been categorically relegated to the background. At last the Allies have drawn the proper conclusion from the futile attempts of the past adventurers—Yudenitch, Kolchak, Wrangel, and others—have decided to abstain from interference in Russian affairs.—*Sotsial Demokraat*, Jan. 28, 1921.¹

Furthermore, the Finnish Government in asking the so-called League of Nations to solve this question [of Karelia] thus joins itself to certain Governments who are carrying on a hostile policy against Russia and her allies—*Russian Soviet Note to Finland*, Jan. 12, 1922.²

The States represented at the Warsaw conference declare that, if one of them shall be attacked without provocation, they will preserve a benevolent attitude toward the attacked State and will immediately consult together as to the measures to be undertaken.—*Article 7 of Treaty of the Baltic League*.³

In any study of this sort a chronological treatment breaks down at some stage. Intentionally I have abandoned it at this point in order to take a view of the policies pursued by Soviet Russia toward the Baltic region. Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were all parts of the Russian Empire. They have separated from Soviet Russia and each now lives its own national life. Geography, mutual interest, and the constant intercourse of ordinary traffic have inevitably bound each to a close relationship with its former ruler. There is, furthermore, a common element in the recent history of the entire region. These seceding states have in varying degree an interest in the safety of each other. Instead of bitter quarrels among themselves, they have finally combined in a more or less formal and real union of interest—the Baltic League.



That interest lies predominantly in the preservation of their independent existence. It also lies in the continuance of normal economic relations with Russia. The time may arrive when, with a restored liberal Russia, practical autonomy can best be preserved by a formal political reunion with that country. But such a step could come only with the practical abandonment of much that has characterized the Soviet régime. It could be possible only as the result of the re-establishment of normal economic life within Russia and on the basis of a commonwealth of nations. For such reasons the best study for adherents of this solution of a difficult problem is the history of the American federal union or of the British Empire. Only by a union similar to that which binds the United States together or the Dominions to Great Britain could a Russian state which would include the autonomous Baltic nations be conceivable in a peaceful world. Such thoughts, however, can wait. At present we deal only with the facts in the case; and these do not hold out much chance of such an arrangement in the near future.

Least of all does a reunion with Russia seem likely in the case of Finland. There is both the long tradition of Finland's existence apart from Russia and the welcome evidence of her renewed prosperity as an independent state. There is the self-conscious pride of nascent strength and the integrity of purpose which have already marked her as a nation. Such elements, in spite of dangerous frontier disputes and threatening commercial crises, make for independence. The more so since there is now evidence that Finland has again emerged from cloistered life and is ready to play her part in the busy traffic of the Baltic. The struggle for Finnish independence is, therefore, the first step in the history of the relations of Soviet Russia with these Baltic states.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF FINLAND

Friction between Russia and Finland had begun before the Soviet Revolution. It was the legacy of more than a century of Russo-Finnish relations. In 1808-9 the whole of the Grand Duchy of Finland had been finally seized by Russia as a result

of the victory of Peter the Great over Sweden in 1721, and as the result of agreements made at Tilsit with Napoleon in 1807. Sweden was too feeble to defend Finland; and thus the union which had existed for more than five hundred years was broken. This conquest involved the liberal-minded Tsar Alexander I and his successors in a dilemma. Russia was an autocracy; but the intentions of its new ruler were that Finland should be ruled in a constitutional manner. "How can one separate portion of the whole autocratic Empire be constitutionally ruled? Finland either was or was not part of Russia. If it were, then the Duchy was subject to the same rule as the rest of the Empire; if it were not, it should forcibly be made one with Russia as soon as possible."⁴

By the dilemma the inhabitants of Finland, deprived of Swedish support, were brought under a new influence. "Since they might not be Swedes and would not be Russians, they realized that they were Finns."⁵ The Finnish nationalist movement, therefore, became the dominant element in their intellectual development. This naturally spread to politics. Side by side with the growth of nationalism there also came the more democratic influence of the age which began to affect the educated classes and spread with surprising rapidity to all sections of the population by 1914. The disputes with regard to Finland, meanwhile, had become acute in 1899. They attracted much attention far beyond her boundaries. So when the destruction of Finland's constitution was accomplished, at least on paper, by Nicholas II in 1910, the policy of Russianization was bitterly denounced.⁶ Then came the World War. For a short time this brought increasing economic prosperity to Finland. In turn, however, the industrial demands made on Finland told on her agricultural productiveness. The result was, therefore, that in 1917-18 Finland had been swept bare of food. Then in March, 1917, came the Russian Revolution.

In Finland the question of independence became at once the dominant issue. Here the Social Democratic point of view was affected by the infection of social unrest that blew across the border from Petrograd. Gradually the forces of revolt

gained in power. A union took place between the Socialists and the disorderly elements in the Russian garrisons in Finland. These had completed the March revolution by hunting down and murdering their own officers and were, therefore, now thoroughly out of hand. A series of strikes, which were largely political in effect, also took place. Meanwhile, the Provisional government in Russia clung to a policy which now seems to be weakly obstinate. They refused independence and yet at the same time were unable to exercise real control of the mobs of Russian troops who now engaged in appalling disorder. On top of this came the November Bolshevik Revolution at Petrograd.

Thus the declaration of independence of Finland came as the result of the more moderate elements combining in the newly elected Diet. The Socialists did not sign this declaration in early December. Instead they insisted that "this independence must be realized by means of a mutual understanding with Russia."⁸ Already greetings had come to Petrograd from a Finnish Soviet delegation.⁹ There were lively stories of armed clashes between local protective bodies and Russian Soldiers' Soviets. Finally at Helsingfors martial law was reported by the Bolshevik elements in Finland; and at a party meeting Stalin, the Russian Soviet Commissary of Nationalities, proclaimed that if the Finns "should require our help, we shall give it to them."¹⁰ In line with this during December "16,000 Russian soldiers reappeared in Finland as Red Guards."¹¹

It was a time of great confusion; and Stalin, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, pointed out the irony of the situation. The Soviet authorities had just granted the independence of Finland "not to the people, not to the representatives of the proletariat of Finland, but to the Finnish bourgeoisie."¹² In the meantime, protests against the influx of Russian Red Guards into Finland were made by the Finnish government.¹³ This, however, was too late, for a revolution was proclaimed by the Socialist party in Finland in the latter part of January. Curiously, the editorials in the Petrograd press seem to have anticipated that revolt. This would

not be strange when we consider the fact that the proletarian revolution in Finland was possible largely because of the sympathetic plans of Petrograd. Thus on January 18 the success of the rising is proclaimed in the *Izvestia*; but it was not until January 29 that the Red Guards seized Helsingfors. Then began the Red Terror.¹⁴

The civil war which now swept over Finland did not, however, prevent the signature of two treaties. One was between the "White" government of Finland and Germany. The other was between Soviet Russia and the Finnish Reds. This latter treaty was the first international document signed by Soviet authorities. It is brief and to the point. It provides for reciprocal acquisition of public property and mutual rights as to commerce and citizenship. The boundaries follow the same lines as heretofore except that a strip of territory is given to Finland insuring access to open water on the north. Furthermore, Finnish subjects in Russia, provided they are engaged in manual labor, are to enjoy "all the political rights accorded to the Russian citizens of the workmen or peasant classes who do not employ labor." All disputes arising under the treaty are to be subject to an arbitration court, the president of which is to be "appointed by the administration of the democratic Socialist Party of the Swedish Left, except if otherwise stipulated later." The value and importance of this document was to be swept aside by the defeat of the Reds in Finland. However, the territorial arrangements continued.¹⁵

On the other hand, the delegates of the "White" government signed at Berlin on March 7, 1918, an agreement with Germany.¹⁶ This was an elaborate treaty of peace including commercial provisions. Much more important than the recognition of Finnish independence, which this ratified, was the landing of German troops in Finland. Against this the Russian Soviet authorities protested in vain.¹⁷ There was also an exchange of notes for some months as to violations of the Brest-Litovsk treaty in respect to naval matters in the Baltic.¹⁸ Under German protection an exchange of prisoners was arranged in early August; and negotiations were begun at

Berlin for a peace treaty between the "White" government of Finland and Soviet Russia.¹⁹ This was possible because of the suppression of the Red forces by troops under the command of General Mannerheim, a former Tsarist officer, who had appeared in Finland in time to take command of the White forces. These combined with German troops under General von der Goltz succeeded by May in overwhelming the Finnish Soviet. It is fortunate that we do not have to investigate the excesses of that struggle. The White Terror was worse than the Red both in extent and intensity for it was stimulated by genuine fear as well as by revenge for the horrors of proletarian rule. Then on top of these extremities of class warfare came famine.²⁰

The conclusion of the struggle coincided also with the collapse of the Central Powers. This, however, did not take place until the Finnish government had invited Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse to be King of Finland. Thus Finland was to have become a German vassal state.²¹ Branting, the Swedish statesman, discussing this step, said: "The whole game is a grotesque farce played by a troupe of country actors before backwoods people who have no notion of the great currents of opinion now stirring the world."²² This is, of course, an *ex parte* statement; certainly the Finns are not by any means a backwoods people. The strategic position of Finland is obvious. In 1918 they were in a cleft stick; but the German domination may also have given the Finns an extravagant notion of their own importance. Acting under German tutelage, the negotiations which were begun during August with Soviet Russia came to nothing within a month. The Soviet government determined to adjourn these until the pressure of famine should bring the Finns to terms.²³ Meanwhile, during the winter of 1918-19, Americans and English Quakers began the food supply of Finland and of other Baltic countries. The German troops were withdrawn; the Finnish government was reconstructed; and Allied recognition of Finland as an independent republic was announced in early May.²⁴

TREATY RELATIONS WITH FINLAND

Finland now had to set her house in order. The steps to that end were largely complicated by the attempts of the Allies to induce Finland to attack Soviet Russia at the same time that General Yudenitch in command of anti-Bolshevik forces approached Petrograd. Once this plan was resisted there was no reason why the peace negotiations which had been dropped in August of 1918 might not be resumed.²⁵ A vigorous exchange of notes between Soviet Russia and Finland was the preliminary to the renewal of these conversations. The entire situation was also complicated by operations of bands of White guards in Karelia who favored the extension of Finnish territory well beyond her natural frontiers. Finally, however, we come to the treaty of Dorpat of October 24, 1920, which regularized the relations of the two countries.

The exchange of notes during 1919 shows how close the two states were to open war. Indeed, had not Soviet Russia been desperately occupied with the repulse of Yudenitch, Denikin and Kolchak, it is difficult to see how hostilities could have failed to produce real war. The correspondence is too long and detailed to spread here on the records; but by selection typical passages can be cited. Thus on February 14, 1919, Chicherin protested against the concentration of Finnish troops on the Russian frontiers; and on April 14 as to raids across the border. The Finnish government replied by threats against the arrest of Finnish citizens in Petrograd in early May. Then in the same month a Finnish band raided Olonetz. This was followed by bombardment of the Finnish positions by a Soviet fortress.²⁶ As the summer wore on, Trotsky also came into the controversy. He pointed out that "the way which leads from Helsingfors to Viborg and thence to Petrograd also leads from Petrograd to Viborg and Helsingfors," and concluded with threats and mutterings.²⁷ Gradually, as the winter approached and as the Finnish government still held back from intervention, wiser councils prevailed.²⁸ Troops were withdrawn; Yudenitch failed in his march on Petrograd; and the immediate occasion for threats and counter-threats ended.

The decision to engage in peace negotiations came only after long delays in the spring of 1920. The gains of the Socialists in the March elections helped in the matter and fear of renewal of internal disturbances led to the resumption of *pour parlers*.²⁹ These developed at Dorpat into real negotiations. The terms of the treaty, which was finally signed on October 24, 1920, are as follows. The war which had been smoldering for nearly three years was ended and the independence and frontiers of Finland were recognized by Russia. In the far north, Petchenga, with right of transit for Russians, was again ceded to Finland. The communes of Repola and Porajarvi in autonomous eastern Karelia were to be Russian and the inhabitants were to "enjoy the rights of national self-determination" whatever that might mean. Certain liberal conditions regarding these communes were granted by the Soviet government. Further undertakings on the part of both countries favored the neutralization of the Gulf of Finland and indeed the entire Baltic Sea. Questions of traffic, of timber cutting and rafting, and of fisheries were left to future negotiation. Neither state was to present any claims for war damages as against the other. Treaties and conventions regulating consular and diplomatic representation, posts and telegraphs, commerce, the exchange of prisoners and repatriation were to be promptly negotiated.³⁰ The treaty was approved on December 11, 1920; later it was ratified.³¹

The negotiations regarding the Aland Islands scarcely concern us at this time. The question was finally referred to the League of Nations for decision. To this there was objection by Soviet Russia, but the matter did not directly affect her. Finland was admitted to the League in June, 1920, and the decision giving the Islands to Finland was issued later.³² More important was the fact that during the following year the treaty of Dorpat was not being carried out. Conference after conference took place. In general, the mixed commissions did not succeed in carrying out their own decisions. It was probable that several thousand Finns were still detained in Russia a year after the treaty had been signed. No transit trade had developed as yet. The delegation of Soviet

Russia in Helsingfors was large and imposing. It possibly numbered one hundred and fifty; the Finnish representatives in Moscow were only eight. The natural inference was that the Soviet establishment was for propaganda purposes. Indeed, complaints were frequent as to Russian intrigues with the radical elements in Finland. On the other hand the Finns were accused of supporting disaffection in Repola and Pora-jarvi in eastern Karelia.³³ Whatever effect such charges and counter-charges may have had, the fact was plain that the treaty was in difficulties. Business men were vigorous in their criticisms as to the hardships of trade with Soviet Russia.

The truth probably is that in addition to dilatory tactics on the part of Soviet Russia, political motives played a large part. There was need of close co-operation between the two countries on purely economic grounds. On the other hand, the Finnish government was anxious for better relations with the Scandinavian countries. Finland resented the way in which Sweden, Norway, and Denmark tended to look askance at her and for that reason she was inclined to look at the other Baltic states as beneath her. In particular Finland opposed the idea of a Baltic military alliance which could be directed only against Soviet Russia. This attitude was fostered in June, 1921, by the appointment of Litvinov as an assistant to Chicherin. Soviet Russia tried to check the plan of a Baltic League by stirring up friction among the various states and particularly to keep Finland aloof.

Across this policy came the added dispute as to Karelia. During the summer of 1921 a revolt against Soviet authority had broken out on the borders of Finland. It was claimed that the treaty of Dorpat was not being enforced and that the Russians were invading the autonomy of the Finnish settlements in eastern Karelia. The entire question was exaggerated by the demands of the Karelians for independence which would place the Petrograd-Murmansk Railway line under their control. These claims do not concern us at the moment except as the entire question suddenly revealed how slender was the thread which kept the northwest of Europe from war. The Finns in Karelia received sympathy and funds from Fin-

land. Organized Soviet government was forced out and a provisional Karelian government was set up. The aid given by the Finnish Red Cross and the assistance across the Finnish frontier soon brought vigorous protests from Chicherin at the end of November.³⁴ In December Finland proposed reference of the entire matter to the League of Nations. This gave Chicherin the chance to declare that Finnish support of Karelia was in truth a violation of the treaty of Dorpat. The notion that the League of Nations should intervene was an invasion of the sovereign rights of Russia. He continued:

The so-called League of Nations also embraces Governments which still pursue a more or less openly hostile attitude toward Russia, as, for example, France, which country systematically organizes and participates in all hostile movements against the Russian Soviet Republic.³⁵

The Finns defended the use of the League of Nations; but Chicherin threatened war. A vigorous exchange of notes regarding alleged violations of the frontier followed during January, 1922, until Chicherin practically issued an ultimatum regarding arms and supplies furnished to Karelian bands. This brought matters to a head, for the Finns were alarmed by the possible effect on their national politics of a struggle with Soviet Russia. The government was afraid lest civil war might once more break out between reactionary and radical groups in Finland. The dispute, furthermore, threatened to involve other states, for Esthonia and Latvia had supported the original Finnish proposal for reference of the question to the League of Nations.³⁶ Finally, as matters quieted down, a treaty was signed on June 1, 1922, which referred the dispute to a mixed Russo-Finnish Commission. Later, the Finns tried in vain to take the dispute before the International Court at The Hague. The entire situation, however, had been critical; the Finns were alarmed over the prospect of war and maintained their neutrality more vigorously than heretofore. Under such circumstances, therefore, came the Russian invitation to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania for a disarmament confer-

ence at Moscow in July, 1922. This matter must wait until the relations of Soviet Russia with the other Baltic states have been noted and until the organization of the Baltic League has received attention.

ESTHONIAN INDEPENDENCE

The Esthonian national movement was to be the foundation of the government which was later recognized by the Allies. It sprang largely from the circumstances of the time; but it had a deeper rootage in the conditions under which Esthonia was ceded to Russia by Sweden in 1721. By virtue of agreements and treaty, the inhabitants were to retain their autonomous institutions, liberty of conscience, and the customs and privileges which they had enjoyed under Swedish rule.³⁷ Esthonia continued under her own provincial laws and special system of administration until 1887. After that date the policy of Russification began to make headway. The Russian system of justice and police, which were introduced through this, met with opposition on the part of the Baltic Germans. When, however, in 1905, as part of the revolutionary movement of that year, a great revolt developed at Riga (now the capital of Latvia) among the working population, the government of the Tsar turned to the German Balts of both Esthonia and Latvia for support. The revolt was suppressed, but the line of division between native Esthonians and Baltic German landowners was sharply drawn.

Thus Russian rule in Esthonia came in the end to depend largely on the strengthening of the ancient German element in the province. When the War broke out, sympathy was somewhat divided, but the position of personal privilege long enjoyed by the Baltic barons kept them in the main loyal to Russia.³⁸ The March revolution of 1917 led to a revival of Esthonian autonomy and, following a decree of April 12, 1917, the Esthonian National Council was elected. This body was in power when the Bolshevik revolution took place and was at once attacked by the Russian Soviet authorities. However, it continued to function until it was suppressed by the advance of the Germans, who promptly restored the power of

the Baltic barons and began to administer Esthonia under German rule.

In the meantime, the *ancien régime* had had short shrift in Esthonia, for on November 25, 1917, the Esthonian Soviet Executive Committee attacked an Esthonian Zemstvo. On its attempt to reassemble, "the workers came out of the factories and dispersed it."³⁹ In this curt message there is the first news of the spread of the Bolshevik Revolution to the Baltic Provinces and of the break which that involved with an old Russian popular administrative body. This was followed by a meeting of "the landless and land-short" peasants of Esthonia who demanded that the Constituent Assembly, which was to meet in January, 1918, at Petrograd, should sanction all laws passed by the Council of People's Commissaries.⁴⁰

Within a month, however, the situation had changed. Bolshevik disorganization began its disruptive work on the fabric of the old Empire. Lettish regiments, forced back by the German advance, joined with Russian troops, who were now full of Bolshevik ideas, to proclaim a new social system in Esthonia. These troops, however, suffered from the breakdown of commissariat and began wholesale marauding, taking away the stock of the "potato proletariat" as well as the stores of the more prosperous.⁴¹ The native population, therefore, were forced by such depredations to clamor for an Esthonian national army to protect them against Russian robbery. Eventually they were to urge secession from Soviet Russia. Then in connection with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk came the Germans restoring the landowners and bringing in German police. Before this had taken place, however, a provisional Esthonian government had been set up. On February 25, 1918, an Esthonian Republic was proclaimed; but its officials were soon forced to flee.⁴²

The flight of members of the Esthonian Provisional government gave to the situation an almost ludicrous aspect. From capital after capital a delegation of Esthonians launched their appeals to the Allies and their protests to the Germans. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik authority in Esthonia had entirely dis-

appeared; the appointment of a Soviet consular agent at Reval was accompanied by a statement that the Russian Soviet government refused, nevertheless, to recognize the secession of Esthonia.⁴³ This was, however, proclaimed by the Germans acting with the authority of the local Landesrath which was composed chiefly of the Baltic barons.⁴⁴ To this the Allies also entered a protest. The British Foreign Office declared their opposition to German dominance in Esthonia; and in May, 1918, both England and France gave provisional recognition "to the Esthonian National Council as a *de facto* independent body, until the Peace Conference takes place." Then the "future status of Esthonia ought to be settled as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the population."⁴⁵ Thus the Esthonian government was given an informal diplomatic position, though it was literally a government without a country and its correspondence was dated from Cranston's Kenilworth Hotel in Bloomsbury.

Thus we come to the end of German plans for Baltic expansion in the autumn of 1918 and to the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919. The Russian Soviet government, by the supplementary treaty with Germany at the end of August, had recognized the independence of Esthonia. This, however, did not prevent a prompt campaign of Soviet conquest which began immediately the Armistice had been signed. This attack was driven back with the assistance of Finnish troops and of a British squadron which was quickly despatched to Reval.⁴⁶ Under these circumstances, therefore, the Esthonian government returned home, and began to function normally. Meanwhile, at Paris, the Esthonian representatives asked for a status which would more definitely fix their international relations.⁴⁷ On May 19, the Esthonian National Assembly definitely declared the independence of Esthonia. This, however, was met by the Allied notes to Admiral Kolchak, which seemed to postpone the question of recognition till his possible success. Against this condition the Esthonians protested.⁴⁸

With the failure of the Allied attempts to use Yudenitch against Soviet Russia and the gradual withdrawal of German

troops from the Baltic region, the separate Baltic nations began to follow an independent foreign policy. On October 1, 1919, a joint declaration was drawn up by Esthonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania proposing the negotiation of peace with Soviet Russia.⁴⁹ Matters dragged, however, till by an armistice on December 31, 1919, Soviet Russia recognized the independence of Esthonia. During January, negotiations continued and peace was signed at Dorpat on February 2, 1920. It is significant that on January 27 Lenin, speaking at a conference of workmen and soldiers, said of the Esthonian peace and of the concessions which Soviet Russia was making:

But we do not wish to shed the blood of workmen and Red army soldiers for the sake of a bit of territory, particularly since the concession is not made for eternity. Esthonia is passing through its Kerensky period and the workmen are beginning to recognize the baseness of their Constituent Assembly leaders, who have broken up trade unions and killed 20 Communists. The workmen will soon overthrow this authority and will create a Soviet Esthonia, which will conclude with us a new peace.⁵⁰

Here is the full justification of the Soviet authorities in making peace. They expected that it would be merely a temporary peace, whose terms they would not be compelled to fulfill. They looked forward to a revolt in Esthonia which would place Soviet authorities in charge. Consequently, the signature of this peace was merely a move in the game. They could do it without the slightest expectation of carrying out the contract. As Lenin also said, on another occasion, "Revolutions do not always travel on scheduled time." It is consequently necessary briefly to examine this treaty.⁵¹

It provides for the ending of the state of war between Soviet Russia and Esthonia and states: "Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence and autonomy of the State of Esthonia." It adds that "from the fact that Esthonia has belonged to Russia, no obligation whatsoever will fall on the Esthonian people and land to Russia." The frontier is drawn south from the Gulf of Narva following as far as possible the line of the rivers to the center of Lake Peipus, thence through Lakes Pskov and Poganova to Sprech-

titschi. A neutral zone along the frontier is established. In case the neutrality of Esthonia and of the Gulf of Finland should be recognized, Russia is to take part in guaranteeing it. Each state pledges itself to prohibit troops intended for war against the other and the transport of munitions intended for such troops. In particular neither state is to permit the formation or presence within its territory of organizations or groups "whose object it is to overthrow the government of the other party to the treaty." Arrangements are made for the repatriation of prisoners and for choice of citizenship within a year. Neither government is to present any claims for war damages; Russia surrenders all property of the former Russian Empire which is in Esthonia; and Esthonia is not to prefer any claim based on the fact that she was once part of that Empire. Furthermore, "Russia grants Esthonia fifteen million gold roubles" which are to be paid within three months. Esthonia is not to bear any responsibility for Russian debts. The property of the University of Tartu [Dorpat] is to be restored by Russia as well as documents of value "if the Esthonian government will indicate where these may be found." Commerce is to be conducted on the basis of the most-favored nation; no special transit or storage duties are to be charged. Russia declares that this treaty is not to serve as a precedent in other negotiations, but that if in new treaties any special rights are granted, those rights shall be extended in full and without any special agreement to Esthonia. Esthonia is to have a concession for the construction of a railway from Moscow to the frontier and is to receive the privilege of exploiting large timber concessions in the interior of Russia.

This was a remarkably liberal document. Its reception was favorable; even the exiled members of the Russian Constituent Assembly at Paris stated that the wish for self-determination "was prompted by the desire to obtain a safeguard against the despotic power and the destructive policy of the Bolshevik usurpers."⁵² At the same time, they spoke of a federal union as the means of an economic and political rapprochement for which all Russian liberals must hope. Later, when the formal

recognition of Esthonia took place, a Russian Social Revolutionary paper rightfully paid Esthonia an eloquent tribute:

It is almost unique in the history of the world, that a small nation, trampled on by its greater neighbors for hundreds of years and only able with difficulty to preserve its national feeling and language should, amidst the rattle of arms, declare itself independent in the course of two years, and almost empty handed drive hostile hordes out of the country; should create, under a hail of bullets, an army out of nothing; and then energetically set to work to build its own state, this again out of nothing and without experience, a state recognized within the course of two years by the European Powers.⁵³

The attitude of the Esthonian government toward Soviet Russia was well expressed in *Paewaleht*, an independent Esthonian newspaper, which stated in February, 1921:

The Russian emigrés have no right to talk as the representatives of Russia. Undoubtedly, the Bolshevik régime will come to a conclusion some day. But future Russia is going to be erected by those who remained at home and it is by evolution and not by revolution that the change will be brought about in Russia. A *modus vivendi* is sure to be found with the rulers of future Russia. Esthonia does not want to be ruled by any Moscow dictators, but is willing to enter treaties with the Russian government in future as an independent state. The fact that Esthonia is independent, absolutely independent, enables both countries to enter any agreements including even a federation.

Inevitably the chief danger to Esthonia came from the non-fulfilment of terms of the treaty with Soviet Russia and from the development of revolutionary forces from within which were supported by Soviet funds, propaganda, and organization. Conferences were held during 1921 between the border states to meet such dangers. The Esthonian government set to work to suppress Communist organizations and was immediately met by economic pressure on the part of Soviet Russia to moderate such policies. In connection with Latvia, sharp notes were despatched in July, 1921, to Moscow protesting the non-fulfilment of treaty terms chiefly as to delay in economic restoration; and during the same month a conference took place at Helsingfors between Esthonia, Finland, Latvia, and Poland to discuss the development of a Baltic

League and to agree on a common policy toward Russia.⁵⁴ Such a plan for a Baltic association would have included Lithuania on the settlement of the Vilna dispute with Poland. This did not immediately result in a Baltic League; instead it provided for a secret, defensive, military alliance between Esthonia and Latvia.

An economic agreement was also signed at Reval by Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which aimed to reduce mutual friction and to develop a uniform economic policy. This was followed in October, 1921, by an economic conference of the border governments at Riga to which Soviet Russia also sent a delegate—Litvinov. The conference turned very largely into a series of complaints regarding Russia's failure to fulfil the terms of her treaties. This, however, did not prevent the renewal of the Russo-Esthonian agreement regarding the passage of goods in transit.⁵⁵

Finally, on the eve of the Genoa Conference, there was signed at Riga a protocol aiming at the restoration of economic life. This was largely at the insistence of Russia, which with Esthonia, Latvia, and Poland attended the meeting. The protocol simply announced in advance that these Baltic states approved the attitude which was to be taken by Russia at Genoa in favor of the restoration of economic relations with Soviet Russia, and that they supported the principle of the limitation of armaments.⁵⁶

Such declarations, however, did not prevent the Esthonian Minister at Moscow two months later from protesting vigorously the "wicked agitation" directed against Esthonia in the Soviet press. This was due to the discovery at Reval of a "secret organization which was aiming at the overthrow of the existing state order in Esthonia and establishing a dictatorship of a minority." The Esthonian government denounced this Red conspiracy as "the most blatant form of breaking the terms of the Russo-Esthonian peace treaty."⁵⁷

With all such declarations, however, there remained the fact that the economic connections of Esthonia with Russia were too precious to be lightly interfered with. Hatred of the Baltic barons might rank first; hatred of Soviet Russia

came second; but above all these came the practical question of the life of Esthonia. That was dependent in large part on the increasing prosperity of Russia and on the vitality of the transit trade through Esthonia from Reval to the interior of Russia. For such reasons the constant watchfulness of the secret police against the activities of the communists, stimulated as these were by the Russian legation, was a moderate price to pay for the independence of Esthonia. That independence was finally recognized by the United States in August, 1922. Practically every other country had done so during 1921; and Esthonia was formally admitted to the League of Nations in September, 1921.

LATVIAN INDEPENDENCE

Meanwhile, on a little slower schedule, Latvia also marched out to independence. The entire Latvian situation was complicated by the presence of German troops. The capture of Riga in the autumn of 1917 and the continued occupation of Latvia by German forces under the treaty of Brest-Litovsk checked any early movement toward independence. Then with the Armistice in November, 1918, there was the decision of the Allies that German troops should not be withdrawn for the moment.⁵⁸ This was sanctioned in the peace of Versailles, by Article 433 which provided:

As a guarantee for the execution of the provisions of the present treaty, by which Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and of all treaties, conventions, and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist Government in Russia, and in order to insure the restoration of peace and good government in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, all German troops at present in the said territories shall return to within the frontiers of Germany as soon as the Governments of the principal allied and associated powers shall think suitable, having regard to the internal situation of those territories.

This Article implied that the Allies could maintain the German troops, who were gathered chiefly in Latvia, as a force to withstand the sudden rush of the Bolsheviks into the Baltic region which the general collapse of the war seemed to

threaten. In this way the spread of Bolshevik power toward Central Europe might be averted. The Armistice had caught the Allies unprepared for the problem of Russia; their own forces were not at hand; and the Conference at Paris did not produce a common ground on which they could operate. Consequently, in order to protect Central Europe from the wave of revolutionary sentiment which was sweeping in from Russia, it was important to give time for a line of border states to develop a new barrier against Bolshevism.⁵⁸

Under such circumstances, the development of a Latvian state was not hasty. Early in January, 1918, the opposition to German influence was apparent in a declaration by a Latvian Socialist Soviet. This declared:

The proletariat of Latvia, belonging in its overwhelming majority to the international revolutionary Social-Democracy, strives to destroy . . . the frontiers between all countries. It cannot, therefore, desire nor demand the fencing off of its narrow, little country as an independent state.⁵⁹

Such a declaration, reaffirming the desire of Latvia to remain a part of Russia, was due largely to the hatred of the Baltic barons, who received the complete support of the Germans. Later in 1918, a middle group of Latvians, who were neither Bolshevik nor conservative, gathered together and it is to them that the notion of a Latvian state is due. On November 18, 1918, a Latvian National Council proclaimed the independence of the country. There followed a Bolshevik invasion which seized Riga and forced the government to leave the country.⁶⁰

A further element in the situation came from the history of the region. Latvia had fallen under Russian control in two parts. The northern part, Livland or Livonia, had been surrendered by Sweden in 1721 and had passed through a history somewhat similar to that of Esthonia. The southern part, Courland, had originally fallen to Poland and was secured by Russia as the result of the third Polish partition of 1795. In both regions, however, the divisions of the population were practically the same. Letts formed the bulk of the population, which in 1914 had numbered 2,605,000. Over

these were the landowners who were chiefly German by descent; "colonists and squires surrounded by an alien race . . . , themselves the vassals of alien princes who might be of an alien faith"; they had shown in time past a "martial and adventurous spirit."⁶¹ Against these ancestral elements the great body of Letts was now in revolt; the problem was to keep them from turning Bolshevik in their opposition to the barons.

A period of great confusion followed, for the country was on the verge of civil war. Throughout a "German 'Army of Occupation' about twenty thousand strong was concentrated in the Libau-Windawa area under the command of General von der Goltz." On May 25, 1919, Marshal Foch telegraphed that "the Allied representatives sent to these areas will subsequently determine . . . the period after which the German troops will be allowed to evacuate the areas."⁶² On June 18, he directed the Germans to stop their advance into Esthonia and to evacuate the entire region. This was not carried out till the threat of economic pressure on Germany secured final obedience in December. The devastations committed by these German troops were considerable.⁶³ On the other hand, they recaptured Riga from the Bolsheviks in the spring. In their support of the Baltic barons, however, they aimed ultimately to prepare the way for German influence and looked to the "coming alliance of Germany with Russia." For this reason they opposed British influence and orders and professed to see in British policy the desire to establish by her navy in the Baltic a predominant position in Latvia from which she would "steal from Germany the opportunity of having before long a great and powerful ally—Russia."⁶⁴ Thus the original idea of the Allies, as expressed in Article 12 of the Armistice, to obtain from Germany loyal co-operation, was wrecked. Throughout 1919 the German troops were perhaps necessary in Latvia, but they were also an evil.

German interference in the domestic affairs of the region was continuous, though the invitation afforded by Latvian political dissensions was considerable. As the year closed, the reconstituted Latvian government took charge and at once

began negotiations with Soviet Russia. This was now possible owing to the Lettish victories over the Russo-German irregular forces commanded by Colonel Bermont who had attempted to interfere in the situation. These negotiations finally led to the signature of peace at Riga on August 11, 1920.⁶⁵

This treaty provided for peace and recognized the independence of Latvia, which was constituted of the southern part of Livonia, Courland, and Latgallia. In its main provisions it followed closely the treaty between Esthonia and Soviet Russia, which has already been summarized. Similar articles provided for the restoration of property, the repatriation of prisoners, the option as to citizenship, commercial relations, and war losses. In particular, the Russian government was to restore railway equipment which had been evacuated from Latvia during the war, and to assist in the restoration of the telegraph lines and lighthouses. On account of such work four million gold rubles were to be paid over by Russia. Latvia was to be freed from any obligations as to Russian debts. There was also an interesting suggestion in Article VI.:

Deeming it absolutely necessary that obligations to cover the losses of the World War of 1914-17, suffered by the ruined countries or parts of countries, on which territories the war was carried on, shall be justly distributed between all the world-powers, both contracting parties undertake the endeavor to reach an agreement between all the powers for the creation of an international world-fund, from which the money shall be drawn to cover the above mentioned losses.

In accordance with a further pledge to extend mutual help to cover these losses, Russia granted "the rights of cutting forest on an area of one hundred thousand dessiatines in order to help Latvian peasantry to rebuild their homes destroyed during the war." On the whole, therefore, this treaty also was a liberal document.

The political significance of the treaty was touched on by Joffe in an article in the *Izvestia*:

... Latvia received, nevertheless, everything that really belonged to her.... Russia has acquired another exit, and not a

window but a wide door, to Europe in the fine Latvian ports of Riga, Libau, and Windawa, through which she is able freely to import and export her goods.⁶⁶

Among these "goods" the Latvians soon discovered was an intelligence service directed from Moscow which sought to impose the doctrines of the Third Internationale by secret service methods which smacked strongly of traditional German espionage. Indeed, Latvia was also exposed to efforts by the anti-Bolshevik Russian elements who endeavored to use her territory to secure recruits for General Wrangel in southern Russia.⁶⁷

These matters, however, were negligible compared with the vigorous exchange of notes regarding the non-fulfilment of the terms of the treaty by Russia which began in November. The Latvian government protested in vain regarding the repatriation of Latvians and the return of the railway rolling stock. Excessive charges for goods in transit were also protested against by Soviet authorities. The entire situation was further aggravated by the discovery that strikes in Latvia were being fomented by Bolshevik propaganda. The Communists were trying to overthrow the Latvian authorities by agitation in order to set up a fresh government subservient to orders from Moscow. In such policies the Soviet legation at Riga was not so active as the legation at Reval which, under Litvinov during 1921, became the G. H. Q. for the entire Communist propaganda for Europe. Both in Latvia and in Lithuania the Soviet legations were ostentatious in their display.⁶⁸

However, the economic necessities of the case tended to improve mutual relations. The two Foreign Offices might write notes by the yard and engage special newspaper men to attack each other in the press. But the need of doing business finally surmounted all complaints. As long as the Soviet power was chiefly interested in preparing for world-revolution, Latvia after all was in no more danger than any other border state. As Soviet Russia turned her attention more and more to the promotion of foreign trade and to the reconstruction of economic life, the importance of the Lettish ports

became clearer. For such reasons it was to the interest of Latvia to serve Russia as a country of transit, as an economic switchboard. Indeed, all the Baltic states came to feel that their independence was probably safer than it would be if the Soviet authority were overthrown and a bourgeois or really liberal national Russian government were set up at Moscow; and this despite the menace of the Third Internationale.

This tendency is evident in a meeting of the Social-Democratic Parties of Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which took place at Riga in October, 1921. A resolution was passed favoring a foreign policy of good will and mutual understanding toward Russia. The prosperity of the Baltic states can be obtained only as the result of a strong and healthy economic co-operation with Russia.⁶⁹ The Latvian government had repeatedly revealed the same fact. In August, 1921, a treaty was signed with the Ukraine;⁷⁰ and the tendency of Latvian policy is strongly in the direction of closer commercial connections. Indeed, the liberal treaties negotiated by Soviet Russia with all the Baltic states are due to their economic importance to Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the influence of the Third Internationale is against cordial relations. In a note of protest against its activities, the Latvian Minister at Moscow stated of one of its subordinate communist clubs:

The facts above quoted plainly show that on Russian territory, right in the capital, an organization is existing, pursuing the aim not only of overthrowing the existing Latvian Government, but also of destroying Latvia itself and its present form of government.

This he pointed out was clearly a violation of Article IV of the peace treaty. The reply of the Soviet government defended the club and charged the Latvian government with facilitating "the publication of every ill-minded and criminal calumny invented against Russia."⁷¹ This sort of exchange does not encourage faith in the development of cordial relations. The entire question of policy will, however, come up again in connection with the development of the Baltic League.

LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE

The relations of Soviet Russia with Lithuania follow more peaceful lines. Indeed, technically these two countries had not been at war. There was the deep-rooted opposition of Lithuania to Russian domination and the record of long oppression by Tsarist officials. The population, however, was for the greater part indifferent to politics and wished to cultivate its farms unmolested. The intellectual elements, nevertheless, had been eager for the revival of the study of the Lithuanian language and history. For the most part Lithuanians had shared the treatment accorded to Russian Poles following the Polish partitions, 1772-95, which had placed them both under Russian rule. However, the national glories of Lithuania dated back to a period prior to their submergence under Polish rule.

Such records did not prevent the Russians from aiming at a more complete assimilation of the Lithuanians than was possible in the case of the Poles, whose national history was a lively and effective element in their daily lives. For this reason the oppressive measures of Tsarist policy bore more heavily on Lithuania.⁷² With ruthless vigor both the Roman Catholic Church and the schools were attacked as the roots of the problem. Russia's "determination to break by force every non-Russian element in the country" was a failure, for today the Church is still strong and the Lithuanian national problem came into being in spite of the persistent efforts at Russification which were spread over a century. Indeed, "the first open expression of Lithuanian national consciousness began in the *Ausra*, a newspaper which was founded in 1883."⁷³ In 1905, a Lithuanian National Assembly demanded merely federal union with Russia. In 1917, it required independence. This was apparent by their proclamation of May, 1917.⁷⁴

The country had been occupied by the Germans since 1915; and following the treaty of Brest-Litovsk they recognized its independence on March 23, 1918. Prince von Urach of Wurttemberg was named as the future King. This was accepted

by the Lithuanians, as the alternative might be a union with Poland under German protection. This independence was, however, a mere sham, for the country was occupied and governed by Germans until after the Armistice. Then, on January 14, 1919, a conference of Lithuanian nationalists summoned the Tariba, or local legislative body, which had been organized in 1917. This provisional government chose a Cabinet and the national life of Lithuania began.⁷⁵ The Bolshevik government tried at once to assert its authority as the German power declined, but thanks to the presence in Lithuania of forty thousand German troops and the creation of a small Lithuanian force, the Bolshevik régime failed to gain a good footing in Lithuania. At the same time the Lithuanian and White Russian elements were chiefly concerned with the agrarian question and with a defense of their territory against Polish aggression.⁷⁶ The Germans, however, had comparatively little to do with the expulsion of the Bolsheviks, for at times they seemed almost to fraternize with them. By arduous work the Lithuanians themselves succeeded in suppressing disorders and in clearing their frontiers of the Russians as they set up civil government throughout their territory. Later, the withdrawal of the Germans took place.

The Lithuanian Constituent Assembly which met in the spring of 1920 now once more declared the independence of Lithuania and proceeded to the task of drawing up a constitution. Meanwhile, negotiations were begun with Soviet Russia. In view of the dangerous situation as regards Poland, these were hurried along and a treaty was signed on July 12, 1920, at Moscow.⁷⁷

This treaty provided for the recognition by Soviet Russia of the independence of Lithuania. The frontiers were fixed as they are indicated on map facing page 102. The Lithuanian frontiers with Latvia and Poland were to be settled with those countries. Both the parties bound themselves "to prohibit the formation or existence on their territories of any government, organization, or group aiming to wage an armed struggle against the other contracting party." Other provisions emphasized this fact. Russia agreed to recognize the

neutrality of Lithuania after other states had done so. The Russian government restored to Lithuania property removed during the War and which was under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, in view of the impoverished condition of Lithuania the Soviet government was to pay Lithuania three million gold rubles and to grant the right of timber cutting on an area of one hundred thousand dessiatines for a period of twenty years. Rights of option as to citizenship, repatriation of refugees, transit rights, the establishment of consular and diplomatic representation, amnesty, and the freedom of Lithuania from any Russian debts were all dealt with. As in the case of Esthonia and Latvia, the treaty as a whole is an amicable and liberal document.

The enforcement of the treaty is another matter; and within a short time Lithuania was compelled to follow the example of the other Baltic states and to make diplomatic protests by strongly worded notes against violations of the treaty. At the same time, secret negotiations were being carried on which looked to joint military action with Soviet Russia in case Poland should attack Lithuania. In October, 1920, took place the Polish occupation of Vilna which was to complicate and embitter Lithuanian relations for a long time. This question, however, does not concern us except as indirectly it affects general matters of Baltic policy.⁷⁸ The relations of Lithuania and Poland remained bad; but the suggestion was privately made in the end of 1921 that it was possible for Lithuania to acquire full control of Memel as compensation for the loss of Vilna. This may be one of the reasons for the occupation of Memel by Lithuanian forces in 1923.

Certainly, Lithuanian policy toward Russia has been conspicuously patient, and recently the official statements of the new Lithuanian Minister at Moscow give color to the idea that Lithuania is cultivating close relations with the Soviet authorities. He said:

Lithuania continues to struggle for its independence. This very struggle and its outcome depend to a great extent on how firmly Soviet Russia keeps the hammer in her hand. The Lithuanian Government has always been and will be loyal to Russia since

this policy is dictated by the interests of Lithuania. Lithuania had some friends. Now they are all gone except Russia. Being isolated in its struggle for independence, Lithuania looks upon Soviet Russia as a friendly state. Lithuania is compelled to believe in the Soviet hammer. With the eyes of a politician I can see how what was sown by Russia is growing and how the Soviet scythe will reap these crops.⁷⁹

Certainly, if this speech was not intended as a deliberate bid for Russian help it was highly injudicious. The Soviet reply was courteous but nothing more; and almost at once followed the demands of Russia that she be consulted regarding the settlement as to the river Nieman.⁸⁰ This question, as well as others, gives opportunity for Russia to mingle in negotiations which affect the entire Baltic region. For such reasons the organization and development of the Baltic League is an important stage in the history of Soviet foreign relations.

THE BALTIC LEAGUE

The prosperity and safety of the Baltic states depends on two factors of equal importance: (1) "unless the necessity of Russia for having at her disposal the ports of the Baltic Sea is fully satisfied, there can never be an entire security for the Baltic states; (2) the Russian transit [trade] is advantageous for the Baltic states."⁸¹

Under such circumstances the Baltic League cannot adopt an aggressive tone. This association of nations has rather the purpose of preventing discord among its members and of assuring to each that it will gather what it has sown. As yet it is largely a paper organization, but with great potentialities; and concretely, as in the case of the problem of disarmament, it can act practically as a unit. Nevertheless, the Baltic League was born of a dread of the great power to the east. The menace of revolutionary propaganda and the threat of drastic action by the Soviet authorities was a compelling force toward union. From a purely military point of view, the lengthening of their common frontier might expose the combined states to a greater danger, for as the salient increased in length the possibility of the attack also became more varied.

This, however, was partially balanced by the advantage of developing a common policy and by the exchange of information.

The main difficulties in accomplishing the association were: first, the slow development of a common policy; and secondly, the difficulties between Lithuania and Poland. Conferences on a variety of subjects were held before the treaty was signed at Warsaw on March 17, 1922. At Dorpat, Helsingfors, and Riga these conferences took place sometimes among the four northern states and often between three or even only two governments.⁸² Generally they were concerned with the regulation of customs and the restoration of economic life. A common policy was first developed between Esthonia and Latvia regarding Bolshevik propaganda and strikes. Then came their secret military convention.

At the same time Lithuania and Latvia consulted as to possible danger from Germany. Out of this there came a commercial and economic agreement. But Latvia, though by no means pro-Polish, was opposed to a military convention with Lithuania as long as the Vilna question was unsettled. Of course, if there were a rude attack on Lithuania, it was possible that Latvia might intervene. In any case there were the claims of Polish estate owners to lands in Latvia which were confiscated under Latvian law. Polish claims to the Illuxt district, which Latvia had received on the settlement of the Latvian-Lithuanian boundary, were unsettled. And a general dislike of aggressive Polish tendencies combined to retard the development of the league.⁸³

In July, 1921, however, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Poland sent representatives to a meeting at Helsingfors to consult regarding policy toward Soviet Russia. Here it was agreed to keep each other informed and to give mutual support as to the enforcement of treaties. There were no military commitments and it was agreed that the next meeting of these states should be held at Warsaw. At Riga there were also meetings which included Lithuania; but both Esthonia and Finland were afraid of Poland because of the Vilna dispute and because of the belief that in the future a strong Russian

government might try to recover Polish territory. As the autumn came on, there was a further coolness between Latvia and Poland as the result of improved Latvo-Lithuanian relations. Indeed, in Esthonia the feeling was distinct that the smaller union with Latvia and Lithuania was alone possible. In January, 1922, with the danger of war between Finland and Soviet Russia regarding Karelia, the interests of both Esthonia and Latvia became more apparent. By February this feeling had spread to Poland; steps were taken to close up the ranks and to bring Latvia and Poland into accord. Then with the Genoa Conference in the immediate future came the March meeting at Warsaw. This excluded Lithuania though the Poles gave a pledge not to attack her nor to stand in the way of an agreement with her.⁸⁴

The agreement signed on March 17, 1922, provided that the governments represented—Poland, Esthonia, Finland, and Latvia—should mutually recognize the treaties that Esthonia, Latvia, and Poland had each signed with Russia during 1920. They agreed not to sign any treaty which would aim directly or indirectly against one of the other signatory states. They promised to notify each other of the text of the treaties each should sign. Negotiations were to be begun for the conclusion of administrative and economic treaties, and protection for minorities was pledged. An agreement was made for arbitration of disputes. Then followed Article 7, which has already been quoted. This, in providing for a benevolent attitude toward any one of the four states which might be subject to unprovoked attack and in providing for an immediate consultation of all four for the decision as to measures to be undertaken in such an emergency, goes beyond neutrality yet does not actually go so far as an alliance. The treaty is for five years and is to remain in force later subject to notice.⁸⁵

One feature attending this agreement was a defensive military convention between Poland and Rumania. This agreement thus made Poland a keystone in the arch of border states extending from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The strength of that connection was not uniform, and yet the relation of this Baltic League to the Little Entente, of Rumania, Czecho-

slovakia, and Jugo-Slavia, was not to be ignored. Later, Finland did not ratify the Warsaw agreement, and in view of the reference of the Karelian dispute to a mixed Russo-Finnish commission it was faintly rumored that a secret understanding with Soviet Russia had been attained. Whether this is so or not, the fact of the Baltic League is of the greatest importance for the future. Indeed, it was largely in connection with the development of Russian policy toward the League that the Soviet proposals for the Disarmament Conference of December, 1922, were revealed.

RUSSIAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

During the conferences at Genoa and the Hague, the Baltic states had loyally supported the desire for recognition of Russia largely because it seemed to them to be natural and also because of the economic advantage to themselves which might result from an increasing Russian transit trade through their territories. At Genoa, Chicherin had declaimed about disarmament. Later, during the Hague Conference, the proposal was first made primarily to the Baltic states.⁸⁸ The replies indicated at once the profound suspicion of Russian motives that had colored the diplomacy of the recent years. This was perhaps natural in view of the long delays that had marked the carrying out of the terms of the previous treaties. For these delays the chaos in Russia was partially responsible; the dilatoriness of the Soviet régime and the national characteristics of the Russians also played a part. Yet we cannot forget Lenin's original statement at the time that the Esthonian treaty was being concluded. Then he had favored the treaty largely because he anticipated a Soviet revolution in Esthonia which would nullify many of its provisions. Certainly, the activities of the Third Internationale in all of the Baltic states had provoked doubt as to the sincerity of Soviet Russia.

The Disarmament Conference at Moscow failed fundamentally because the states did not have confidence in Russia. The negotiations which preceded it and its sessions are in reality a study in distrust. The moral atmosphere was lacking which could bring about mutual reliance. For this Litvinov, who

had formerly acted as diplomatic chief at Reval, was partially responsible. Neither his character nor his past performances gave him the position which would warrant belief in his integrity.

The receipt of the invitations to the Conference was the occasion of inquiries as to its purpose and plan. This was later cited by the Soviet authorities as evidence of distrust. The ministerial crisis in Poland also delayed matters. The result was that the plan was abundantly discussed in the press and opportunity was given for the members of the Baltic League to confer as to a united policy. *Latvia* thus summed up the Latvian view on July 4, 1922:

Everybody who knows the current Bolshevik life and policy must see this Russian step stands in pronounced contradiction to Bolshevik actions exercised so far. It is also known by everybody that the Bolsheviks have so far based their power upon a powerful, forcible militarism and that the Red Army was to uphold the prestige of the Bolshevik Government amidst the Russian people. . . . The Red Army was kept in such immense strength not only for foreign aggression but particularly for putting down revolutionary risings in Russia itself. . . . Russia cannot have any serious disarmament intentions. The call for disarmament had to be made for various reasons. Firstly, in view of the absolute fatigue of the Russian people in respect of military oppression; secondly, for instituting within the ranks of the Red Army the illusion of an early holiday; and at last, for agitation amongst the peoples surrounding Russia of the idea that Russia is indeed a peace-loving country and is fighting for peace.

The Estonian Foreign Minister, Mr. Piip, was more reserved. He said that the Baltic states "approve in principle of the Russian proposal but preserve at the same time certain freedom of action."⁸⁷ The Soviet Minister at Reval spoke of Russia's sincerity in the proposal for a reduction in her army and declared: "the fact that Soviet Russia was the initiator of the Disarmament Conference once more emphasizes her sincere desire for peace."⁸⁸ Poland was very cautious and with Latvia referred to the coming plans of the League of Nations for a discussion as to armament limitation.⁸⁹

Finally, on August 24, 1922, the Russian government issued

a note reviewing the situation and formally renewed the invitation. Rumania was also invited, but replied that a necessary preamble was Russian recognition of the frontier which included Bessarabia. This was, naturally, enough to prevent her acceptance. Later, Lithuania was invited and it is noteworthy that even at the time of the conference there was not a word of criticism directed against Lithuania by the Russian official press. This would seem to isolate her from the other Baltic states and to suggest more cordial relations with Russia. The Soviet invitation stated:

The Russian Government could entertain no doubt but that the governments of all countries would gladly welcome our proposal and try to find ways and means to reduce their armed forces to a minimum, thereby giving the populations the possible opportunity to devote themselves to peaceful economic constructive work.⁹⁰

The Soviet Minister to Latvia also stated:

It is the desire of Soviet Russia to make the relations of Latvia closer than they have been in the past. Latvia has so far received only prejudiced judgment upon Soviet Russia. . . . The geographical and economic situation of Latvia necessitates the maintenance of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. . . . In fact, such an unfavorable attitude on the part of Latvia toward Russia is even harmful for Latvia and does not do either side any good.⁹¹

Finally the Conference met at Moscow on December 2. In a long interview a member of the Russian Foreign Office had reviewed Soviet relations with the Baltic states and with Poland. Throughout he emphasized the importance of economic relations and claimed that the Conference would promote business.⁹² Litvinov had declared that "Soviet Russia was born with the word 'peace' on its lips and has always been true to it." The Conference would "have to deal with but one question: the reduction of territorial armed forces."⁹³ The recent policy of Soviet Russia, the *Izvestia* stated:

shows that its greatest attention is paid to the restoration of domestic economic life. . . . All rumors concerning aggressive plans of Soviet Russia are unfounded and spread by political groups which themselves nurse aggressive plans against Russia or try to keep small nations in obedience.⁹⁴

Elaborate statistical charts were published to prove that Soviet Russia was extremely moderate in her military organization and proposed now a reduction of her forces to the absurd figure of two hundred thousand men or one quarter of their present strength, provided the other countries reduce their armies proportionally.⁹⁵ At the Conference the Estonian delegate said: "Material disarmament should be preceded and accompanied by political disarmament." Finland laid the emphasis on arbitration; and the delegates of the Baltic League stated: "The temporary lack of mutual confidence is the cause of militarism and should be remedied."⁹⁶

The Poles finally came out clearly for the necessity of "political guarantees of non-aggression" in order that an "atmosphere of confidence" might develop. This Litvinov criticized, declaring that Soviet Russia wished "to create an atmosphere of confidence but by acts, not by 'scraps of paper' and by words."⁹⁷ Steklov argued that the border states were harassed by revolutionary tendencies and that they were trying to maintain their armies for domestic purposes as well as for outside dangers.⁹⁸

Finally, after various questions had been referred to committees, there was a dispute as to the exact size of the Polish army. This had been notified to the League of Nations as of 294,000 men, while at the Conference, in anticipation of a possible reduction, the Poles now claimed it to be 370,000.⁹⁹ The Finns seemed to have the best arithmetic for they "declared straight that the Finnish army numbered 28,000 and would not be reduced." The essential points of the border states were stated on December 11 to be (1) the signature of a non-aggressive and arbitration agreement, (2) the acceptance of the official figures as given for 1923, and (3) the reference of the matter of reduction to a committee of experts who would meet after the agreement had been signed. This Russia refused to do since she again declared that she was in favor of disarmament at once "for a long time and in earnest." The Conference thereupon broke up.¹⁰⁰

The result, therefore, was that the Soviet press came out at once in bitter criticism. Litvinov, at the closing session,

had referred contemptuously to "solemn political treaties" which are merely "empty phrases" and which deceive the "broad masses of the population." He insisted that only actual proportional reduction of armies would be the genuine proof of the intention of non-aggression. Along these lines, therefore, both the *Izvestia* and the *Pravda* began a vigorous attack, prophesying revolutions and disorders among the border states.¹⁰¹ In a signed editorial Steklov said:

The peaceful tendencies of the Soviet Republic are thus beyond the slightest suspicion; equally apparent are the aggressive feelings of the governments which were represented at the Moscow Conference and of those which force others to waste money for armaments. The laboring masses will bear this fact in mind. That is one of the great achievements of the Moscow Conference which will not remain fruitless.¹⁰²

The Latvian delegate thus summed up the entire matter: "The Baltic delegates had hoped to save the situation by creating an atmosphere of confidence. Such an atmosphere would have been ensured if the Moscow Conference had signed the non-aggressive and arbitration pact."¹⁰³ The fact seemed to be that by desertion and other causes the efficiency of the Red army had been decreased. The Soviet authorities sought to secure a reduction in the armies of the Baltic League which would amount to a proportionate decrease in order to cover the decrease in Soviet forces. When, however, it came to a matter of signing a solemn treaty against future aggression and for arbitration, the Soviet authorities withdrew. Later, they announced that they had officially stated a reduction of forces to equal losses already due to desertion from their own army. Then when they actually praised the Poles for their firm stand, the entire situation became clearer.¹⁰⁴ The facts in the case now agreed with the new figures given for the Soviet army.

Thus the story of the Baltic region is first of all a successful struggle for independence; second, it is a matter of the enforcement of treaties; third, it is a constant struggle against propaganda; fourth, it is a complicated economic affair; and fifth, it is a question of mutual confidence and trust. Unfortunately, these last are still lacking.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. *Sotsial Demokrat* is the organ of the Esthonian Social Democratic party.
2. *La Question de la Carélie Orientale*, Helsingfors, 1922, p. 97.
3. This treaty was signed at Warsaw, March 17, 1922, by Poland, Esthonia, Finland, and Latvia. *Current History*, Vol. XVI, p. 471. Finland later failed to ratify this treaty.
4. *Finland (Handbooks prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 47)*. (London, 1920), p. 17.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 37. Cf. Mavor, *My Windows on the Street of the World* (London, 1923), 2 vols., II, pp. 38-50.
7. *Finland*, pp. 39-61. Yarmolinsky, "The Republic of Finland" in *Current History*, VII, Part 2, pp. 437-41.
8. *Finland*, p. 58.
9. *Petrograd Pravda*, Nov. 15, 1917.
10. *Pravda*, Nov. 20, 29, Dec. 27 (evening edition), 1917.
11. *Finland*, p. 57.
12. *Izvestia*, Jan. 1, 1918; *Gazette*, Jan. 10, 1918.
13. *Izvestia*, Jan. 16, 1918.
14. *Ibid.*, Jan. 18, 23, 1918. *Finland*, p. 60.
15. *Texts of the Finland "Peace"* (Published by the Department of State), Washington, 1918, pp. 5-12.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-46. *Current History*, VIII, Part 1, p. 52, and pp. 445-48. The "stipulation that no territorial changes were to be made without consultation with Germany" made the recognition of Finnish independence largely illusory. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference at Paris* (London, 1920), I, p. 232.
17. *Izvestia*, March 16; April 6, 1918.
18. *Ibid.*, April 12, 23, 24; May 3, 16, 21, 28, 30; June 6, 16, 18, 25; and July 1, 1918. Throughout this period, Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy*, is very useful.
19. *Izvestia*, June 4, 18; July 24, 30; Aug. 4, 1918. *Texts of Finland "Peace,"* p. 53.
20. Söderhjelm, *The Red Insurrection in Finland in 1918* (London, n.d.); Ruhl, *New Masters of the Baltic*, chap. ii, *Current History*, VIII, Part I, pp. 438-44; Part II, pp. 53, 264.
21. *Ibid.*, IX, Part I, pp. 78, 289.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 506.
23. *Izvestia*, Aug. 7, 18, 23, 25, 27; Sept. 3, 12, 1918.
24. Ruhl, chap. iii. *Current History* X, Part I, pp. 51, 473.

25. Vorovsky, "Finnish Imperialism," in *Soviet Russia*, Sept. 20, 1919.
26. *Izvestia*, Feb. 15, 1919 (translated in *Soviet Russia*, July 5, 1919); April 15, April 29, May 6, 11, 14, 21, 28 (translated in *Soviet Russia*, Aug. 9, Sept. 16, Sept. 27, Oct. 11). *Wireless News*, July 21, 1919.
27. *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1919. Cf. *Ibid.*, Sept. 11.
28. The Note of July 31, 1919, is translated in *Soviet Russia*, Feb. 7, 1920; that of Oct. 9 in *Ibid.*, Feb. 28; that of Oct. 29 in *Ibid.*, Jan. 31. The pressure which the Socialists in Finland were able to exert in favor of peace is noted in *Ibid.*, April 24, 1920. The announcement that peace negotiations are to begin is of May 28 from Helsingfors in *Ibid.*, June 26, 1920.
29. *Current History*, XII, p. 459. *Soviet Russia*, July 3, Aug. 4, 1920.
30. The English translation of this treaty is in a pamphlet—*"The Treaty of Peace between Finland and the Russian Soviet Republic,"* Government Printing Office (Helsingfors, 1921). It is also in *Treaties, Agreements and Conventions (Sbornik Deistvuiushtchikh Dogorovov) of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic*, 4 parts (Moscow, 1922), 23, p. 76. (In Russian.) Hereafter this will be cited as *Sbornik*.
31. *Wireless News*, Helsingfors, Dec. 11, 1920. Cf. *Petrograd Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1920.
32. *The Aland Islands. (Handbook prepared under the Direction of the Historical Division of the Foreign Office—No. 48.)* (London, 1920.) *League of Nations Special Supplement*, No. I, Aug., 1920, and No. 3, Oct., 1920. Also the *Journal of the League of Nations*, 1920-23, *passim*. *League of Nations, Council's Reports*, Seventh Session, July 9-20; Ninth Session, Sept. 16-20; Tenth Session, Oct. 20-28, 1920.
33. Cf. *Le Droit de la Carélie* (published by the Central Government of Karelia), 1922.
34. *La Question de la Carélie orientale* (published by the Finnish Foreign Office). Helsingfors, 1922, contains the text of notes. Cf. *Soviet Russia*, Feb. 15, 1922.
35. *Ibid.*, March 1, 1921. *Latwigas Sargs*, Dec. 15, 1921; *New York Times*, Jan. 4, 1922.
36. Further correspondence regarding the entire question is to be found in *Livre Vert* (published by the Karelian Delegation), Helsingfors, 1922. The notes to the League of Nations are pp. 171 *et seq.* Cf. *Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 1922.

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37. *Courland, Livonia and Esthonia* (Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Foreign Office, No. 50), (London, 1920), pp. 16-24.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
39. *Izvestia*, Dec. 6, 1917.
40. *Petrograd Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1917. Cf. *Izvestia*, Feb. 22, 1918.
41. *Petrograd Pravda*, Dec. 23, 1917.
42. Hale, *The Baltic Provinces*. (Report of the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the Situation in the Baltic Provinces.) Sixty-sixth Cong., First Session, No. 105, Washington, 1919, pp. 11-13.
43. *Izvestia*, May 25, 1918.
44. *Ibid.*, May 28, June 6, 1918.
45. *Pour l'Esthonie Indépendante* (Recueil des Documents diplomatiques publié par la Délégation Esthonienne), (Copenhagen, 1918), pp. 30-32, 61-62.
46. "Paravane," "With the Baltic Squadron, 1918-1920," in *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CIX, N.S. May, 1921, pp. 705-716.
47. *Mémoire sur l'Indépendance de l'Esthonie présenté à la Conférence de la Paix par la Délégation Esthonienne*, April, 1919. Paris, n.d. This contains a short history of the entire period. *Esthonia and the League of Nations; Memorandum by the Secretary General; Les Etats-Unis et l'Esthonie* (a manuscript memorandum). Cf. Hale, *The Baltic Provinces*, pp. 14-17.
48. *Addendum au memoire sur l'indépendance de l'Esthonie présenté à la conférence de la paix par la délégation Esthonienne* June 19, 1919, Paris.
49. *Letter de la Délégation esthonienne adressé à M. le Président de la Conférence de la paix à l'occasion de la proposition de paix faite par le gouvernement des Soviets*. Paris, Sept. 29, 1919. Cf. also *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 10, 1919, and *Petrograd Pravda*, Nov. 15, 1919, for an article by Joffe.
50. *Izvestia*, Jan. 28, 1920.
51. *Treaty of Peace between Russia and Esthonia*, London, n.d. The text in translation is also given in *Soviet Russia*, April 17, 1920. The original Russian text is in *Sbornik*, I, p. 100.
52. *The Private Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly*, Paris, 1921, pp. 62-63.
53. *Narodnoje Dielo*, Jan. 29, 1921.
54. *Wireless News*, Berlin, Sept. 1, 1921. Cf. *Ost-Information*, Berlin, June 29, 1921.
55. *Revaler Bote*, Nov. 11, 1921. Cf. also *Ost-Information*, Berlin, Nov. 2, 12, 1921.

56. Radek in *Pravda* on March 23, 1922, addressed an angry and threatening article to the Baltic states warning them against a pro-Ally attitude at Genoa. The protocol was signed Mar. 30. *Sbornik*, III, p. 4.
57. *Rigasche Rundschau*, June 14, 1922. Cf. also for counter-attacks on Esthonia, *New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1922, and *Izvestia*, Sept. 17, 1922.
58. Hale, *The Baltic Provinces*, pp. 16 et seq.
59. *Izvestia*, Jan. 7, 1918.
60. Hale, p. 17.
61. *Courland, Livonia and Esthonia*, p. 18. Cf. also *Russian Poland, Lithuania, and White Russia* (Handbooks prepared under the direction of Historical Section of the Foreign Office No. 44) (London, 1920), pp. 28 et seq., *A memorandum on the Relationship between Latvia and Russia* (manuscript).
62. Hale, p. 40.
63. Temperley, I, p. 344-45.
64. Hale, p. 23, quoting German orders issued at Riga, June 16, 1919. Cf. articles by Preedin on Great Britain's Baltic Policy in *Soviet Russia*, Jan. 10, 17, 24 and 31, 1920. Naturally, these articles take an unfavorable view of British policy.
65. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 11, 1920; *Soviet Russia*, June 12, 19, 1920. The English translation of this treaty is in *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1920. The Russian text is in *Sbornik*, I, p. 35.
66. *Izvestia*, Aug. 14, 1920.
67. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Oct. 25, 1920.
68. *Ost-Information*, Berlin, Nov. 27, 1920, and April 9, 1921.
69. *Sotsial Demokraat*, Oct. 20, 1921. Cf. for a cheerful view of the situation, *Christian Science Monitor*, April 17, 1923.
70. *Valdibas Vestnesis*, Dec. 20, 1921.
71. *Izvestia*, Sept. 30, 1922.
72. *Russian Poland, Lithuania, and White Russia*, p. 40 et seq.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
75. Hale, *The Baltic Provinces*, p. 24 et seq.
76. *Severnaya Communa*, March 1, 1919; *Soviet Russia*, May 8, 1920.
77. The English translation of the treaty is in *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1920. The original Russian text is in *Sbornik*, I, p. 50. Cf. Naron-shevitch, "Lithuania and her International Obligations," in the *Baltic Review*, I, No. 7, Feb., 1921, p. 293. *Soviet Russia*, Aug. 21, Oct. 2, Nov. 13, 1920; March 19, 1921.
78. *Ost-Information*, Berlin, Sept. 10, 1921.
79. *Pravda*, July 14, 1922.
80. *Izvestia*, Aug. 30, 1922.

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81. Seya, "A League of Baltic Republics," in *Our World*, May, 1923, p. 50. Dr. Seya was Latvian Chargé d'Affaires at Washington.
82. Cf. Machray, "The New Baltic States," in *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CVI, N.S., Dec., 1919, pp. 803-13.
83. Cf. Machray, "A Baltic League," in *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CX, N.S., July, 1921, pp. 54-64.
84. Cf. Machray, "The Baltic League," in *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CXI, N.S., May, 1922, pp. 734-43.
85. *New York Times*, April 16, 1922, quoting *Kölnische Zeitung*, March 23, 1922. The text of the agreement is in *Current History*, XVI, pp. 470-71.
86. *Izvestia*, June 14, 1922, and *Pravda*, June 14, 1922. Cf. *New York Times*, June 16, 1922.
87. *Latvijas Sargs*, July 12, 1922.
88. *Jaunakas Sinas*, July 17, 1922.
89. *Latvijas Kareivas*, July 26, 28, 1922.
90. *Izvestia*, Aug. 24, 1922. Russian Notes are in *Russian Information Review*, Sept. 15, Dec. 2, and Dec. 30, 1922. Cf. Radek, "The Fear of Disarmament," *Pravda*, June 30, and in *Soviet Russia*, Sept. 15, 1922.
91. *Rigasche Rundschau*, Sept. 9, 1922; *Izvestia*, Nov. 2, 1922, analyzes the entire situation.
92. *Ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1922.
93. *Pravda*, Nov. 30, 1922.
94. *Izvestia*, Dec. 2, 1922.
95. *Ibid.*, Dec. 2 and 3, 1922; *New York Times*, Dec. 4, 1922.
96. *Izvestia*, Dec. 3 and 5, 1922.
97. *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1922.
98. *Ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1922.
99. *Ibid.*, Dec. 9 and 10; *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1922.
100. *Izvestia*, Dec. 12, 1922. The official figures for the Finnish forces in 1923 are: Present Strength (a) Regular Army, 34,500; (b) Civil Guard, 100,265; Trained Reserves (a) Regular Army, 75,000; (b) Civil Guard, 50,000.
101. *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, and *Pravda*, Dec. 13, 14, 1922.
102. *Izvestia*, Dec. 14, 1922.
103. *Rigasche Nachrichten*, Dec. 19, 1922.
104. Scammell, "Fact and Fiction about the Soviet Army," in *Current History*, XVIII, May, 1923, pp. 293-99.

CHAPTER VI

SOVIET RUSSIA AND POLAND

Unfortunately, numerous facts show clearly an aggressive and imperialistic policy on the part of the Russian Soviet Government, whose troops are overrunning Lithuania and White Russia, thereby introducing a Soviet administration in territory which is alien to it and enslaving the peoples, thereby denying them the right to dispose of their own fate. In view of the fact that part of these territories is incontestably Polish, these measures directly affect the vital interests of the Polish nation:—*Polish Note to Soviet Russia, Dec. 30, 1918.*¹

The Soviet Government asserts that in spite of the harsh outcome of acts committed by detachments and by foreign forces in different parts of Russia, none of these forces has, however, descended to a depth of barbarity comparable to that which has been systematically exercised by the Polish authorities with their scheduled and terrific massacres of Jews and their numerous murders of their political adversaries.—*Soviet Note to Poland, June 3, 1919.*²

THE openness of Poland is largely responsible for her tempestuous history. It is a history that is well known and the earlier relations with Russia cannot detain us. The extinction of Polish liberty was a part of the joint policy of greed and imperialism that produced the three Polish partitions in 1772, 1793, and 1795 by Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The history of the nineteenth century showed that not even the illiberal ingenuity of Prussia and the tyranny of Tsarist Russia could strike the heart of Polish nationality. In 1914 the immediate question was as to the Poles. Would they remain divided between Russia and the Central Powers or would Polish nationality assert itself to unite with one side or the other? The Russians took no chances, and at once the proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas was issued, promising self-government to Russian Poland.³

During the long months of Russian defeat and of the German occupation of Poland the issue was plain—could Poland be restored among the nations? Gradually as the grinding force of Allied success proved the uselessness of further struggle by the Central Powers, the courage of Polish patriots revived. They came forward as a free, determined group to claim for themselves the liberty and the nationality that had been so long withheld.

Poland was, however, a state without boundaries, with only the memories of her history, and with the problem of her future foreign policy unsolved. The work of restoration was not merely physical; it was moral and spiritual as well. Unfortunately, politics were stormy and the extravagant claims of hasty Nationalists bid fare to wreck her difficult fortunes. In particular, her relations with Soviet Russia became immediately pressing. On these depended her long eastern borders and the maintenance of social order. Under such circumstances, both her own national ambitions and the responsibility of maintaining the key to the strategical position against the Bolshevik Revolution were heavy burdens for the new state.

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF POLAND

On November 4, 1916, the Central Powers issued a proclamation that Poland should be a "national state with hereditary monarchy and a constitutional government."⁴ The military occupation of Poland continued in the meantime. In March, 1917, the Russian Provisional government also issued a proclamation declaring that Poland should be an independent state "attached to Russia by a free military union."⁵ On June 4, 1917, a unit of the Polish national army was recognized in France and the agitation for Polish independence began to take form.⁶ President Wilson, in the Fourteen Points, came out for an independent Poland to include territory which was indisputably Polish and which should have access to the sea.

In the meantime, as a temporary war measure, a Regency Council was set up by the Central Powers in Poland. This

followed disputes between Germany and Austria as to the future status of the new state. The prospects of a really independent Poland did not seem encouraging.⁷ At Petrograd, the Bolsheviks talked of the "self-determination of peoples," but so far used only the word "autonomy" with reference to Poland. Finally, at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky declared for the "independence of Poland," but stated that "this independence will remain a dead letter as long as Poland remains under military occupation." He concluded by saying: "If the Polish state is an independent state, it should have geographical frontiers. If the Kingdom of Poland is a Kingdom it should have a King. If it has neither frontiers nor a King, it is neither a state nor a Kingdom." Under the circumstances, he complained of the indefinite character of the German demands.⁸

This debate, however, was cut short by the German ultimatum. The independence of Poland was recognized by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. At the same time, friction between Soviet authorities and Polish troops within the Russian army had developed as the latter sided with anti-Bolshevik elements. Open war, therefore, began by the Polish Legion in the Ukraine against the jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Commissary on Polish National Affairs.⁹ Throughout the spring and summer of 1918, the representative of the Polish Regency Council met with continued opposition at Moscow, and his work in connection with repatriation was conducted only under the auspices of the German Embassy.¹⁰ Finally, a Soviet envoy was appointed to Warsaw at the end of October; but this was too late to settle affairs, for now with the collapse of the Central Powers the real issue of an independent Poland was to appear.¹¹

On June 3, 1918, the Allied Supreme War Council favored Polish independence.¹² Troops from America began to come to France to join the Polish army; and in October the Polish Republic was proclaimed in Galicia, while trouble was reported from Prussian Poland as well. In November, General Pilsudski was declared Chief of State and with the next few weeks asserted his power and ordered all German authorities

to evacuate. In all this movement the Bolsheviks naturally had no part.¹³ The difficulties of the situation soon became apparent in Poland, where a temporary movement against the Pilsudski government developed. The Ukrainian forces began an attack on Polish forces; and the Poles hastened to occupy important points on the Russian frontier. Finally, order was partially restored; General Pilsudski became dictator under authority of the newly elected Diet; and a government was organized under Paderewski which was recognized by the Allies.¹⁴ In the meantime, the Polish army was reorganized under French auspices. This Paderewski defended by saying to the American press: "Your advice to us not to fight is good advice for a dying man, but not for a man who wishes to live and enjoy liberty."¹⁵ This was evident in the preparations for a conflict with the Bolsheviks.

RUSO-POLISH RELATIONS, 1919-20

Throughout this period, the general influence of France on Poland lay beneath the surface; but the bellicose intentions of the Poles were matched by the warlike desires of the Soviet forces. These had swept westward in the winter of 1918-19 to the capture of Vilna, Bielostok, Brest-Litovsk, and invaded Congress Poland. This was across territory that was in dispute, and the Poles quickly accepted the challenge. Napoleon Bonaparte once said: "The Polish question is the key to the European vault"; we might add that the key opened a charnel house of war. Certainly, the period of conflict which now opened in lands already tortured by five long years of bloodshed and devastation took on the horrors of guerrilla combat. The diplomatic correspondence teems with charges and counter-charges as Russian and Pole accuse each other of almost every form of duplicity and atrocity.

The scene opens with the accusation by the Polish government that diplomatic representatives of the former Polish Regency Council have been arrested and their property has been seized. The Soviet government replies by denying the charge, since these representatives were not empowered by a really national government, and in any case they were prompt-

ly released.¹⁶ Before the controversy is stilled, members of a Russian Red Cross mission in Poland were set on and murdered. Some months later the Polish government sentenced the murderers to prison for only a year or two.¹⁷

So the story goes; mutual accusations are made as to violations of territory and seizure of towns and villages. Hostages are held by both sides until an exchange is arranged by the Red Cross. All of this, however, without a formal declaration of war and in spite of a steady stream of communications continuing between the two governments. Proposals for negotiations are frequent, but invariably break down on one point or another.¹⁸ Finally as Chicherin states:

The Soviet Government was compelled to ask Ventzkowsky [Polish diplomatist] to leave Soviet Russia, having at the same time declared that at any moment it would be ready to begin peace negotiations again as soon as Poland ceased her military operations.¹⁹

The essential fact was that there was no Eastern frontier. The lines proposed at Paris by Dmowsky in November, 1918, and April, 1919, fell far short of the extreme claims of the Poles. At least the Poles so felt it, for they undertook to extend their power eastward in such fashion as to bring about a real conflict with the Ukraine.²⁰ Here the situation had been complicated by the existence under Petlura of forces which still carried on the traditions of the Ukrainian Rada and which were, therefore, anti-Bolshevik. In a later chapter the story of Soviet policies regarding Soviet Ukraine can be told. At present, Petlura's ventures were chiefly in eastern Galicia which he held against the Poles as the representative of the Republic of Western Ukraine, though his ambitious extended eastward toward Kiev.

Convinced that the fight for eastern Galicia and for Lemberg was now useless, Petlura came to terms with the Polish government. He signed a treaty in December, 1919, and by another treaty on April 21, 1920, with the Poles an alliance was made.²¹ The terms of this agreement provided that in return for the surrender of eastern Galicia to Poland, the government of Petlura was recognized as the rightful govern-

ment of the Ukraine; the Poles were to conquer Kiev for him and to help drive out Bolshevik forces; two Polish ministers were to enter his cabinet; and Poland was to have the right of transit to Odessa for her exports for a period of fifteen years.

Prior to this, the Russian Soviet government had made on January 28, 1920, an offer of peace to Poland which was carefully studied during February. Both sides, however, had apparently settled on a renewal of the contest on a vigorous scale. Indeed, Pilsudski stated early in February that he expected war.²² The Polish government first called a conference at Warsaw of Finland, Latvia, and Rumania to consult on terms and later issued a reply to Soviet Russia.²³ The Polish reply to the Soviet offer of discussion was at once so extravagant and so impossible that the attack could not long be postponed.

This declared for the following points: (1) the frontiers of 1772—the fresh territory was to be given a chance to organize itself under Polish protection; (2) Soviet Russia was to recognize all the frontier states and their new frontiers, together with Rumania's claim to Bessarabia; (3) prohibition of Soviet propaganda for revolution; (4) Russia was to pay an indemnity for all damages done to Poland since 1914; (5) railway rolling stock to be returned; (6) cash indemnity for all losses to Poles; (7) exchange of prisoners and provision for repatriation of citizens; (8) Poles in Siberia were to return with all the honors of war; (9) archives, paintings, and art treasures to be returned; (10) as a guarantee of the Russian performance of the treaty, the Poles were to occupy the government of Smolensk, a large province whose eastern boundaries lay about one hundred miles from Moscow. To this should be added the demand that a stable government should be set up in the Ukraine.²⁴

As will be seen from the map, the old frontiers of Poland as they existed in 1772 at the time of the First Partition stretched well beyond even the claims put forth by Polish representatives at the Peace Conference. Consequently, on news of these Polish demands in March, the Supreme Allied

Council protested against these claims.²⁵ Within a month, however, the Polish drive began and so rapid was their advance in the south that Kiev fell on May 6. The Poles even talked of moving southward on Odessa. In the north the Poles were also successful till they held a line well to the east of Minsk. The utmost advance was reached in early June. Thus within about six weeks after the drive began, the Poles had control of a large part of the territory they had demanded and held Kiev besides.²⁶

The march on Kiev was itself a surprise to the Polish nation. The plan had originated with Pilsudski who did not, it seems, take even his Cabinet into his confidence. It was accomplished in about a week from the advanced positions on the Pripiet River. The conception was, of course, based on an extravagant estimate of the amount of assistance that would rally to Petlura's forces in the Ukraine and was of a piece with the tempestuous character of Pilsudski. It was strongly criticized by both the British and French at the time; and as events will show was too much of an undertaking for the new Polish army to carry through to success.²⁷

Already on May 14 the Soviet offensive had struck toward the Pripiet; indeed, the Russians struck back very quickly. In early June their forces gathered near Kiev and almost cut the lines of communication. The Poles were forced to evacuate Kiev on June 11 and on July 7 Rovno fell. In the north also hard fighting began and on July 11 Minsk was recaptured by Bolshevik forces. Then the Polish front cracked and there began a rapid withdrawal. Within a month the Russians were at the very gates of Warsaw and had cut the main line of rail to Danzig.²⁸ On July 10 the Poles had appealed to the Allies for assistance. On July 11 a proposal was made for an armistice which would lead to a conference at London of the Soviet authorities and all the Russian border states. In the House of Commons, Lloyd George explained that England was bound to protect the integrity of Poland as a member of the League of Nations. Supplies were poured into Poland *via* Danzig and at a conference of the British and French premiers at Hythe it was decided on the initiative

of Lloyd George that General Weygand should be sent to Poland to organize the defence of Warsaw.²⁹

The Soviet authorities had counted on capturing Warsaw; they made the play of accepting the armistice terms; but they rejected the plan for a conference at London. The Allies had declared that they would not permit Poland to be disarmed, her form of government to be changed, her territories to be reduced, or to be used as a bridge to connect Soviet Russia with Germany. The British sent arms and the French sent officers to assist the Poles while all the world waited to see whether the Soviet forces would be strong enough, after their rapid advance, to capture Warsaw.³⁰

On August 11 the Soviet authorities agreed to an armistice to be signed at Minsk and on August 15 came the Polish counter-attack led by French generals. The Russian flank had been too much extended in the endeavor to cut communications with Danzig. The result was that the Soviet forces were forced to withdraw rapidly, losing many prisoners. By the time negotiations were ready to begin at Minsk, the Russian armies were back again in the north almost on a line with that they had occupied before their big advance in June.³¹

In all of these events, this chasing back and forth across the plains of Poland and White Russia, the armies had not really fought an engagement that would compare with even a minor attack during the World War. It was primarily a war of movement and thanks to French leadership the "miracle of the Vistula" had freed Warsaw from danger. Both sides were now exhausted and really wished for peace, though now the Poles were in a position which enabled them to secure favorable terms and to compel the Soviet authorities to agree to a frontier line that was in reality a compromise between the extreme claims of the winter and the line originally proposed by the Allies at Paris in 1919. The new frontier followed closely the line of the German trenches in 1917-18. It had, therefore, a certain strategic advantage in a country where small geographical features are of exceptional importance.

The Polish army was the great achievement of Poland's

first year of independence. The "Poles have great martial and patriotic traditions, and their army had formed and maintained itself under conditions that would have dissolved most others."³² In reality the army almost preceded the government. Its work was first to restore order and to oppose Bolshevism. In this they turned with traditional zest to baiting the Jew, who during the German occupation had enjoyed "high day and triumph." "Once a Jew, always a German"—as the saying goes;³³ and Germany had been hated in Poland as her worst enemy. Add to this the fact that popularly the connection of the Jews with Bolshevism was already fixed. "Whatever the truth is . . . the average Pole and especially the army looks on Bolshevism as an entirely Jewish invention and affair."³⁴ Finally, there was the long memory of Tsarist oppression in Poland. Under such circumstances, fighting with Soviet authorities, who were looked on with horror by the strongly anti-Semitic Poles, was inevitable. Poland is the country in which Bolshevik doctrine was most bitterly opposed. This was despite general conditions which in 1918-19 strongly favored its spread. Thus the conflict began.

The Soviet authorities declared in January, 1920:

In so far as the real interests of Poland and of Russia are concerned, there is not a single question, whether territorial, economic, or other which could not be decided in a peaceful way by means of negotiation, concession, and mutual accord.³⁵

The fact that domestic politics had placed in power in Poland the more democratic elements was by irony to make peace more difficult. It was the party which had looked on Russia as the great enemy, which dreamed of a federal union of Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine, and which was bent on the expulsion of Russian rule within the boundaries of 1772.³⁶ The more conservative party was, however, not so ambitious. Their interest lay in the rapid restoration of normal economic conditions; they had maintained relations with historic Russia; and they were less anxious for the continuation of war. The democratic elements were, however, in control; and from both Paris and Warsaw there came the idea of an attempt to carry

on the struggle against Bolshevik rule by means of Polish arms.³⁷

The international character of the struggle was naturally emphasized at Moscow. It was also claimed as a class war and as a conflict supported by the international bourgeoisie. Lenin said:

At the present moment certain imperialist countries in alliance with small states bordering on us are trying to do what all the imperialistic countries in alliance with all the border states were unsuccessful in accomplishing. . . . Thus the French need the re-establishment of a Poland of generals and are ready to make any sacrifice to accomplish this, while England, because of her economic situation, needs precisely the dismemberment of Russia and a weak Poland for her trade interests and colonial policy.³⁸

So in numerous meetings held to whip up enthusiasm, the cry was strong that "the toiling masses must understand that the existence of Poland and Russia can be guaranteed only by the overthrow of the insolent and pitiable Polish bourgeoisie."³⁹ In the Russian press the slogan was "Let the Poland of landlords and capitalists perish! Long live the Workman's Peasants' Poland! Long live the World Revolution!"⁴⁰

At the same time, the Russian appeal was also made to national patriotism. The Social Revolutionaries were allowed to hold meetings to attack Poland; and Zinoviev, the president of the Third Internationale, came out with an address to Russian nationalists:

The war is becoming national. Not only the advanced sections of the peasant population but even the wealthy peasants are hostile to the advance of Polish land owners. . . . We Communists must be at the head of this national movement, which will gain the support of the entire population and which daily grows stronger.⁴¹

For the recapture of Kiev and in order to drive the Poles from Russian soil, former Tsarist officers and officials were also drawn in. It was reported that General Brussilov was responsible for the plans that led to the Russian counter-attack in early June. Certainly, outside of Russia the emigrés

were bitter enough against Polish success. The War seemed to diminish for a time Russian hostility to the Soviet authorities and to consolidate Russian opinion along ancient, nationalist lines.

In two notable articles Radek, for the Bolsheviki, analyzed this feeling and Soviet policy. He wrote:

. . . Every bourgeois patriot in Russia understands perfectly well that the Poles are not interested in overwhelming the Bolsheviki; for the Bolsheviki could have peace with Poland any day if they would only cede enough territory to the Poles and pay a large enough indemnity. . . . We preach that this is a war for Russian independence; when we assert that we are employing in this war every available source of aid, not primarily to defend the Soviet government and Communism, but to defend the independence of Russia. . . . The moment the Entente backed up the Polish reactionaries, it made implacable enemies of the Russian reactionaries. The Soviet Government is defending the unity and independence of the territory inhabited by the Russian nation. . . . If a reactionary Poland utterly refuses to be a peaceful neighbor of Soviet Russia, the existence of a reactionary Poland becomes impossible.⁴²

Nevertheless, some Russians, notably Savinkov, sided with the Poles in their fight against the Soviet. He was to receive supplies from the Polish High Command for the maintenance of anti-Bolshevik Russian bands.⁴³ This was revealed after negotiations for peace were actually under way at Riga where the negotiators had finally met. These meetings were naturally stormy and on more than one occasion only a sincere desire for peace and the pressure exercised by the Allied Powers enabled them to continue.

The attitude of the United States during the negotiations was also a disappointment to the Poles. This was shown in a note of August 21, 1920, when the Secretary of State declared:

[The United States] could not approve the adoption of an offensive war program against Russia by the Polish Government. The American Government is of the opinion that the Polish advance into Russia tended to create a national sentiment in that country, which ignored the tyranny and oppression from which the people suffer and afforded an undeserved support to the Bolshevik régime,

which enabled its leaders to embark upon the invasion of Polish territory. . . . [It urged that Poland] abstain from any aggressions against Russian territorial integrity; to state that its policy is not directed against the restoration of a strong and united Russia; and that pending a direct agreement as to its eastern frontier, Poland will remain within the boundary indicated by the Peace Conference.⁴⁴

THE PEACE OF RIGA

The course of the war had involved many questions—the Anglo-Russian trade agreement, French support of General Wrangel's forces in the Crimea, and relations with Rumania. Each of these will later find its place; for the present the facts regarding the peace which was to be negotiated at Riga demand notice. This peace was made by stages. Fighting kept on as the representatives gathered; and it was not till October that an armistice and preliminary treaty were signed. Then followed the long negotiations which led to the signature of a permanent document. This took place at Riga on March 18 and was ratified by the Poles on April 15, 1921.

When the Soviet authorities put forward, on August 11, terms of peace, they imagined themselves the victors. They, therefore, required among other things the reduction of the Polish army to fifty thousand and they inserted a clause in the terms which read:

"City workmen and the industrial workmen of Poland, who are in trade unions, are to be armed, under the control of representatives of workmen's and trade union organizations of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, Poland, and Norway."⁴⁵

This was in reality a proposal to create the nucleus of a force designed to foment revolution. It would have introduced an alien element in Warsaw, and was part of a well-considered scheme to promote armed disorder in Poland and ultimately possibly the revolt of the industrial proletariat. Fortunately for Poland, the turn of military events gave her representatives the opportunity to oppose such a plan and, indeed, to compel a complete recasting of the terms of peace. By the middle of September, the Polish offensive had recovered a large part of the territory lost in the disastrous retreat

of June and July. Already at Minsk, Radek had privately intimated that, provided the Poles would abandon any notion of supporting Wrangel in the south, peace might be secured. Consequently, on September 21, at Riga, negotiations were renewed.⁴⁶

Immediately Joffe, the head of the Russian delegation, recognized the changed conditions and with tactical skill abandoned in sweeping fashion the majority of the points of the Soviet peace program as announced at Minsk. He wound up his statement by an ultimatum that Soviet Russia would plan for a winter campaign if the armistice were not concluded within ten days. This sledge-hammer way of dealing with affairs surprised the Poles; but by arduous and hasty work the terms were defined and elaborated in a preliminary peace which was signed on October 12. Its essentials were later embodied in the final treaty.⁴⁷

The Soviet comments on the treaty indicate clearly an apologetic tone and the desire to make the best of a bad bargain. Thus the *Izvestia*:

For long years Clemenceau and Lloyd George tried to fence off Europe from Russia by a sanitary cordon, to establish barbed-wire barriers between the Russian Revolution and capitalistic Europe. But their efforts ended in shameful failure. After the conclusion of peace we shall not have a single neighbor with whom we are in a state of war.⁴⁸

The Petrograd *Pravda* said:

Russia emerges from war at the price of heavy concessions. . . . We are accepting conditions of peace that are very severe for us because we are convinced that time works in our favor.

Thus the "yoke of nobles imposed on the toilers" will "not be of long duration."⁴⁹ Chicherin tried to show that the recognition of a "free Soviet Ukraine" by Poland was a great victory for Russia.⁵⁰ Lenin also declared:

Our army showed that a large but ruined Soviet country in the summer of 1920 was only a few steps from complete victory. The whole world saw that there is a power which does not fear the Versailles treaty, and that no Versailles treaty can break the forces

of workmen and peasants, as the latter know how to get rid of landlords and capitalists.⁵¹

The Russian Press Review, the official organ of the Soviet Foreign Office, said in denouncing the treaty: "In spite of all the phrases contained in the text and the sauce with which it was served by the Polish diplomats, the peace represents, as far as Poland is concerned, an instrument of imperialist robbery. . . . Neither Soviet Russia nor Poland in the moment of victory paid the slightest attention to the 'Curzon line'." ⁵² However, the Poles, by wireless from Warsaw, repudiated the anti-Bolshevik and the counter-revolutionary Russian forces, saying: "their military operations . . . are being conducted entirely on their own responsibility, without there existing the slightest liaison with the Polish authorities." ⁵³ In this result there was, for the time, the real justification of the treaty for Soviet Russia. Trotsky summed the matter up when he said:

There can be no two opinions about the fact that the issue of the war with Poland was not in accord with our expectations and hopes. Had it not been for the transfer of troops to the Wrangel front, our position on the Polish front would have been very strong and the war's end would have been different. We, therefore, accepted painful conditions of peace.⁵⁴

The bargainings of the peace delegations at Riga need not detain us, as they worked slowly toward the final document. Already these debates were embittered both by charges that the Poles were breaking the armistice by assisting guerrilla warfare, and by opposition to plans for Soviet propaganda in Poland.⁵⁵ Perhaps the most notable comment on these negotiations was from a speech by Lenin quoted in that curious organ of the Russian emigrés, *Ost-Information*:

An independent Poland is very dangerous to Soviet Russia, it is an evil which, however, at the present time has also its redeeming features; for while it exists we may safely count on Germany, because the Germans hate Poland and will at any time make common cause with us in order to strangle Poland. I am not fond of the Germans, by any means; but at the present moment it is more advantageous to use them than to challenge them. Although

Germany has been defeated it can nevertheless be of use to us. Through their positive resistance against the fulfillment of the Versailles treaty, they keep Europe in an unstable and undecided situation, which furnishes the best atmosphere for spreading Bolshevik doctrine. France is our worst and bitterest enemy, because it does everything it can to stabilize the European situation. In Italy we should be able to cause a revolution at any time we feel like doing so, but even there we ought to act in concert with Germany, because Germany is trying to get Italian industry under its control. Everything teaches us to look upon Germany as our most reliable ally. Germany wants revenge, and we want revolution. For the moment our aims are the same, but when our ways part, they will be our most ferocious and greatest enemies. Time will tell whether a German hegemony or a Communist federation is to arise out of the ruins of Europe.⁵⁶

The terms of the treaty can now be summarized: The declaration of peace is followed by the definition of the frontier; this runs as is indicated on map facing page 102. Both Soviet Russia and Poland recognize the independence of the Ukraine and of White Russia (White Ruthenia) and agree to abstain from any agitation, invasion, or organization of troops directed against each other, as well as from any transit of guns and munitions. Mutual respect for instruction in the languages of the Russian, Polish, White Russian, and Ukrainian populations and for their cultural and religious institutions is guaranteed. Neither party shall pay any indemnity or war reparations. Provision is made for option as to citizenship and the return of prisoners; political prisoners are to have the benefit of amnesty. Russia and the Ukraine are to restore to Poland all military trophies, libraries, and works of art taken from the museums of Poland since 1772, with the exception of military trophies captured in the course of the war 1918-21. Soviet Russia is to restore the bank deposits belonging to Polish subjects and will indemnify in gold the losses to Polish factories which have been nationalized. Russia releases Poland from any debts contracted with the former Russian Empire. Goods in transit in either direction shall not be subject to duties; but Poland reserves the right of control over merchandize coming from Germany and Austria destined for Russia. Russia and the Ukraine promise to pay

Poland within a year thirty million gold rubles due to Poland as her share in the "active participation of the territories of the Republic of Poland in the economic life of the former Russian Empire." State property is to be held as by the boundaries. By an annex to the treaty, Poland is to receive 525 locomotives, 695 passenger cars, and 16,800 freight cars.⁵⁷

This treaty of Riga was a document of "high politics." The years of war had not been concerned exclusively with Russo-Polish interests. These were, in reality, part of the larger relations between Soviet Russia and western countries. The peace, indeed, depended in part on those relations; it was signed two days after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian trade agreement. That agreement had often been endangered by the prolonged struggle between Soviet Russia and Poland. As was well known the French opposed the treaty and the trade-agreement. France gave General Wrangel quasi-recognition and assisted him with munitions in the Crimea. His defeat, therefore, was a blow to French policies.

The result of the treaty was, further, a blow to those who still clung to the idea of a "barbed-wire fence" against Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, the Poles had conducted a campaign which gave them an eastern frontier and this included territory that had not been conceded by the Allies. It was a better frontier than anyone had expected; indeed, the interests of Poland now really looked to the continuance in power of the Soviet régime. Certainly, it was a border that would not be willingly conceded by Russian nationalists who vigorously denounced it. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Poles had much with which to be content. But it behooved them to step carefully and to consolidate their gains.

This was evident in the visit made by Sapieha, the Polish Foreign Secretary, to London and to Paris in February, 1921. His desire to have the new frontier recognized by the Allies was not granted. Indeed, it was not so recognized by them till March 14, 1923, and by the United States till March 26, 1923. Nevertheless, the French Foreign Office on February 19, 1921, finally agreed to a treaty between France and Poland. This treaty provided: (1) a promise to act in concert on foreign

questions; (2) mutual assistance and economic restoration by special agreements which were to be drawn up later; (3) concerted action for defense if either should be attacked without provocation; (4) each country promised to consult the other before concluding new agreements concerning policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw thus secured the aid of Paris in a future struggle with Soviet Russia.

On March 3, 1921, a Polish-Rumanian agreement gave added recognition to the new eastern frontiers. It was for a period of five years and was a defensive military convention which was in the main directed against the possibility of attack by Soviet Russia.⁵⁸ Its significance lay in the fact that it established a connection between Poland and a member of the Little Entente—Czechoslovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Rumania. The Little Entente was based on treaties signed between Czechoslovakia and Jugo-Slavia on August 14, 1920, and extended on April 23, 1921; a similar agreement was signed on June 7, 1921, between Jugo-Slavia and Rumania; and a third document also provided for a defensive alliance against Hungary between Czechoslovakia and Rumania.⁵⁹ None of these three states was to sign an alliance with any other except on due notice to the other two. Furthermore, some months later a treaty was signed between Czechoslovakia and Poland which was not a defensive alliance, but which gave free transit for military supplies through territory of one state in case the other should be attacked. Mutual repression of hostile organizations; a reciprocal guarantee of each other's independence; and a declaration that Czechoslovakia had no interest in eastern Galicia and that Poland had none in Slovakia were also included. Thus a second point of contact was set up with the Little Entente on November 7, 1921. In March, 1922, Poland joined the Baltic League which became an element in her policy. In such fashion Poland strengthened her fences against both Germany and Soviet Russia.

RUSSO-POLISH RELATIONS, 1921-1923

In the strengthening of the Polish army or in the development of an interest in oil, the influence of France had been

evident in Polish affairs. It also extended benevolently toward the negotiations with Czechoslovakia. The press began to talk of a military alliance between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France which would marshal sixty-two millions against Germany's sixty millions. Such matters, however, were gossip as compared with the realities of friction with Soviet authorities regarding the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty of Riga.

These began even before the treaty was ratified at Warsaw and continued for some time. Even if we make every allowance for Soviet propaganda, the facts seem to indicate that the Polish government was lax in its enforcement of the provisions relating to the existence of anti-Bolshevik forces within its territories. On the other hand, there was also undoubtedly delay in carrying out the terms of the treaty by Soviet Russia. These conditions and the disordered state of the border districts, which had suffered severely during all these years of fighting, contributed their share to the existence of border bandits who raided on both sides of the frontier and who were the occasion of repeated accusations and complaints by both governments.

Naturally, as between Russians and Poles, these incidents assumed the character of border warfare; they also led to the use of language in the diplomatic correspondence which would otherwise seem unusual. The fact is, however, that war has not resulted. Both Soviet Russia and Poland are anxious to preserve peace in spite of their irritation against each other. To the Poles their continued occupation of the Vilna district, which is now sheltered from Soviet Russia by a corridor of territory, gave reason for wishing to maintain their frontier from north to south. To the Russians who were concerned with their economic development, the reduction of their armed forces seemed necessary. The net result is that officially peace has been maintained and the most dangerous and open frontier in Europe has now stood for more than two years and a half. This, despite false alarms and warlike rumors from every border village and from capitals like Prague and Bucharest.

In the voluminous correspondence of two talkative races, we select a few major complaints. For several months following the signature of the treaty, the Soviet governments made charges regarding the activities of the Savinkov brothers who were waging a guerrilla war from Polish territory. In much the same way the Ukrainian Soviet protested regarding Petlura's activities. To such charges the Poles, on the other hand, entered a denial, defended the rights of Russian emigrés to seek refuge in Poland, objected to border depredations, and protested against the non-observance of the treaty by Russia.⁶⁰

Chicherin, in September, 1921, took up the cudgels for the Russian prisoners who he said died in enormous numbers in Polish prison camps. He charged that France was inciting a new war against Soviet Russia and "leaves to the judgment of the working masses and honest citizens throughout the world the diabolical machinations of France." The Poles replied by refusing to continue the work of repatriation and by charging Russia with failure in the matter of payments due under the treaty.⁶¹ During September, 1921, the correspondence is an almost daily exchange of vituperative messages between Moscow and Warsaw.

Already the Polish Foreign Office had written:

The Russian Government together with the Ukrainian Government, is conducting through its agents agitation and propaganda on Polish territory, and is forming organizations to violate Poland's territorial integrity and to overthrow by force the political and social structure of Poland.⁶²

Shortly came a long dispute regarding documents which were alleged to be from the files of the Polish General Staff and which were said to prove a conspiracy between Polish officials and anti-Bolshevik Russians. To this the Poles replied by stating that these documents were forged and were given to Soviet agents in order to mislead them.⁶³ Indeed, for a time it seemed as though the entire work of carrying out the treaty was at a standstill, for both governments were so much occupied as to these complaints and as to others similar in character.

Finally, a compromise was reached in October, 1921. The

Poles agreed to expel fourteen Russians from Poland, including Savinkov and Petlura. Soviet Russia consented to carry out the treaty. This was scarcely settled before, in November, stories of raids by Polish bands along the Ukrainian frontier occupied the center of the stage. As winter progressed, however, there was a gradual decrease in these complaints.⁶⁴

In the spring there was a renewal of charges regarding violations of the Polish frontier by armed Soviet banditti.⁶⁵ More general matters also came up at the Genoa Conference. There the Russians objected to the signature by Poland of the protest against the Russo-German treaty. This the Poles denounced, claiming that they were not in Russian leading-strings.⁶⁶

Again the religious clauses of the treaty of Riga were involved in a vigorous exchange of notes in May, 1922.⁶⁷ It was also asserted that the publication and style of Soviet notes "frequently serves the purpose of Communist propaganda."⁶⁸ The complaints regarding border warfare still continued, but not in such volume or vigor. Gradually, the long quarrel descended to disputes as to the technical privileges of diplomats.⁶⁹ Then at the end of 1922 there was the abortive Disarmament Conference at Moscow.

The notable fact was that in spite of these bitter exchanges no war had ensued. During the course of 1922 and 1923, the Poles were more and more engrossed in domestic politics and with economic reconstruction. In similar fashion the attention of Soviet Russia was turned to the struggle against the famine and the restoration of business and agricultural life. Thus there remains for the future the question of the frontier. Certainly, the restoration of a strong Russia would probably provoke an attempt to recover territory which the Russian nationalists still believe is theirs on grounds of race. In the meantime, though the long forces of economics are leading to more friendly relations between the two countries, the situation still remains doubtful.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. *Izvestia*, Jan. 10, 1919. *Livre Rouge*, Moscow, 1920, p. 30.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 62, June 3, 1919.
3. The proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas is in *Current History*, I, p. 359. The open character of Poland is well illustrated in a quotation from Grabowski, *Five Attributes of Poland* (written in the sixteenth century) which is quoted by Kulakowski, "Poland's Thousand Years of Evolution," in *Current History*, IX, Part 2, p. 319: "While other nations are defended by water and have embattled gateways, impassable mountains, we have nothing of the kind. . . . From all sides the plains and ways to Poland are open and broad to the enemy; advances, retreats, entrances, exits; he [the enemy] gets victuals and prisoners where he pleases and how he pleases. In our hands only, in our hearts and throats only is our armory—these are our mountains, our waters, these the castles and ramparts of Poland."
4. *Current History*, V, p. 470.
5. *Ibid.*, VI, p. 488.
6. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 296.
7. *Ibid.*, VII, p. 65.
8. *Livre Rouge*, Moscow, 1920, pp. 7-13.
9. *Petrograd Pravda*, Dec. 6, 23, 1917; *Izvestia*, Dec. 18, 1917; March 2, 1918.
10. *Ibid.*, April 6, June 23, July 5, and August 7, 1918.
11. *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1918.
12. *Current History*, VIII, Part 2, p. 126.
13. *Ibid.*, IX, Part I, pp. 497, 500; Part 2, p. 79.
14. Lewinski-Corwin, "The Political Situation in Poland," in *Current History*, IX, Part 2, pp. 313-19; *Ibid.*, X, Part 1, pp. 63, 302.
15. *Ibid.*, X, Part 1, p. 67; Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement* (New York, 1922), 3 vols., III, pp. 218-24. ("A Confidential Report by General Kernan on Conditions in Poland.")
16. *Livre Rouge*, pp. 19-30. The exchange of notes between Moscow and Warsaw, *Izvestia*, Jan. 10, 1919.
17. *Livre Rouge*, pp. 31-37, 47-50, 95. *Izvestia*, Jan. 11, Feb. 12, March 28, 1919.
18. *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1919 (translated in *Weekly Bulletin of Bureau of Information on Soviet Russia*, I, No. 13, May 26, 1919); *Izvestia*, April 15, 1919 (translated in *Soviet Russia*, Oct. 25); *Livre Rouge*, *passim*.

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19. Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy*, p. 32; *Izvestia*, May 3, 1919.
20. *Izvestia*, April 17, 1919. *L'Ukraine Sovietiste, Quatre Années de Guerre et de Blocus. (Recueil des Documents Officiels d'après les Livres Rouges Ukrainiens)* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 144-45. Rakovsky asks for the mediation of Moscow to prevent friction with Poland regarding the Ukrainian frontiers.
21. *Current History*, XII, p. 454. *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 132, 146. *Soviet Russia*, March 27, 1920.
22. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 29, Feb. 5 (an appeal for peace), 1920; *Current History*, XII, pp. 76-77.
23. *Current History*, XII, p. 254; *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1920.
24. *Current History*, XII, pp. 78, 254.
25. *Ibid.*, XII, p. 79.
26. *Wireless News*, March 16, 1920; *Petrograd Pravda*, April 26, 1920; *Current History*, XII, pp. 454, 573, 632. A summary of the entire situation in early 1920 based on documents is given in *Soviet Russia*, May 29, 1920.
27. Lecture by Prof. R. H. Lord at the Williamstown Institute of Politics, August, 1922; *Times* (London), April 3, 1920.
28. *Current History*, XII, pp. 632, 753.
29. *Ibid.*, XII, pp. 756, 919-21.
30. *Ibid.*, XII, p. 923.
31. *Ibid.*, XII, p. 924; Cf. Joffe, "Soviet Russia's Peace Offensive" in *Pravda* (Petrograd) Aug. 22, 1920) (translated in *Soviet Russia*, Oct. 30, 1920).
32. *Report of Sir Stuart Samuel on his mission to Poland. Parl. Papers*, 1920. Cd. 674, Misc. No. 10 p. 28.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
35. *Livre Rouge*, p. 86.
36. Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of the Conference* (Cambridge, 1920), p. 169.
37. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 13, 1920.
38. Speech at Special Joint Session of Moscow Soviet with Central Executive Committee, Factory Committees, and Trade Union Boards, *Pravda*, May 6, 1920.
39. *Wireless News*, Moscow, May 7, 1920.
40. *Pravda*, May 8, 1920. Similar statements are in *Izvestia*, May 8, 1920, and in *Wireless News*, May 7, 16, 1920.
41. *Ibid.*, May 18, 1920. Cf. an article on the Third Internationale in *Political Review* (London), No. 4, June, 1920.
42. Radek, "The War with Poland," in *Freiheit*, July 27, Aug. 7, 1920 (translated in *Living Age*, Sept. 11 and 18, 1920).
43. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Sept. 27, 1920.

44. Note to Poland, Aug. 21, 1920, in *International Conciliation*, No. 155, Oct., 1920, p. 474.
45. Petrograd *Pravda*, Aug. 12, 1920.
46. *Current History*, XIII, Part 1, p. 85. The British government had made lively protests concerning the entire matter. Petrograd *Pravda*, Sept. 25, 1920.
47. *Current History*, XIII, Part 1, pp. 235-38; Petrograd *Pravda*, Sept. 25 and 26, 1920; *Soviet Russia*, Oct. 30, 1920. The translation of the armistice and of the preliminary peace are in *Current History*, XIII, Part 1, pp. 407-410, and in *Soviet Russia*, Dec. 11, 1920, which also contains a discussion of the terms. The Russian texts are in *Sbornik*, I, p. 63; II, pp. 42, 43 (the treaty), 80, 83; III, p. 58, 245.
48. *Izvestia*, Oct. 14, 1920.
49. Petrograd *Pravda*, Oct. 14, 1920. Cf. *Ibid.*, Oct. 5, 7, Nov. 26, 1920.
50. *Pravda*, Oct. 17, 1920.
51. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Oct. 18, 1920.
52. *Russian Press Review*, Oct. 22, 1920.
53. *Wireless News*, Warsaw, Nov. 4, 1920.
54. *Wireless News* to *Chicago News*, Nauen, Nov. 11, 1920.
55. Cf. *Ost-Information*, Berlin, No. 78, Nov. 24; No. 80, Dec. 1; No. 82, Dec. 23, 1920; No. 92, Jan. 19, 1921.
56. *Ibid.*, Berlin, No. 81, Dec. 4, 1920.
57. The English translation of the treaty is in the *Polish Bulletin*, New York, April 22, 1921. The Russian text is in *Sbornik*, II, p. 43. A summary is in *Soviet Russia*, May 14, 1921. For French comment on the treaty, cf. *Journal des Debats*, Mar. 22, 23, 1921. There was a persistent rumor as to secret clauses regarding Polish neutrality in case of war between Soviet Russia and Latvia, and of Russian neutrality in case of war between Lithuania and Poland, *Sevodnja*, April 7, 1921. There does not seem to be any reason to suppose that the rumor is true.
58. The text of the treaty is in *Current History*, XV, p. 133. The military convention was signed during the summer.
59. The texts of the treaties between Rumania and Czechoslovakia, and Jugo-Slavia and Rumania are given in *Ibid.*, XIV, Part 1, p. 947.
60. *Soviet Russia and Poland* (in Russian) (Moscow, 1921) (Published by the People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs). pp. 15-30.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-60, *New York Times*, Sept. 23, 1921.
62. Polish Note of Aug. 25, 1921, in *Weekly News Release*, Oct. 5, 1921. (Published by the Polish Bureau of Information, New York City.)

63. *Soviet Russia and Poland*, p. 55; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 160 *et seq.* Unpublished notes and memoranda regarding the dispute. The publication of the Russian Red Book (*Soviet Russia and Poland*) was bitterly criticized as propaganda; but it unquestionably contains essential documents.
64. *Monitor Polski*; Nov. 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 23; Dec. 7, 9, 14, 1921; Jan. 5, 1922; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 170-200.
65. *Monitor Polski*, March 20, 21; April 28, 1922. Unpublished notes, March 11-April 21, 1922.
66. *New York Times*, April 26, 27, 1922.
67. *Monitor Polski*, May 1, 1922.
68. Polish Note of June 26, 1922; *New York Times*, June 12, 1922.
69. *Monitor Polski*, May 2, 6, 12; June 27, 1922. Unpublished notes, May 2-June 29, 1922; *Izvestia*, July 21, 1922; *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 13, 1922.

CHAPTER VII

SOVIET RUSSIA, RUMANIA AND BESSARABIA

The crime-covered Rumanian oligarchy has started warfare against the Russian Republic. Accustomed to base its rule upon the poverty, thralldom, and blood of the Rumanian peasants and workers, the Rumanian monarchy has made an attempt to save itself, its landlords, and bankers by seizing Bessarabia and turning it into a bulwark against the mighty torrent of the Russian Revolution.—*The Treachery of the Rumanian Bourgeoise*.¹

Today, for the last time, I find myself obliged to declare to you that the Royal Government does not in any way, neither directly nor indirectly, recognize any claim of this sort [over Bessarabia] on the part of the Russian Government, nor of its successors if there are to be any. . . . As regards this question, the Royal Rumanian Government has never hesitated in the affirmation of its rights which it considers to be inextinguishable.—*Note of Take-Jonescu to Chicherin*, Nov. 18, 1921.²

IN the summer of 1916, Rumania finally threw in her lot with the Allies in the World War. The result was disastrous for Rumania. Today the controversy still rages as to whether Rumania was compelled by Russia to engage in the war or as to whether, eager for Transylvanian spoils, she chose to disregard the best military advice and to entangle herself in a contest from which she was to emerge prostrate. The result was plain, as Rumania was forced to sign a truce with the Central Powers at Focșani on December 9, 1917. This was in part due to the failure of Rumanian strategy and in part to the state of affairs on the Russian front, where the moral collapse was well nigh complete. The central fact was, that the Rumanian army was utterly unable to withstand the terrific pounding which General Mackensen had inflicted on the Rumanian forces.

With the end of the fighting the latent element of Rumanian

hostility to Russia began to show itself. Friction between the rabble of the Russian army and the disorganized elements of the Rumanian forces commenced. This culminated in the invasion of the Russian province of Bessarabia in January, 1918. The disintegration of Russia had begun and the Rumanians thought they saw in the confusion of the revolution opportunity to indemnify themselves at Russian expense for the losses which they anticipated at the hands of the Central Powers. Later, with the failure of the Central Powers to hold their dominant position, the incursion of Rumanian forces into Bessarabia continued till finally the province became Rumanian. Thus Rumania profited on both frontiers; she acquired Bessarabia from Russia, her former ally, and she was awarded a large part of Transylvania at the expense of Hungary.

The loss of Bessarabia has aroused much feeling among Russians of all classes and parties. The Soviet authorities were furious, and Russian emigrés of all sorts are practically unanimous in vigorously denouncing Rumanian cupidity. Certainly, there is small chance that a strong, restored, nationalist Russia would willingly consent to see Bessarabia remain Rumanian. Yet on this troublesome point the weight of ethnographical and linguistic statistics would seem to favor Rumanian claims. The ancient history of Bessarabia gives more than an equal right to Rumania. Statistics are unfortunate data on which to rely in the case of Bessarabia; but if we take figures which might not be regarded as favorable to Rumanian claims, we find, by the Russian census of 1891, out of a total population of 1,641,599 that, 1,098,995 are Moldavian (Rumanian) and 233,251 are Ukrainian, which is the population next in numerical rank. There are also large Rumanian or Moldavian minorities in near-by districts.* The Bessarabian question, however, continues to be difficult and dangerous.

THE BESSARABIAN QUESTION

Historically, we must go back to the days when the Turks were sovereign in all the modern Balkan states. Then during

the Napoleonic epoch, as one of the periodic wars between Russia and Turkey was waging, came the danger of Napoleon's march on Moscow. Russia hastened to make a peace with Turkey, which was signed at Bucharest in 1812. Nevertheless, by this treaty Russia acquired the eastern part of Bessarabia, a region almost entirely inhabited by Moldavians. The rest of Moldavia remained Turkish; later it was to be known, together with its neighboring province, Wallachia, as Rumania. This division of the Moldavians between Russia and Turkey was partially upset in 1856. At the close of the Crimean War by the treaty of Paris, the rights of the two Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, were recognized and they were granted autonomy under Turkish sovereignty. At the same time, part of Bessarabia, which had been acquired by Russia in 1812, was surrendered to form, a few years later, part of the united principality of "Rumania."

Then in 1877, when Russia again went to war with Turkey, Rumania joined with Russia to win formal recognition of her independence from Turkey and to lose Bessarabia back to Russia. The arrangements, which were ratified at the Congress of Berlin, ignored the gallant part played by the Rumanian army during the war and granted to Russia possession of the rich lands lying between the Dniester and the Danube. Rumania received from Turkey as indemnification for the loss of Bessarabia the marshy district of Dobrudja, south of the Danube delta. This settlement was vigorously protested by Rumanian representatives, who, however, were overruled by Bismarck who thus sought to drive a wedge of discord between Rumania and Russia. So Bessarabia was subject now to the processes of Russification which, with increasing vigor, sought to stifle all nationalist or separatist elements throughout the empire from Finland in the north to Bessarabia in the south.

Russian rule in Bessarabia did not, however, find much to oppose it. There was lack of local patriotic feeling due to the absence of any strong nationalist party. The inhabitants were mostly farmers who were content to till the soil and in their lethargy to refrain from political agitation. Among the upper

classes, even those of Moldavian blood, were soon to be found many whose affiliations became strongly reactionary and Tsarist. Altogether it was a region in which there seemed to be small chance for revolutionary or nationalist ardor. Then came the March revolution at Petrograd in 1917. It is evidence of the wide-spread relief of Russia at the downfall of the Tsarist government that even in Bessarabia there was promptly a request for provincial autonomy. Among a people who had been slow in political movements, national feeling first showed itself only along educational lines. The school teachers began to agitate in June, 1917, for the restoration of the use of the Moldavian language whose employment had been stifled under the Tsars. A National Moldavian Commission was also set up under the impulse of "self-determination" which talked of autonomy, but which made no demand for reunion with Rumania. The hopes of these leaders of provincial autonomy, within a reformed federal Russian state broke down with the success of the Bolshevik revolution in November, 1917. People now began to talk of nationality and to cast about for relief from threatened Bolshevik rule.⁴

THE LOSS OF BESSARABIA, 1917-1920

The opposition to the Bolsheviks was evident first on December 15, 1917, when a national council in Bessarabia proclaimed its independence as "the Moldavian Republic." This was a logical development of the application of the doctrine of "self-determination" on the part of a population which knew nothing of politics or of industrial life. It might have succeeded had it not been for the Rumanians on the one hand and the Bolsheviks on the other. The Bessarabians had successfully protested against their inclusion in the Ukraine until March, 1918, when Ukrainian rights were reaffirmed. At the same time, Rumanian troops had begun to cross the frontier and the claims of a common language and race were asserted to draw Bessarabia to its ancient connection with historic Moldavia, which was now a part of the Kingdom of Rumania.

The attitude of the Soviet government did not remain long

in doubt. On December 31, 1917, a vigorous protest was made to the Rumanian Ambassador at Petrograd regarding the alleged intervention of Rumanian forces in the affairs of Bessarabia. This was quickly followed by the arrest of Diamandi, the Rumanian Ambassador, an event which as we have already seen, the Diplomatic Corps protested most vigorously. His final deportation was accompanied by a fusillade of protests and accusations against Rumanian officials and by the seizure by the Soviet authorities of about eighty million dollars, the Rumanian treasure which had been transported to Russia to save it from seizure at the hands of the Germans.⁵

In the meantime, at Brest-Litovsk, there proceeded the diplomatic struggle between the Soviet representatives and the Germans, a conflict which was finally enlivened by the presence of two rival Ukrainian delegations. The Ukrainian Rada signed a separate peace with the Central Powers on February 9, much to the chagrin of Trotsky who had produced a Ukrainian Soviet delegation. The contest between Soviet and Rada in the Ukraine belong to a later chapter; but the effect of these disputes led the Rumanian government to seek an agreement with Soviet Russia. This was particularly urgent as the Central Powers now presented an ultimatum requiring Rumania to sign a preliminary peace with them on March 5, 1918, which was later expanded into a series of agreements to be known as the Peace of Bucharest, signed on May 7, 1918. These left Rumania prostrate before the exploitation of both her agricultural and mineral resources at the hands of military and economic leaders from Berlin and Vienna.⁶

In February, however, the Allies were bending every effort to "restrain" Rumania, and to prevent the collapse of the phantom "eastern front." They, therefore, undertook to arbitrate between the Russian revolutionary elements at Odessa, in the Ukraine, and the Rumanian forces who had entered Bessarabia. In January, the "Moldavian Republic" had given way to a movement for the annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania with the result, that these Rumanian forces had quickly disposed of the demoralized Russian troops in Bessarabia and were welcomed by the population.⁷ The situation was a diffi-

cult one; but the Allied diplomatic corps in Rumania maintained:

the intervention of Rumanian troops [in Bessarabia] is a military operation without any political character, undertaken in full accord with the Allies and with the Bessarabian authorities with the evident humanitarian purpose to guarantee the provisioning of Russian and Rumanian troops as well as the civil population.⁸

At the time these negotiations were taking place, it was evident from the remarks of Captain Reichanner, of the French Military Mission, that he was doubtful if the political ambition of Rumania could be controlled. Nevertheless, under the influence of Colonel Boyle, of the British army, and of the French Consul at Odessa, an agreement was signed on March 9, 1918, by General Averescu, for Rumania, and by Rakovsky for Soviet Ukraine, under which Rumania promised to withdraw her troops from Bessarabia and agreed:

not to take any hostile military or other action against the Russian Republican Federation of Councils of Workmen and Peasants and will not attempt to support those made by other states.⁹

At Moscow the news of the agreement by which "Russian sovereignty in Bessarabia was restored" was followed by a request from the Rumanian Consul General for the return of normal relations between Rumania and Russia.¹⁰ Before this could develop, however, a change of Cabinet had taken place at Bucharest. The agreement of March 9 was repudiated; and in the face of the declaration of the Allied diplomats the new Foreign Minister declared:

Russia will never restore herself. No one can believe in the return of Tsarism in Russia. Numerous changes will still take place in Russia. . . . General Averescu fears Russia because of Bolshevism. . . . Whatever may be our future, we will not be the only ones in the world to defend Rumania and Bessarabia.¹¹

The news of this declaration of the formal annexation of Bessarabia was the signal for an outburst of Soviet wrath. Chicherin protested that it was a "flagrant violation" of the previous agreement, "an act of violence" which "lacks all international legal force whatsoever."¹² Rakovsky declared

that "an impossible abyss" had opened between Russia and Rumania, he held up to ridicule the appeals of the Allied diplomats at Bucharest in February. "It is obvious that the November revolution which broke with the annexationist policy of the Allies, was bound to induce the Rumanian oligarchy to seize Bessarabia."¹³ Later, the protests of the small group of Ukrainian peasants in Bessarabia were marshalled against Rumania.¹⁴

As the Peace Conference at Paris gathered, Chicherin and Rakovsky returned to the attack and presented futile ultimatums to the authorities at Bucharest.¹⁵ Finally in August, 1920, as the Russians were planning to take Warsaw, Chicherin proposed negotiations. He apparently hoped that the lesson which he expected Soviet forces would give to Poland might compel Rumania to come to terms.¹⁶ To this Rumania quickly agreed; but as the Soviet troops retired from Poland the anxiety of Rumania rapidly decreased. Nevertheless, in October, 1920, the Rumanian government again declared its readiness to discuss the situation.¹⁷ Indeed, the Soviet government scarcely seemed aware of the fact that Rumania was about formally to receive the assent of the Allied Powers to her acquisition of Bessarabia. This took place on October 28, 1920. Once more, therefore, Russia made vigorous protests. It is significant, however, that this treaty has been ratified only by Great Britain and Rumania. Neither France, Italy, nor Japan has taken action and the United States still refuses to regard Bessarabia as other than Russian. In the case of France it has been suggested that the influence of the Russian emigrés is responsible. The treaty is, therefore, not a completed document.

Chicherin and Rakovsky declared that they "could not recognize the validity of a treaty concerning Bessarabia, signed without their participation, and that they were not bound in any way by an agreement on this subject which was signed by foreign governments."¹⁸ To this Take-Jonescu, the Rumanian Foreign Secretary, and General Averescu replied by wireless:

I attach importance to establishing the fact that there has never

been any annexation, that this province, as Rumanian as the rest of the Kingdom, from which it was only separated by the arbitrary act of 1812, joined the mother country of its own wish, as expressed by its representatives. This union has, in conformity with public law, been recognized by the Great Powers in the Convention signed at Paris. The union of Bessarabia with Rumania is thus a question which has been definitely settled and the Rumanian Government cannot consent to let it any longer be discussed.¹⁹

The controversy naturally could not end in this fashion; but the Soviet authorities chose by force of circumstances now to transfer the burden of their complaints to other matters. Thus Bessarabia was restored to Rumanian rule in the face of a solid Russian opinion against such a step. That the Soviet authorities have not failed to protest is plain; but they have not gone to war. The claims of the Rumanians are sound ethnographically, though one may well wish that the record of their diplomacy and administration were better.

RUSO-RUMANIAN DISPUTES, 1920-23

The frequency with which during the past three years, the question of the Rumanian frontier has been raised in notes sent by the Soviet government is evidence of the difficulty with which Russians contemplate the settlement of the Bessarabian question. It is also evidence of the exposed character of that frontier and of the ease with which border raids can be organized. The disturbed state of affairs in the Ukraine is further responsible for a number of incidents that would otherwise probably not have occurred. Already during the closing stages of the Polish war, complaints had been made that Petlura's forces had equipped themselves on Rumanian soil. With the conclusion of peace at Riga, the correspondence turns naturally on the alleged support given to refugees from General Wrangel's forces who came across the frontier. In December, 1920, Chicherin acknowledged Rumanian efforts to maintain neutrality and again proposed negotiations on all pending questions, including Bessarabia. He declared in response to Rumanian protests that the con-

centration of Russian troops near the frontier was entirely a question of providing them with suitable winter quarters.²⁰ Later, he again proposed a conference regarding the navigation of the Dniester. This was followed in March, 1921, by a warning as to the protection of "White" Russian bands near the Rumanian frontier. In April, the Soviet government also urged the immediate regularization of navigation on the Dniester. A conference was, therefore, fixed for May at Reval, in Esthonia. Later, this was postponed to meet at Warsaw. In the meantime, a number of frontier incidents had occurred and the correspondence became heated.²¹

Makno, a Ukrainian Robin Hood, had escaped the Soviet troops and had taken refuge in Rumania. Raids in pursuit of him had crossed the river and Bolshevik troops were disarmed on Rumanian territory. Stories were also current that the bands of Petlura were once more loose and were violating Rumanian neutrality. To these charges the government at Bucharest entered a strong denial, stating that if Rumania wished to make war she would do so by means of her own troops.²² Finally, in October, at Warsaw, negotiations took place nominally as to the sale of Rumanian wheat for Russia, where the famine was starting on its ravages.

In the course of these conversations the Soviet authorities clearly played for the restoration of economic and diplomatic relations. There was discussion as to whether in case Russia recognized the restoration of Bessarabia to Rumania, the Rumanians would give up hope of their confiscated treasure of eighty million dollars, abandon all claims against Russia, and pledge neutrality in the event of a fresh Russo-Polish war. The Rumanian delegates refused to admit that Bessarabia was a bargaining element, objected to Russian insistence as to the protection of minorities in Bessarabia, and insisted on the restitution by Moscow of the Rumanian treasure. The conference, therefore, broke down leaving wild rumors behind it.

There followed a distinct stiffening in the tone of the correspondence, most of which had taken place by wireless. Both Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine sent sharp complaints regarding bands which they claimed were organized and

equipped on Rumanian territory and which raided across the frontier.²³ Such disputes continued throughout the winter. Finally, at the Genoa Conference, Chicherin objected to the presence of both Rumanian and Japanese delegates on the principal commission regarding Russia.²⁴ This gave a temporary flip to gossip regarding French assistance to Rumania in the event of a war with Russia. The repeated visits of French officers of high rank to Bucharest did much to keep this talk going.

In such an abridged account of these matters the general result of the situation is well illustrated by two small news items of June 12, 1922, in the *New York Times*. Grain had been sent from Rumania for the relief of the famine sufferers in Russia. For this the Soviet authorities returned thanks. In the second place, a Soviet aviator was forced to make a landing and on inspection his load was found to consist exclusively of Russian propaganda directed to the stirring up of revolutionary elements in Rumania.²⁵ Under such circumstances, the frontier, and indeed the entire region, can scarcely be regarded as secure. At the Disarmament Conference at Moscow in December, 1922, the Rumanians were absent; they sent a reply declining to come for they refused to discuss Bessarabia and the Russians refused to return the funds which they had confiscated in 1918.²⁷ As late as November, however, the Russians said that the only obstacle to the presence of Rumania at the Conference was her "absurd demand that she should be guaranteed the possession of Bessarabia which she has forcibly annexed."²⁸ The attitude of Rumania was sufficiently indicated in an editorial of the *Universal* of May 19, 1922, which said: Bessarabia "is Moldavian land, it is ours and to the various pretensions to discuss this question can be opposed only a veto: *Non Possumus*."²⁹ Thus to the mind of Russia, Bessarabia remains an open sore; to the mind of Rumania it is a *sine qua non* for the restoration of normal diplomatic relations.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. *Izvestia*, Jan. 14, 1918. A decree was issued breaking off diplomatic relations, seizing the Rumanian gold reserve, and declaring the Russian Commander-in-Chief on the Rumanian front to be an outlaw and "an enemy of the people."
2. *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, *Quatre Annes de Guerre et de Blocus, Recueil des documents officiels d'après les livres rouges Ukrainiens* (Berlin, 1922), p. 102.
3. *Bessarabia* (Handbooks prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 51) (London, 1920), p. 28.
4. The entire matter is summarized in *Ibid.*, pp. 15-25. Cf. also Bibesco, "Redeeming the Bessarabians," in *The Forum*, December, 1921.
5. *Izvestia*, Jan. 1, 14, 16, 31, 1918; *Gazette*, Jan. 17, 1918. *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, p. 49.
6. The texts of all these documents are to be found in *Texts of the Roumanian "Peace,"* Washington, 1918.
7. *Izvestia*, Feb. 21, 1918; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 49-50.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-55; *Texts of the Roumanian "Peace,"* p. 205.
10. *Izvestia*, March 31, April 2, 1918.
11. *Ibid.*, April 17, 1918; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, p. 56.
12. *Izvestia*, April 19, 1918; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, p. 57.
13. *Izvestia*, May 16, 1918.
14. *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 57-60.
15. *Izvestia*, Feb. 9, May 3, 1919 (translated in *Soviet Russia*, Aug. 16, 1919); *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 62-65.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 68. Cf. *Soviet Russia*, May 8, 1920.
17. *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 69-71; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Aug. 29, Oct. 27, 1920; *Wireless News*, Bucharest, Oct. 11, 1920.
18. *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 71-72.
19. *Wireless News*, Bucharest, Nov. 10, 1920; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste* p. 72.
20. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Nov. 24, Dec. 12, 14, 23, 24, 26, 1920; *Ibid.*, Bucharest, Dec. 12, 16, 1920; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 73-76.
21. *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 23, April 9, 19, 29, May 23, June 1, 19, July 7, 24; August 8, 1921; *Wireless News*, Bucharest, April 13, 29, July 13, 17, 1921; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 77-84. *Soviet Russia*, July, 1921.
22. *Wireless News*, Moscow, August 8, 13, 22, Sept. 17, Oct. 3, 22, 1921; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 84-98; *Soviet Russia*, Nov., Dec., 1921.

23. *Izvestia*, Nov. 29, 1921; *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, pp. 98-106. There is a long *annexe* of documents relating to these raids, pp. 107-126; *Indreptarea*, Feb. 21, 1922.
24. Mills, *The Genoa Conference* (London, 1922), p. 76.
25. *Current History*, XVI, p. 711.
26. *New York Times*, June 12, 19, 1922.
27. *Izvestia*, Sept. 27, 1922. Note of the Acting Commissar of Foreign Affairs L. Karakhan to the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Douka.

Rumania is prepared to participate at the conference only on the condition that Russia recognizes her occupation of Bessarabia. Such an unprecedented demand is a proof of the fact that Rumania does not want to give genuine guarantees for the maintenance of peace with her neighbors. For it is difficult to believe that anybody would seriously expect Russia to cede a huge part of her territory to another power just to reward that other power for its participation in the matter of disarmament. . . . The Russo-Rumanian negotiations in Warsaw in 1921 failed to yield any results because Rumania made her participation in the peace conference dependent upon our readiness to recognize in full all her territorial and material claims, heedless of the interests of Russia. . . . The refusal to take part in the Disarmament Conference without territorial compensation forces upon the Russian Government the conviction that Rumania is the only one of the contiguous countries that does not desire to be at peace with Russia, but wants to reserve to herself complete freedom of further armaments and increase of her armed forces.

28. *Izvestia*, Nov. 2, 1922.
29. Cf. *Le Temps*, May 19, 1922 (an interview with Antonescu, the Rumanian Ambassador at Paris). Cf. Dennis, "Soviet Russia, Rumania and Bessarabia," in *Current History*, Feb., 1924.



CHAPTER VIII

SOVIET RUSSIA AND FEDERATED RUSSIA

"A complete separation of these two Soviet states [Russia and the Ukraine] is merely an artificial process, in contradiction with the entire past and future struggle of the Ukrainian workers and peasants. A complete national separation of Ukraine will inevitably lead to an internal national struggle within Ukraine, and to the magnification of the economic demoralization both in Ukraine and in Russia."—*Thesis adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.*¹

"The consolidation of the Soviet Republic and the abolition of national oppression are merely manifestations of one and the same process of emancipation of the workers from the imperialistic yoke."—*Resolution of the Tenth Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party.*²

IN the novel and twisted political science of Soviet Russia, the separation of sections of the former Empire to form new states or to unite with other independent countries was a process which extended in all directions. The doctrine of "self-determination" spread rapidly; and the result was a map of the former Tsarist domains which at times seemed like a jig-saw puzzle. Furthermore, the various parts were cut to suit particular and often merely temporary purposes. The result was that the organization of historical Russia received repeated blows.

The shock of the revolution was followed by various smaller cracks. One of these was the split which for a time seemed to threaten the integrity of Russian territory in the south-west. The establishment of an independent Ukraine was itself wrapped with possibility of an enormous extension of German-Austrian power.³ It was also a movement which sought, under the direction of a group of intellectual leaders, a substantial historical basis. Thus, alongside of the political possibilities of this national separation there were also certain

cultural features which still remain. The Ukrainian language may be only a dialect of Russian; but it merited the approval of the Russian Academy in 1905 as a subject for special study.⁴ How far a Ukrainian civilization may yet develop is still uncertain; however, on themes such as these it is unnecessary to enter.

— The facts of an attempted separation and later the reunion of the Ukraine as one of the federated states of the new Russia are in themselves our only concern. They involve another turn in the story and lead also to a study of the ways in which the authority of Moscow has slowly asserted itself. (The reunification of Russia under Soviet power is in itself a domestic affair; but certain aspects of it are also a part of diplomacy and as such intrude into the story of the foreign policies of Soviet Russia.)

THE UKRAINE AND SOVIET RUSSIA

The revolution of March, 1917, found the Ukraine an integral part of Russia. It was inhabited by one of the oldest branches of the Slav race in Europe. Originally as a "frontier" region, its tumultuous history had been a story of tribes and chieftains rather than of a settled nation. Attempts to set up a national state had failed, and since 1654 it had been definitely recognized as part of the Russian state. As the Russian Empire developed under modern conditions, the importance of the coal and iron in south Russia became increasingly clear. Then as Russia began to export, the value of the Black Sea ports gained. The result was that the Ukraine, from an economic point of view, was welded as an essential part to the Russian Empire.⁵

At the same time, among a small group of intellectuals the idea of Ukrainian nationality had sporadic support. Since 1846 this movement gained slowly, so much so that the policy of Russification took on new strength to combat this separatist tendency. Naturally, this Ukrainian national movement found assistance in Austria, which sought to spread complications of this sort within the Russian Empire.⁶ The outbreak of the War, however, had for a time united Russia and checked this

tendency. Then in March, 1917, came the opportunity for the development of the ideal of autonomy. The Ukrainian nationalists who had been in prison were released; a Ukrainian National Congress was called in April; and for the next few months there was increasing demonstration of this liberal spirit.⁷

On June 24, 1917, the Ukrainian Rada or Congress issued a decree of autonomy which was opposed by the authorities of the Provisional government at Petrograd. A temporary compromise was, however, arranged in early July. Then cutting across this dispute came the Bolshevik revolution of November. The Rada now saw a chance to combat both the central authority and also to prevent Soviet interference in the South. It consequently issued a "universal" or proclamation on November 20, declaring in the present emergency the temporary independence of the Ukraine as a component part of a future Russian federation. The language of the decree was more radical than usual because the Rada hoped by social and land reforms to forestall the Bolshevik régime.⁸

It immediately brought to an issue the whole question of the attitude of the Soviet authorities toward nationalities within Russia. This had been stated in their decree of November 16, 1917:

1. Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
2. The right of self-determination of the peoples even to the point of separating and forming independent states.
3. The abolition of all privileges and limitations founded on nationality or religion.
4. Free development of national minorities and racial groups inhabiting Russian territory.⁹

We must clearly understand that the Soviet use of the word "people" means "workmen and peasants"; it is "the dictatorship of the proletariat" that this decree refers to, for on it alone depends all political power. This was evident from Trotsky's orders to Krylenko:

The Ukrainian laboring masses must convince themselves in fact that All-Russian Soviet power will place no obstacles in the

way of the Ukraine's self-determination. . . . But . . . although we do not intend to impose our will upon the Ukrainian people, we are prepared, nevertheless, with all means, to support Ukrainian Soviets in their struggle against the bourgeois policy of the leaders of the present Central Rada.¹⁰

The Bolsheviks, while adhering to their recognition of the "independence" of the Ukraine, specifically attacked the Rada as assisting counter-revolutionary elements, as disorganizing the army, and as withholding supplies. By the end of December, the struggle began between two parties in the Ukraine, each claiming to be the rightful government. On the one hand was the moderate element represented in the Rada at Kiev; on the other hand was the new Ukrainian Soviet supported from Petrograd, whose headquarters were at Kharkov.¹¹ This was evident from the vigorous correspondence between the three parties and by the decree recognizing the Ukrainian Soviet:

Greeting the genuinely popular Soviet authority of the Ukraine formed in Kharkov and regarding this workers' and peasants' Rada as the real government of the Popular Ukrainian Republic, the Soviet of People's Commissaries pledges to the new government of the sister-republic absolute and all-around support in the cause of peace, and also in the task of transferring all lands, factories, enterprises, and banks to the laboring people of the Ukraine.¹²

It will be well to bear this declaration in mind as there remains the still further test as to whether the Russian Soviet authorities kept their pledges.

The immediate problem was further complicated by the negotiation of peace at Brest-Litovsk. Here came a delegation of the Rada claiming independent power to make a separate peace. In vain Trotsky protested; he produced at a later stage a Ukrainian Soviet delegation which disputed furiously the right of the Rada delegation to represent the Ukraine. Meanwhile, sharp fighting took place in the Ukraine for the control of Kiev. As we have seen, the representatives of the Central Powers cut short the dispute by signing on February 9, 1918, a separate peace with representatives of the Rada, and later, in March, by requiring that Soviet Russia

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they had overthrown the boasted independence of the Ruthenians, driving their forces to join Petlura in Podolia. There Petlura finally made an agreement in 1920 with the Poles by which they were to conquer Kiev for him and assist him in setting up a state which would be in many ways an appanage of Poland. The disastrous results of this attempt we have already noted in the chapter on Poland.²²

The second military force which tried to secure control of the Ukraine was that of General Denikin. His endeavors have already been partially described. Between May and September, 1919, practically the entire Ukraine was under his control. As Prince Mirsky describes it:

But Denikin's Government also failed to satisfy anyone. The White troops were everywhere (especially in the south and east) welcomed at first, but everywhere in two or three months they were heartily hated. The looseness of their discipline and their contempt for human life and property made them a pest to the population.²³

Petlura was defeated by Denikin, but he, in turn, was rapidly forced to retreat before the third army in the field—Trotsky's Red army. By the first of 1920 not a single White soldier remained on Ukrainian territory. The struggle for the Ukraine, therefore, resulted in a decisive victory for the Soviet authorities. These at the outset maintained that they were not fighting the Ukraine and that the Soviet forces in that region were those of the Ukrainian Soviet under Rakovsky.²⁴ They declared:

This is the same struggle of the working people for its complete emancipation that is going on in Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, Poland, and White Russia against the rulers of the exploiters and oppressors, both native and foreign, and against all their agents and lackeys. . . . The politics of the Directory with respect to the Allied Powers, however, is nothing but a repetition of the old policy of the Ukrainian Rada with respect to German imperialism, with whose military forces it helped to enslave the Ukraine. . . . We must convince ourselves, first of all, that the Directory has ceased the struggle against the working masses of the Ukraine and has decided to defend her liberty against the threatened offensive of Anglo-French and American imperialism.²⁵

In the meantime, there was no question but that Lettish and Chinese troops were enlisted in the Soviet struggle. Kharkov and Kiev were temporarily held. Rakovsky was in power at both places; but he declared that "until the Ukraine has its own Red army, it counts on the support and experience of the Great Russian comrades and that the constitution of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic has been adopted by the Ukraine." Again he stated on April 9, 1919, that "until the complete organization of a regular Ukrainian Red army and the abandonment of the guerrilla form of warfare, we trust in the support of Great Russia. In a word, we shall strive for complete solidarity with the Russian Soviet authority."²⁶ This made it plain that in Soviet Ukraine, Russian Soviet forces were really reconquering territory that had claimed to be independent. Out of this solidarity of purpose there was later to develop the system of alliance and of federation.

With reference to Allied troops at Odessa, the Soviet Ukrainian authorities were particularly bitter. At Odessa were French and Greek forces against whose presence Rakovsky violently protested.²⁷ He declared that "the bestialities committed by the French and the Greeks recall by their brutality Asiatic tortures of the middle ages."²⁸ This, if true, was possibly due to the fact that French troops and French sailors became mutinous while on this foreign service in the Ukraine. They were anxious to return home and they seem to have been affected by the proximity of the Bolsheviki. The result was their evacuation of Odessa, which was occupied by the Bolshevik forces who themselves engaged in an orgy of atrocities. Of course there was the added difficulty caused by bandits who preyed on both armies. These bandits generally, toward the end of 1919, became known as Green Guards and preyed severely on the retreating forces of Denikin.²⁹ Altogether the situation in the Ukraine and in the Crimea at the start of 1920 was appalling.

The final stage in this confusion was the attempt of General Wrangel from the Crimea to restore the fortunes of the anti-Bolshevik forces—the remnants of General Denikin's army.

In this he first fell foul of the British who had been negotiating in the spring of 1920 with Soviet authorities as regards the disposal of these forces. The British decided to withdraw their military mission and to refuse any more supplies. This led the French, who had been eagerly watching the victorious advance of the Poles, in May, 1920, to try to restore the anti-Bolshevik front in south Russia. The supplies and money furnished were not sufficient to enable General Wrangel to oppose the new attack launched at him in October, 1920, by the Red army. This in turn was possible largely because of the armistice concluded between the Poles and the Soviet authorities. Although an able military leader, General Wrangel was forced back and on November 14 took refuge on a French warship in Sevastopol harbor. There followed hordes of refugees who fled to Constantinople and later were dispersed in Jugo-Slavia and elsewhere. Thus came to an end the military history of anti-Bolshevik attempts in southern Russia. The Soviet was supreme, for Petlura was also driven away from Kiev, a refugee.³⁰ Earlier Lenin had declared:

We must finish with the enemy in the course of the next months. The masses themselves will rise and every individual will become an agitator; in that way the masses will create a force that cannot be broken, which will guarantee a Soviet Republic not only in Russia but in the whole world.³¹

SOVIET RUSSIA AND SOVIET UKRAINE

So in the spread of the Soviet system lay the justification of the extension of the example of revolution. There was, of course, the added fact that the Ukraine was essential to Russia from an economic point of view. The co-operation of the military forces of both Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine was to result in an alliance which was not based merely on military necessity. During these four years of constant warfare, the government of the Ukraine had almost lapsed. "The idea of a United and anti-Russian Ukraine has fallen flat, and the future of Ukrainian political thought may lie only in the development of the idea of a local self-administration within the limits of a large (and possibly loose) federation."³²

The question in 1920 was how to formulate the relations of the two states. At first the Ukraine under Rakovsky was inclined to magnify itself. Lenin understood this when in January, 1920, he addressed the workmen and peasants of the Ukraine on the occasion of the defeat of Denikin.³³ He stated first:

It is self-evident and fully and generally acknowledged that only the Ukrainian workmen and peasants themselves, at their own All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, decide the question of whether the Ukraine is to merge with Russia or is to remain an independent separate republic, and in the latter case what kind of federated union is to be established between that republic and Russia.

Lenin then went on to speak of the dangers of nationality, of the way in which bourgeois societies used it "to strengthen the power of capital." He declared that there must be "an international union of workmen, an international brotherhood of workmen. We are opponents of national hostility, of national antagonism, of national patriotism. We are internationalists." We aim at the union "of all nations of the world into a single world-wide Soviet Republic." He spoke of the centuries of oppression and distrust which must be overcome. The question of state frontiers was secondary and unimportant. By the recognition of the independence of the border Baltic states, he hoped to win the confidence of "their toiling masses." He thought the idea of the complete independence of the Ukraine sprang from distrust of the Great Russian. For the present, common action to combat bourgeois schemes was best—to show a united front "as an example of actual solid alliance" of workmen and peasants in the struggle for the fundamentals, for "the dictatorship of the proletariat," for "Soviet authority," for the destruction of "the yoke of landlords and capitalists, for the World Federative Soviet Republic."

A year later, with the negotiation of peace with Poland and with the expulsion of Wrangel, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine finally signed, on December 28, 1920, a treaty of military and economic alliance.³⁴ The following commissariats were united: (1) the supreme economic council; (2)

war and navy; (3) foreign trade; (4) finance; (5) labor; (6) transportation; (7) posts and telegraphs. Article VI of the treaty reads as follows:

The direction and control over the united commissaries shall be exercised through the All-Russian Congress of the Councils of Workmen's and Peasants', and Red Army Delegates, and through the All-Russian Central Executives Committee, in all of which the Ukrainian Socialists' Soviet Republic shall send its representatives in accordance with the decision of the All-Russian advisory congress.

This means practically that except for foreign affairs, agriculture, education, and justice, practically the entire direction of the more important branches of government were vested in Russian hands with participation by the Ukrainian delegates. Rakovsky commented that "joint warfare and joint work will doubtless make the union closer and stronger in the future."³⁵ Mirsky concludes that "to all intents and purposes it [the Ukraine] is a province of Bolshevik Russia" and adds, "as for the Bolsheviks, however long they may last they will never be other than a thin (if well-woven) net of military despotism thrown over a practically ungoverned population."³⁶

Thus "self-determination" had come to mean only "self-determination by a Soviet"; and that was limited in practice so that gradually the authority of Moscow as exercised by the Communist Party was supreme in most essential matters. However, there was the second conception—that of a federated Russia. Here we come to the real political function of the Communist Party. It is first of all an international organization. Its center is at Moscow in the Third Internationale. "In each Soviet state, the supreme control of all state activities must be in the hands of a national communist party, which is hierarchically subordinate to the executive committee of the Third Internationale." It is the duty of every Communist Party in each country in the world to endeavor to secure the adoption of a system of politics which will take its orders from the Moscow executive committee. The recognition of the independence of Esthonia or of the Far Eastern Republic was due to temporary causes. The real purpose was the eventual

domination in each of such countries of the Communist group. Then inevitably and of necessity such a country would federate with Russia. This step would take place under the direction of the Central Executive Committee at Moscow.³⁷

Under such circumstances, it is apparent that both by the interpretation and practice of "self-determination" and by the application and development of the idea of "federation" there was possible an immense extension of power directed by Moscow. It was the demonstration of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as exercised by the handful of men who controlled and guided the power of the Communist Party in Russia. Moscow was to become a new international Rome. Naturally, this could be accomplished only by persistent propaganda. As Pasvolksy says:

Thus what is sometimes asserted to be the "nationalistic" policy of the Soviet régime with regard to Russian unity is merely a direct development and unfolding of the Communist policy of world-revolution. The efficacy and permanency of this solution of the question are obviously bound up inseparably with the existence of the Soviet régime in Russia and the continuation of the work of the Third Internationale, which has been defined by its own leaders as the "general staff of the world-revolution."³⁸

So Rakovsky in an article on "Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine" writes of the centralization of power which must result from this plan:

The tendency of Socialistic revolution is political and economic centralization, provisionally taking the form of international federation. Of course, the creation of this federation cannot be effected by the stroke of the pen, but is the result of a more or less extended process of elimination of particularism, provincialism, democratic and national bourgeois prejudices. . . .³⁹

In practice, however, what was the importance of having foreign affairs in the hands of Soviet Ukraine? The personal qualities shown by Rakovsky during these years had made him too valuable and too strong a man to neglect.⁴⁰ His co-operation was, therefore, an element in the situation. Furthermore, the size and location of the Ukraine were also to be considered. The Ukraine was 174,510 square miles with a

population of 26,000,000. It contained the most important coal and iron deposits in European Russia and was also the richest agricultural region.

As Michael Pavlovich (Weltman) an acute Soviet writer, described the situation:

The burning question of the stomach, the acute inexorability of the need for the Ukrainian flour bag, the Ukrainian sugar bag has forced strategists who were conducting the campaign against the Soviet Republic, to choose for their advance on Moscow not the shortest way, but without question the route by way of Kiev and other Ukrainian cities.⁴¹

The ports of the Black Sea also were important for trade and for propaganda. All of these factors made the control of its foreign relations a serious matter. The remains of Ukrainian nationalism were worth cultivating, particularly in view of the character of the economic relations which had formerly existed with Poland and indeed with Central Europe.

Actually, however, the fact that the Ukraine was associated with Soviet Russia in signing the treaty of Riga with Poland did not play a large part. For a time the Poles maintained a legation at Kharkov, but they soon found that important questions were settled at Moscow. Indeed, Rakovsky soon gave authority to certain Russian diplomats abroad to act for the Ukraine.⁴² As we shall see when it came to the Genoa Conference, an all-Russian delegation was sent which included Rakovsky; and the various "independent" states of Russia signed a preliminary protocol, pledging the unity of Russia in the negotiations. Yet occasionally there is an assertion of the independent quality of negotiation and signature that serves to remind one of the federal character of Russia. Thus the American Relief Administration, before its workers could enter the Ukraine, without danger of arrest, was obliged to secure from the Ukraine an agreement identical with that signed with Soviet Russia.

The entire matter of the relation of the two states is excellently treated in an interview with Yakovlev, the acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine.⁴³ He notes first of all that the principal problem of Ukrainian foreign policy

was to secure recognition by other states and in that fashion to dispose of the claims of previous Ukrainian governments, particularly that of Petlura. Naturally, in this Poland was chiefly concerned; as she was also in disputes regarding the enforcement of the treaty of Riga. Commercial relations with Czechoslovakia had been put on a stable basis. In negotiations with Germany and Austria regarding the repatriation of prisoners a way was found to initiate proposals for a commercial treaty and to study ways and means regarding German investments in the Ukraine. With Turkey a treaty to promote friendly relations had been signed; and with Italy a trade agreement. In like fashion treaties had been signed with Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia. In Bessarabia, on the contrary, relations with Rumania continued to be stormy. Within the Russian Federal State economic relations were cordial, especially with Russia itself and with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In this connection, Yakovlev went out of his way to define the foreign policies of both Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine. He referred to the alleged "political supremacy" of Russia and said:

The foreign policy of the Ukraine has not nor cannot have any interests other than common with Russia, which is just such a proletarian state as the Ukraine. The heroic struggle of Russia, in complete alliance with the Ukraine, on all fronts against domestic and foreign imperialists, is now giving place to an equally united diplomatic front. The Ukraine is independent in her foreign policy where her own specific interests are concerned. But in questions which are of common political and economic interest to all Soviet republics, the Russian as well as the Ukrainian Commissariats for Foreign Affairs act as the united federal power.

In other words, Moscow controls their united policies.

THE SOVIET RÉGIME AND FEDERATED RUSSIA

While this subject of the relations of Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine is still fresh, it is well to consider also the whole problem of nationalities, the organization of the Soviet Foreign Office, and the efforts made to regulate the relations

of Federated Russia. Many of the actual facts can of course be treated in the development of policies regarding the Caucasus and Central and Eastern Asia; but the ground plan can be considered at present. (The question of "nationalities" is perhaps one of the most complicated problems of the entire scheme of Soviet policy.) One of the chief difficulties arises from the gradual shifting of boundaries which has taken place. These have been and are being altered to meet economic rather than racial facts. The idea has been that the notion of the economic dependence of one part of Russia on the other should be emphasized.) To this end liberties have been taken in certain cases with ethnic distribution. Furthermore, the process is not complete; indeed, no sooner is one map drawn than another is needed to note the changes which have been made. For this reason it is expedient to discuss the principles which are involved rather than the detailed factors.

If we include Mongolia there are today thirty-four divisions of Russia (including Soviet Russia) which in varying degrees are endowed with attributes of independence or autonomy or which are allied with Soviet Russia. Mongolia is an allied dominion which claims independence from China and which is at present occupied by Soviet troops. Its status can be more fully considered under the Far East. The Far Eastern Republic was the occasion of a moment. It was an independent, allied state which for reasons of diplomacy was not federated with Moscow, though in practice it had such rank. Its disappearance in November, 1922, was due to the fact that its usefulness had ended and Soviet Russia was once more in power on the Pacific as the Japanese withdrew their troops from Vladivostok. It also can receive fuller treatment in the chapters on the Far East.

There follow the independent federated Socialist Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, White Russia, and the three Caucasian states of Georgia, Azerbaidjan, and Armenia, which are themselves federated in a single trans-Caucasian Socialist Soviet Republic, whose capital is at Tiflis. This is also federated with Russia. The existence of such states is thus de-

fined in a thesis of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine:

Of all the Soviet Republics that have thus far existed, only Soviet Russia has been able victoriously to resist international and internal counter-revolution, and to deal smashing blows to its opponents. Soviet Russia alone holds the geographical conditions, as well as the economic and political resources, which make of it an impregnable fortress against all the attacks of international imperialism, . . . the leader and organizer of the international proletariat in the struggle against international imperialism. Each new Soviet republic, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, will seek support and aid from Soviet Russia. And effective alliance with Soviet Russia is the revolutionary duty of every new Soviet state.⁴⁴

The conditions here described apply to all such states. The degree and character of that alliance may differ in some cases, but the principle is clear. In the case of the autonomous divisions of Russia, theses adopted by the Tenth Communist Party Congress in 1921 serve as a definition of their status:⁴⁵

. . . the victory of the Soviets and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat are fundamental conditions for the abolition of the oppression of peoples, the creation of equality among nations, and the guarding of the rights of national minorities. . . . The national Soviet Republics . . . can not maintain their existence and overpower the united forces of imperialism unless they unite in a close union of states. . . . The experiences of Russia in the application of the various forms of federation and in the transition from a federation based on Soviet autonomy . . . to a federation based on a treaty between the independent Soviet Republics, as well as the admissibility of intermediate steps, have fully corroborated the practicability and elasticity of the federative system as the common form of Government alliance between the Soviet Republics. . . . The abolition of actual national subjection will here constitute a very long process, requiring a persistent and stubborn battle against all the remnants of national oppression and colonial enslavement. . . .

Under these rather dry formulas there has developed in Russia a series of autonomous republics or regions which, either because of racial or social and economic interest, constitute convenient units of administration. These do not constitute bodies with an independent foreign policy, and

from a diplomatic point of view they are integral parts of Soviet Russia. The tendency is to increase the influence of the central authorities. This is evident from the direction exercised by Moscow to prevent local and ardent communist parties from rushing an autonomous region too fast toward the theoretically ideal form of Sovietism and also from the degree of actual control which rests invariably with Moscow. A list of these regions is given in the footnote and reference is made to the maps facing pages 177 and 269.⁴⁶

Turning now to the functions of the Russian Soviet Foreign Office, we find included in its field of action both the independent federated and allied states and the normal foreign relations of the government. Changes of personnel and modifications of bureaucratic organization were frequent during the first three years; but beginning about 1920 there is a more definite and organized régime. The earlier stages of diplomatic intercourse were, as we have seen, full of difficult passages and sudden changes, some of which have unquestionably given credence to charges of bad faith on the part of the Soviet authorities.

Furthermore, the language of the Russian Foreign Office shifted from time to time. Thus Trotsky, on December 16, 1917, referred contemptuously to diplomatic "recognition." He declared that the Soviet authorities are "absolutely indifferent to this detail of the diplomatic ritual"; and defied the diplomatic world by stating that the "Soviet Government considers diplomatic intercourse necessary not only with Governments but also with revolutionary socialist parties bent on overthrowing existing Governments."⁴⁷ In similar fashion he denied to foreign embassies in Russia the right to draw funds on deposit in Russian banks unless the funds of the Tsarist and Provisional government embassies were turned over to the Soviet authorities.⁴⁸ Diplomatic communication in code was temporarily denied to foreign representatives in May, 1918.⁴⁹ Later, in August-September, came the arrest of consular officials in Moscow. Such measures, however, were soon stopped, for they placed the Soviet authorities in the unenviable position of having deliberately broken their

pledges. The difficulties with regard to diplomatic communication and representation have in recent years arisen largely because of charges of smuggling on the part of foreign diplomats.

With regard to Russian diplomatic representation abroad, naturally one of the first steps of the Soviet government was to dismiss from their posts both Tsarist and Republican representatives.) This applied in the United States to the dismissal of George Bakhmetev, who was formerly Tsarist Ambassador at Washington.⁵⁰ By an oversight Boris Bakhmetev, who was appointed Russian Ambassador at Washington under Kerensky, was left untouched. The appointment to London of Litvinov and of Karpinsky to Switzerland as "temporary plenipotentiary" did not have effect in a diplomatic sense, for neither man was received at his post.⁵¹ Later, Joffe was sent as an envoy to Berlin and Kamenev was proposed to Vienna.⁵² The former, however, was soon expelled from Germany for his activities in propaganda. The procedure, on the appointment of other diplomatic agents, seems to have been full of confusion for a time.⁵³ (Thus on June 4, 1918, a decree was passed stating that Soviet Russia "is guided in its international relations by the principle of recognition of absolute equality of great and small nations,") and therefore all envoys were to be known as "plenipotentiary representatives." (Furthermore, this was to apply to foreign diplomatic representatives in Russia.⁵⁴ This, however, was found to be impossible.) Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan have today full-fledged embassies at Moscow; and Mirbach, the German diplomat who was assassinated was also an Ambassador.⁵⁵

(Later, as the government became more organized, the Foreign Office underwent a reorganization, and, beginning in 1920, a formal annual report of the Commissariat was made.)⁵⁶ The office was divided into (1) political department for western affairs, (2) political department for eastern affairs, (3) economic and legal department, (4) press and information department, (5) administrative department. The staff was rapidly increased; thus it has risen between January 1 and

December 1, 1921, from 609 to 1,301. This is not an excessive number, when we consider that the higher figure includes 450 guards and when we realize that in addition to the few formal diplomatic representatives present in Moscow there are several commercial and trade agencies. More particularly, in addition to the independent federated republics the allied Soviet Republics of Bokhara, Khiva, and the Far Eastern Republic were also included in the list of governments whose affairs have been considered by the Soviet Foreign Office. Of course, this does not take into consideration the staffs maintained both at home and abroad for propaganda and revolutionary purposes. The interlocking directorate of the Soviet government and of the Third Internationale serve to place this subject as material for a special later chapter.

The fact of the representation of the independent republics brings us back, however, to the original subject—the efforts made to regulate the relations of the federated and allied states lying within the boundaries of the former Tsarist Russia.) This was the subject of much study which finally led to the signature of a treaty between Soviet Russia, Soviet Ukraine, the trans-Caucasian Soviet Republics, and the White Russian Soviet Republic, on December 30, 1922.⁵⁷ This is in effect a joint decree; it is based on experience and has the result of a new joint constitution. Its importance cannot be minimized particularly when we recall that these relations were to be the model for future agreements in the event of the spread of Bolshevik ideas by the world-revolution or by alliance with other states.

The treaty provides in the first place for the unification of the republics as “The Alliance of Socialist Soviet Republics.” Its “sovereign power” is vested in the Congress of the Alliance and when that Congress is not in session in the Central Executive Committee. The Congress in turn was “composed of the representatives of the city Soviets, every 25,000 electors delegating one Deputy, and of the representatives of the Provincial Soviet Congress, every 125,000 inhabitants delegating one Deputy.” This Congress elected 270 representatives for Russia, 68 for the Ukraine, 26 for the trans-

Caucasian Republics, and 7 for White Russia, to form the first executive committee.

Obviously, the Central Executive Committee elected at annual meetings of the Congress is too large a body to remain continuously in session. It meets three times a year, but may be called in extraordinary session at any time. Consequently, a praesidium of nineteen members is chosen from the Committee in which the sovereign power rests during the intervals between meetings. There is, in addition, a Council of People's Commissaries composed of the chiefs of the various departments involved. This is the executive of the Central Executive Committee.⁵⁸ A Supreme Court for the Alliance is set up. The decrees and decisions of the Council of the Alliance have almost complete authority; they can be abrogated only by the Central Executive Committee. On the other hand, the decrees and decisions of the individual Councils of the separate Republics may be annulled by the Executive Committee or by the Council of the Alliance, though "every republic retains the right of unhampered withdrawal from the Alliance." Moscow is its capital and a single flag, coat of arms, and seal are provided.

The grant of powers to the Alliance and consequently ordinarily to the Council is sweeping. It includes practically everything, from shoes to sealing wax. It is a complete list of the ordinary functions of government.⁵⁹ All of these are an absolute grant. The result, of course, is a definition of power for the Alliance which is predominantly Russian. Under such circumstances, the fiction of freedom is absurd; "self-determination" is acceptable only if it is in accord with Soviet principles; "federation" is in reality centralization; and the entire doctrine of nationality is now openly swept aside before the authority of Moscow which is supreme.

On the basis of this treaty a new constitution was promulgated in the summer of 1923. Its provisions need not detain us except in so far as they may affect the federated status of Russia. Thus there was objection by the Ukraine in April to the organization of an upper house which should contain 120 members. These were to be elected indirectly by all the

various regions of Russia, including Russia itself, the Ukraine and so on, to the smallest of the semi-autonomous districts. Each of these was to elect four members. The Ukrainian protest was against the admission of four members each for every one of these districts, many of which are virtually under the absolute control of Moscow. This protest was partially successful in that the new Council of Nationalities is composed of "five representatives for each federated and autonomous republic and one representative for each of the autonomous provinces." ⁶⁰

The præsidium is twenty-one instead of nineteen, but its composition is of the same type as that provided in the treaty. The Central Executive Committee has the sole power to revise and confirm "all decrees and ordinances that determine the general rules of the political and economic life of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics." There is no pretense about the entire constitution; it is absolutist in its spirit and Tsarist in its conception. An oligarchy is substituted for the will of the nation and in practice it rules. As Rakovsky pointed out, the tendency of Socialistic revolution is toward centralization. Here we have not a constitution on the American model, but the restoration of an imperial power. The new S. S. S. R. has taken the place of the R. S. F. S. R. and has thereby emphasized the unity of rule which is gathered and exercised in the hands of a small group of leaders at Moscow.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. Quoted in *Soviet Russia*, Dec. 11, 1920.
2. Quoted in *Ibid.*, Oct., 1921.
3. Cf. two interesting articles on "Germany's Ukrainian Policy," by Dr. Paul Scheimann, in *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 20, May 1, 1919.
4. *The Ukraine* (Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office No. 22). London, 1920, p. 30.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-23.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-32.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-37.
8. *Current History*, VII, Part 2, p. 428. Cf. for a general discussion of the Ukrainian question three articles by Margolin and Nikolaieff in *Current History*, XVI, pp. 309, 782, and 1046.
9. *Petrograd Pravda*, pp. 157-158.
10. *Izvestia*, Dec. 8, 1917.
11. *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 20, 21, 28, 29, 1917; Jan. 3, 4, 1918.
12. *Ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1917.
13. *Current History*, VIII, Part 1, p. 63; *Texts of the Ukraine "Peace,"* Washington, 1918, pp. 9 et seq. The bitter denunciations of the Rada are to be found in *Negotiations Leading to the Brest-Litovsk "Peace,"* Washington, 1918. Also note, *Izvestia*, Jan. 4, 11 ("The Rada and German Imperialism"), 16, 31, 1918.
14. *The Ukraine*, p. 37.
15. *Current History*, VIII, Part 1, pp. 51-52. The influence of Germany is evident from the language of the Ukrainian note: "This barbaric invasion of our northern neighbors once again under hypocritical pretexts, sets up as its aim, as earlier in our history, the destruction of the independence of our State. . . . In this hard struggle for our existence we look around for help. We are firmly convinced that the peaceful and order-loving people of Germany will not remain indifferent when it learns of our distress." Cf. *Izvestia*, Feb. 14, 17, 19, 1918.
16. *The Ukraine*, p. 38; *Current History*, VIII, Part 1, p. 453.
17. *Izvestia*, March 22; April 2, 4, 7, 9, 27, 30; May 9, 15, 18, 25, 28, 29; June 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 16, 1918; *Texts of Ukraine "Peace,"* p. 155.
18. *Current History*, VIII, Part 2, p. 264.
19. *Izvestia*, June 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28; July 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 31; Aug. 4, 18, 23, 27; Sept. 15, 25; Oct. 1, 10, 1918.
20. *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 15, 22, 29, 30, 31, 1918.
21. *The Ukraine*, p. 40; cf. also pp. 49-54 on Ukrainian nationalism.

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
22. *Izvestia*, Jan. 10, 12, 1919; Radek on "Poland and the Ukraine," in *Soviet Russia*, Aug. 28, 1920.
23. Prince D. S. Mirsky, "The Ukraine" in the *Quarterly Review*, April, 1923, p. 333.
24. *Izvestia*, April 2, 1919.
25. Note of Chicherin in *Ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1919.
26. *Svernaya Kommuna*, April 10, 1919.
27. *Izvestia*, April 9, 11, 1919; *Vechnie Chass* (Odessa), April 4, 9, 1919.
28. *L'Ukraine Sovietiste*, p. 19. The entire correspondence is vigorous, pp. 10-35.
29. Bechhofer, in *Denikin's Russia*, chap. vi. Cf. *Izvestia*, Oct. 19, 1920.
30. *Soviet Russia*, Dec. 25, 1920. A note on French responsibility for all of this situation includes the following: The French Government which egged on Poland to begin this war against Russia . . . and which has done everything in its power to prevent the re-establishment of peace between Russia and Poland, seems now to be pursuing the object of continuing to prolong the sufferings of the working classes in Eastern Europe.
31. *Izvestia*, April 25, 1919. (Speech to railway men, April 11.) Cf. *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1919.
32. Mirsky, p. 335.
33. *Petrograd Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1920. Cf. *Izvestia*, Jan. 10, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 21, 1920.
34. *Current History*, XVII, p. 107. Cf. *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 28, May 18, Oct. 9, Dec. 1, 9, 1920; *Izvestia*, July 12, 1920; *Soviet Russia*, March 27, Dec. 11, 1920.
35. Quoted in *Ost-Information*, No. 89, Jan. 8, 1921.
36. Mirsky, p. 335.
37. Resolutions of the Tenth Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party quoted in *Soviet Russia*, Oct., 1921, pp. 162-66.
38. Pasvol'sky, "The Reunification of Russia," in *Yale Review*, April, 1922, p. 572.
39. Rakovsky in *Soviet Russia*, Dec. 11, 1920, p. 571.
40. Cf. biography of Rakovsky in *Ibid.*, May 21, 1921.
41. Pavlovich (Weltman) in *Soviet Russia*, Dec. 4, 1920.
42. *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 28, 1920.
43. *Izvestia*, Aug. 13, 1922.
44. Quoted in *Soviet Russia*, Dec. 11, 1920, p. 572.
45. *Ibid.*, Oct., 1921.
46. *Statesman's Year Book*, 1923; various notes and lists are to be found in *The Russian States, A Description of the Various Political Units Existing on Russian Territory* (London, 1922). The following "independent" republics have been recognized:

The Ukraine Socialist Soviet Republic, the Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic, the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic, the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic, the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic, the Khorezm (Khiva) People's Soviet Republic, the Bokhara People's Soviet Republic, and the Mongolia People's Republic. The following provinces have been given autonomy: Turkestan, Kirghiz, Tartar, Bashkir, Dagestan, Mountain (north Caucasian), Yakutsk, Crimea, South Osetia, Abkhazia, Adjara, and Zyriansk. The following are autonomous regions: Karelian Labor Commune, Kalmeitz, German Volga Commune, Adghai, Votiat, Oyrat, Cherkess, Chechentsi, Mari, Chuvash, Kabardin, Kalmuk, Buryat (Mongol). This list differs from any so far published and it may be out of date within a short time. Cf. also *Sotsial Democraat* (Reval), Feb. 12, 1921; an official bulletin of the "People's Commissariat on Affairs of Nationalities" (1921), p. 14; *Soviet Russia*, April 30, 1921; *Izvestia*, Sept. 1, 1920; Oct. 19, 1921; Mar. 10, June 8, Aug. 1, 1922; *Moscow Wireless News*, Feb. 6, 1920; Sept. 4, 7, 1921; *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1921; *Petrograd Pravda*, Jan. 14, 1922. Castagné, *Le Bolchevisme et l'Islam* (Paris, 1922), I, pp. 75-76. Map by Col. Martin in *Foreign Affairs* (Sept., 1922). *Official Map of Soviet Russia*, 1922, which was the basis of the maps opp. pp. 177, 269.

47. *Izvestia*, Dec. 16, 1917.
48. *Ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1918.
49. *Ibid.*, May 16, June 1, 1918.
50. *Collection of Laws and Orders*, 63, Nov. 28, 1917. Actually, George Bakhmetev had resigned from the diplomatic service immediately after the abdication of the Tsar in March, 1917, on the ground that he was a convinced Monarchist. He was the only Russian diplomat to resign on that account. Maklakov, Kerensky Ambassador in Paris, was dismissed by special decree. *Gazette*, Dec. 13, 1917.
51. *Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1918.
52. *Izvestia*, April 6, 1918.
53. *Ibid.*, April 10, May 18, 23, 1918.
54. *Ibid.*, June 4, 1918.
55. The *Izvestia* was full of wild rumors as to the whereabouts of various foreign diplomats. Cf. March 12, 19, 30, 31, May 23, 1918. *Ibid.*, July 7, 1921. (Regulation regarding Foreign Representatives in Russia.)
56. *Annual Report of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Ninth Congress of Soviets*, Moscow, Jan., 1922 (in Russian).
57. *Current History*, XVII, p. 953.
58. This "Sovnarkom" consists of the following members: Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Council, the Commissaries for

Foreign Affairs, War and Navy, Foreign Trade, Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection, Labor, Food, Finance, and the president of the Supreme Economic Council.

59. Article I of the Treaty gives the list as follows: (a) Representation of the Alliance in international relations; (b) modification of the external boundaries of the Alliance; (c) conclusion of treaties on the admission of new republics into the Alliance; (d) declaration of war and the conclusion of peace; (e) raising of external loans; (f) ratification of international treaties; (g) establishment of fundamental principles regulating home and foreign trade; (h) establishment of fundamental principles and of general scheme regulating the united national economy of the Alliance and the conclusion of treaties of concession; (i) regulation of affairs relating to the transportation system, posts, and telegraphs; (j) establishment of the fundamental principles regulating the organization of the armed forces of the Alliance of Socialist Soviet Republics; (k) ratification of the unified state budget of the Alliance of Socialist Soviet Republics, the establishment of the currency, monetary, and credit systems for the Alliance, and separate republics and the local taxes; (l) establishment of the general principles regulating the holding of land and the distribution of land holdings as well as the exploitation of mineral beds, forests, and waters in all the territories of the Alliance; (m) general allied legislation relating to migration; (n) establishment of the fundamental principles regulating the judiciary system and of the court proceedings, as well as the criminal and civil legislation of the Alliance; (o) promulgation of the fundamental labor laws; (p) establishment of the general principles regulating public education; (q) promulgation of general measures bearing on the protection of the public health; (r) establishment of a common system of measures and weights; (s) organization of an allied statistical service; (t) constitutional legislation relating to allied citizenship and to the rights of foreigners; (u) the right of general amnesty; (v) abrogation of such decrees promulgated by the Soviet Congresses, Central Executive Committees, and Councils of People's Commissaries of the Republics forming the Alliance as infringe on the stipulations of the treaty of Alliance.
60. The text of the new constitution is given in the *New York Times*, Aug. 12, 1923. Cf. Dennis, "Soviet Russia and Federated Russia," in *Political Science Quarterly*, Dec., 1923.



CHAPTER IX

SOVIET RUSSIA, THE CAUCASUS, AND THE NEAR EAST

Soviet diplomacy established relations with the Angora Government from the very beginning, based upon mutual protection against European imperialism . . . and it is therefore natural that she should turn solely to Russia for support in her struggle against Europe. There is thus established what in the language of the old diplomacy may be called an "entente" as against an "alliance" between the R. S. F. S. R. and Turkey.

—S. KOTLIAREVSKI, *Russia's Legal Achievements in Asia*.¹

As a result of the imperialistic and civil wars, Russia temporarily disappeared from the international horizon as a great Power. The new Russia born during the revolution was still too weak to speak its word in international politics. But the Soviet Republic has been growing stronger every year and has taken advantage of existing dissensions among the European Powers, not less skilfully than old Russia. Aware of its ever-growing strength, Soviet Russia can never be discouraged by temporary diplomatic failures, since the final victory is assured. Russia is coming back to the international stage. Let us hope that the day is coming when this reappearance will be felt so strongly that no one will dare to contradict her voice.—*Summary of an article by Steklov, "Russia Is Coming Back."*²

THE fuller significance of this policy of "self-determination" and "federation" becomes more apparent as the scope of the policies of Soviet Russia with regard to the Caucasus is revealed. In the Near East, and particularly with reference to the Turkish government at Angora, which was set up by Mustapha Kemal Pasha at the end of 1919, the foreign relations of Soviet Russia pass through several stages. They are a reflection of the stages which affect all her Asiatic policies.

Indeed, as we take up the Caucasus and the Near East, borderlands of two civilizations, the ancient factor of religion

intrudes into the foreign relations of Soviet Russia. Muhammadanism furnishes both a barrier and a channel; Bolshevik conceptions of society fall foul of the fundamental ideas of Moslem social and political life. At the same time, the unity of Islamic society is a tempting means for propaganda and for the creation of political combinations that reach well beyond the confines of Soviet power. We have thus a new element in the foreign policies of Soviet Russia, as they touch and react from the powerful force of ancient conceptions as to religion and property. In the West, internationalism could run riot; in the East, where national boundaries had been drawn by the sword and were limits only for the strongest, there were also older, quieter, yet profound forces before which the gabble of a new society must pause.

Gradually, however, fresh ideas have come to Asia, and the wave of nationalism that has spread from Eastern Europe to affect the conglomerate structure of Western Asia and beyond has in it enormous disruptive power. It has spread discontent and separation everywhere. Consequently, the society which was confronted by Bolshevism—this new madness from the west—did not have in it all the elements of stability that were common in Asia only a few years ago. In the Caucasus particularly was this true, for here was Jebel Assuni—the Mount of Languages as the Arabs called it—where remote communities found novel justification for ancient habits. The separation of hamlets in different valleys was quickly proclaimed as the reason for new nations. Thus, the explosive influence of nationalism found vent in a small region, where even the old census of the Tsars indicated twenty-seven different languages.

Furthermore, still another factor was present. This was the influence of modern imperialism which was responsible for the existence in the East of vulnerable points of Western society. The capitalistic struggle for new territories, the domination of European states among remote and subject Asiatic populations, and the investment of vast sums in foreign extracting enterprises both within the frontiers of Russia and on her borders were all responsible for a new appetite

by Bolshevik endeavor. In Asia was the Achilles heel of capitalism. If Asia could be set aflame, in revolt against the modern imperialism of England, of France, and of eager Italy and Greece, then a blow might be struck at the reserves of power, at the reservoirs of authority. The Soviet authorities took grip of the situation; they bent every effort to stir up trouble. To beat capitalism in Europe they reached out across the frontiers of Asia.

THE TURKS AND THE CAUCASUS, 1917-19

The Caucasus and the trans-Caucasus had come to Tsarist Russia bit by bit. Gradually as one valley after another gave way as the result of war or treaty, Russia was able to establish her rule over a variety of chieftains and races. The Georgians were peaceably annexed in 1801, thus clearing the way for more direct relations with both Turks and Persians.³ Then in 1878, Kars, the Verdun of that region, had fallen and the Russians increased their interest in Asiatic Turkey by adding Armenian territory to their dominions. The Caspian was already almost a Russian lake; Batum on the Black Sea became a Russian port; and soon petroleum developed as a great economic asset. Azerbaijan and Baku were simply other ways of spelling oil. There came Western capital to feast like bees upon honey. To the south lay the unexplored mineral wealth of Asiatic Turkey, while northern Persia lay under Russian influence.

In March, 1917, came the Russian Revolution. Almost at once the old traditions of separation became a force. Daghestan and the northern Caucasus proclaimed their independence of the Provisional government at far-off Petrograd. Georgians proposed a republic of the trans-Caucasus; and the Muhammadans sent delegates to a meeting at Tiflis in April, 1917.⁴ The attempt to rouse these rough mountaineers had succeeded only too well, as a proclamation of provisional and partial independence was issued on December 2, 1917, of a vague region which called itself the Union of the Caucasus. It was at all events anti-Bolshevik, though it did not look for ultimate and final separation from historic Russia.⁵

Meanwhile, on the frontiers of Poland, at Brest-Litovsk, there was hastily signed a treaty which was to give the Turks a chance to press in and thus confuse a situation which was already complicated. This treaty was in the first place based on the armistice signed on December 15, 1917, which provided for the cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of Russian and Turkish troops from Persia "upon the basis of the principle of the freedom, independence, and territorial inviolability of the neutral Persian state."⁶ The treaty, which was signed on March 3, 1918, provided in Article IV for the evacuation of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum by Russian troops and for the "reorganization of the national and international relations of these districts." This was left "to the population of these districts" in agreement with the "neighboring states, especially with Turkey."⁷ A separate treaty of the same date provided that "the Russian Republic undertakes to demobilize and dissolve the Armenian bands, whether of Russian or Turkish nationality now in the Russian- and Ottoman-occupied provinces and entirely to disband them." Provision was made for the marking of the frontier, which "shall be restored there as it existed before the Turko-Russian war of 1877 and 1878." Russia abandoned all attempts to maintain "spheres of influence and exclusive interests in Persia."⁸

On August 27, 1918, by a supplementary treaty between Germany and Russia, Russia agreed to "Germany's recognizing Georgia as an independent state." Germany promised to give "no assistance to any third Power in any military operations in the Caucasus outside Georgia" or Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. She was also to stop any third Power from "overstepping" lines drawn to include the Baku oil fields, the output of which, as we have already seen, was placed largely at the disposal of Germany. Russia for her part "will do her utmost to further the production of crude oil and crude oil products in the Baku district."⁹ These provisions were to be chiefly honored by their violation, for Baku became a sort of shuttlecock. It was occupied during the next two years by the forces of six different governments.

Immediately on the signature of the treaty in March,

1918, the Turks hurried to occupy the restored provinces and marched on Batum. This advance was accompanied by Turkish atrocities, so that the Soviet government protested directly to Germany as the responsible authority. The Armenians also sent a vigorous protest to Berlin against the intolerable conditions of the Turkish advance.¹⁰ On April 17, 1918, the Turks entered Batum, which had been defended by the Armenians; later, they informed the Moscow government that the Caucasian authorities had begged for peace and added with unconscious irony that if such a request had not been made there would have been "inevitable bloodshed."¹¹ The Union of the Caucasus had already been denounced by the Soviet Republic which protested in vain against secession from Russia as proclaimed by the trans-Caucasian Diet on February 23, 1918. This had been formally announced on April 22, 1918.¹² The so-called "union of the hill tribes of the Caucasus" also was specifically repudiated by the Soviet authorities, though it had simply carried out "self-determination" but not along Soviet lines.

The example of trans-Caucasia became epidemic, however, for Georgia declared her independence on May 26, 1918; On May 28 the Tartars of Azerbaijan and the Russian Armenians did the same.¹³ Thus the result was the application of separatism on a large scale. The trans-Caucasian Union went to pieces as the explosive effect of revolution spread. This was the occasion of German intervention; a German Chamber of Commerce was hastily organized at Tiflis; and German troops were hailed as liberators.¹⁴ The advance of the Turks was thereby checked, so they concentrated on the occupation of Armenia eastward and later became friendly with Azerbaijan. Furthermore, secret treaties were negotiated between the Turks and the Georgians and the Turks and Azerbaijan providing for reciprocal armed assistance.¹⁵

In July, 1918, this Turco-Tartar combination planned in Azerbaijan the occupation of Baku; but in August came an extraordinary British force which pushed on ahead of supplies and communications and which by a miniature *coup d'état* occupied Baku in August. This expedition under Gen-

eral Dunsterville had been detailed to proceed from Bagdad and, crossing Persian territory, made a desperate attempt to protect the Baku oil fields. Owing to the instability of the native troops at Baku, Dunsterville was forced to retire in September, which he did *via* the Caspian Sea to Enzeli.¹⁶ The Turks then came in and for a brief time held the town in defiance of the Germans. These had signed a treaty at Berlin on August 27, 1918, which they hoped would provide for just such a contingency. However, the Turks did not stay long at Baku, for by October they were decisively beaten in the field both in Iraq and in Palestine and were forced to sign an armistice with the Allies. Thus all the Turkish gains in the Caucasus were handed over to the Allies. The few Germans melted away and the problem of the Caucasus now reached a new stage. The Allied forces returned to Baku and later also occupied Batum.¹⁷ In the meantime, Moscow was sending frequent and futile protests against everything that was happening. The Soviet authorities finally repudiated the Brest-Litovsk treaty with Turkey.¹⁸

Of course, the main question involved was the control of the oil fields at Baku. In July, the Soviet government had proclaimed the nationalization of the oil industry; against this even the neutral governments had protested at Moscow.¹⁹ For the moment at least the Caucasus had escaped from Communist control. The Georgians were hastening to London and to Paris to plead their own cause; the Armenians at Paris once more solemnly declared their independence;²⁰ and Azerbaijan now organized a fresh government under Muhammadan leaders who were bitterly anti-Soviet. Under such circumstances and because of the German collapse in the west, their grandiose plan of an expedition to the east *via* Persia, Turkestan, and Afghanistan to threaten the British in India was swept away and the hopes of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism seemed to be dashed. On the other hand, there was talk on all sides of Denikin and of the possibility of an armed anti-Soviet force making its way northward to Moscow. In short, the Caucasus underwent another transformation. Once more it seemed to be the cradle of events. Toward

it both the magnates of oil and the hopes of anti-Bolshevik Europe turned in joyful expectation.

Then like a douche of cold water came the news that Lloyd George had spoken of the interests of the British Empire in the same vein as had Disraeli more than forty years before. He raised the question as to whether a "reunited Russia" could be anything but "the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with."²¹ Immediately the pro-German party began publishing Lloyd George's speeches in south Russia. His "opinion that the Volunteer Denikin's cause was doomed helped to make that doom almost certain."²² The blows given by Lloyd George to the side of anti-Bolshevik Russia were felt everywhere. Soon it became a débâcle as the Red army advanced rapidly till in early 1920 the menace of Denikin to the Soviet régime was terminated.

Meanwhile in the rear of Denikin the Georgians rejoiced, They did everything they could for their own national cause because Denikin would not recognize their independence. In this policy they helped to clear the way for their own destruction later at the hands of the Bolsheviks. The Georgians were, in fact, drunk with new nationalism; they abused the British army; they were bitterly anti-Russian; and they intrigued with everyone. One cannot but recall Gibbon's description of the Georgians—"a handsome but worthless people"—to guess at the spectacle presented at Tiflis in the end of 1919.²³

In Turkey the victory of the Allies had won them plenty of trouble: they were busy trying to determine who should have what territory in the scramble for the spoils of war and for concessions and spheres of influence. The Greeks, sword in hand, had been invited to land at Smyrna, and thus to begin the attempt to march inland which later was to act as such a stimulus to the formation of a new Turkish government at Angora. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, nominally interested in problems of demobilization, had gone from Constantinople to Angora, there gradually to organize his nationalist Ottoman revolt. This movement aroused great interest in Soviet Russia where the press declared that this Turkish nationalist development was in reality a Communist movement. At all

events, they claimed that their propaganda was at work in Asia Minor. Such news was confidently asserted by wireless and signed by Chicherin.²⁴

The truth was, of course, that the Turkish nationalists, taking advantage of the mixed policy of the Allies, had finally issued in January, 1920, their famous national pact. The rump of the National Assembly escaped from Constantinople to Angora; and under Kemal they were developing a small army which was later to oppose the Greeks. Slowly, therefore, the opposition to the Allies gained headway. The Soviet authorities were watching this movement eagerly, for if they could use it against the Allies there was still considerable chance that they might recover power in the Caucasus and again occupy Baku.

Thus an identical note was sent by Chicherin to Georgia and to Azerbaijan on January 6, 1920. This was triumphant in its tone regarding the fate of Denikin and proposed that the two governments at Tiflis and at Baku should make military treaties with Soviet Russia to complete the ruin of "White" Russian forces.²⁵ Thus quiet negotiations going on between Soviet Russia, and representatives of Turkish nationalism, of Georgia, and of Azerbaijan with the object of pooling their interests in opposition to the Allies and in the case of Russia in order to crush the remnants of Denikin's forces.²⁶ From this double dealing and intrigue the Armenians apparently stood out. At the end of 1919 they were confident in the support of the Allies and were busy about their own affairs.

THE SOVIET CONQUEST OF THE CAUCASUS

1. *Azerbaijan*—The leaven of unrest was quickly at work in Baku, for with the collapse of morale in the Russian armies, armed soldiers came flocking back to their homes. At Baku they found three local Communist organizations already at work—Russian, Turkish, and Persian. Bolshevik propaganda was rife among the soldiers, and on March 17, 1918, a revolt took place which swept in Armenian troops as well.²⁷ The result was the establishment for a few months of a Soviet of Azerbaijan. This was chiefly hostile to the Moslems who were

everywhere caught by the ardor of the Bolshevik *coup d'état*. Thus this local Soviet copied that of Moscow and nationalized everything.²⁸ They were unable, however, to consolidate their power, and soon an army, which was chiefly Muhammadan, swept down on Baku and on July 25, 1918, took the town. The leaders of the Soviet government were arrested and thus the "first Muhammadan republic" in the world put up its flag. In this fashion the government, which during these months had declared the independence of Azerbaijan, on May 28, 1918, came to Baku. But it did not last a year.²⁹

There followed in August, as we have already seen, the brief episode of the occupation of Baku by the "Hush Hush" army under the command of General Dunsterville. This force from point of view of major strategy was designed to put heart into the population of the Caucasus and to block the way against the German project of an offensive through Persia, Central Asia, and Afghanistan toward India. As such it was ludicrously small; nor as a force to protect the oil fields was it adequate to defend foreign investments. On September 15, 1918, it withdrew from Baku as the Turks marched in. These in turn remained only for a short time till another British force arrived under the terms of the Armistice.³⁰

Such occupation gave way, however, before the advance of Soviet forces in April, 1920. This was preceded by persistent propaganda; but the decisive facts were the presence of Soviet troops who came by sea to Baku. The British again retired to Enzeli where they were attacked on May 18, 1920, and forced to abandon the attempt to mix in Caucasian affairs.³¹ At Baku a vigorous Soviet government was set up which at once sent a wireless declaring its desire "to enter into fraternal alliance" with Soviet Russia "for the purpose of a joint struggle against world-imperialism." As the *Izvestia* proclaimed the next morning—"thus Baku oil will not fall into the hands of foreign capitalists!" The reply to the wireless message was "complete and forceful assistance to . . . this new member of the growing World Soviet Revolution."³²

This was soon followed by the negotiation of a series of

treaties which were all signed on September 30, 1920.³³ These provided for the unification of military organization and command, of organs of national economy and foreign trade, of food supply, of communications, and of finance. Thus the conduct of negotiations regarding all economic relations with other countries, the export and sale of goods and products, import trade, and the conclusion of economic treaties were to take place only through the intermediary of Russian Soviet offices. This practically stultified all claims to independence by Soviet Azerbaijan, though Chicherin still declared that the Baku government was independent.³⁴

2. *Armenia*.—The ethnographic region which we call Armenia was in 1914 divided into Russian Armenia, Turkish Armenia, and Persian Armenia. During the war the Turkish Armenians suffered frightfully, in part because they attempted to maintain aloof from the struggle and because they had refused to try to seduce the Russian Armenians in behalf of the Turkish cause. After the Russian army went to pieces in 1917, there followed a critical period which was ended only by the collapse of Turkey. Immediately, the cause of Armenian independence became a real issue. In the summer of 1919, General Harbord, for the United States, led an investigation into conditions in that general region. On April 23, 1920, the United States recognized the independence of Armenia with frontiers which were still to be defined; and on August 10, 1920, the treaty of Sèvres was signed which again provided for an independent Armenia.

This was too late, however, to deal with the practical question which the Soviet advance on Azerbaijan and the revival of Turkish nationalism at Angora had placed before the world. The treaty of Sèvres remained ineffective, the United States refused a mandate for Armenia, and famine lay heavy on the entire region. In addition, there was the chronic dispute as to territory with the Tartars of Azerbaijan. This had resulted in a feeble war that had been going on since 1919. The first step of the Soviet government was, therefore, to settle this by demanding the surrender to Azerbaijan of three districts,

one of which was Nakhitchewan which was largely inhabited by Tartars.

There followed the arrival at Erivan, the capital of Armenia, of a Russian Soviet delegation, who in spite of protests quickly began Communist propaganda. Already at Moscow, an Armenian delegation was trying to negotiate a peace treaty, which finally led to the signature of a preliminary agreement on August 10, 1920.³⁵ It was the signal for a high-handed policy, which ignored Armenian protests and threatened reprisals for anti-Communist action by Armenia. This policy caught Armenia just at the time when Kemal was pushing his attack on the Turkish provinces. It seemed as though Armenia was to be overwhelmed on all sides. Finally, on November 7, 1920, she signed an armistice with the Turks; and during the next month the final step was taken. "Better the Bolsheviki than the Turks," as an Armenian said. Soviet Armenia was proclaimed on December 2, 1920. At last the Turks were compelled to check their advance under the threat of war by Soviet Russia, which thus came to the aid of the new Soviet government. All of Turkish Armenia was now under the Turks; there remained therefore only Russian Armenia. There all the decrees and fundamental ordinances of the Moscow government were put into effect. Armenia, despoiled of her hopes, wasted by famine, and harried by the Turks, now turned unwillingly to Soviet Russia both for food and for military support. As a reward Nakhitchewan was temporarily restored to Armenia.³⁶

3. *Georgia*.—On the establishment of Soviet government in Azerbaijan, the question of relations with Georgia became pressing both from a military point of view and for communications. The Russian Soviet authorities decided to proceed cautiously and not to hurry the revolution which they expected would take place in Georgia. Furthermore, it was at a time when Pilsudski's forces were just outside Kiev and when France was on the point of recognizing Wrangel's army in the Crimea. To have provoked the possibility of further trouble in the Caucasus was contrary to the interests of Russia. The Moscow authorities, therefore, sought a treaty with

Georgia. That government had refused to aid Azerbaijan against them, and had opposed Denikin in time past; it also had ambitions toward Armenian territory and Batum in the southwest.³⁷

Under such circumstances, it was possible for Soviet Russia to trade on the cupidity of the Tiflis government and later possibly to use Georgia as a means to open communications with the outside world. A treaty was therefore signed on May 7, 1920, by which Soviet Russia recognized the sovereignty and independence of Georgia and renounced all previous claims to Russian sovereignty.³⁸ All interference in the internal affairs of Georgia was barred; Batum was ceded; armed bands of hostile organizations directed against each other were not permitted; and a commercial treaty was to be negotiated dealing with tariffs and communications. *Soviet Russia* naïvely and prophetically comments: but "most favorable conditions for the victory of the Socialist Revolution have been created in Georgia."³⁹

The treaty also provided that military forces hostile to Soviet Russia which were now interned in Georgia were to be surrendered to Russia. To superintend this a Russian Soviet delegation soon appeared in Tiflis; furthermore, under its auspices an agreement as to friendly mutual relations was arranged between Soviet Azerbaijan and Georgia, signed on June 12, 1920.⁴⁰ As though to cap the situation, the news of Secretary Colby's note regarding the inviolability of Tsarist Russian frontiers became known—"With the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian State." This was a bitter disappointment to patriotic elements in Georgia, who protested what they regarded as a wanton blow against their independence.⁴¹

Meanwhile, the Allies pursued their usual wavering policy regarding Batum. In February, 1920, British troops at Batum had been ordered to withdraw. This order was countermanded; but on July 8 the final evacuation took place leaving the city to the uncertain abilities of the Georgians. It was now open to Soviet Russia to protest emphatically

when in November, 1920, it was reported that the Allies were returning to Batum. They declared such a possibility was

a grave menace for the security of Russia and would compel the Russian Government to resort to most serious measures in order to ensure the welfare of both the Soviet Republics, Russia and Azerbaijan. We could regard the occupation of Batum by forces of the Entente in no other light than an attempt to form a new front in the south against us.⁴²

In this and other notes, Soviet Russia took the position of the guardianship of the trans-Caucasus and plainly threatened the Tiflis government with intervention. There were also complaints regarding the holding up of food supplies for Armenia by Georgia.⁴³ Finally, the arrest of Communists at Tiflis was asserted to be in violation of the secret article of the treaty of May 7. This apparently read:

Georgia undertakes to recognize the right of the Communist organizations existing on the territory of Georgia to have an unobstructed existence and activity. . . .⁴⁴

These circumstances accompanied by reports of an Armenian revolt and the activities of French cruisers in the Black Sea led Soviet Russia to invade Georgia. This was made possible by the systematic underground work of Communist agents who at Tiflis and elsewhere had prepared the way. The result was the proclamation of a Soviet Republic in Georgia in March, 1921. As for Batum, the arrival of Soviet Russian troops was just in time to prevent occupation by Muhammadan forces acting on Kemal's orders. Thus ingloriously ended even the pretence of Georgian nationalism. It had flouted its friends and welcomed its enemies.⁴⁵

Now the larger aims of Soviet policy became apparent. A treaty was arranged consolidating the railway systems of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.⁴⁶ There were also repeated discussions of vast schemes for the extension of Soviet influence throughout Persia and thus to Baluchistan and India. Meanwhile, nearer home by the recognition of the independence of Daghestan and of the autonomous regions of Kabardia, Balkaria, and Cherkess, a row of cis-Caucasian territories had

been built up to act as a boundary to the trans-Caucasus. None of these was large enough to act by itself and they were so jealous of each other that each was dependent on Moscow.

It also became apparent very quickly that the new state of affairs in the Caucasus aimed to promote the dependence of the peoples of the Near East on Russia. The Red Army was not withdrawn from Georgia. Lenin declared that the Caucasus would be a chief area for the struggle of Soviet Russia against the imperialistic Allies. Azerbaijan was encouraged to send diplomatic representatives to Persia and Afghanistan. Such steps, however, did not prevent the centralization of authority in the entire region as indicated by the organization of a trans-Caucasian Republic with its capital at Tiflis.⁴⁷ In December, 1921, the union of the three Soviet organizations was set up though the formal continuance of their separate governments was permitted.⁴⁸ Furthermore, in December, 1922, there came the treaty which, as we have already seen, centralized still more completely the authority and purpose of all these republics in the hands of leaders at Moscow.

Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how Lenin's original plan for the Caucasus can have results. He explained his purpose in a letter of April 14, 1921, addressed to the Communists of the Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan, and Mountain Republics.⁴⁹ He pointed out the differences which existed in the history of these republics. "The Entente burned her fingers with Russia and for the time being she will be likely to be more careful." Russia is still cut off from the outside world; but the Caucasus which is "still more industrial in character than Russia . . . can reorganize its commercial and trade exchanges with the West much more quickly and easily." It was advisable, therefore, to proceed carefully. By concessions to capitalism and to the prejudices of bourgeois society, it would be possible to restore trade. It would be wise for the Caucasus to adopt "only the fundamental truths, combined with the spirit and lessons of experience." Thus a slower, more cautious, and more systematic transition to Socialism is desirable. Above all, keep the door open westward. Such results for the Caucasus fit in, of course, with the

new economic policy which was just being proclaimed in the spring of 1921. The difficulty lies in the fact of centralization which compels all foreign trade and investment to pass first through the eye of the needle at Moscow.⁵⁰

MOSCOW AND ANGORA

The confusion of Allied diplomacy in Turkey and the resiliency of the Turkish nationalists were responsible for the establishment of a new Turkish government at Angora. The divisions among the Allies, the abandonment of Cilicia by the French, the supply of arms and munitions furnished to the Turks from French, Italian, and other sources, and the understanding which developed between Soviet Russia and the government of Mustapha Kemal were in turn the chief factors which promoted the overthrow of the Greeks in Asia Minor. Thus the Turks were able to put into effect the lessons of western nationalism which during the past century had almost wiped out Ottoman rule in Europe. To this Western nationalism the Turks added vague dreams of Pan-Islamism as a motive force until the entire Christian world was stirred by an uneasy notion that the Muhammadan world might turn again and burst on European rulers with violence and success.

Lord Northcliffe was possessed of this idea during the closing years of his life; and if we take the numbers and distribution of Moslems in Europe, Asia, and Africa, it is an imposing element. Stoddard, in his *Rising Tide of Color* and *The New World of Islam* has by clever patch-work of extracts from propagandist literature built up a theory which might pass muster among the dilettanti; the facts in the case, however, are so far against the physical menace of Pan-Islamism. If it were a question of mere numbers, swept into a single Muhammadan movement, led by efficient and honest leaders, equipped with the destructive machinery of the modern world, we might well take alarm. Today, however, to cite only one factor, we find the processes of modern war more highly technical than ever before. A thousand years ago, even three hundred years ago, Islam and Christianity were on an equality in the use of the mechanical instruments of war. Since that

time, the area of such a conflict has increased enormously; but the ingenuity, the scientific research, the ability to use the novel and dreadful implements of war have rested on the side of Christian Europe. Until, therefore, we teach the Muhammadan to employ successfully this new technique of war, until the average young Moslem turns for his daily bread to the ordinary vocation of a mechanic, there is small danger of a successful recovery of the leadership of the world by its Pan-Islamic elements. Such is a purely materialistic defence of this view of the question. It leaves out of consideration other important factors. Surely these weigh, and weigh in decided fashion when we consider how much of war is morale, psychology, credit, and capital.

There is, however, the question of the possibility of the spiritual alliance of Bolshevism and Pan-Islamism. How far could such a connection be established and, in point of fact, is there any chance of such a combination? Religion and property are two ancient words in Islam. Muhammadan society is essentially conservative; on the spiritual side it is contemptuous of the western world. To the Muhammadan, Bolshevik ideas seemed to be a new sort of insanity from the West. To the Asiatic mind this new riot of revolution merely illustrates once more the essential craziness of the Westerner. Only the youngest and less religious elements of Moslem society were inclined to accept such conceptions. Thus early in 1920 it required little persuasion to induce the Sheik-ul-Islam, who in many ways was the Chief Justice of the orthodox (Sunni) Moslem world, to issue a Fetwa, or legal opinion, on the new madness—Bolshevism.

Bolshevism is at present engaging the attention of those who control the destinies of nations. It is the duty of Islam, which directs a great portion of humanity, and reflects their sentiments, to proclaim its attitude to all Muhammadans and to the world in general. Whatever may be the basic principles of Bolshevism, the fact that their application is harmful to humanity, to social life, and to the rights of individual property, makes it quite impossible to reconcile them with the principles of Islam. . . . It is to the interest of Islam to use its strength and influence to oppose Bolshevism as a danger threatening civilization, justice, and right.⁵¹

If such an opinion by a Muhammadan layman were open to attack because it came from Constantinople, where possibly the influence of the Allies might explain such a dictum, the language of Mustapha Kemal from Angora is also clear on this point. He declared in 1921:

We are a popular government; our policy is clear and stable. It is not that of the democratic group nor of the Socialist party. We are not of any party; the character of the administration that we shall adopt concerns only ourselves and is adapted to our particular necessities.⁵²

Thus the government at Angora made it plain that an understanding with Soviet Russia was merely a marriage of convenience, and divorce was quick and easy in the East. Indeed, as we turn to the story of this connection, it is also plain how suspicious each side was of the other and yet how useful the entente was to them both in their conflict against a common enemy—the Allies.

With the advent of Bolshevik rule in Azerbaijan, and the spreading of propaganda throughout the Caucasus, the reality of the Red Army became clear to the Turks who were now desperately defying the Western world. Mustapha Kemal, therefore, wrote to Chicherin proposing diplomatic negotiations. In reply, Chicherin wrote on June 4, 1920.⁵³ He repeated the principles of Turkish policy as laid down in the National Pact and as given by Kemal. These he approved and also the delimitation of frontiers with Persia and Armenia for which he offered Russian mediation. Expressing the cordial good wishes of Soviet Russia for the success of the government at Angora, he proposed to establish diplomatic and consular relations with it. Later Kemal wrote:

We are in arms against the Western Powers because they have contradicted the principles of self-determination with regard to Turkey. We welcome intervention by Soviet Russia in fixing frontiers between us and Armenia and Persia.⁵⁴

The resumption of friendly relations began at once.⁵⁵ In the course of these negotiations, the collapse of Armenia took place. A telegram from Angora felicitated Soviet Russia and

declared that "a close union" between the two countries "will be sufficient to unite against the imperialists of the world all those who until now have supported their authority with meekness based on patience and ignorance."⁵⁶ Small wonder that the Russian Press commented: "Turkey has spoken in a language in which no diplomatic document of Tsarist days was ever written. For us in the interests of Communism such a change of views of Turkey towards us is very convenient."⁵⁷

More candid expressions are in a letter from Achmed Mukhtar, the Turkish Foreign Secretary, who stated that the Turkish government "considers itself the natural ally of Soviet Russia as long as the two countries fight together against the common enemy and defend the principle of the freedom of peoples in defiance to the imperialists of the West." So in January, 1921, we have a picture of suspicious yet selfishly cordial relations between the two governments. In February came to Moscow a Turkish peace delegation to negotiate a treaty. This was greeted by the following clear statement:

A new powerful force—Revolution—has made its appearance in the arena of world-politics and strife. Imperialists will never abandon the idea of economic rule over Turkey and this the Turkish masses fully understand. . . . The world-revolution is developing along the whole front. In the West it takes the form of a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In the East it is first of all the struggle between the workers and their foreign oppressors. In this struggle, Soviet Russia is the only stronghold to which all those who are oppressed and who do not wish to remain slaves may look for help.⁵⁸

Thus came the signature of the treaty on March 18, 1921. At a time when international agreements with Afghanistan, Bokhara, Persia, Poland, and Great Britain were also made, it was small wonder that Moscow rejoiced:

The treaties with Turkey, Persia, and Bokhara are significant because they are treaties not with imperialist states but with their victims. They are all united with Soviet Russia by their direct common interests, which consists of self-defence against the aggressive policy of world-imperialism.⁵⁹

This treaty between Russia and Turkey was also signed at a time when both France and Italy were trying to come to

terms with Angora by secret treaties.⁶⁰ Military supplies were soon to come from both sources. They were much needed as the Greek war was a heavy burden. The supply of money and, to a certain extent, of munitions from Soviet Russia was, however, of immediate assistance. The preamble to the treaty referred to "the fact that difficulties of any kind affecting one of the two peoples will endanger the situation of the other" and proposed "a treaty of amity and brotherhood between" the two governments.⁶¹ Neither state was to recognize "any international agreements to which either . . . may have been obliged by force to put its signature" and Moscow recognized Angora as the sole government representing Turkey. The boundaries were arranged for, Turkey recovering Ardahan and Kars, but agreeing to Georgian sovereignty at Batum on condition of the establishment of autonomy in that district and the granting of free transit for goods passing through the port. Nakhitchevan was finally to be an autonomous region under the protectorate of Azerbaijan. Each power recognized "many points of contact between the movement for national liberation of the peoples of the East and the struggle of the working population of Russia for a new social order."

On the question of the Straits, which had been a fundamental matter in Tsarist days, Article V reads:

In order to guarantee to all peoples the opening, as well as the freedom of commerce through the Dardanelles, both contracting parties declare their readiness to assign the final drawing up of an international regulation concerning the Black Sea and the Dardanelles to a special conference of delegates of the littoral states, provided that the decisions made by this commission shall not in any way encroach upon the complete sovereignty of Turkey, nor upon the security of Turkey or of its capital, Constantinople.

All previous treaties between Turkey and Russia were denounced and Russia relieved Turkey of all former financial obligations. The capitulations were wiped out. There was the usual mutual prohibition of organizations hostile to the other on the territory of either one of the countries. Communications and transport were to be restored, the protection of citizens, the application of the most-favored nation clause,

option as to citizenship, repatriation, and the establishment of consular representation were all included in the treaty. Russia undertook to see that the Caucasian Republics should recognize this agreement.

Naturally, in connection with this treaty there was much gossip regarding secret articles. It was reported that the treaty also forbade either power to make an agreement with a third government without consulting the other. Certainly, Aralov, Soviet Envoy at Angora, required explanation from Kemal regarding the conclusion of the so-called Bouillon agreement with France in October, 1921, which surrendered Cilicia to Turkey. An agreement with Soviet Russia as to the supply of arms and of money to Kemal is also alleged. In return for this it was reported that Russia was to have priority of exports from Anatolia and to get a contract for a railway line from Sivas to Angora and *via* Samsun to the Black Sea; this was to be temporarily under their control. It is obvious, however, that such a concession was directly opposed to the fundamentals of Turkish policy. The defeat of the Greeks at the Sakaria relieved Kemal for the moment and the need of Russian help diminished. On the whole, therefore, such alleged secret provisions seem to be doubtful. Their source is questionable and nothing can be observed in later events to substantiate them.

Undoubtedly, the more ardent Bolsheviki saw in the situation of the Turks opportunity for propaganda and for intrigue. As representatives of the Co-operative Organizations of Soviet Russia, a trade delegation came to Constantinople in the spring of 1921 with large powers of back-stairs negotiation. It does not, however, seem to have accomplished anything that is definite. On the other hand, there was a lively intrigue in connection with the arrival of Enver at Batum in 1921. He was a bitter enemy of Kemal, who regarded him of old as a renegade and a robber. That he should be welcomed by the Soviet authorities in the Caucasus was reason for anxiety. It roused at once all the ancient Turkish prejudices and suspicions regarding Russian policies. The Third Internationale attempted to develop a Turkish Communist group but this

was severely checked. Against Enver, Kemal seems to have protested till he was compelled to move on to Central Asia and to stop his intrigues against Kemal in Kurdistan and in Adjaria, near Batum.⁵² This strengthened the Pan-Islamic wing of Kemal's agents who began to extend their operations in the Middle East trying to nullify Soviet propaganda and to forestall the work of the Third Internationale. All of this, however, did not prevent the conclusion of the treaty of Kars between Turkey and the Caucasian Republic with Soviet Russia as the supervising agent.⁵³

This was closely along the lines of the treaty of the previous March between Soviet Russia and the Angora government. It repealed the treaty of Alexandropol in December, 1920, between Turkey and Armenia and substituted frontiers already defined. With the exception of certain local provisions, the document stood article for article in accord with the original agreement which it in reality put into effect.⁵⁴ Immediately, on its signature on October 13, 1921, the Soviet government issued a general protest against alleged Greek atrocities in Asia Minor.⁵⁵ Later, a treaty was also signed between the Angora government and the Ukraine on January 2, 1922. This was practically identical with the March treaty, though it contained an additional article stating that "no regulations can be made or enforced as regards the international rivers which flow into the Black Sea, without their active participation."⁵⁶ It was also vaguely reported at the time that a secret Article provided, in case Rumania should come to the assistance of the Greeks, that the Ukraine was to make a military demonstration on the Bessarabian frontier. Whether this is true or not, it is quite likely that something of this sort might have happened.

The multiplication of treaties did not, however, mean a gain for Soviet Russia. The Turks were ready to maintain friendly relations with Soviet authorities as long as it paid, in view of their struggle against the Greeks. To split the Western Allies and to assimilate all Moslem nationalities under the leadership of Angora were parts of a plan which was wholly nationalist. For Bolshevism had no chance in Kemal's

territory where the eradication of foreign control in order to make satisfactory independent terms with Western capital was the dominant policy.⁶⁷ The Turks were glad to have a protest made during the Genoa Conference by Soviet Russia in their absence; but their main attention was now concentrated on the recovery of Smyrna. The stories of pro-Bolshevik interviews with Kemal were largely for effect as were also the protests of Russia regarding the use of the Black Sea by the Greek navy.⁶⁸ Kemal was in control of the situation; the Communist friends of Russia were at a discount; and such opposition as existed at Angora was of a conservative, clerical character. Thus the Turks bent all their energies to overwhelm the Greeks, which they did with the capture of Smyrna in early September, 1922. That immediately raised the question of the Straits, whose "freedom" had been the subject of bitter contest between Russia and Turkey in time past. The Turks stood pledged to settle the matter in conference only with the Black Sea littoral states. Yet it was to become part of a general international agreement in defiance of Russian objections.⁶⁹

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

The news of Turkish success at Smyrna quickly led to rejoicing at Moscow.⁷⁰ It also led to vigorous claims by Soviet Russia that Russian interests and rights in respect to the Straits should be recognized. For a few weeks, as the Turks halted at Chanak, it was doubtful whether the improvised defense of Constantinople by the British under General Harington would result in peace or war. Wild rumors of Soviet mobilization and of plans for military intervention were current. These quieted as it became evident that the Turks did not wish Russian troops in Anatolia and as the Soviet authorities thought they saw in diplomacy rather than in arms the best chance for winning success for historical Russian policies.⁷¹

This point of view was explained in a Russian note of September 12, 1922, to Great Britain:

Russia cannot consent to the Straits being opened to the battleships of any country and in particular that Great Britain with the

consent of her allies should have control of the Straits, without the consent of and against the wishes of the Powers who have vital interests in the Black Sea, and should have the right of decision as to the fate of the Straits. Russia, Turkey, the Ukraine, and Georgia, to whom belongs practically the whole of the Black Sea coast, cannot admit the right of any other Government to interfere in the settlement of the question of the Straits and will maintain the point of view above set out even if the contrary point of view is backed by military or naval superiority.⁷²

Such a note backed by expressions of sympathy for the Turks brought the Russian program to the front. This was followed on September 24, 1922, by a longer and more definite statement of the entire problem from the Russian point of view.⁷³ It proposed an international conference which Russia should attend as the spokesman of her interests "in the East and on the Black Sea." This was in the face of a strong rumor that the Allies intended to deny to Soviet Russia any right to participate in the settlement of the Near Eastern question. Against such a possibility the *Izvestia* protested vigorously that these ideas were "directed not only against Soviet Russia but also against the nationalistic Angora government and against the whole Turkish people."⁷⁴ Chicherin said:

We are not making threats and are not rattling the sword, but we do insist upon proper consideration in all questions relating to the Near East, particularly the commercial freedom of the Straits.⁷⁵

On October 20, 1922, another Russian note expressed the same point of view in more particular form:

Russia also reserves the right to support the stipulations of the Russo-Turkish Moscow treaty, according to which definite statement, the international status of the Straits ought to be entrusted to a Black Sea delegation.⁷⁶

Such protests finally led to the inclusion of Russia at the Lausanne Conference to sit with the Conference when the status of the Straits was under discussion. In the meantime, the Soviet press fairly bristled with articles on the Near East.

One of these indicates Russian anxiety regarding the Turkish attitude and protests against their "persecution" of the Turkish Communist party. In doing this "the Turkish government is cutting off the branch on which it sits."⁷⁷ Thus early in the situation the Soviet authorities suggested that Turkish nationalism was going its own gait. Consequently, the press reiterated its protests that "the only country which would be able to support the Turks at the Lausanne Conference is Soviet Russia."⁷⁸ Radek declared that Russia was on the side of Turkey, not for the sake of Russia alone, but also because she saw in the situation an opportunity for "revolutionizing the East and thereby strengthening the world-proletariat and the Russian Revolution." Soviet Russia sees "only the great historic road which the industrial proletariat is treading in company with the peoples of the East in their common struggle against world-capitalism."⁷⁹ Thus the opportunity offered by the Lausanne Conference came to be the major consideration. It might even lead to *de jure* recognition of Soviet Russia. Who could tell?

As the Conference met under the presidency of Lord Curzon, the Russian Soviet delegation, which included both Chicherin and Rakovsky, mustered its strength to concentrate on the question of the Straits. That ancient quarrel loomed as a dividing issue. A review of the history of the problem is impossible here, but its present status and the alliance of Turkey and Russia strongly recall the condition of affairs which surrounded the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833. Then the Turks, hard pressed in Anatolia by the rebellious forces of Mehemet Ali (the Viceroy of Egypt), had signed an alliance with Tsarist Russia. Aid was to be given by Russia, and in return the Turks were to close the Straits to hostile warships. Later, the treaty lapsed, and in 1853, and again in 1878, British warships entered the Dardanelles in support of Turkey against Russian advance.⁸⁰ There was borne in, therefore, the fact that the question of the Straits was in reality a struggle between Great Britain and Soviet Russia—the old contest between the whale and the bear. In any event, the Turks might well ask themselves whether their national

policy should be that of Russia. Was Revolutionary Russia any safer than Tsarist Russia?

On December 4, 1922, the first meeting regarding the Straits took place. The issue was soon plain. Were the Straits to be open to the commerce of all nations and were warships to be free, under proper restrictions, to navigate both the Straits and the Black Sea? Was the pledge regarding the solution of such questions which had been made between Soviet Russia and Turkey to hold? And was the navigation of the Black Sea to be a problem exclusively for the littoral states, or was it to be subject to a broader international agreement? The Turks hesitated as they tried to find a way which would reconcile these questions, which would protect the sovereignty of Turkey at Constantinople, and which would safeguard their national interests. Chicherin declared that Russia aimed to realize two fundamental ideas:

(1) Equality for Russia and her allies with the Powers as regards position and rights, and (2) the preservation of peace and security in the territories of Russia, and of the republics allied with her and freedom in their economic relations with other countries.⁸¹

He then went on to apply these principles to the problem of the Straits. He reviewed recent history, took his stand on the safety of Constantinople, and demanded that the Straits be closed to warships and open to commerce. He concluded:

Any solution based on the presence in the Straits of forces belonging to certain Powers and tending to create a preponderant situation for one Power or group of Powers will encounter determined opposition not only from Russia and her allies, but also from public opinion in all countries which desire to eliminate those sources of conflict in the Near East which constitute a permanent menace to the cause of peace.⁸²

The views of the Allies were expounded on December 6 in a lengthy statement by Lord Curzon. As the Turks still held back, Chicherin again took up the defence of the Russian views. At the conclusion of his speech he turned to Lord Curzon saying:

You are uneasy because our horsemen have reappeared on the heights of the Pamirs, and because you no longer have to deal

with the half-witted Tsar who ceded the ridge of the Hindu Kush to you in 1895. But it is not war that we offer you, it is peace, based on the principles of a partition wall between us and on the principle of the freedom and sovereignty of Turkey.⁸³

To this almost personal allusion, Lord Curzon said that he had understood that the Russian proposals would "place Russia in a position of supremacy in the Black Sea, with Turkey following obediently behind her." In ironic fashion he added that he was glad to learn of the "friendly and innocent intentions now expressed by the Russian government in view of which Mr. Chicherin would doubtless now tear up most of the proposals made by him two days ago."⁸⁴

Such fencing took place throughout the sessions to the obvious irritation of the Russians who resented the pontifical sardony of Lord Curzon. Finally, on December 8, Ismet Pasha for Turkey made a statement which opened the way toward agreement along the lines suggested by the Allies. Throughout, he pointedly ignored the Russian contentions and failed even to mention her interests.⁸⁵ Chicherin, on the other hand, again spoke, as though both for Russia and Turkey, insisting that there would "not be any stability without the co-operation of Russia."⁸⁶ Apparently, however, Russia was surprised by the conciliatory attitude of the Turks and reserved her criticisms till a later time. The gist of the issue as seen by the *Izvestia* was that "the substance of British policy is to convert the Black Sea into an 'English Lake.' That is why England does not want to see Turkey the sentry at the Bosphorus."⁸⁷

At the sessions on December 18 and 19, 1922, Chicherin put forward the Russian program which recognized the Black Sea as a *mare clausum* to foreign warships.⁸⁸ During the next six weeks the Convention respecting the régime of the Straits was put into shape to be introduced again on February 1, 1923. In the interval, Chicherin gave to the press a memorandum regarding the Eastern Question and Russia's policy. It was in reality a jeremiad that "in spite of the awful lessons of the recent past the Great Powers are still persisting in their former fatal policy." The settlement of the problem of the

Straits suited "only those states which are anxious in the future to make use of the Straits as a basis for military operations directed against the countries bordering on the Black Sea." ⁸⁹

It was during these weeks also that the Turks made plain their fear of Russia. Some of them went about trying to build up support which might protect them against possible Soviet attack. The principle of the alliance had dissolved as the Turks resolved to distrust revolutionary jargon and to look for the future to their own national weapons. The Conference finally broke up without a signature, but the Turks said they were ready to accept the draft plan for the Straits which was finally accepted at the conclusion of the second session of the Lausanne Conference in July, 1923. The Russians, on the contrary, refused to sign. Chicherin protested that there had been "no negotiations." He concluded:

Under these conditions there cannot be any decision in the Straits question. There is none and there will not be any without Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia. If the convention is signed without Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia, the latter will retain an entirely free hand and complete liberty of action. If certain Powers sign this convention without Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia, the Straits question remains and will remain open.⁹⁰

So Soviet Russia retired, beaten, and disgusted, to meditate on the folly of trusting the Turks. The main principle of the Convention to which such violent exception was taken are as follows: (1) the Straits are open to commerce in time of peace and in time of war, Turkey being neutral; (2) in time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, they are also open except as Turkey may take measures to limit the passage of enemy vessels only; (3) in time of peace, warships may freely pass, except that the maximum force which any one Power may send into the Black Sea shall not exceed that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers. This does not prevent the despatch of three ships, of which no individual ship shall exceed ten thousand tons; (4) in time of war, Turkey being a neutral, the same is true except that the belligerent rights in the Black Sea of any belligerent Power cannot be limited;

(5) in time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, the same is also true except as limited by No. 3, and the measures taken by Turkey to prevent the passage of enemy ships and air craft shall not interfere with the passage of neutral ships and air craft; (6) the Straits are demilitarized except for forces of twelve thousand to be used as a garrison for Constantinople; (7) a High Commission is set up to supervise the administration of the Convention.⁹¹

In the main, therefore, as the actual conditions of international relations came to light, the alliance of Turkey and Soviet Russia broke down. The Russians tried to divert attention from this by criticizing the failure to secure a treaty at the first session of the Conference of Lausanne. Chicherin declared that the "Conference proved that Russia must be regarded as an essential factor in international life," but failed to specify any other results.⁹² Almost immediately the Third Internationale began vigorous protests against the persecution of Communists in Turkey.⁹³

In short, the Turks had used Soviet Russia as much as was necessary. They now pursued their own ends. Thus the policy of Soviet Russia has consolidated itself in the Caucasus, and has also stimulated the renewed national life of Turkey. In doing so, Russia has reverted to aims and notions that suggest historical Russian conceptions. In the Near East it certainly remains true that no permanent settlement can be ratified without the co-operation of Russia. In July, 1923, it is reported in the press that Russia has finally decided to sign the convention regarding the Straits, though with reservations.⁹⁴ This probably is due to general policy,

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. In *Novy Vostok*, Vol. I, (Moscow, 1922). This is a new periodical devoted to Russian interests in the Orient.
2. *Izvestia*, Dec. 7, 1922. This article was written with reference to the Lausanne Conference.
3. *The Caucasus* (Handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 54) (London, 1920), pp. 20-25.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-30; Bammate, "The Caucasus during the War" in *Current History*, X, pp. 123-26.
5. Bammate, pp. 126-27; *Current History*, IX, Part 1, p. 401.
6. *Texts of the Russian "Peace,"* Washington, 1918, p. 7.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-70.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-88.
10. *Current History*, VIII, Part 2, pp. 131 et seq.; *Izvestia*, April 13, 1918.
11. *Ibid.*, May 9, 1918.
12. *Ibid.*, March 28, May 16, 18, 1918.
13. *The Caucasus*, p. 30.
14. *Izvestia*, May 28, June 2, 1918.
15. *Current History*, XII, p. 259.
16. On this matter Cf. Dunsterville, *The Adventures of Dunsterville* (London, 1920). General Dunsterville declares that his mission was "to reorganize the broken units of Russian, Georgian, and Armenian soldiery and to restore the battle line against the Turkish invasion" (p. 3); he found that "there is no unity of thought or action, nothing but mutual jealousy and mistrust" (p. 118); the "importance of Baku was enormous" and his duty was to prevent its falling into the hands of German-Turkish forces (pp. 140-41); consequently, we find "a British General on the Caspian, the only sea unploughed before by British keels, on board a ship named after a South African Dutch President and whilom enemy [President Kruger] sailing from a Persian port, under the Serbian flag, to relieve from the Turks a body of Armenians in a revolutionary Russian town" (p. 219). *Izvestia*, April 23, 1919 (a note from Chicherin to protest regarding the alleged behavior of the British at Baku in August, 1918).
17. *Current History*, IX, Part 1, pp. 401-403; X, Part 2, p. 531.
18. *Izvestia*, Aug. 20, Sept. 21, Oct. 10, 11, 12, Nov. 2, 1918.
19. *Ibid.*, July 30, 1918.
20. *Current History*, XI, Part 2, p. 143.
21. *House of Commons Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 121, p. 723, Nov. 17, 1919. Lloyd George said: "There was a very great States-

man, a man of great imagination, who certainly did not belong to the party to which I belong, Lord Beaconsfield, who regarded a great, gigantic, colossal, growing Russia rolling onwards like a glacier towards Persia and the borders of Afghanistan and India as the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with. I am not on that now, except that it has perhaps great relevance to one observation of my Noble Friend, that is, the consolidation of those nationalities on their own ground."

22. Bechhofer, *In Denikin's Russia*, p. 121.
23. Bechhofer, chaps. ii and viii.
24. *Wireless News*, Sept. 22, Dec. 14, 1919.
25. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 6, 1920; Chicherin Note to Georgia, Feb. 15, in *Soviet Russia*, April 24, 1920.
26. *Pravda*, Feb. 26, March 31, 1920.
27. Castagné, "Le Bolchevisme et l'Islam" (*Revue du Monde Musulman*), Paris, 1922, Vol. 51, pp. 104 *et seq.* On this and other points this collection is very useful.
28. Castagné, p. 108.
29. Castagné, p. 110.
30. Dunsterville, chap. xvii.
31. Raskolnikov in *Petrograd Pravda*, July 15, 1920. Translated in *Soviet Russia*, Oct. 23, 1920 (p. 393).
32. *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 28, 1920; *Izvestia*, April 29, 1920.
33. *Sbornik*, etc., I, pp. 1-11.
34. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Oct. 11, 1920; *Wireless News*, Paris, Oct. 13, 1920; *Petrograd Pravda*, Oct. 3, 1920.
35. *Pravda*, Aug. 14, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Aug. 11, 1920.
36. *Sbornik*, III, p. 14; *Current History*, XIII, Part 1, p. 244; Part 2, pp. 69-71, 338; *Russian Press Review*, No. 13, Dec. 8, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Dec. 3, 22, 1920; *Petrograd Pravda*, Jan. 12, 1921; *New York Tribune*, Jan. 26, 1921; Radek, "How the Allies Liberated Armenia" in *Izvestia*, June 12, 1920, based on an article by Paxton Hibben in the *New Republic*, March 31, 1920; Pavlovich (Weltman), "The Turkish Offensive against Armenia," in *Soviet Russia*, Feb. 12, 1921; *Ibid.*, March 5, 1921; Hibben, "Soviet Armenia," in the *Nation* (N. Y.), March 22, 1922; Semenov, "The Near East," in *Russian Life* (No. 6, Feb.-March, 1922), pp. 191-196. These various articles, if we allow for partisan feeling, give substantially the same version of the fate of Armenia.
37. *Current History*, XII, p. 631.
38. *Sbornik*, etc., I, p. 27. Cf. *Soviet Russia*, July 31, 1920 (p. 123).

39. *Ibid.*, June 26, 1920 (p. 646).
40. *Slovo* (Tiflis), June 27, 1920.
41. *Ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1920; cf. *Current History*, XIII, Part 1, p. 246.
42. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Nov. 16, 1920. Cf. *Ost-Information*, Berlin (No. 78), Nov. 27, 1920.
43. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 27, 1921; *Soviet Russia*, April 9, 1921.
44. *Sbornik*, III, "Corrections and Supplements."
45. *Izvestia*, Jan. 29, 1921; *Soviet Russia*, April 23, 1921; *Current History*, XII, p. 1072-75; XIII, Part 2, pp. 339, 519; XIV, p. 264.
46. *Wireless News*, Moscow, May 11, 1921.
47. *Current History*, XV, pp. 864, 1048.
48. *Living Age*, March 25, 1922.
49. *The Truth of Georgia* (Tiflis), May 8, 1921; cf. *New York Times*, June 8, 1921.
50. On the Caucasus generally there are two useful articles by Poidebrad, "Le Caucase pendant et depuis la Guerre," in *Etudes* (Paris), May 5 and 20, 1922. They merit careful study, as the author was a French officer who originally accompanied Dunsterville in the "Hush-Hush" army in 1918.
51. *New York Times*, July 30, 1922.
52. "Le Bolchevisme et l'Islam," II, *Hors de Russie* (*Revue du Monde Musulman*, Vol. 52), p. 206.
53. *Soviet Russia*, Aug. 7, 1920. Earlier, on April 23, 1919, a false report of a Turkish Soviet revolution had led the *Izvestia* to declare the solidarity of Russian and Turkish interests in the proclamation of revolt for all Asia.
54. *Orient News* (Constantinople), Oct. 21, 1920.
55. There is some question as to an agreement said to have been signed at Trebizond on Oct. 27, 1920, between Radek for Soviet Russia and Achmed Mukhtar for Angora. Both the British and French governments gave out the text, which is also given in *Ost-Information*, Berlin, No. 89, Jan. 8, 1921. Cf. *Current History*, XIII, Part 2, p. 67. The chief reasons for rejecting this document as very probably a forgery are that it provides for facilities for the development of Communism in Turkey, recognizes Turkish control over Arabia and Syria, refers to Turkey as a Republic, and is concerned largely with a program of joint military occupation of newly conquered territory. I have not found any Russian reference to such an agreement, nor is there evidence that Radek was in Trebizond at that time.
56. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Dec. 4, 1920.
57. *The Battle Truth* (Petrograd), Dec. 7, 1920. Cf. Chicherin "The Eastern Policy of the Soviet Authority," in *Izvestia*,

- Nov. 6, 1921. Friction threatened between Soviet Russia and Turkey with regard to Armenia at this time.
58. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Feb. 22, March 3, 1921. Cf. *Russian Press Review*, No. 26, March 7, 1921.
 59. *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 22, 1921.
 60. Both of these secret agreements failed of final ratification at Angora. Later in the Bouillon treaty of October, 1921, the French entered for a time into very friendly relations with the Kemalists.
 61. *Sbornik*, II, p. 72.
 62. Cf. *New York Times*, Dec. 25, 1921; *New York Tribune*, Jan. 29, 1922.
 63. *Izvestia*, Oct. 7, 1921.
 64. *Sbornik*, III, p. 49.
 65. *Izvestia*, Oct. 25, 1921.
 66. I have a copy of this treaty from Rumanian sources.
 67. The same ideas inspired a speech by Kemal on Sept. 19, 1921, reported in the *Izvestia*, Dec. 18, 1921. Cf. *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1922; also *Morning Post* (London), July 4, 1921, for a statement by Kemal on Turkish policy.
 68. *Izvestia*, May 31, June 30, July 12, 18, 22, August 10, 17, Sept. 6, 1922. *Aksham* (Constantinople), March 6, 1922; *Vakit* (Constantinople), March 6, 1922.
 69. As a comment on the general attitude of the Turks there is the quotation from *Le Journal* of an interview with Abdul Medjid, the new Caliph at Constantinople: "I can assure you that my country will have nothing in common with the Bolsheviks, as Communist doctrines are in flagrant opposition to the prescriptions of the Koran which recognizes and protects private property." *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 22, 1922.

In spite of statements like this and in spite of the entire history of Russo-Turkish relations, an article in the *Fortnightly Review*, June, 1923, misinterprets the subject and refers more than once to "Soviet Anatolia"—Godden, *The Advance of Soviet Asia*, pp. 931-41.

A vigorous critique on the subject is Oldberg, "Sowjet—Russland Politik im Orient," in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Band 50, Heft I, pp. 127-203. The author is strongly anti-Bolshevik; he has apparently studied the sources.

70. *Rabochaya Moskva*, Sept. 6, 1922.
71. *Izvestia*, Sept. 10, 26, 1922; *New York Times*, Sept. 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 1922; *New York Evening Sun*, Sept. 20, 1922; *New York Evening Post*, Sept. 24, 1922; especially *Public Ledger*, Oct. 5, 1922, where mention is made of future difficulties with

- Soviet Russia regarding the fulfillment of the treaty of March 16, 1921; *The Interpreter* (New York), Oct. 21, 1922.
72. Text of note was given out by the Russian Trade Delegation, Sept. 23, 1922; *Izvestia*, Sept. 13, 14, 16, 1922. Cf. *Polsednya Novosti*, Sept. 15, 1922.
73. *Nation* (N. Y.), Oct. 25, 1922.
74. *Izvestia*, Sept. 26, 1922.
75. *New York Tribune*, Oct. 12, 1922. Cf. *New York Times*, Sept. 27, 30, Oct. 2, 8, 1922; *Public Ledger*, Oct. 6, 1922; *New York Evening Post*, Oct. 19, 20, 1922.
76. *New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1922; *Russian Information Review*, Nov. 11, 1922. Cf. *New York Times*, Oct. 29, Nov. 5, 20, 1922; *Soviet Russia*, Dec., 1922.
77. *Izvestia*, Nov. 21, 1922.
78. *Ibid.*, Nov. 22, 1922.
79. *Pravda*, Nov. 22, 1922; Cf. *Izvestia*, Nov. 23, 1922, for an article by Steklov who declares of the Eastern peoples that "only in closest contact and collaboration with the Russian nation can they hope to accomplish their liberation." The general idea was that Russia was indispensable.
80. Cf. Dennis, "The Freedom of the Straits," in *North American Review*, Dec., 1922. The substance of this article was prepared for the use of the American Delegation at the Peace Conference in 1919.
81. *The Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923* (Turkey, No. 1, 1923), Cd. 1814, London, 1923, p. 129.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31. Cf. *New York Evening Post*, Dec. 4, 5, 1922.
83. *The Lausanne Conference*, p. 149.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 156 et seq.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
87. *Izvestia*, Dec. 9, 1922. Cf. *New York Times*, Dec. 12, 19, 1922.
88. *The Lausanne Conference*, pp. 228-88, containing the records of the sessions of Dec. 18 and 19, 1922.
89. *Russian Information Review*, Jan. 6, 1923. Cf. *New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1922. On Jan. 18, 1923, the *Izvestia* declared that the Conference had become a contest between Russia and England.
90. *The Lausanne Conference*, p. 456. Cf. *Russian Information Review*, Feb. 24, 1923.
91. *The Lausanne Conference*, pp. 772 et seq.
92. *Juanakas Sinas* (Riga), Feb. 13, 1923.
93. *Izvestia*, Feb. 14, 1923.
94. It is reported that the convention was signed by Jordansky, who took Vorovsky's place at Rome.

CHAPTER X

PERSIA, RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA, AND AFGHANISTAN

Now, however, having for the first time met in a congress of the nations of the Orient, you must proclaim a real, holy war against those robbers, the Anglo-French capitalists. . . . The hour has struck when the workers of the entire world will be able to arouse and bring into motion tens and hundreds of millions of peasants, when they will be able in the Orient, too, to create a Red Army, will be able to arm themselves, will be able to organize insurrection in the rear of the English, will be able to throw the fire-brands among these robbers, will be able to make life miserable to every brazen-faced British officer lording it in Turkey, Persia, India, and China. . . . The Communist Internationale today addresses itself to the nations of the Orient and says to them: "Brothers! We call you, first of all, to a holy war against British imperialism!" —Speech by Zinoviev in *Stenographic Records of the First Congress of the Nations of the Orient at Baku*, Sept. 1, 1920, pp. 47-48.

There was a time when capitalistic Europe, and first of all British Imperialism, watched with ever-increasing fear the growth and influence of Tsarist Russia in Asia. . . . The bourgeois Russia of the landlords established its rule over the peoples of the East by blood and iron. Its advance posts were moving nearer and nearer to India, this jewel of the British Crown and at the same time the Achilles heel of British Imperialism. Now . . . the British bourgeoisie . . . are disturbed by the unprecedented force with which Communism subjugates even the backward peoples of the East. . . . The resolutions of the Baku Conference will resound as an alarm signal in the hearts of the workmen and peasants of Asia and Africa and as a funeral march in the ears of the bourgeoisie doomed to die.—"*The East and the West.*"¹

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic brands as criminal the policy of the Government of Tsarist Russia, which, without the agreement of the peoples of Asia and under the guise of assuring the independence of these peoples, concluded with other states of Europe treaties concerning the East which had as their ultimate object its gradual seizure. The Gov-

ernment of the R.S.F.S.R. unconditionally rejects that criminal policy as not only violating the sovereignty of the States of Asia, but also leading to organized brutal violence of European robbers on the living body of the peoples of the East.—*Article II of Russo-Persian Treaty, February 26, 1921.*²

TECHNICALLY, the position of Persia during the World War defies definition. Her neutrality was violated both by the Allies and by the Central Powers. Teheran was a hot-bed of pro-German propaganda until the British cleaned it out in 1916. Both sides freely made use of her strategical position to plan or to carry out far-reaching schemes of combat and of intrigue. As British plans for the extension of control in Mesopotamia travelled to completion, the union of British and Russian forces from the Caucasus became a major element in the success of their joint operations. Thus also the Turks, who had in the main kept within their frontiers, were drawn, under stimulus from Berlin and by the impetus of the war, to consider the eventual part that Persia must play in a conflict to extend German and Turkish influence in Central Asia and toward India.

All of these elements seemed to come to a head as the Russian Revolution broke. The forces involved were not large as we think of the millions in combat further to the west; but the stakes were tremendous and the ultimate results as regards area and population were enormous. Even as the collapse of Russian armies seemed to suggest German victory, the determination of the British strengthened to hold what they had. So we see the great area of Persia (628,000 square miles) as a chess-board on which with cunning and vigor the opponents moved their men to victory or defeat.

On paper Persia was an independent, sovereign, neutral state, entitled to all the prerogatives that usually belong to such a state. Actually, however, northern Persia, including its capital, Teheran, had been a Russian preserve for many years. Such a situation had been recognized by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. This had, in reality, made a sandwich of the country. In the middle was a permanently neutral Persia, to the south was a British sphere of influence,

and to the north a Russian sphere. The agreement had not created a new condition of affairs, but, in the larger interests of world-politics, as they were seen at the time from St. Petersburg and London, it had ratified and defined tendencies that were already at work.

The Persian state had in the meantime often been a fiction. The ultimate power at Teheran was Russia. The proud traditions of ancient Persia had become a bagatelle, as Cabinet after Cabinet played with power. The Shah was at times worse than a *roi fainéant* without a *major-domo*. Happily pleased with frivolous trips to Europe, for which he was finally compelled to borrow money, he left his Ministers to bribe and to be bribed, while the country seemed to be sunk in a lethargy that nothing could rouse. Finally in 1906, the stirrings of the pot culminated in the idea of a constitutional revolution. This established a Medjliss or Parliament. The administration of the country continued as before, though now there were the forms of western government to be more or less observed. At no time, however, was the Medjliss a representative institution; it became a debating club which could be summoned on occasion and was always an excuse for failure to take prompt action. Slowly, nevertheless, these debates began to take shape and form; Cabinets began to be patriotic; and the local press found occasion to devote more attention to public affairs.

The intentions of groups of public officials were admirable as they studied and discussed the failings and misfortunes of their country. The latter were due chiefly to the lack of a financial system and to the domination of foreign interests in the conduct of affairs and in the development of resources. The dishonest practices of an earlier day were continued even while they were criticized. Above all, the notion gained that in other European countries or in America foreign advisers might be found to reform the state of affairs and to give vigor to the administration. One attempt of this sort, the introduction of Mr. Shuster from America to restore order in public finance, fell foul of the Anglo-Russian agreement. After the war in 1922, a second attempt of the same sort is

now being made on a larger scale with Dr. Millspaugh, formerly of the Department of State at Washington, as the head.

In the meantime, however, the Anglo-Russian agreement has been done away with; an Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 has also disappeared. The determination of the present directors of public life in Persia to accomplish the almost impossible task of restoring order and honesty to Persian affairs has taken on a new lease of life. The dry bones have stirred and there is a whisper of life in Persia. In these years there has naturally been the supreme endeavor to free Persia first from Russian control and secondly from British direction. So patriotic Persians have played the game of international politics to restore real sovereignty to their country. In all of these matters, the connection of Russia with Persia has been of paramount importance. Indeed, the Russian Revolution was in its influence almost a domestic event in Persia, the affairs of Persia bear such a close and intimate relation to the stormy progress of history to the north.

THE FREEING OF PERSIA

The news of the revolutionary ferment in Russia had come to Teheran as fortunate and unexpected. Quickly the possibility of freeing Persia from Tsarist Russia had become apparent. In Berlin it was also promptly seized by Persian exiles who wrote an appeal to the Stockholm International Socialist Congress in 1917. They recited their woes as victims of "the greed of European imperialism" and, after a review of recent history, demanded the repudiation of "all concessions, conventions, and contracts wrested from the Persian Government" by coercion. Tsarist Russia, they declared, was the source of all their misfortunes; they therefore hailed the Russian Revolutionary peoples as their friends.³ This might be German propaganda, but it was also Persian patriotism. In the meantime, in the *Izvestia*, a clever article on Persia pointed out that the best way to oust England from Persia was by the denunciation of Tsarist rights in Persia.⁴ This was immediately followed by the formal Soviet note which proclaimed the abrogation of all Russian claims in

Persia that infringed the rights of Persian sovereignty and promised every effort to have Persia cleared of Turkish and British troops. In the future, Russian relations with Persia should be "based upon a free agreement and mutual respect among nations."⁵

In the treaties negotiated at Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers, where reference was made to Persia, the Soviet government, as we have seen, repudiated claims to special privilege. Quickly, attacks were made and protests were launched at the continued presence in Persia of Tsarist officials and officers.⁶ At Teheran a formal ministerial decree was passed also amending the old treaties with Russia.⁷ Later, at the Peace Conference in Paris, a group of Persians declared that the occupation of Persian territory by Allied troops was now no longer necessary, and that all illegal and reactionary treaties should now be canceled, especially the Anglo-Russian agreement as to Persia.⁸ This attempt to raise the Persian question at Paris was quickly hushed by negotiations which were begun by the British at Teheran in the spring of 1919. Such a step had, however, been preceded by attempts to disperse the Soviet agents in Teheran.⁹ In this, both Russians of the *ancien régime* and the British were concerned, for at the time everything was being done to check any revolutionary tendencies in Persia, and to forward the endeavors of General Denikin in the north.

The result of these negotiations was the signature at Teheran on August 9, 1919, of a new Anglo-Persian agreement.¹⁰ This document has since failed of ratification; and it remains only as a melancholy tombstone.¹¹ Lord Curzon was an authority on Persia, but it was the old rather than the new Persia. For this agreement practically placed the government of the Shah under British direction and established a British protectorate in fact if not in name. As such it "disappeared," for no Persian government dared to bring it before the Medjliss for ratification; the British themselves were compelled to recognize the failure of the attempt to profit by the upheaval in Soviet Russia in order to step into the position of priority hitherto claimed at Teheran by Tsarist Russia. This docu-

ment insisted on the determination of the British government "to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia" and then planned the appointment of British expert advisers to manage the affairs of Persia. That the Persians undoubtedly were in need of such advisers is plain, but the difficulty for the Persians was that they were British. Indeed, it is a question whether popular feeling was stronger against the Russians or against the British. Persia, which was to become a member of the League of Nations, was now bound along the rough road toward real independence.

The news of the Anglo-Persian agreement led to bitter comment in the French press and certainly was not approved by the United States.¹² Nor did the visit of the Shah to England in November, 1919, aid the situation. To be sure, Lord Curzon was rhetorical at the Lord Mayor's banquet when he spoke of "the British lion" standing forth "as the proud and valiant champion of the rights and liberties of Persia."¹³ That a British syndicate should secure promises for the construction of a railway from Mesopotamia to Teheran with a branch from Kasvin to Enzeli on the Caspian seemed to emphasize the fact of British military and commercial domination.¹⁴ The result was that Persia began once more to turn toward Soviet Russia. If she could by playing one Power against another win a way to her own sovereignty, the question of experts and of foreign loans might be solved.

Already Soviet agents had tried unsuccessfully to engage in propaganda in Persia. Only in the northwest, in the province of Ghilan, did they stir Kuchuk Khan to set up a real government which was later to be useful to them. He was an idealist Robin Hood who later paid with his head; his conception of freedom was chiefly that of his own liberty to govern. In the meantime, Chicherin had addressed an appeal to the workers and peasants of Persia. He denounced the Anglo-Persian agreement and repeated the Soviet pledge that all the old Tsarist treaties which had enslaved Persia were null and void. He pointed to the continued occupation of Persia by British troops and declared:

The laboring masses of Russia see in the Persian workers their

brothers, their friends, and their future comrades in the revolutionary struggle for the complete liberation of the workers. . . . The era of complete liberation is near. The hour of judgment for English capitalists will soon strike.¹⁵

In the face of such appeals, it was inevitable that unrest in Persia should develop. The Persian government was fully alive to the dangers of Bolshevism, but nevertheless wished to maintain good relations with the Soviet authorities in order to use them against the British. The prestige of the English steadily lost ground, particularly in the spring of 1920. The fall of Baku to the Soviet authorities, and later their occupation of Enzeli and Resht, created a sensation.¹⁶ Prince Firouz at Paris stated frankly that he hoped for friendly relations with Soviet Russia, but that the Persians did not want Bolshevik doctrines.¹⁷ The capture of Enzeli was the signal for prompt diplomatic action by Russia promising the evacuation of that region as soon as the British withdrew from northern Persia.¹⁸ At the same time there was reason to believe in the existence of far-reaching plans for Soviet intervention in Persia. At first the London press was the victim of alarmist reports that even Teheran had been occupied by Russian forces. The Persian Prime-Minister appealed to the British for troops to maintain the authority of the government as every malcontent in Persia was now swept into a pro-Bolshevik mood because of the Russian advance.¹⁹ Persia also appealed unavailingly to the League of Nations for assistance.²⁰

The summer of 1920 was an anxious time in Persia. The foreign legations made preparations to quit Teheran in case the Bolsheviks should attack. In the meantime, a Persian Ambassador departed for Moscow to explain the situation. The British were face to face with the question as to withdrawal or as to continuance in spite of their own unpopularity.²¹ The Soviet authorities, triumphant on the Caspian, now threatened northeastern Persia by a skilfully instigated rising which might lead the way to Russian intervention from the direction of the trans-Caspian. This was frustrated by Major Blacker of the British Expedition in eastern Persia.²² Finally, in January, 1921, the British ordered the withdrawal of their

forces, leaving the Persians to face their difficulties alone. This, however, was the signal for a *coup d'état* at Teheran. A revolution took place in February, which, for a short time at least, gave Persia a more vigorous government.²³ It came at the same time with news from Moscow that a treaty with Soviet Russia had been signed. Thus with British withdrawal of troops in northern Persia, a settlement with Russia, and the victory of more vigorous elements in Persia, the entire prospect appeared brighter.

THE RUSSO-PERSIAN TREATY

The attitude of the Persian government toward Bolshevism was emphatic. The social conditions which had produced the doctrines of communism in Russia were non-existent in Persia. Bolshevik doctrines were contrary to the traditions and the religion of Persia. They could not find a fertile soil in any Muhammadan country. The danger that Persia would turn Soviet was therefore small. Nevertheless, the danger of unrest, of brigandage, and of political banditti was considerable. To fish in troubled waters was the known policy of Moscow; the traditions of Russian policy looked on Teheran at least as an outpost; and the dangerous rivalry with England created serious difficulties. It was, however, the clear intention of the Persian government to safeguard their complete independence and integrity and to escape from the pernicious effects of Anglo-Russian rivalry by maintaining a neutral attitude and by strengthening the economic forces of Persia through assistance from neutral advisers who would not have any political interests to bring forward. It was from this point of view that Persia now, in 1921-22, turned to the United States for advice and unofficial assistance. Whether Dr. Millspaugh and his band of American experts can restore Persian finances and assist in the development of the natural resources of the country remains to be seen. In the meantime, the policy of the government is "Persia for the Persians."

The treaty with Soviet Russia was, therefore, a necessary preliminary to the development of such a policy. It is a remarkable document; half of it is Soviet propaganda and the

other half a notable charter of Persian liberties. The Russian authorities planned its phrases and arranged for its promulgation distinctly for the effect that it might have on liberal opinion throughout the world. They distributed copies, not through diplomatic channels, but to intellectual and vocal elements who might be depended on to spread its ideas abroad.²⁴ A closer study of its clauses and the accompanying notes, together with the later diplomatic policy of Soviet Russia, tend to modify somewhat the impression which it at first created. As time has passed, a path seems to have been left open to the traditions of aggressive Russian national policy in Persia. The provisions of the treaty, however, now require analysis.²⁵

The Russian Soviet government declared "as canceled and invalid all treaties, agreements, and conventions entered into between the former Government of the Tsars and Persia, and prejudicing the rights of the people of Persia." This was in accordance with statements made on January 14, 1918, and on June 26, 1919, whereby "Russia once and for all renounces the predatory policy toward Persia adopted by the former imperialistic Governments of Russia." Such language was evidently intended not only for Teheran, but also for the talk of bazaars in Kabul, Bombay, and Calcutta.

Boundaries were, with slight modifications, fixed as in 1881. There was reciprocal renunciation of the practice of interference in domestic affairs. A strict rule was laid down as to hostile organizations or groups in each other's territory. In case any attempt should be made by a third party to acquire or use Persian territory for war on Russia, Persia was to permit the march of Russian troops into Persia "in order to take all necessary military measures for purposes of self-defence." The Russian government was to have the right to require the expulsion of hostile elements from the crew of any Persian vessel on the Caspian Sea; but Persia, for the first time since 1828, was free to maintain a naval force on the Caspian.

Russia renounced "the financial policy adhered to in the East by the former Russian authorities for the purpose of gaining political ascendancy over Persia." To this end all

former loans to Persia were canceled and the property of the Bank of Persia was transferred to Persia. Rights in ports, roads, and railways were also given up as being in line with "world-imperialism." All concessions were surrendered with the proviso in Article XIII:

The Government of Persia in its turn promises not to cede the concessions and property returned in fulfillment of the present treaty to any third Power or its citizens, as property, or for disposal or use, but to retain all rights connected therewith for the benefit of the people of Persia.

Fishing rights in the Caspian, commercial relations, the re-establishment of postal and telegraphic communications and of diplomatic and consular representation were to be dealt with later in separate conventions. The rights of citizens to trade and reside in each other's territories and of transit trade were mutually granted. Persia was to use for educational purposes the plants of Russian missions in Persia, for Soviet Russia was opposed to "the religious propaganda of missionaries in Muhammadan countries, the disguised aim of which was to gain political influence on the masses and thereby to further the predatory intrigues of Tsarism."

As regards the meaning of Articles V and VI, in a letter of December 11, Rothstein, the Soviet Envoy at Teheran, stated these articles were directed against "counter-revolutionaries" and did not include "any attacks of agitation by word of mouth or by writing" against Russia which might be carried on "within the limits ordinarily allowed in the intercourse between two friendly governments." Furthermore, with regard to Article XIII, which has been quoted and with reference to transit trade, he assured the Persian government that he would "support [it] in the negotiations for the modification of the said articles, . . . in a manner consonant with the desires of the Persian government and the interests of Russia." Thereupon the treaty was ratified on December 15, 1921.

The signature of this treaty made the fate of the Anglo-Persian agreement certain. The *coup d'état* of February had

been opposed to Bolshevism; but the new Prime Minister, Zia-ed-Din, in April, said that the relations of Persia and Great Britain were "cordial" because the Anglo-Persian agreement had "disappeared." In May, the British troops were finally moved out from Persia just as Rothstein, the new Soviet Envoy, arrived. He had already said that "towards Persia our policy is a matter of political morality. . . . Our Persian policy will in due course of time be appreciated by all Eastern peoples, who will quickly recognize the Soviet's new conception of freedom for downtrodden and oppressed peoples."²⁶ Part of this policy, as the Persians saw it, was the withdrawal of foreign troops. In February, Chicherin had said that Russian troops would stay in Persian Azerbaijan until the British would also withdraw their troops. The evacuation of Russian troops was, therefore, the first test of the treaty. Finally, on September 8, the last of these was withdrawn.

The influence and propaganda methods of Rothstein were soon to be a source of trouble.²⁸ Newspaper reference to "Soviet Persia" led the Persian Minister in Washington to write that "such a statement was absurd, as their Muhammadan religion does not allow Persians to have such a form of government."²⁹ At the same time, Lord Curzon in the House of Lords, unconsciously did his best to drive Persia toward the Bolsheviki by his speech of July 26, 1921. In the course of a requiem service for the Anglo-Persian agreement he said:

"The Persian Government has deliberately rejected the chance of recovering its fortunes with British aid. . . . It has fallen back on the game of playing off one foreign country against another and now seems not unwilling to accept the caresses of the Soviet Government—caresses which generally end in strangling those to whom they are applied."³⁰

Lord Curzon viewed the situation "with a feeling of disappointment and almost of despair" as British efforts had been "largely in vain." The exasperation of the Persian press at these statements was clear; they furiously rejected the idea of an exclusive British policy of economic exploita-

tion and the *Star of Persia* said that the Anglo-Persian agreement was "an instrument of English colonial policy which would have destroyed our independence forthwith."³¹ All of this, however, did not prevent the Persian government from following with vigor the rebel chief of the Soviet government of Ghilan when the Russian troops were withdrawn from Enzeli. Kuchuk Khan, therefore, paid the penalty of his idealism and of having been too friendly with the Russians. Later, the danger that Russian troops might be called on to assist the Persian government in suppressing another genial but vigorous rebel, Simko, was finally avoided. He had made himself master of Urumiah on the borders of Kurdistan where he defied Persian troops. This movement also collapsed in February, 1922. The general result was that the Third Internationale now withdrew support of individual chieftains who pretended to become Communists, but who pursued only a policy of personal gain.³²

So far, in spite of vigorous propaganda conducted in the press, in schools, by moving pictures, and individually, the Soviet legation had not won its way. The personality of Rothstein was offensive to the Persians and his hectoring ways had antagonized many. In particular, little developed toward the restoration of trade chiefly because of conditions of disorder in Persia and because Soviet Russia had nothing to trade with. Russian exports to Persia, which in 1913-14 had figured at more than 657 million Krans (about six and a half million dollars) in 1919-20 were only 160 million Krans. As a practical matter of business, the restoration of commercial relations was, therefore, of the greatest importance. Unfortunately, both Rothstein and the Soviet press promised much and performed little. The envoy, furthermore, seemed to regard the failure as due to the state of affairs in Persia. Finally, in April, 1922, a Persian commercial mission was sent to Moscow to negotiate a treaty. This was attempted at first with the Russian co-operatives, but did not come to much. A postal and telegraph convention was also negotiated.³³ Meanwhile, the chance of reviving commerce seems largely to depend on Soviet adjustments regarding foreign trade. Rothstein him-

self has been recalled from Teheran. His successor has been more cautious as to propaganda; but at present the main difficulties depend on business conditions and on the endeavors of the Soviet authorities to recover oil concessions which they had forfeited by the treaty of February, 1921. In short, the Soviet government contributed much to the reduction of British influence in Persia, but so far there had been nothing to take its place. In the future, with a Russia restored to normal, it is impossible not to believe that the relations of the two countries will quicken; the test will come as to whether Russian policies may not again follow national lines. Certainly, the future of northern Persia is economically connected with Russia.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND RUSSIAN TURKESTAN

After all, in spite of Russian traditions at Teheran, Persia was in reality merely an outpost for Soviet Russia. Within Russia itself at Tashkent, in Turkestan lay the center from which the foreign policies of Soviet Russia in Central Asia were to radiate. There in 1917 an almost bloodless revolution had set up Soviet rule. Oppression lost Tashkent for a time, but soon the Bolsheviki were again in power. Not so with Turkestan as a whole, however, for Dutov and his Orenburg Cossacks continued a resistance across strategical routes, which blocked the way to complete Soviet authority throughout the country, for nearly two years.³⁴ From the south came the British, first with a lonely group of officers to Tashkent, and later in 1918 in force to capture Merv. This they reached through eastern Persia along the Afghan boundary. From Meshed they crossed the Russian frontier with more than two thousand troops and defeated Bolshevik troops at Dushakh. These included Hungarian war prisoners now organized under Soviet leaders.³⁵

This victory on the borders of the Russian trans-Caspian province seems to have quickened the ambitions of British officers who drew plans for the establishment of British leadership throughout all of Russian Turkestan. They were confident that they could take Tashkent. At the time, in 1919,

they already practically held Persia with troops at Enzeli in the northwest, at Meshed in the northeast; and in the south the South Persian Rifles, a local body of troops were under British-Indian command. The temptation, therefore, was strong to push on from Merv and to paint the map of Central Asia with British red. Events in far-off England, the struggle for economy and the development of doubt as to the success of further British expansion combined to restrain such adventures. The British withdrew from Meshed in 1920, having held that route toward India for two years with a mere handful of troops practically on "secret patrol."

The essential character of rule on the frontiers of the old Russian Empire was clearly recognized by the Bolsheviks at Tashkent. They said frankly: "We mean by self-determination of peoples the self-determination of the laboring classes. . . . The power in the border lands must belong to the Soviets."³⁶ This was the declaration of a Bolshevik autocracy that had quickly developed at Tashkent and which had struck murderously at the organization of local Muhammadans as a separate authority at Kokhand. There, in early 1918, 10,000 Moslems were killed and the town was put to pillage. This was later sorely to embarrass Soviet leaders at the Baku Conference of Eastern peoples. The story of this attack on the Muhammadan population had traveled far and wide in Central Asia. No proclamations of autonomy could undo the damage done. The result was the organization of bands of Bashmaks, under local chieftains, who as bandits raided Turkestan from their stronghold in Ferghana for the next two years. The country was ravaged; Soviet troops were cut off; and government ceased.³⁷

Meanwhile, at Tashkent, authority in this Federated Soviet Republic was in reality vested in the Turkestan Commission of eight members appointed from Moscow who could override the power of the local executive committee and the commissars.³⁸ The commission continued to send by wireless repeated messages for propaganda purposes and to conceal the actual situation. Occasionally, however, a message of

reality would creep out through the *Izvestia*. Thus as late as April 29, 1922, we read regarding the Bashmaks:

For well nigh five years these bands pillage without mercy the population of Ferghana under cover of the struggle against the Soviets. If at the start some sort of an ideal led the Bashmaks to act it is now no longer the same. The former idealist movement has become an instrument of robbery which at present is disavowed by the local population.

In May of 1920 there was a temporary peace, but raids soon broke out again. Meanwhile, by decrees, the authority of Moscow was extended to foreign affairs, railways, means of communication, and economic life. The military authorities were supreme, and former Russian officers of the Tsarist General Staff were called to command the army in Turkestan in the endeavor to restore order.³⁹ The frontiers of the republic of Turkestan were extended to include the old districts of trans-Caspia, Amu-Darinski, Samarkand, Ferghana, and Sir-Darinski.⁴⁰ Tashkent remained the capital. Work in the oil fields and coal mines and on the farms was carried on as though in an armed camp. Barbed-wire entanglements and guns were part of the equipment. The wireless comment of a Soviet optimist was that before the revolution the workmen "were slaves, now they are masters. Like one man they armed themselves to defend national property."⁴¹ In late 1920, armored cars were necessary for travel on the Turkestan Railways. Slowly, however, this concentration of military power won the way. On April 12, 1921, the Turkestan Commission was abolished and an autonomous government was permitted to function "but within the limits of the Soviet Federation."⁴²

KHIVA AND BOKHARA

The Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara retained under Tsarist Russia certain powers of self-government, which were vested personally in their rulers. Their connection with the Tsar's government was a personal one resulting from the conquest of these regions by Russian arms and diplomacy in the 'sixties and 'seventies of the last century. Consequently, their status

as regards the revolution was at first different from that of the rest of Central Asia. There was the definite personal challenge to their allegiance and the quickening opportunity to declare their formal independence. With the disappearance of the Tsar their union with Russia also disappeared at least on paper. However, the two states had had different histories.

1. *Khiva*.—Curiously enough, Khiva was the first region in Russia to show that all was not well during the World War. A revolutionary outbreak took place during 1916-1917. This was due to local conditions and the harsh rule of the Khan of Khiva. He appealed for help to the Tsar's government, which sent military forces under General Galkine. These in turn inaugurated a period of massacre and pillage among the population, which was ordinarily peaceful and law-abiding. Galkine was recalled just as the Russian Revolution broke at Petrograd in March, 1917.⁴³ In view of this and because of the influence of events in Russia, the Khan was compelled to grant a constitution. These disputes dragged on till, in November, 1917, a Bolshevik government was set up at Tashkent. This now paid attention to events at Khiva and by eager propaganda stimulated the revolt till the Khan was forced to flight. In June, 1919, a Soviet Republic of Khorezm was proclaimed at Khiva by the revolutionary Khivans and Russian Communists.⁴⁴

The result was the signature of a treaty of alliance with the authorities at Moscow and the negotiation of a commercial treaty as well. These treaties were signed on September 13, 1920. They were made during an interval when the Turkestan government was stronger and when the essential economic unity of Turkestan, Khiva, and Bokhara had a chance to develop along more peaceful lines. The autonomy and complete independence of Khiva were recognized and all the old treaties with Tsarist Russia were annulled. Public buildings and plants were ceded by Russia, which also declared void all concessions giving the right to exploit the natural resources of Khiva. Industry was nationalized. Irrigation, a very important matter, was left to the direction of a mixed commis-

sion. Communications were to be regulated later; boundaries were left as before; rights of citizenship were reciprocal; and strangers were to enjoy political rights if they were devoted to the cause of the revolution. The usual prohibition was mutually laid down as to the formation of bands hostile to each other. Military policy was to be arranged in common; Russia was to supply educational facilities and to pay five hundred million (paper?) rubles to Khiva. No concession as to natural resources or industry was to be granted to any state save Russia; commerce was also nationalized; and Russia was to supply technical personnel and facilities. Khiva was to supply Russia with all raw materials needed and Russia was to supply finished goods, the prices for which were to be fixed annually. The Russian Co-operative Associations were to be recognized in order to avoid agents and speculators. Free trade was mutually guaranteed. The net result, therefore, was the complete economic and military domination of Soviet Russia.⁴⁵

This plan did not work smoothly and it is evident that adjustments were necessary. In particular, the revival of the Bashmaks threatened Khiva or the Republic of Khorezm, as the official title now ran. This danger, however, has now disappeared with the fall of Enver Pasha. The essential quality of economic unity has been preserved. This is fundamental, not only for the foundation of the textile industry, but for all forms of industrial life.⁴⁶ Thus a recent Russian writer says:

While creating the indispensable economic unity, the treaties with Khorezm and Bokhara . . . offer guarantees that these portions of Central Asia shall not become objects of . . . a policy which fails to grasp the economic and cultural peculiarities of the territory . . . of Turkestan which represents a homogeneous world of its own.⁴⁷

2. *Bokhara*.—Here we find a history by no means so relatively peaceful. The ancient historical and military traditions of Bokhara have something to do with this; and there is also the fact of the closer connection which exists between Bokhara and its stormy neighbor, Afghanistan. Above all, the position

of Bokhara, dividing southern Turkestan, has played a part. The pure despotism of the Amir of Bokhara had continued under the protection of the Tsar until 1917. Then, as though by instinct, the Bolsheviki marched to war against Bokhara. The result was disastrous to Soviet plans; hundreds of members of the Young Bokhara party, including the progressive and not only the Bolshevik elements were massacred; and the Bolshevik expedition from Tashkent was forced to retire, making peace with the Amir on March 25, 1918.⁴⁸

The fear then was, that in connection with the Bolshevik massacre of Moslems at Kokhand a general Muhammadan rising would take place in Central Asia. So, for nearly eighteen months, Bokhara was left to itself. This did not mean, however, that propaganda was muzzled. By way of illustration is an appeal from Chicherin to the people of Khiva and Bokhara reciting the situation in Persia and pointing out that they must soon choose between "the Workmen's and Peasants' Government of Red Turkestan" and "the approaching imperialist British state" which plans "to impose on you the yoke of slavery." The time has come "to liberate with a common effort not only yourselves but also all the workers of the Near and the Far East from the grasp of the greedy European birds of prey."⁴⁹ The results of such propaganda and the work of the Young Bokhara party culminated in the capture of Bokhara by the Bolsheviki on September 2, 1920. The Amir fled to Kabul to become a guest of the Afghan government.⁵⁰

Thus the new Soviet Republic of Bokhara took its place; it promptly proclaimed the desire to aid "the world revolution by dealing a crushing blow to world-imperialism in the Orient." As a preliminary, however, the confiscation of industry, and the punishment of the more conservative and stable elements in Bokhara took place. Relations with Russia were soon fixed by a treaty signed on March 4, 1921. In many respects this agreement followed lines already laid down in the treaty with Khiva in the previous September. Soviet Russia, "renouncing more particularly the colonial policy of all former capitalist governments of Russia, the predatory tendencies of

which had for their objective the subjugation of the laboring masses," recognized the "complete independence and autonomy" of Bokhara, made a close alliance and "brotherly union," and annulled all treaties concluded by Tsarist Russia.

A military and political agreement was to be made between the two states: prohibition of mutually hostile organizations was pledged; boundaries were fixed as heretofore; and a uniform economic plan "on the basis of Government-managed foreign trade and the principle of direct exchange of goods" provided for a "concentrated economic policy." Irrigation by the river Zarevshan was to be placed in the hands of a mixed commission. The Amu-Darya flotilla, railways, and telegraph systems in Bokhara, and all immovable state property was a free gift to Bokhara. On the other hand, all immovable property belonging to the ex-Amir was transferred to Soviet Russia, as well as "all private capitalistic enterprises." All concessions, of which there were quite a number, were cancelled; all private enterprises requiring "the utilization of labor" and all surplus property were nationalized.⁵¹

An economic treaty of the same date also provided that:

Commercial relations between both contracting parties shall be carried on on the principle of exchange of goods (barter), with strictest adherence to the principle of cost of production and to the exclusion of any additional profit.

Such trade was to be conducted by the two states. Soviet Russia was to have preferential right to surplus products for export; and in turn was to supply technical experts, etc. Soviet Bokhara was to oppose "the influx of predatory industrial capital and of elements of foreign bourgeoisie"; but the possibility of "concessions to foreign capitalistic powers" is considered in a later article, where Soviet Russia is given the preference. Such treaties established the economic system of Soviet Russia; and the continued presence of the Red army made her politically supreme.⁵²

Nevertheless, as time went on, unrest developed; adherents of the Amir continued the fight in the mountains; and several of the more important leaders of the Young Bokhara party

deserted. This persistent disturbance, the revival of Bashmak conspiracies in Turkestan, and the opposition of Muhammadan elements finally led the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1922 to permit Enver Pasha to enter the region. However, he had scarcely arrived when he deserted to the Bashmaks and set up the flag of revolt.⁵³

Enver, in his declaration to the Soviet authorities, recited "the inextinguishable desire of the peoples of Bokhara, Turkestan, and Khiva to live free and independent" and spoke for the Muhammadans who "are today enduring a régime of violence imported by demagogic elements and foreign communists."⁵⁴

Only a few months earlier, Enver Pasha had been in the trans-Caucasus organizing in Adjaria, near Batum, Soviet forces with which both he and the authorities at Moscow hoped to replace Mustapha Kemal at Angora.⁵⁵ Now by a stroke, he sought to place himself at the head of Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic hordes of Central Asia. For the moment Enver seemed to be successful; but in July, 1922, the Soviet military forces had gathered in sufficient force to defeat his troops. In all probability, he himself was killed.⁵⁶ The movement was at all events checked. Thus this Turkish-Albanian adventurer, who had sought fighting wherever it might be found, who had had a distinguished career as a Young Turk, but who since 1918 had been regarded as a renegade and a robber by all true Ottomans passes from the scene. He had intrigued where he might; and it was fitting that he should die on this last adventure, finally fighting the Russians.

The rôle of Afghanistan in this matter is doubtful. Toward the end of 1921 the Amir had claimed for himself a large part of Bokhara; he was probably sympathetic with the ideas which underlay Enver's plans; but in July, 1922, the Afghan Foreign Minister publicly said that the disturbances in Bokhara were "a kind of internal disorder in which the Russian and Afghan governments have no right to interfere." The Amir of Afghanistan was probably waiting to see whether Enver had any chance of winning.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN

From their mountainous and central position the tribes of Afghanistan watched the course of events as the rumors and fantastic tales of a war greater than any man knew reached at last the bazaars of Kabul. For many years the buffer position between Russia and British India had been an uneasy one. Nominally the direction of foreign affairs had been in the hands of the British who paid the Amir a subsidy. They, at all events, had left the domestic affairs of Afghanistan alone for many years. In Russia there was the slow, enormous pressure which had forced the frontiers in the north to their present line. But Russia had of late also left Afghanistan alone.

The Afghan was an opportunist ready to turn to his own advantage the giant combat which had convulsed the world. Repeated lessons had, however, taught him that it was a dangerous business to raid southward into India. So the advent of German propaganda had on the whole left him cool. Nor did Habibullah, who was Amir till 1919, think of turning toward Russian territory till in 1917 he understood that a new madness—revolution—gave him a chance to recover districts which had long been lost. So the first effect of disorders in Russia was to stir Afghanistan to try to profit by the situation and to extend its power northwestward. This was the easier as in early 1918 there came the tales of the Bolshevik attack on Muhammadans at Kokhand and the unsuccessful raid at Bokhara.

Then early in 1919 Habibullah was murdered and his son Amanullah took his place. By this time, seditious agitation was rife in India and along the frontier. Exaggerated stories of the situation, the impatience of a new ruler to prove his mettle, and the belated results of German intrigue now bore fruit. In May, 1919, came a Third Afghan war. Amanullah prepared to invade India; in spite of mutiny among Anglo-Indian forces and temporary British defeat, the British command of the air was the decisive factor. The bombing of Kabul by the British aeroplanes was too much for the Amir

and in June he asked for peace.⁵⁷ The attempt is sometimes made to attribute to Bolshevik plot this short campaign. It may be true, but there were other reasons as well. Certainly it is true, however, that, immediately war was decided on, permission was granted for a Bolshevik mission to start from Tashkent for Kabul. This was headed by Bravin, who earlier had headed the first Bolshevik mission to Teheran. Along with the Bolshevik members there came German and Austrian technical experts with a considerable supply of warlike material and money, and Barkatallah, notorious as an anti-British Hindu who had figured during the World War at San Francisco and elsewhere as a German agent. He now returned to Afghanistan from Moscow. This expedition reached Kabul in August, 1919.⁵⁸

In the meantime, Amanullah had signed peace with the British on August 8, by which he lost his subsidy and the right to import munitions through British India. He gained, however, the direction of his own foreign policy, for "Afghanistan is left officially free and independent in its affairs, both internal and external. Furthermore, all previous treaties have been canceled by the war."⁵⁹ To the Bolsheviks this war had been premature; they, therefore, set to work to prepare Afghanistan for another. This was despite the plain intimation to Amanullah by the British that they expected him to expel the mission and to avoid all anti-British agitation. Bravin held out the expectation that the advance of Afghan influence toward Merv would be accepted by the Bolsheviks. Under these circumstances, an Afghan mission was sent to Moscow to establish independent relations.⁶⁰ But Bravin was unsuccessful in persuading the Amir to attack India once more. He was therefore succeeded by Suritz, a man of greater ability, who also brought with him German and Austrian experts. Meanwhile, both at Kabul and Tashkent and at Moscow there gathered groups of Indians many of whom had been German agents during the War, and who now preached sedition against the British. Altogether, it was a group calculated to carry out the main object of this Soviet policy—"the overthrow of British rule in India."⁶¹

There was, therefore, intrigue enough in Afghanistan during 1920. Still the Amir hung back from war, though Nadir Khan, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, at the instigation of Suritz, had conferences with tribal chieftains from the north-west frontier. Moscow threatened that England would soon hear the voice of Soviet Russia "not only in London but among the millions of toilers in the East."⁶² From Kabul propaganda was planned to reach not merely throughout Afghanistan but India as well; "Tashkent is only a *pis-aller*" for such work and Kabul was to become the real base. In all such endeavors, Suritz was assisted at the time by Djemal Pasha who came eagerly to Kabul to assist in the work of stirring up the Afghans to an attack on the British in behalf of Pan-Islamic ideas and for the benefit of the Turks in Asia Minor. The plans of these men were in common though their motives were different.⁶³

Under such circumstances there was signed at Moscow on February 28, 1921, a treaty between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. This provided mutually for recognition of independence and each pledged itself "not to enter with any third state into a military or political agreement which would damage one of the contracting parties." Diplomatic and consular representation were settled; free transit trade was guaranteed; and the boundary was rectified to the advantage of Afghanistan. The independence and freedom of Bokhara and Khiva were recognized "whatever may be the form of their government in accordance with the wish of their peoples." Furthermore, both of the parties "agree upon the freedom of Eastern Nations" on the same principles. As special and secret clauses, Russia promised to give a yearly subsidy of one million gold or silver rubles, to construct a telegraph line in Afghanistan, and to supply technical and other experts. It is doubtful, however, whether any of these provisions has been met, though the British allege recently that arms have come into Afghanistan, and that large amounts have been expended for propaganda.⁶⁴

This agreement was followed at Moscow by the signature of a treaty on March 1, 1921, between Afghanistan and the Turk-

ish government at Angora. In many respects this document is remarkable, for it explains the essentially pro-Turkish bias of the Amir of Afghanistan and bespeaks attention for the program of Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic ideas that underlie it. Both states "transfer their age-long moral unity and natural alliance to the political sphere, to bring about a state of material and official alliance and in the name of the future welfare of the whole East to conclude a treaty of alliance." There is a mutual recognition of independence and a joint recognition of the independence of Bokhara and Khiva. "The leadership of Turkey" is mentioned and a pledge is made of alliance against "any imperialistic state in pursuance of the policy of invasion and exploitation of the East." All treaties with third states are to be mutually submitted; diplomatic representation is provided; a postal service is to be established; and the Turks promised a military mission and assistance.

This, of course, was in line with the policy which has so perplexed both Russia and England. It aimed to establish a pro-Turkish federation of Khiva, Bokhara, Afghanistan, and Turkey and thus either with or without the assent of Russia to maintain the solidarity of the Sunni Muhammadan world. Politically, so long as England remained at odds with the Turks, such a combination could be directed against her by an appeal to the religious feelings of millions of Indian Moslems. The damage done to this possibility by the contemptuous treatment of the Khalifate on the part of the Angora government was considerable. Indeed, there is a bare possibility that the Amir of Afghanistan would himself like to become Khalif. How much more dangerous, however, would such a confederation of Muhammadan states be to Russia with her millions of restless Moslems in Turkestan and neighboring provinces! As a distinguished scholar wrote in 1919:

The disruption of Russia thus opens greater opportunity for Ottoman Irredentism in Central Asia than in any other Turkish-speaking area. In Central Asia, Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism do not conflict with each other. The whole population is Turkish; the whole population is Sunni; and the present possessor is not an ancient Moslem state but a recent Christian conqueror.

If Russia vanishes as a Power from Central Asia, it might still be open to Ottoman diplomacy to work for a Turkish-Islamic state in Central Asia which would then be added as a fourth member to the projected Islamic alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.⁶⁵

Such plans or suggestions have not come true; but the possibility of attempts to realize them may spell trouble and perhaps ruin to Soviet power in Central Asia. It is for such reasons, as we shall see, that Russia is playing with fire in her relations both with Turkey and Afghanistan. In her anxiety to use them both against England, she may have let loose a combination which will whip up against her the resentment of her vast Muhammadan populations.

Still another treaty remains to be noted—that between Afghanistan and Great Britain. This was signed at Kabul on November 22, 1922. It modified the previous treaty by giving Afghanistan permission to import munitions through India and by providing for consular and diplomatic representation. On signing it, the Amir gave a solemn warning to the British that he did not approve of their Turkish policy at the time. He would welcome a change in their attitude toward Moslems in any case.⁶⁶ As we have seen, the signing of peace between England and Turkey will do much to relieve this situation.

In general, therefore, Soviet Russia has tried to make use of Afghanistan for purposes of propaganda and indirectly for war against the British in India. To this end the successor of Suritz at Kabul, Raskolnikov, has labored with inadequate funds. Afghanistan, on the other hand, has considered solely its own advantage and has refused so far to be drawn again into a frontier war with the British. In pursuing this policy, Soviet authorities raise other and fundamental questions which may affect their position throughout the Muhammadan East.

SOVIET POLICY AND THE MUHAMMADAN EAST

The impression stands clear that throughout these years Soviet Russia has been far from strong in Central Asia, nor

on the whole have her policies as regards either Turkey or Persia been productive of permanent gain. In each of these two countries she has been used against the British. The main reason for her failure to seize the opportunities given her have been her lack of appreciation regarding the forces of nationalism and of religion. Her obsession has been Communism. Gradually, these mistakes have been understood, but the East does not easily forget. However, throughout these years there has also stood as the foundation of her Asiatic policy the hatred of Great Britain and the desire to make use in every way of the Asiatic upheaval which is now under way. The Soviet authorities have certainly not hesitated to use the newest instruments in their endeavors to stimulate this unrest of Asia. Today the messengers of Moscow, embassies from Kabul, and furtive couriers of insurgent groups travel the roads of Jenghis Khan, of Tamerlane, and of the Romanovs. This last and newest picture of routes of revolutionary propaganda and of the latest diplomacy in Asia is, therefore, also in part a map of the oldest trunk lines, the historical thoroughfares of Eurasia. Aeroplanes laden with propaganda pamphlets fly above mountain trails that the Huns and the Mongols first used to raid the world. Even the busy wireless stations for Central Asia are at the old junctions for long caravans of camels. Propaganda trains in Turkestan, colored posters for India, moving pictures, and lectures by enthusiastic graduates of the new Oriental university of revolution at Moscow are all part of the busy program. There are appeals to the most radical elements and patriotic calls to former Tsarist officers to defend the frontiers of Russia. The archives of the General Staff are searched for old plans for the invasion of India while the glib jargon of the latest revolution is used to convert the bewildered horse thief of the Pamirs.⁶⁷

All this comes to an Asia that is already confused and angry. There men may speak the dialect of the world-revolution, but they think in ancient terms of racial and religious ferments. In recent years, all Asia balanced between two evils—Russian domination and British domination. Of the

two evils the British seemed to be preferable. The British practiced democracy at home, consequently their authority in Asia was less stringent than that of Russia. As Ferrero has recently pointed out in a series of articles in *L'Illustration*:

But when Russia fell, no one could any longer endure what had until then been the lesser of two evils. The Anglo-Japanese alliance broke down. The Ameer of Afghanistan stood out for complete independence. In India and China the desire for independence blazed up afresh. In Persia, England could find no support whatever for the treaty of 1919. The Angora Assembly was able to build up a new army. The treaty of Sèvres has remained a dead letter because Russian power was essential to its enforcement. If the army of the Tsars had still dominated Asia, the Angora Assembly would have had neither the time nor the means to do what it has done.⁶⁸

Because of the lack of a normal, liberal Russia, the whole world has gone off the tracks. "The great moral value of authority" has been missing. In its place there has come the octopus of revolution. Slowly the autocracy of the Russian revolt has shown itself; under the language of Communism there has become plain its opposition to nationalism and to democracy. Gradually, a new sort of Soviet imperialism has become apparent as concentrated power in the hands of a few men in Moscow has sought to make the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the servile revolt, a force for all Asia, and indeed for all the world; but in so doing the moral and maintained power of Russia was diminished rather than revived. Whether Russia can "come back" or not the opportunity of altering the history of the world may not come to Asia. In any case communism has failed to impress itself upon Asia at the last because of the essentially conservative character of Asiatic society. Religion and property still count in Asia.

This notion did not at first penetrate the ardent revolutionaries of Tashkent and Moscow. Thus they continued to send optimistic telegrams in 1919 declaring:

The Revolutionary East is now passing from unorganized activities to organized active struggle against world-imperialism. . . . The idea of Communism is beginning to penetrate rapidly into all

Eastern countries, which in their revolutionary movements are beginning to attain the standard of the Third Internationale.⁶⁹

Soviet Russia is as a shining light to enslaved India, oppressed Persia, and the laborers of the Far East.⁷⁰

Still the difficulties were many. Thus on October 6, 1919, Tashkent wired:

Owing to the lack of experienced military instructors possessing a knowledge of the native language and because the Moslem Red Army soldiers know no Russian, the organization of the Red Army is greatly affected.⁷¹

A knowledge of English was also in demand at Kabul, where there were gathered various agents of unrest. *Pravda* declared:

The East is becoming Red. The proof of this lies in the dozens of revolts and protests of which we get reports from Afghanistan, Egypt, Turkey and India. The East is already stretching out its arms toward Soviet Russia—towards Moscow—and is turning its face away from London.⁷²

The difficulties of the campaign became apparent as the Muhammadan East failed to rally to the slogans of revolutionary Russia. Mistakes were being made and a new program of endeavor was launched. This was given in a wireless message on "Party Work among Moslem Peoples":⁷³

In working among Muhammadans there are two guiding principles which have to be borne in mind, as they play an important part in their life, i.e., their religious and national conceptions. Religious prejudices are much stronger among the Muhammadans than among Russian or other European peasants and workmen. As they are still at that stage of development when the civil and family life is closely united with religious ideas, religion plays a greater part in their life than in the life of people who have developed more from an economic standpoint. This, therefore, implies that great caution must be exercised in the struggle against religious prejudices. This should not be combated by a direct repudiation of religion, but by undermining the same by the propaganda of education. . . . Especially point out the "class" character of the Muhammadan clerical caste and its rapacious tendencies with regard to the poorest inhabitants. The religious fanaticism of the Muhammadans has periodically been utilized by various Moslem states whenever they had attained military power for the

attainment of their aggressive aims. What used to be done by the Russian Tsars, aided by Pan-Slav ideas, was done by the Arabs and later, one might say even now, by the Turkish and Afghan nationalists by means of so-called Pan-Islamism. . . . The second principle is based on the nationalist movement which, particularly during the existence of the Soviet authority, has occupied so large a part in the life of the Moslem states. . . . Soviet authority does not and has not differentiated between various Moslem peoples. . . . Communists must adopt a favorable attitude toward the wish for self-determination prevailing among the masses provided the self-determination wanted can be brought about within the boundaries of the Soviet régime. . . . Independent Moslem Soviet Republics cannot exist without close military and economic union with Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. . . .

Such advice, eminently sound from the point of view of propaganda, was due to the fact that its principles had been disregarded. Dissensions existed at a time when unity was needed.⁷⁴ Radek was threatening the Allies with the spread of propaganda in the East in retaliation for their refusal to trade or to recognize Soviet Russia.⁷⁵ The dread of Russia among the British was distinctly part of Soviet propaganda, while at the same time plans were made to set up routes, through eastern Persia, from Turkestan to Baluchistan. At this time, in 1920, the Soviet authorities were also optimistic regarding the possibility of reaching India with their propaganda, using Kabul as a base.⁷⁶

In spite of these ideas and in the face of the instructions given to use the politics of religion, the Congress of Peoples of the East called at Baku in September, 1920, was not a success. From the first, the call ignored religion. Thus on July 3, 1920, a contrast was drawn between former religious pilgrimages and the present call to start a "new, free, equal and brotherly life" at Baku.⁷⁷ The idea was to shake society from its "spiritual coma" in order to deprive "the capitalistic world of its very foundations." At the Congress, the speech of Zinoviev was interpreted as an attack on Islam and Bela Kun (of Hungarian fame) denounced monarchy. Furthermore, a speech by Enver Pasha was read which at once irritated the supporters of Mustapha Kemal. The Moslems of

Central Asia insisted on recalling the Bolshevik massacre of Muhammadans at Kokhand in 1918. Four languages were used and a babel ensued; at the end of three days a revolt was threatened and the entire meeting degenerated into a fair. A statue of Karl Marx was unveiled and effigies of Wilson, Lloyd George, and Millerand were burned. The conference was to have set all Asia aflame with war and revolution; but the Oriental representatives wagged their heads, decided that Moscow was still mad, and went home puzzled and disdainful. The result was that the Russian press was strangely silent.⁷⁸

As time went on, however, the efficiency of Soviet propaganda improved. It never reached India in the form and volume that it hoped to; but it sought to make use of Muhammadanism. The cry of Islam was to be the first bond of union, yet it was to give way to Communism and agnosticism before its unifying power was lost. The Bolsheviki were keen to use Pan-Islamic ideas and methods, but to prevent their ultimate success. Under such circumstances, Sir Robert Horne, in a useful review of the situation for Krassin, the Russian delegate at London, made a peremptory demand that if the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement were to stand, such anti-British Russian activities must stop.⁷⁹

This the Bolsheviki did not do; instead they sought to adopt Communist ideas and methods to the requirements of the nationalist movement among Moslems. It was a purely utilitarian movement. The spread of the conception of revolution through Afghanistan and Persia to India was the main purpose; but as yet such an endeavor was premature for the masses were unprepared and unarmed. The chief object in 1921-22 was, therefore, to profit by every turn of nationalist agitation in India and to hammer home the idea that Soviet Russia was the great guide to successful revolt.⁸⁰ Nor was this confined to India, for at a meeting of the "Toilers of Japan, China, and Korea," held at Moscow on November, 1921, in the building of the Club of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the same notion was constant of allegiance to "the center of world-revolution, Red Moscow."⁸¹

In such endeavors the issue has become clearer that Turkish

propaganda and Soviet propaganda can travel the same road only for a time. Ultimately, they must separate. Already the success of the Turks against the Greeks has strengthened them in Persia and Afghanistan. The plan for an Eastern Entente of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan goes on apace, but with Soviet Russia left out. To this prospect Radek is fully alive as he lectures the government at Angora and declares that Russia

can save Turkey only when it realizes, finally and irrevocably, that there is no other course for Turkey than that of union with the proletarian revolution. . . . This requires that Turkey, in the face of all transient demands, should remember that her real emancipation is only through union with Soviet Russia.⁸²

Still another factor arises as the British protest again regarding the "maleficent labors" of the Soviet government from Mesopotamia to China. The charge is made in detail that Soviet Russia has been returning to the practice of 1920 and that the steady, persistent propaganda of anti-British revolt is still going on. The Soviet government, by a specious reply, denies the charges and in a friendly tone asks for a conference at which full recognition of Russia may be granted.⁸³

Thus the program of Soviet Russia rests as it began—with the desire for world-revolution. This, at times, is tamed to concrete proposals for Indian revolt. To make use of every wind of unrest directed against the British as the leading Western power in Asia is a part of the entire matter. In planning such a policy, they are athwart the ideas of Moslems who look for their own revival by an aggressive campaign to preserve themselves whether from the British or from the Soviets. In this connection the policies of Soviet Russia reach also to the Far East, to Siberia, Mongolia, China, and Japan.

NOTES TO CHAPTER X

1. Leading article in the *Petrograd Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1920.
2. *Sbornik*, II, p. 36.
3. *Izvestia*, Dec. 30, 1917.
4. *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1917.
5. *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1918.
6. *Ibid.*, Feb. 21, March 28, April 9, 14, 16, May 14, 1918.
7. *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1918. *The Decree of the 4th Asad*, 1297 (June 27, 1918).
8. *Les aspirations nationales de la Perse* (Comité national d'Etudes sociales et politiques, 31, Mars, 1919) Paris, 1919. *Current History*, X, Part 2, p. 75.
9. *Izvestia*, June 4, Aug. 10, Sept. 12, 1918; April 11, 1919.
10. Published in *International Conciliation*, No. 145, Dec., 1919. *Parliamentary White Papers*, Persia, No. 1 (1919).
11. Cf. Stoddard, "How Persia Died; A Coroner's Inquest," in *The Century*, June, 1920.
12. *New York Times*, Aug. 29, Sept. 24, 1919.
13. *Current History*, XI, Part 2, p. 156.
14. *Ibid.*, XII, p. 63.
15. *Wireless News*, Petrograd, Aug. 30, 1919. Cf. *Ibid.*, Moscow, May 17, Dec. 3, 1920, for an appeal by Communist Persians.
16. Raskolnikov in *Petrograd Pravda*, July 15, 1920. Translated in *Soviet Russia*, Oct. 23, 1920 (p. 393), J. M. Balfour, *Recent Happenings in Persia* (Edinburgh, 1922), pp. 187 *et seq.* This book, by a member of the British financial mission to Persia, was withdrawn from sale following a libel suit.
17. *Current History*, XII, p. 258.
18. *Wireless News*, Moscow, May 23, 1920. *Soviet Russia*, July 24, 1920.
19. The London Press, May 23-26, 1920. *Current History*, XII, pp. 453, 631.
20. *Ibid.*, XII, p. 811.
21. *Wireless News*, Moscow, June 10, 1920; *Near East*, Sept. 2, 1920; *Current History*, XII, p. 1084; XIII, Part 1, p. 510, *Soviet Russia*, Sept. 4, 1920.
22. Blacker, *On Secret Patrol in Asia* (London, 1922), pp. 267 *et seq.* On Nov. 16, 1920, in the House of Lords, there was a valuable debate on Persia; Lord Curzon spoke with ability and calmness.
23. Balfour, chap. xi. This book is interesting for the entire period 1919-21. *Current History*, XIII, p. 512; XIV, p. 172.
24. *Ibid.*, XIV, pp. 355, 526.
25. *Sbornik*, II, p. 36. Translated in *Soviet Russia*, April 30, 1921.

26. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Feb. 17, 1921.
27. *Soviet Russia*, March 19, 1921, a note from Chicherin on Feb. 15, 1921.
28. *Wireless News*, Stockholm, June, 1921. *Current History*, XIV, p. 886.
29. *Ibid.*, XIV, p. 898.
30. *House of Lords Debates*, July 26, 1921. Cf. *Current History*, XIV, p. 1067.
31. *Current History*, XV, p. 141.
32. On this entire period the recital of events by Ducrocq in *Le Bolchevisme et l'Islam, II Hors de Russie* (*Revue du Monde Musulman*, vol. 52) Paris, 1922, is useful. Cf. also Chicherin, "The Eastern Policy of Soviet Authority," in *Izvestia*, Nov. 6, 1921.
33. *Ibid.*, Feb. 21, June 30, Aug. 24, 1922; *Trud*, July 1, 1922; *Pravda*, Aug. 13, 1922. *Bolchevisme et l'Islam*, II, pp. 125 et seq., 160 et seq.
34. Blacker, p. 20. Castagné, *Bolchevisme et l'Islam* I, p. 233.
35. Blacker, pp. 129, 139.
36. *Izvestia*, Feb. 26, 1918. Cf. *Izvestia*, May 15, 1918.
37. Castagné, I, pp. 236-43.
38. *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 20, 1920. Cf. *Soviet Russia*, Nov. 1, 1919.
39. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 28, 1920.
40. *Slovo* (Tiflis), Aug. 16, 1920.
41. *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 7, 1920. Cf. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Nov. 17, 1920, Jan. 11, 1921.
42. *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 12, 1921.
43. Castagné, I, p. 202.
44. Castagné, I, pp. 204-6.
45. *Sbornik*, I, pp. 17, 23.
46. Castagné, I, pp. 214-16.
47. Kotliarevski in *Novy Vostok*, I (1922).
48. Blacker, p. 157; Castagné, I, p. 217; *Izvestia*, Jan. 24, 1918.
49. *Wireless News* (via London), Oct. 20, 1919.
50. *Wireless News*, Tashkent (via Moscow), Sept. 2, 1920; Petrograd *Pravda*, Sept. 4, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Sept. 10, 1920; Castagné, I, pp. 217-26.
51. *Sbornik*, II, p. 7. Cf. *Soviet Russia*, May 28, 1921.
52. *Sbornik*, II, p. 12. Cf. for a narrative of events, Tchokai Ogly, "Les Evénements de Boukhara," in *Orient et Occident* (Paris), May, 1922, pp. 40-48.
53. Castagné, I, pp. 227-29.
54. Castagné, I, p. 230.
55. *New York Tribune*, Jan. 29, 1922 (an article by Pasvolsky).

56. *Izvestia*, July 12, 18, 1922; *New York Times*, Aug. 17, 1922.
57. *Papers regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan*, 1919. *Parl. Papers*. Cd. 324, London, 1919, pp. 6-30; Blacker, chap. vii; *Current History*, X, Part 2, p. 66.
58. Cf. *Izvestia*, May 6, 1919; *Wireless News*, Samara (via Moscow), Sept. 18, 1919; *Wireless News*, Tashkent, Nov. 3, 1919.
59. *Papers*, etc., p. 36.
60. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Dec. 19, 25, 1919.
61. Letter of Sir Robert Horne to Krassin in *London Times*, March 17, 1921; *Daily Gazette* (Karachi) May 7, 1920; *Wireless News*, Tashkent (via Moscow), March 3, 1920.
62. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Sept. 23, 1920.
63. *Ibid.*, Moscow, July 27, Sept. 26, Oct. 7, Nov. 10, 1920. *London Times*, March 17, 1921. Cf. on this matter, Holdich, "The Influence of Bolshevism in Afghanistan, in *New Europe*, XIII, pp. 230 *et seq.*; "Auster," "Lenin's Political Strategy," in *Ibid.*, pp. 402 *et seq.*; Nikulin, "Sketches of the Afghanistan of Today," in *Izvestia*, Sept. 8, 1922.
64. *Sbornik*, II, p. 15 (cf. *Soviet Russia*, April 30, 1921); *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, Russia*, No. 2 (1923). Cd. 1869. London, 1923, p. 7; Blacker, p. 274.
65. *Muhammadan History* (Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 57), London, 1920, p. 95.
66. *Treaty between the British and the Afghan Governments signed at Kabul*, Nov. 22, 1921. *Treaty Series*, No. 19 (1922). Cd. 1786. London, 1922. Cf. *The Nation* (New York), March 22, 1922. The treaty also forbids Christian services in Afghanistan, permits free transit trade through India, but requires the submission to the British of lists of munitions imported via India.
67. Blacker, p. 285; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Dec. 6, 1919; an article by Dennis in *New York Times*, July 30, 1922. Cf. for messages of propaganda, *Petrograd Pravda*, April 27, 1919; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Sept. 5, 17, 30, Oct. 12, 15, 27, Nov. 19, 27, Dec. 3, 1920. Cf. for useful articles on the general subject, Reinsch, "Bolshevism in Asia," in *Asia*, April, 1920; Shuler, "Is Bolshevism Possible in China," in *Living Age*, May 29, 1920.
68. Quoted in *Literary Digest*, June 23, 1923.
69. *Kommuna*, Sept. 26, 1919.
70. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Oct. 15, 1919.
71. *Ibid.*, Tashkent, Oct. 6, 1919.
72. *Ibid.*, Moscow, Nov. 27, 1919.

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73. *Ibid.*, Moscow, Feb. 21, 1920; *Ibid.*, Tashkent, Jan. 13, 1920.
74. *Ibid.*, Moscow, Feb. 27, March 19, April 30, May 22, 1920.
Ibid., Tashkent, April 20, 1920.
75. *Ibid.*, Moscow, Sept. 23, 24, 1920.
76. *Ibid.*, Moscow, Oct. 16, Dec. 23, 1920.
77. *The Second Congress of the Communist International*, Washington, 1920, p. 140.
78. *New York Times*, Aug. 17, 1920, July 30, 1922; *Petrograd Pravda*, Aug. 25, Sept. 4, 17, Oct. 17; *Izvestia*, Sept. 10, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Sept. 8, 9, 18, 1920; *Ibid.*, Nauen, Sept. 28, 1920; *Chicago Daily News*, Sept. 30, 1920; Castagné, I, pp. 118-21, *Stenographic Records of the Congress, etc.* (in Russian), Moscow, 1921, pp. 108-12 (Enver Pasha's statement).
79. *London Times*, March 17, 1921.
80. *Izvestia*, Sept. 19, 1920.
81. *Ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1921. Cf. on the entire question of Bolshevik organization for Asiatic propaganda Castagné, I, pp. 46-76; *New York Evening Post*, Jan. 24, 1922; *New York Times*, Aug. 24, 1922.
82. *Izvestia*, July 27, 1922.
83. *Reply of the Soviet Government to His Majesty's Government respecting the Relations between the two Governments, Russia*, No. 3 (1923), Cd. 1874. London, 1923, p. 8.

Allied Republics
 ① Khiva ③ Mongolia
 ② Bokhara

Autonomous republics
 ④ Kirghiz ⑦ Buryat
 ⑤ Turkistan ⑧ Yakutsk
 ⑥ Qorat



CHAPTER XI

THE FAR EAST. I.

SIBERIA AND THE ALLIES

The Crusade against Revolutionary Russia, started by German imperialism in the West, now has brought to light another enemy of Socialist Russia in the Far East—Japanese imperialism.—Editorial in *Izvestia*, April 7, 1918.

... the Japanese Government remain constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.—*Declaration by the Japanese Government*, Aug. 3, 1918.¹

From the first day of the intervention the Japanese troops have violated this solemn declaration of the Japanese Government. Under the guise of combating "Bolshevism," the peasant population of the Russian Far East has been mercilessly annihilated; entire villages have been burned down and looted, and men, women, and children have been slaughtered.—*Statement by the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic*, Washington, 1921.²

To the credit of her intelligence and consistency, Japan has never wavered in her opposition to Bolshevism, but she has espoused the cause of the anti-Bolshevik Russians in order to win to her side the elements which she believed she could subsequently depend on to realize her objective of an eastern Siberia subordinate to her power.—Barrows, "Japan as our Ally in Siberia," in *Asia*, XIX, p. 929.³

THE angry diatribes by the authorities of Soviet Russia against Allied intervention in Russian affairs, during 1918-20, became a scorching blast when directed against the Japanese in the Far East. Old feuds, racial antipathies, and latent national feeling were whipped to the surface by the Bolshevik

protests. The landing of marines at Vladivostok in April, 1918, and later the predominance of Japanese troops in the Siberian Expeditionary Force were used by the Soviet government in the endeavor to secure an issue on which eventually all Russians could feel alike.

For this reason, charges that the anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia were supported by the Japanese took on a new venom. The prolonged occupation of Vladivostok by the Japanese and the persistence with which they sought to impose onerous economic and military conditions as the price of their withdrawal lent to this campaign against them and all their works the character of a Russian crusade. Finally, on their voluntary evacuation of the mainland of Siberia in October, 1922, Trotsky could exclaim: "At last we have back our own Russian city of Vladivostok!"

The divisions into which the revolution had driven Russia were so sharp that, for a time at least, bands of "White" Russians were undoubtedly able to operate against the "Red" forces in Siberia largely because of Japanese assistance. This connection had partial justification in the close and friendly relations which had developed since the Russo-Japanese war between the Tsar's government and the Japanese Foreign Office. The fall of the *ancien régime* at Petrograd was in fact a blow to a system of secret agreements which Tokyo had carefully fostered.

Furthermore, a Bolshevik victory in Siberia, on the borders of Manchuria and Korea, might well seem a menace to the autocracy of Japanese politics. On the other hand, from the point of view of the Russian anti-Bolshevik elements, had not the Japanese entered Siberia under the ægis of Allied support against a common enemy—the Central Powers? Did not the civil war in Russia become, at least for a time, part of that great conflict? In any case, in Far Eastern affairs, Russia and Japan had operated in close harmony since 1907.

THE SECRET RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATIES, 1907-16

The full extent of that co-operation was not known to the chieftains of the "White" Russian armies or to the rabble of

counter-revolutionary *condittieri* who swarmed about the line of the Siberian railway during 1918-21. Indeed, the contents of an entire series of four secret agreements between Russia and Japan, 1907-1916, was not made generally public until the time of the Washington Conference.⁴ However, to appreciate the background of the Japanese entry into Siberia in 1918, a summary of those secret conventions is essential.

The year 1907 was marked by the diplomatic connection established between two existing alliances—the Franco-Russian or Dual alliance and the Anglo-Japanese. During the summer of that year, the *Entente Cordiale* between England and France, which dated from 1904, became the bridge by which Japan and Russia, the recent opponents in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, came to friendly co-operation in Far Eastern affairs. In like manner, England and Russia buried their ancient rivalry in Asiatic politics by the Anglo-Russian entente.⁵ As a preliminary but lasting step in these diplomatic developments was a Franco-Japanese agreement to respect each other's interests in the Far East.⁶ Thus was the groundwork laid, open to the world, of the realignment of great forces which were to play a dominant rôle in the coming struggle of the World War.

With this formal re-establishment of cordial relations between Russia and Japan, which had followed so quickly the treaty of peace at Portsmouth in 1905, there came also the first secret convention of 1907 between the late enemies. This was sheltered behind the public document of July 30, 1907,⁷ which was little more than an acknowledgment of the *status quo*. The secret agreement of the same date, however, recognized first, the special interests of Japan in Korea in distinct fashion. Second, a line of demarcation across Manchuria was fixed north of which, in self-denying fashion, Japan agreed not to seek railway or telegraph concessions. Russia, on the other hand, agreed to refrain from seeking similar concessions south of that line which stretched eastward from the course of the river Nonni as that stream flowed southeast to join the Sungari River. Third, Russian interests in the Chinese East-

ern Railway were stated and in vague fashion Japan recognized that Russia also had interests in Mongolia.⁸

This agreement, therefore, provided for the delimitation of areas for economic penetration of Chinese territory. The same principles were also involved in a second secret agreement of 1910. As before, a public convention of July 4 served as a diplomatic envelope to conceal the terms of a longer and more positive document.⁹ The open treaty merely confirmed the mutual maintenance by Japan and Russia of the *status quo* in Manchuria. The secret convention, also of the same date, mentioned again the line of demarcation in Manchuria, as provided for in the secret agreement of 1907, and mutually recognized the special interests of each Power in each of the two areas thus defined. Secondly, in its own sphere of interest either Power was free to take "such measures as shall be deemed necessary for the maintenance and protection of those interests." Thirdly, neither Power was to take any political action within the sphere of interest of the other party in Manchuria; and the agreement of 1907 was extended to include all new privileges and concessions. Finally, there was to be a friendly exchange of opinion on all matters relating to Manchuria; and "in case these special interests should be threatened the two governments will agree on the measures that may become necessary for common action or mutual support in order to protect those interests." In other words, this agreement was on the very edge of a treaty of defensive alliance.¹⁰

Again in 1912, a third secret treaty of June 25 further confirmed these previous agreements. It also recognized the special interest of Japan in Inner Mongolia east of a line drawn north and south on the meridian of Peking. As provided in the first secret document Japan had recognized Russian interests elsewhere in Mongolia. These terms of 1910 and 1912 had been almost in reply to the proposed neutralization of Manchurian railways as advocated by Secretary Knox for the United States. At all events the rejection of that plan by Russia and Japan matches well with the policies indicated in these secret agreements.¹¹

There remains the fourth secret treaty of practical alliance signed July 3, 1916. This was negotiated at the same time as an open agreement providing for general co-operation between Russia and Japan in the Far East.¹² This secret document, furthermore, derives special interest from the fact that it was first published under authority from Trotsky, in 1917, at the time that the collection of secret treaties relating to Allied diplomacy during the war was published. Apparently, the contents of the three previous treaties was not discovered in the hasty search for secret Tsarist documents which the Bolshevik leaders made at that time. At least they were not published in the pamphlet which was then issued.¹³

This treaty of 1916 had its origin in pressure brought to bear from Tokyo. The issue of the War was then uncertain. The United States was still neutral; and it was possible that on the conclusion of peace American interest in Far Eastern matters might be renewed. In that event, there might be objection by the United States to the rapid strides in Chinese affairs which Japan had made during the war. Already she was apparently settling down to the occupation of Shantung, which had been seized as the result of the capture of the German colony of Kiaochow. A treaty of 1915 with China, which had included the substance of the notorious twenty-one demands, had been signed. It was important, therefore, that Japan should look to the consolidation of gains which had been made in the Far East during the War.

Furthermore, in the event of German recovery or even of victory, a treaty of alliance with Russia to protect the Japanese position in Manchuria would be useful. Undoubtedly, the same motives worked also at Petrograd. There was, however, an additional element which may have played a part; at least Sazonov, who was still Russian Foreign Minister, is credited later with personally advancing it as a reason for signing this secret pact. This was the fear that German diplomacy might succeed in detaching Japan from the Allies during the War.¹⁴

Already in May, 1916, the Japanese had received offers of a separate peace from Germany, which might include Russia.

At Peking there was pointed gossip as to alleged friendly personal relations between von Hintze, the German Minister, and Hioki, the Japanese Minister; later, Hioki was transferred to Sweden. At Stockholm, von Lucius, the German Minister, was active in such matters and had found a channel to approach the Japanese Minister at that post. It might, therefore, become important to forestall any further attempts along these lines by binding Japan even more closely to the Allies by a separate and additional diplomatic agreement. Whether or not such reasons were effective, it was also obvious that the government of the Tsar as well as Japan, by the secret diplomacy of the past decade, had step by step pursued a policy counter to the major principles on which rested American ideas with regard to the integrity of China and the open door in the Far East. From this murky background emerges the secret treaty of 1916.

By this brief treaty of alliance Japan and Russia engaged to safeguard China from the political domination of any third hostile Power and agreed to co-operate to that end. In the event of a declaration of war by such a third hostile Power, the two allies were to act together both in war and in the conclusion of peace. Article IV, however, is particularly important in that apparently it implied the necessity of assistance to Russia and Japan by their other allies. Thus "it is requisite to have in view that neither one or the other of the high contracting parties must consider itself bound by Article II of this agreement [as to war and peace] to lend armed aid to its ally, unless it be given guarantees by its allies that the latter will give it assistance corresponding in character to the importance of the approaching conflict."

The following year, Japan by the secret notes of February, 1917, also gained the promise of support by the Allies to her demands at the coming peace conference for the cession of German colonies north of the equator.¹⁵ Under such circumstances, the possibility of further developments on the mainland of Siberia came, in 1918, as a new channel of importance to Japanese interests. The revolution in Russia had apparently torn up the four secret treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912, and

1916. The advent of the United States into the War presented new problems. Particularly did the slow and cautious decision to organize a joint allied Siberian Expeditionary Force involve the immediate future of the Far East with untold possibilities. It was, at all events, essential to Japan to hold what had already been staked out for her.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEGION

The Russian revolution was destined to bring to the front the essential solidarity of Russian dominions both in Asia and Europe. Events at Petrograd in November, 1917, soon had their repercussion in far-off Vladivostok. This was not due to the rapid spread of Bolshevism to the Far East, but to the fact that Bolshevik foreign policy, as shown in the treaties of Brest-Litovsk, had practically closed Russia to the Allies on the west and south. There remained the back entrance by the Far East.

For the Allies the War must go on its tragic way whether to victory or defeat. There were still elements in Russia which might co-operate to restore shattered power. At all events, there were supplies at Vladivostok and along the line of the trans-Siberian Railway which might be protected from seizure. Furthermore, there came in the spring of 1918 perhaps the most amazing new factor in the situation.

This was the proposed "Anabasis" of the Czechoslovak Legion. The true and eloquent chronicle of that spacious event belongs to the history of the rebirth of the ancient state of Bohemia as the Czechoslovak Republic. The record of the wanderings of these troops across two continents cannot, therefore, detain here the narrative of other matters. From the outset, however, the movement of the Czechoslovak force is entangled with the diplomatic history of these days.

The nucleus of this gallant force was in the "Czech Unit" of four companies organized at Kiev in 1914. It consisted of Czech residents and refugees in Russia who saw in the World War a chance to oppose Austrian rule in Bohemia on behalf of Czech nationality. These four companies soon received recruits from Czechs who deserted from the Austro-Hungarian

forces which were in battle-line against the Russians. The men who "crossed the front," as the phrase went, became literally men without a country; but as the War progressed the number of these patriotic pioneers, who were in search of national life, increased. In 1917 the "Czechoslovak Brigade" was organized; and Czech prisoners of war in Russia also swelled the number until, in the summer of that year, two divisions were recruited as an army corps.¹⁶

Meanwhile, the complete equipment of this reorganized force was delayed by the chaos and disorder prevailing in Russia at this time. Fortunately, Dr. Masaryk, who is now President of the Czechoslovak Republic, was the political leader of the army. His wisdom and sagacity saved the situation. In view of the Bolshevik revolution and the negotiation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, it was evident that further war against the Central Powers was now impossible in Russia. The débâcle of the Russian army was complete; to break through, on the front was out of the question. There remained the audacious thought to encircle the globe, if need be, in order that these Czech forces might appear on the western front.

On February 8, 1918, the Czechoslovak corps in Russia, which then numbered 45,000 men, was declared to be an autonomous part of the smaller Czechoslovak forces already in France. Dr. Masaryk, therefore, undertook negotiations with the Soviet authorities for the passage of this army to France, there to join battle once more against the Central Powers. The world had become a gigantic chess-board and men of faith and knowledge, such as Masaryk, proposed to shift their human pawns in this desperate game for Czech national unity and freedom. Thus began the movement of the Czechoslovak Legion to Siberia on its way to France.¹⁷

Already the situation of these forces was extremely difficult. In the Ukraine where they were concentrated, civil war had begun and German forces were also approaching. Charges were made that among the Czech war prisoners were elements hostile to Bolshevik rule.¹⁸ This the Russian Branch of the Czechoslovak National Council met by denial of intervention

in the civil war near Kiev and by a proclamation of strict neutrality in Russian affairs.¹⁹ Furthermore, a large part of their munitions were to be given up to the Bolshevik authorities as the Czechoslovak forces began their evacuation eastward in Siberia.²⁰ This surrender was to take place at Penza. There Russian officers who had been in command in the Czechoslovak corps also gave up their posts. Nevertheless, the situation was extremely delicate. The Czechs were commandeering trains; supplies had to be secured; and at times local Soviet authorities were hostile. In the rear a sharp and successful rearguard engagement with pursuing German forces was fought at Bachmac in the second week of March.²¹

This ended the danger of direct German intervention. There remained the effect of German pressure on the Soviet authorities to harass and check this astonishing retreat to the Pacific. There was also the chance that some local fracas along the line might flare up into ugly trouble. This finally took place in the railway station at Cheliabinsk on May 14, 1918.

Beside a car containing Czechoslovak troops there arrived a party of Hungarian war prisoners. A stone was thrown by a Hungarian and at once the feuds of the Hapsburg Empire were set loose on the borders of Siberia. A riot followed, the Hungarian was killed, and the local Russian authorities arrested a few of the excited Czechs. Immediately their companions took charge of the situation; arms were seized; and the imprisoned Czechs were freed.²²

This small affair was soon followed by other disturbances along the railway line. Attempts were vainly made to minimize the difficulty.²³ The restless Czechs were on their way to fight for home and freedom. The Soviet authorities were now thoroughly aroused to the danger that these new forces might combine with Russian anti-Bolshevik bands which were forming in Siberia. Furthermore, the Allied representatives in Russia protested against the disarmament of the Czechoslovak Legion, which they declared was now an integral part of their armies.²⁴ Ambassador Francis from Vologda, which had become the diplomatic capital of Russia, took up the

cudgels for the Czechoslovak forces, and there was a sharp exchange of notes at Moscow.²⁵

The Soviet government, however, strongly maintained the position taken after the riot at Cheliabinsk. Trotsky declared that "the Japanese landing in Vladivostok and the opening of a campaign by Semenov's counter-revolutionary bands made the further movement of the transports to the east impossible." He ordered immediate and complete disarmament of forces all along the line under penalty of death. In addition, the Russian Branch of the Czechoslovak National Council, which was the political general staff in Russia, was ordered to disband.²⁶

These strained relations between the Czechoslovak troops and the Soviet government thus reached a climax in early June. The Legion was scattered along the tenuous line of railway stretching from west of Penza to far-off Vladivostok more than six thousand miles away. Nevertheless, the decision was made to fight their way out. In this fashion, events in Siberia became the basis of further development of Soviet policies. This broadening of the entire issue became inevitable as the decision was also reached by the Allies to send troops to assist in the evacuation of the beleaguered Czechoslovak forces. There was now a Siberian front where both arms and diplomacy were to play a confused and often futile rôle.²⁷

ALLIED INTERVENTION IN SIBERIA

The effect upon the relations of Soviet Russia with the Allied and Associated Powers of this outbreak of war along the line of the Siberian Railway during 1918-19 has already been noted. There remains, therefore, only the consideration of those factors which belong distinctly to the field of the Far East. Foremost is the decision to organize the Siberian Expeditionary Force. There follows brief description of the local chaos prevailing in Siberia. Thus the way is cleared to the development of Soviet diplomacy in the Far East.

The scene now shifts to Washington where Secretary Lansing, in early September, 1918, was to announce the recognition of the new state of Czechoslovakia. Dr. Masaryk had

come from Siberia to plead for assistance for his Czechoslovak legionaries. From France came General Janin on his way to act as commander of these forces in Siberia and to direct their transport to the western front. In the meantime, the slow objection of our War Department to the despatch of American troops to Siberia gave way before the final decision of President Wilson to join in the organization of the Siberian Expeditionary Force.

This whole matter was greatly complicated by the confusion of tongues at Washington as to the proper policies to be pursued with reference to Soviet Russia. The decision to co-operate in the Far East came only after urgent pleas by the Allied Powers. The possible effect of opening the road to Japanese troops in Siberia was the particular stumbling block. Both in Tokyo and Washington there were careful diplomatic conferences. The terms and circumstances of the despatch of troops of Vladivostok were defined and hedged about in meticulous ways. At last a statement to the press was issued by the Department of State which was practically an *aide mémoire*. To this the Foreign Office at Tokyo gave full adherence, though both Americans and Japanese were from the first mutually watchful.

As stated for the United States on August 3, 1918, the grounds and purpose of the Siberian Expeditionary Force were as follows:

We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czechoslovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only Powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, as far as may be, the country to the rear of the westward-moving [sic] Czechoslovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented.

In taking this action the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.²³

This elaborate but carefully limited declaration was in accord with the real views which were prevalent at the War Department and at the White House. Certainly, the conviction was strong in the General Staff that the War must be won in France and that the Siberian Expedition might be one of those "side shows" on which the Allies had already wasted so much time and effort. From the White House there was declared the conviction and determination to protect the Czechoslovak forces and also a policy of delay as to Russia. This was due largely to the fact that the President's mind and heart were also apparently set on events in France. Furthermore, it is a question whether anyone in the Department of State had both sufficient authority and energy at that time to follow an active and decisive policy as regards Russian affairs. At all events, the Department became a veritable grave for reports and recommendations regarding Russia and the Far

East. Thus at the outset, the Siberian venture was deprived of aggressive or constructive direction in Washington.

The situation was far different at Tokyo. Indeed, one reason for the prolonged hesitation of American authorities with regard to Siberian affairs had been the earlier proposals and the policy of Japan in respect to intervention. The Japanese Foreign Office, immediately after the Bolshevik revolution, had addressed a note to the Allied Powers and to the United States proposing an expedition to Siberia to prevent the spread of Bolshevism and to check any attempts on the part of the Central Powers to utilize the war prisoners then in Siberia. To this proposal the United States refused assent and stated that she was opposed to military intervention. This American refusal was prior to British acquiescence in the idea that Japan might demand a price for her intervention to establish an eastern front on the Urals. The plan was rejected because it was impracticable and inconsistent with American traditional friendship with the Russian people. We wished to help them, not to use them.²⁹

Furthermore, it was reported that General Horvath, who had been a Tsarist official and was still in command along the Chinese Eastern Railway, had received unofficial offers of assistance from Japan to help him with munitions and men in the organization of a volunteer Russian army to oppose the Bolsheviks. In return, Japan was to intervene alone; she was to receive northern Sakhalin; she was to be given preferential economic rights in eastern Siberia and full equality with Russians in fisheries; she was to be granted exclusive mining and lumbering concessions; and Vladivostok was to be demilitarized and become a free port. At about the same time, on May 16, 1918, Japan entered into an agreement with China; in view of the "fact that the gradual extension of enemy influence toward the east may jeopardize the peace of the two countries," it was proposed that they should engage in joint military and naval action in Siberia. Later, on September 6, 1918, it was stated that the "duty of these forces shall be to assist the Czechoslovak forces, and to drive out German and Austrian forces and such as may be rendering assistance to

them." The terms of this agreement were kept secret until their publication on March 14, 1919; they involved also contracts as to the supply of munitions. Such terms arose from an exchange of notes on March 25, 1918, between Tokyo and Peking. The secrecy of these proposals gave rise to much gossip and to charges that the Japanese were about to plan intervention without reference to Europe or America. These and other projects had been in the air for months.³⁰

Naturally, they had affected governmental opinion in the United States as to the wisdom of co-operating with Japan in any Siberian venture. They also serve to explain the care with which the Siberian Expeditionary Force was launched. The United States had no intention of clearing the way for Japanese exploitation of Siberia under the cover of a joint venture to rescue the Czechoslovak Legion.

THE SITUATION IN SIBERIA

The detailed story of the Expeditionary Force is no part of this history. The chaos which existed in Siberia during 1918-20 is, however, an important factor in the entire situation. This state of confusion and practical anarchy had begun soon after the Bolshevik Revolution in November, 1917. Then an attempt was made by local Bolshevik elements to seize Harbin on the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. Fear by foreigners led to a protest by the consular body who asked for Chinese troops. These occupied Harbin in spite of vigorous protests from Trotsky in Petrograd; and the Bolsheviks were driven back into Siberia.³¹

There an uncertain and confusing situation continued for some time. Local Soviets here and there along the line of the trans-Siberian Railway organized, but the sparse agricultural population of eastern Siberia did not speak the dialect of the proletarian, industrial revolution. Furthermore, as the storm of Bolshevism spread eastward in European Russia many refugees thronged into Siberia. These gave support for a time to the remnants of the Provisional government. During the winter of 1917-18, however, the Bolshevik movement extended itself somewhat into Siberia.

To meet this, an attempt was made at Tomsk, in western Siberia, to organize a movement for Siberian autonomy. This was launched by Socialists who hoped to co-operate with the Constituent Assembly scheduled to meet at Petrograd in January, 1918. This Assembly, as we know, was rudely dispersed by the Bolsheviks; as a consequence, the Tomsk convention broke up and the leaders fled to Harbin there to plan for an anti-Bolshevik rising in June. This first appearance of "autonomy" as a political issue was due primarily to anti-Bolshevik feeling; it had no root outside of party opposition.

However, with the outbreak of war along the line of the Czechoslovak army in June, there was a veritable crop of autonomous governments. Particularly at Omsk, at Samara, and at Uralsk these short-lived organizations sprang up. Finally, at Ufa, in September, 1918, a conference connected these different elements.³² To this united anti-Bolshevik movement was now added that of Admiral Kolchak. He had arrived from the Near East, having been called by General Horvath to eastern Siberia to head an anti-Bolshevik government. This new government soon was at odds with the Socialists, and on November 17 a number of their leaders were arrested at Omsk. This *coup d'état* placed Kolchak as the nominal head of the entire anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia.³³

In the meantime, a cavalry leader, who had been a captain in the Tsarist army, had come to the front. This was Semenov, Ataman (or commander) of Cossacks, who gathered about him a small number of troops. He and other leaders with their organized bands, now conducted a guerrilla war against the Bolsheviks in eastern Siberia. Incidentally, by their methods and because of the support, which was later given to them by the Japanese, Semenov and his like were largely responsible for the alienation of local feeling. Nominally, Semenov was subordinate to Admiral Kolchak during 1919, but the bloody depredations of his counter-revolutionary bands reacted in favor of the Soviet authorities.³⁴

These developments, moreover, took on special significance because of Japanese policies. In December, 1917, the desire

of the Japanese to intervene in Siberia had been evident; but the Foreign Office at Tokyo proceeded with great caution lest difficulties with the Allies and with the United States might develop. However, a Japanese warship dropped anchor at Vladivostok on December 30, 1917. Later a second Japanese ship came to be followed by a British and an American cruiser. The local authorities protested, but foreign consuls defended the presence of these ships in view of the possibility of local disturbances. On April 5-6, Japanese and British landing parties undertook the protection of their nationals, and Japanese patrols began to search the persons of pedestrians in the city of Vladivostok.³⁵

The news of these events, particularly the report of anti-Bolshevik organization in March, had prompted a despatch from Irkutsk which was given prominence in the *Izvestia*.³⁶ The facts in this despatch were somewhat distorted; indeed, they anticipated foreign intervention. Its significance for the future lay in the declaration that against an anti-Bolshevik movement on the Pacific coast backed by Japanese troops strong "*patriotic*" feeling was shown by the common people who were "prepared for every sacrifice for the defense of the Soviet *fatherland*." This was propaganda in one sense; but the use of the terms "*patriotic*" and "*fatherland*" gave a clue to the new campaign which the Soviet authorities were to launch in Siberia. In the first wave of Bolshevik internationalism these terms were practically taboo in Petrograd. Now with reference to possible Japanese intervention they were quoted with approval in the *Izvestia*, the official organ of the Bolsheviks. This is perhaps the first evidence since November, 1917, that appeal was to be made to Russian national patriotism rather than merely to proletarian class feeling.

Meanwhile, the news of the landing of marines at Vladivostok stirred Chicherin, who had recently become Commissar of Foreign Affairs at Moscow, to protest to the Allied representatives.³⁷ Ambassador Francis, at Vologda, had previously cabled Washington advising against Japanese interference or intervention in Siberia for the time being.³⁸ At Moscow, Col.

Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross in Russia, telegraphed that

the latent hostility of all Russian people to Mongolian domination will transform present resentment against Germany into far more bitter resentment against Allies. . . . We are now at most dangerous crisis in Russian situation and if colossal blunder of hostile Japanese intervention takes place, all American advantages are confiscated.³⁹

The official press was full of indignation at the news. The *Izvestia* declared:

The imperialists of Japan want to choke the Russian revolution and cut off Russia from the Pacific. They want to grab the rich territory of Siberia and enslave Siberian workmen and peasants. What do the other allied countries intend to do? . . . The British have landed a descent right after the Japanese. Does this mean that England intends to go hand in hand with Japan in strangling Russia? ⁴⁰

Radek, the vitriolic mouthpiece of the Soviet Foreign Office, submitted the entire policy of the Allies to careful analysis. Japan, instead of joining Germany at the commencement of the World War in 1914, went after Kiaochow and Shantung. "From a participant in the international robber's war, Japan turned into the marauder of this War, trying with the least effort to grab the most." Because the Allies were busy with the War, they have had to put up with Japan's provocative behavior. Now, however, the French are alarmed for the safety of their twenty billions of francs invested in Russia. They, therefore, are inciting the Japanese to seize Siberia whose natural resources would serve to protect the interests of French creditors. "In her rôle as guardian of this security, Japan evidently hopes to divide the Allies and paralyze the opposition of America." Thus "the Japanese offensive policy proves how wrong it would be for us to reckon on the help of the Allies against Germany."⁴¹

Later, another able but anonymous writer, "Viator" pointed out that Japanese intervention and penetration in eastern Siberia would play into German hands.⁴² All this conjecture and analysis was summed up in a speech by Trot-

sky, who was now head of the War Office, at the Sergievsky People's Palace, on June 16, 1918. This was delivered at the moment when war with the Czechoslovak troops had begun and when the Germans were consolidating their gains won by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. But the Soviet authorities were still convinced that there was prospect of the spread of the revolutionary movement into Central Europe. Trotsky declared:

From the Far East the Japanese threaten us, getting ready to occupy Siberia up to the Urals; the German is extending his hands to meet them; they will meet as allies and divide the hide of the slain bear. . . . If our Soviet Republic should be in such a disastrous situation and should be forced to choose between German and Japanese troops, I would say . . . better the German army than the Japanese, because the German is more cultured, the people are more educated, and there are more workmen, and awakening is possible; while the Japanese are a foreign people, we do not know their language, the working class is less conscious, much time must pass before a revolution will develop on Japanese soil. Japanese rule is more bitter, more terrible than the rule of the Germans. . . . If Japan sends her troops she will not withdraw them, she will do just what the Germans are doing. . . . Any policy in connection with the Allies is the most wicked treacherous policy with respect to the Russian people.⁴³

In view of such a statement, the decision of the Allies on July 6 to undertake the protection of Vladivostok ⁴⁴ and later the announcement of the joint expeditionary force were looked on in Moscow as a program of exploitation. The rapid advance of Japanese troops during August and September along the line of the Siberian Railway, the co-operation of the Czechoslovak forces, and raids on the local Siberian population by the bands of Semenov and Kalmikov, another counter-revolutionary leader in eastern Siberia, all combined to give the Allied intervention the character of a hostile military invasion. By the end of 1918, practically all of Siberia was temporarily lost to Bolshevik control.

However, the essential problem of relations with the anti-Bolshevik Russian authorities at Omsk remained unsolved. Should Allied troops advance to Omsk and there give prac-

tical assistance to the forces gathering about Admiral Kolchak? Was the expedition which was to relieve the Czechoslovaks to become an instrument of attack against the Soviet government in Russia? Involved in any decision regarding this, there were three factors: the character of the All-Russian government at Omsk; Japanese intentions in Siberia; and American participation.

(1) The reports on the situation at Omsk were pessimistic. There was actually no effective administration, no organization of the army, and reactionary rather than moderate liberal elements constantly gained in power. With the national future at stake, facing in the Bolshevik movement the menace of world-revolution, the traditional, garrulous, inefficiency of Russian bureaucracy settled on Omsk. The buzzards of corruption had their fill while other bolder birds of prey in ruthless fashion fed on the vitals of an innocent and unoffending people. Nevertheless, it was clear that the government which was developing at Omsk was the only alternative to the Soviet Republic. Furthermore, Admiral Kolchak, himself, even after he had been made the nominal dictator of that government in November, 1918, was personally honest and patriotic.⁴⁵

(2) Japanese intentions in Siberia were exposed to two different sorts of attack. First, there was the persistent story of a secret agreement between Germany and Japan for the restoration of Tsarist rule in Russia and for a consequent division of the rewards of such a policy in territorial and economic plunder between Germany in the West and Japan in the Far East. It is probably true, according to a confidential British statement, that "Japan was almost on our backs in 1917"; but in the autumn of 1918 the collapse of German military power had become inevitable. This the Japanese authorities finally recognized, and the repeated endeavors to prove the existence or validity of such an agreement in 1918 fell to the ground. I have never met a responsible person who believed in the truth of the charge as to this intrigue with Germany by Japan in the Siberian venture.⁴⁶

A second attack on Japanese intentions was that from the

outset the Japanese looked on Siberia in a proprietary spirit; they hoped to profit by continued turmoil in Siberia and they did not wish the success of the All-Russian government at Omsk. Moreover by the unconscionably large military forces that they poured into eastern Siberia in the autumn of 1918, and by the flood of Japanese commercial agents and Japanese merchandize which they sent in, it was asserted that they hoped to consolidate their position in Siberia. And this was in the face of the solemn declaration of disinterestedness by the Japanese Foreign Office in August, 1918. The evidence in support of this charge seems now overwhelming. It is impossible to enter into details. Almost any reliable account by eye-witnesses of the situation in Siberia at this period will bear out this charge.⁴⁷

Indeed, the situation had become so serious that as early as November 2, 1918, Secretary Lansing at Washington took steps to warn the Japanese government of the dangers of the policy which her military party was following in Siberia. After a few days of bitter discussion at Tokyo, this led to the order for the withdrawal of more than fifty thousand Japanese troops. As originally proposed, the number of Japanese troops had been fixed at about eight thousand; but within a few months that number had risen to more than seventy-two thousand. Such a protest by the United States showed what a state of uncertainty and disunion the Siberian Expeditionary program had already reached.⁴⁸

(3) The third general factor was the problem of American participation in any general plan for a movement against the Bolsheviki. The United States had made it plain in the original statement of August 3, 1918, that her objectives were limited. American troops were only to assist in the evacuation of Czechoslovak troops and "to steady" Russian endeavors for self-government. American troops were, however, confined strictly to the immediate neighborhood of Vladivostok. They did not participate in the Japanese advance, nor did they join Czechoslovak forces in the interior. These were eagerly looking for American support, for they were becoming confused by the conflict of policies which paralyzed the All-

Russian government at Omsk. They were still ready to fight, though subjected to insidious propaganda by the Bolsheviks. But they wished in visible fashion to find themselves in battle-line with the Americans, whom they knew they could trust.⁴⁹

The state of affairs at Omsk, the aggressive policies of the Japanese, and the character of the anti-Bolshevik leaders in eastern Siberia whom the Japanese were supporting all combined to give pause. The question of an active policy by the United States was, therefore, hedged by difficulties on every side. Nevertheless, in October, 1918, Ambassador Morris from Tokyo, who was practically American High Commissioner in Siberia, General Graves, and Admiral Knight, who was in command of American naval forces at Vladivostok, united in a detailed report recommending a further development of American policy.⁵⁰

This report came as a rather disagreeable surprise to authorities at Washington who had been hesitant as to the wisdom of the entire policy of the Siberian Expeditionary Force. It proposed that a small American force, to be joined by detachments of the other Powers, should be sent into the interior to the Ural front to assist the Czechoslovaks and to give moral support to the anti-Bolshevik forces. It was reported that President Wilson regarded this entire report as "the most convincing document" he had read on the Russian problem. It was in line with other reports from men who had recently come from Russia; and the three authors of this recommendation were men of exceptional ability and wisdom.

Furthermore, Ambassador Morris was a man who had stood close to the President in his earlier political battles and who was imbued with the spirit of the President in international affairs. Nevertheless, these recommendations were rejected at Washington largely, it has been said, because of opposition in the War Department. Certainly, it is known that there was a group of men on the General Staff who had scarcely appreciated the plight of the Czechoslovaks and who were fixed in the determination that nothing should possibly interfere with the prosecution of the war on the western front. The fact that it was proposed that only a comparatively small

number of American troops would be sent to the Ural front did not affect such concentration of mind.

Moreover, there was no one in Washington, who had the confidence of the President, to whom the Russian problem was paramount. Thus in October, 1918, there died at Washington a plan which, if successful, might possibly have given to Allied intervention in Russia a vastly different character. The danger, of course, would have come from Allied intrigues, and these were already numerous. But it gave a chance that Russian endeavor to restore civil government might succeed along liberal lines, that genial but futile Tories like General Knox of the British Mission might not be pointed at as the power behind Kolchak, and that the Japanese could no longer assume a proprietary position with regard to Siberia. Later, at Paris, in the spring of 1919, as we have seen, the United States viewed with favor the endeavors of the Kolchak government. America verged practically on recognition; but then it was too late to order troops to the Urals to give effective aid. So there remained in eastern Siberia a small American expeditionary force which was condemned for the time to "military exile." In any event, the difficult problem of the relations of Soviet Russia to the dominant power of Japan in eastern Siberia continued as an ever-present factor.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

1. *Russian American Relations*, p. 240.
2. *Memorandum of the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic*, Washington, 1921, p. 1.
3. This article by Dr. Barrows in *Asia*, September, 1919, deserves special attention as it was written shortly after the author had returned from Siberia where he had been Lt.-Colonel on the Staff of General Graves as Intelligence Officer.
4. Two articles in *Sun* (Baltimore), Dec. 12 and 13, 1921, by A. L. P. Dennis.
5. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, 1894-1919. Two vols. (New York, 1921), I, p. 674.
6. *Ibid.*, I, p. 640.
7. *Ibid.*, I, p. 657.
8. Cf. Dennis, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*. (Publications of the University of California), Berkeley, 1923. Chap. ii, sec. 4. This essay before its publication was a confidential memorandum used by the American delegation to the Washington Conference.
9. MacMurray, I, p. 803.
10. Cf. an alleged text of this treaty was published by the New York *American*, April 17, 1921; de Siebert, *Entente Diplomacy and the World* (New York, 1921), p. 17.
11. Cf. Dennis, *op. cit.* It might be remarked that in any case the attacks by bandits in northern Manchuria would have compelled military forces to protect the Railway in case the Knox plan had been acceptable.
12. MacMurray, II, p. 1327.
13. *Ibid.*, II, p. 1328. As translated from the *Gazette* of the Provisional Workmen-Peasants governments, Dec. 21, 1917, cf. Pasvolsky, *Russia in the Far East* (New York), 1922, p. 165. This is a useful sketch in broad outlines of the main factors. Still another text of the treaty is to be found in Laloy, *Les documents secrets publiés par les bolshévins* (Paris, 1919). Cf. Dennis, chap. iii, sec. 8.
14. Cf. Pasvolsky, p. 50.
15. Cf. Dennis, chap. iii, sec. 7.
16. Klecanda, *Operace ceskoslovenskevo Vojska na Rusi v Letech*, 1917-1920 (Prag. 1921), pp. 7 *et seq.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. On Nov. 22, 1917, in Petrograd *Pravda*, appeared a proclamation to Czech war prisoners in Russia declaring that "bourgeois" elements were trying to make use of the leaders of the Czech volunteers.

19. *Izvestia*, Feb. 22, 1918. Proclamation of the Czechoslovak National Council.
20. *Izvestia*, March 28, 1918. Antonov, Commander-in-Chief of the South Russian Bolshevik Army, issued an order: "The revolutionary troops will never forget the brotherly service rendered by the Czechoslovak corps in the struggle of the laboring people of the Ukraine against the bandits of predatory imperialism. The arms which the Czechoslovaks are handing over are being accepted by the revolutionary troops as a brotherly present."
21. Klecanda, p. 9.
22. *Izvestia*, May 22, 1918. A full account of the incident is here given which differs somewhat from the version given in the Soviet note of June 13, *R. A. R.*, p. 224. The Czechoslovak account is given in Ackerman, *Trailing the Bolsheviks* (New York, 1919), pp. 109-121.
23. *Izvestia*, May 30, June 9, 1918, for statements by Trotsky. Cf. *Ibid.*, June 6, on the provocation of the Czechoslovaks due to the report that they were to be evacuated *via* Murmansk where they would be exposed to German submarine attack.
24. *Ibid.*, June 6 and 8, 1918.
25. Francis, p. 303.
26. *Izvestia*, May 30, June 12, 13, and July 4, 1918. *R. A. R.*, p. 224.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 267. A defence of Soviet policy toward the Czechoslovak troops.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 237. The Japanese statement is on p. 249.
29. After careful study, I reject the statements made by Spargo, *Russia as an American Problem* (New York, 1920), p. 236, and also those by Barrows on this particular matter. Robert Wilton ("The Rush for Siberia," in *Fortnightly Review*, Nov., 1921, pp. 782-805), who was in the Far East at this time, claims to have prepared a plan for joint allied intervention in Dec., 1917, which was accepted in principle by all save Japan who delayed the project because it did not provide for exclusively Japanese intervention. On the whole, however, I think the Japanese Foreign Office acted in good faith. The plans and projects of the Japanese General Staff and of the militaristic group present another and difficult problem.
30. Cf. Spargo, p. 240, and Barrows, pp. 929-30. MacMurray, II, pp. 1406-15. Cf. also Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic* (London, 1923), chap. vii.
31. *Izvestia*, Dec. 25, 1917; *Moscow Pravda*, Dec. 29, -evening edition; and *Izvestia*, Jan. 24, 1918, where a note from the Chinese Legation quotes paragraphs 5 of the Chinese Eastern

Railway agreement of 1896, giving China full authority to protect the railway and its officials, and points out that Harbin is after all in Chinese territory.

2. *R. A. R.*, p. 257. Ackerman, *Trailing the Bolsheviks*, chap. vii.
3. Various documents relating to this are published by the Department of State—*Documents relating to the Organization and Purposes of the Anti-Bolshevik Forces in Russia*. Washington, 1920 (Russian Series No. 3), p. 1. Kolchak's relations with the Allies during 1919 have already been noted in chapter iv.
4. Cf. Spargo, pp. 241, 251; Barrows, p. 930; Ackerman, pp. 239-40. Ackerman's book is the report of a trained and reliable journalist and is well documented.
5. *Izvestia*, March 26, 1918; *Japanese Intervention in the Russian Far East* (published by the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America) (Washington, 1922), pp. 7-10. This is naturally a partisan book, but it is in the main accurate and includes many essential documents.
16. *Izvestia*, March 9, 1918.
17. *Ibid.*, April 6, 1918. *R. A. R.*, p. 194. Here is given the able Soviet statement regarding the danger of Japanese intervention.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
20. *Ibid.*, the press teemed with despatches and protests. Cf. *Izvestia*, April 9, 10, 13, 19, 26, May 15, 23, 25, and June 13, 1918.
21. *Ibid.*, April 7, 1918.
22. *Ibid.*, May 15, 1918.
23. Trotsky's speech was published as a pamphlet by the Central Executive Committee.
24. *Japanese Intervention*, p. 11.
25. Wilton, "The Rush for Siberia," in *Fortnightly Review*, Nov., 1921, p. 786, gives a picture of confusion and corruption at Omsk. A realistic picture of Siberian intervention and Russian and Allied inefficiency is given in a novel by Gerhardt, *Futility* (New York, 1922).
26. Spargo, pp. 252-54 gives a summary of these charges which I am unable to accept. Many of the documents referred to are either mis-dated or are forgeries. They can possibly all be traced back to the Moscow *Trud*, of Dec. 7, 1918, where a confused text of an alleged German-Japanese treaty was published. This document with eight articles purports to provide

for the joint restoration of orderly government in Russia; Germany is to receive concessions in southern China and to participate in advantages gained in Central Asia and Persia by Japan; Japan in turn is to support Germany at the coming peace conference in order to mitigate the severity of the terms to be imposed on Germany and is to conclude a secret military convention with Germany against the aggressive intentions of England and America; a further treaty is to define the fundamental lines of foreign policy of Germany, Japan, and restored Tsarist Russia. This document is an obvious forgery, based on gossip and issued at this time for propaganda purposes. However, that Germany made advances to Japan during the War is unquestionable.

47. The personal conversation of numerous foreign observers in Siberia is unanimous on this point. Cf. also Ackerman, chap. xi; Barrows, p. 930; and Spargo, chap. v. A despatch of July 7, 1917, from the Russian Ambassador at Tokio during the time of the Russo-Provisional government, which was published in the *Izvestia*, April 7, 1918, states the objection of the Japanese to the granting of Siberian concessions to Americans. The views then expressed are the natural basis of the economic policy followed by Japan in Siberia in 1918-21. Naturally, the memoranda and publications of the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic are full of these charges; but it is unnecessary to make use of them.
48. Ackerman, pp. 241 *et seq.*
49. *Ibid.*, chaps. vi, ix, and x.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 194-96. Under this discreet account there is a lot of real history; p. 136 stated that the United States never intended to give armed assistance to the Czechoslovaks and that Ambassador Francis exceeded his instructions. This is probably untrue. The United States looked at the entire matter as a problem in reconstruction, while the Allies viewed it as a belligerent problem. Ambassador Francis probably gave a belligerent tone, as was his practice, to his instructions, but technically he remained within them. In any case, President Wilson was sincere in his determination to aid the Czechoslovaks, who were our only "Allies" during the war.

CHAPTER XII

THE FAR EAST. II

FROM KOLCHAK TO JOFFE

With reference to the United States and Japan our first political aims are to repel their shameless, criminal, bandit-like invasion of Russia that serves only to enrich their capitalists.—*Interview by wireless with Lenin, Washington Post, Aug. 5, 1919.*

The significance of the Orient for Soviet Russia at the present time has been quite clear. Soviet Russia and the countries of the Orient represent giants supplementing each other. Just as we are the hopeful bulwark for oriental peoples in their struggle for independence, they in turn are our allies in one common struggle against world imperialism.—EMUS, "Our Policy in the Orient," in *Izvestia*, July 17, 1921.

In the absence of a single, recognized Russian Government the protection of legitimate Russian interests must devolve as a moral trusteeship upon the whole Conference. It is regrettable that the Conference, for reasons quite beyond the control of the participating Powers, is to be deprived of the advantage of Russian cooperation in its deliberations, but it is not to be conceived that the Conference will take decisions prejudicial to legitimate Russian interests or which would in any manner violate Russian rights. It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Conference will establish general principles of international action which will deserve and have the support of the people of eastern Siberia and of all Russia by reason of their justice and efficacy in the settlement of outstanding difficulties.—*Statement to the Press by the Department of State. September 19, 1921.*

The Japanese Delegates to the Washington Conference were unanimous in the view that what Japanese public opinion expected of them was to envisage the problems not so much in terms of the special interests of Japan, but rather in terms of a just and expedient world settlement. This striking change from a national

to an international point of view, from a competitive idea to a co-operative ideal, from suspicion to confidence, had occurred in the short space of three years. . . . [Japan] can have no interest which will not be gravely imperiled by war, and infinitely benefited by peace.—SABURI, *Speech at Washington, December 9, 1922.*¹

THE PERIOD OF CONFUSION—1919

THE news of the American refusal to co-operate in western Siberia came at an unfortunate time. The *coup d'état* of November, 1918, which drove out from Omsk the more radical elements in the government, alienated for a time the Czechoslovak troops who regarded with suspicion the reactionary gentry who now surrounded Admiral Kolchak. The Japanese had fastened themselves on the railway line in eastern Siberia and refused to move west of Lake Baikal. Furthermore, in European Russia there began early in 1919 the reorganization of military forces which gradually and only after desperate efforts were to become the Red army, under the efficient and enlivening direction of Trotsky.

In addition, the organization of the Third Internationale, with its Asiatic as well as its European program of propaganda, was to lend renewed strength to the eastern policy of the Soviet government. For the time, however, the best assistance which the Bolsheviki could have desired came from the orgy of oppression enjoyed by the counter-revolutionary elements in eastern Siberia at the expense of the local population. This condition of practical anarchy, together with Japanese militarism, combined to honeycomb the people of Siberia with a profound and patriotic desire to be quit of this state of affairs even at the risk of Bolshevik influence and control.

However, during the spring and summer of 1919 in western Siberia and in southern Russia the forces of Admiral Kolchak and of General Denikin continued a hardy struggle, which was dependent for success mainly on two factors—supplies from the Allies and popular support from the peasants. The Allies failed them and the peasants were alienated by the reactionary elements who had gathered at headquarters.

In this connection was the behavior of Semenov in the Chita district which lay across the line of communication of the Omsk government. Until December, 1919, he frequently held up shipments of supplies to Omsk, robbed military trains, and in general was one of the largest contributing factors in the final failure of the Kolchak movement. He was thus a traitor to his own cause yet in this policy he received the protection and support of the Japanese.²

Meanwhile, Allied troops including American detachments acted as guard for the railway in eastern Siberia, whose operation since February, 1919, had been under the direction of an Inter-Allied Technical Board.³ Czechoslovak troops were also used for this purpose in western Siberia. During the autumn of 1919 they began to move eastward to their final evacuation at Vladivostok. This movement, however, was not accomplished without friction with Semenov at Chita and with the Japanese. In spite of the bedevilling of Kolchak by the Japanese, the existence of a buffer region west of Lake Baikal between them and the actual Bolshevik front had been welcome to the Japanese. They were not unwilling that the Czechoslovaks should continue fighting along the railway, and in various ways tried to delay their final departure.⁴

The actual collapse of the All-Russian government was due to the crumbling away of Kolchak's forces and to the surrender of the Admiral, who had retreated to Irkutsk, by retiring Czechoslovaks on January 19, 1920. On February 7, he was shot by the Bolsheviks. From that moment the Japanese were faced by the realities of the situation in eastern Siberia. In February, Chicherin for the Soviet Government offered peace on the basis of immediate evacuation.⁵ This was influenced by reports of the rice riots in Japan and the hope that with the coming withdrawal of American forces the Japanese would give up the fight. In this the Soviet authorities were disappointed. On April 1 the last United States troops withdrew from Siberia, but on the previous day the Japanese issued a statement giving reasons for their continued occupation.

This document, which should be compared with the Japanese statement of August 3, 1918, declared that:

The expedition of our forces to Siberia was undertaken with a view to assisting the Czechoslovak troops. Therefore, when the evacuation of the latter has been completed, our forces shall be withdrawn. This was definitely stated at the time, in our declaration. But no other country is in such proximity to Siberia as our Empire. Unfortunately, the present political situation in the Far East, which not only threatens the safety and life of our citizens residing in Siberia, but is also a menace to the general peace in Korea and Manchuria, makes it impossible for us to withdraw our troops from the Russian Far East immediately. The Japanese Government, therefore, desires to corroborate its statement that *the presence of the Japanese forces in the Russian Far East does not imply any political designs against Russia* (italics in the original) and desires to declare that as soon as the political situation in the Russian Far East has become normal to the extent that there will be no danger for Korea, and Manchuria, and life and property of our nationals protected and normal railway communications restored, that then, after the evacuation of the Czechoslovak forces has been completed, *our troops will be withdrawn from Siberia as early as possible.* (Italics in the original.)⁶

Following this, on April 4 a Japanese attack on local Russian troops took place in Vladivostok. A simultaneous attack by Japanese troops throughout the maritime province resulted in practical control of the Pacific coast.⁷ The struggle was, therefore, to take on a new form. Further evidence of this was the organization on April 6, 1920, as the result of a conference at Verkhne-Udinsk between local Siberian leaders and other Russians, of a new Russian revolutionary state—the Far Eastern Republic.⁸

THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC

During 1920 there was another crop of new local governments in Siberia. The fall of Kolchak left the situation much as it had been early in 1918 before the organization of the Omsk government. In western Siberia, however, at Irkutsk, the Western Siberian Revolutionary Committee finally took charge, for Moscow and Soviet authorities became supreme. It was local opposition by leaders in Siberia to the control

of this Irkutsk committee which particularly prompted the revival of the idea of autonomy for eastern Siberia. This led to the organization of the Far Eastern Republic as an independent state in close connection with the Soviet Republic.⁹ Gradually, it outlived the other movements for local control and became the real government for nine-tenths of eastern Siberia. Only in the coastal provinces and at Vladivostok were there anti-Bolshevik elements who clung to an emasculated power under the guns of the Japanese.

From the first this new government was bitterly opposed to Japanese occupation. It was also engaged in a running fight with successive counter-revolutionary bands who derived their almost open support from foreign sources. In the struggle against these elements, both the Soviet Republic and the Far Eastern Republic were led to violate the long Mongolian frontier on the south and thus to include disputes with China within their stormy international relations. In all these affairs, the influence, if not the actual control, of Moscow was apparent. This became increasingly evident until the government, which had chosen Chita as its capital, voted itself out of existence. Thus in mid-November 1922, the Far Eastern Republic disappeared, swallowed by the Soviet government which still reigned and ruled supreme at Moscow.

Because of the anomalous and often extraordinary connections which existed between Chita and Moscow, during 1920-22, as well as because of the final return of eastern Siberia to its historic relations with European Russia, the entire field of the foreign relations of the Far Eastern Republic belongs properly to any review of Soviet diplomacy in the Far East. Indeed, any other interpretation of these relations is impossible. At almost every stage the voice of Moscow is heard broadcast in eastern Siberia. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau."

Such connections, however, should not obscure the fact that in domestic affairs, in the frame of government finally set up at Chita, the Soviet system was not adhered to. The constitution adopted by the Far Eastern Republic was that of a radical democratic state. It contained a bill of rights,

but abolished private ownership of land; and its legislature was elected on a universal franchise which ignored the dictatorial principles of the proletarian revolution.¹⁰

Krasnoschekov, the first Prime Minister, was a Jew of Russian descent who had been educated in Chicago and he had lived there as a lawyer under the name of Tobelson. He had, however, suggested the idea of a "buffer" state some time before April, 1920, and it was largely at his initiative that the conference at Verkhne-Udinsk organized the Far Eastern Republic. Later he retired to Russia. There were other Russians who also played a part in these first stages, many of whom had figured in the employment of the Soviet government. Among them was "Bill" Shatov, who had been well known in America as an I. W. W. organizer and agitator.

Meanwhile, other Russian elements in Siberia led a precarious life. Despite statements by the Soviet Foreign Office Japanese policy had been directed toward assisting individual anti-Bolshevik leaders rather than to promote organized governmental agencies which might have stopped the turmoil in Siberia. Now in 1920 the Japanese set to work to consolidate their own position along the Pacific coast. In the interior, Semenov was compelled, by forces directed from Verkhne-Udinsk, to flee from Chita by aeroplane in October, 1920.¹¹ Japanese troops along the railway line had been withdrawn. Consequently, there remained in Siberia east of Lake Baikal three elements—the Japanese along the coast; the scattered anti-Bolshevik remnants of Kolchak's followers and of the armed bands who continued to maraud; and forces which had combined to organize the Far Eastern Republic and which included the adherents of the Soviet government at Moscow.

The representation of the Moscow authorities in the negotiations with the Japanese was shown as early as April, 1920, when Vilensky, the Soviet plenipotentiary in the Far East, entered into direct relations with Matsudaira, the civil representative in Siberia of the Foreign Office at Tokyo.¹² The progress of the Far Eastern Republic led to further negotiations with the Japanese. In May an arrangement was made by which troops of the Far Eastern Republic were barred

from regions in the east where the Japanese set up so-called neutral zones and where the anti-Bolshevik troops were in control. This was followed, July 16, 1920, by an exchange of notes defining frontiers between the Japanese sphere and the territories under the Far Eastern Republic. These and other documents, however, did not touch the heart of the matter.¹³

The Japanese had already occupied northern Sakhalin as reprisal for a massacre of Japanese troops at Nikolayevsk in March. A detachment of troops had also been sent to the coast of Kamchatka. Vladivostok, under the guise of a temporary local government, was practically Japanese. There was no sign of evacuation save an occasional proclamation which always spoke of conditions still to be fulfilled.¹⁴ This situation led the Far Eastern Republic to vigorous diplomatic protest in January and March of 1921. These documents called attention to the earlier pledges of Japan to withdraw her troops on the fulfillment of the object of the expedition, "that is, upon the completion of the evacuation of the Czechoslovak army" which had now been accomplished. They recited the later statement of March 31, 1920, which has already been quoted, and claimed that the continued presence of Japanese troops was itself responsible for disorder. "Russian cities and villages in the zone of intervention are enveloped in a poisonous cloud, as it were of robbery, murder, and all kinds of unspeakable crimes." They demanded that Japan should adhere to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the Far Eastern Republic, that a time should be set for Japanese evacuation, and that treaty relations should be set up between the two governments.¹⁵

As these protests did not produce results, notes of April, May, and June were despatched couched in even more vigorous language.¹⁶ The government at Chita also sent protests to the United States. They pointed out that intervention in Siberia in 1918 had resulted from the American invitation to Japan to join in the movement, that the purposes of intervention had now been accomplished, and that American troops had withdrawn, though the Inter-Allied Railway Technical

Board remained in Siberia. They asked, therefore, "when will the United States government, which invited the Japanese government to a military co-operation in the Russian Far East, require a definite end to be put to the intervention which began in 1918 by that invitation?"¹⁶ Such language squarely and fairly raised the issue of the moral responsibility of the United States.

This appeal to the United States fitted in with an American note to Japan despatched in May, 1921, whose contents were revealed at the Washington Conference in January, 1922. This note by implication exposed the suspected purposes of continued Japanese occupation. It stated that the United States can "neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of a present Japanese occupation or control, that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia." Such language clearly indicated that the United States was aware of the attempts which the Japanese were making to consolidate their economic, if not their political, penetration of Siberia under cover of the military occupation.¹⁸

This note was a warning of the isolation of Japan in her Siberian policy. Taken in conjunction with other matters then pending, such as the Shantung Question and the dangerous naval rivalry of America and Japan, it marked an additional score on the record of policies which were then rapidly separating the United States from her recent associate in the World War. Under such circumstances, the invitation in July to Japan to take part in a conference on armaments and on Pacific and Far Eastern questions, which would include Siberia on its agenda, gave pause. This invitation, however, did not alter Japanese purposes; at that time it merely changed the methods which were employed. Instead of the futile turmoil of military leaders in Siberia, an attempt, now was made to secure Japanese policies by a conference with the Far Eastern Republic which would be held before the Washington Conference. This met at Dairen in September, 1921.

In the meantime, the relations of Soviet Russia to the Far Eastern Republic had been more clearly defined. The interest of Moscow in all these matters emerges as the plans for the proposed conferences take shape. The connection of such factors in the development of an articulated Russian policy toward China was also to be apparent. Indeed, the entire program of Soviet Russia had now advanced to an Oriental stage. As Lenin had declared on July 21, 1920, at the Second Congress of the Third Internationale: "At the present moment the flag of Soviets is beginning to be raised throughout the Orient, in Asia." The principle of communism "has become immediately accessible to hundreds of millions of oppressed and exploited in the colonies. . . . We know that we are defending the interests of seventy per cent. of the population of the entire world."¹⁹

Such language stimulated the reply of Bolsheviks in Siberia triumphant over Semenov: "The united liberated East standing as guard for the Revolution sends greetings to Red Moscow." In the Far East was a "barricade" against the enemies of "Mother Moscow."²⁰ From Chicherin, as Foreign Secretary, came in turn a note of June 1, 1921, to the Allies protesting against the Japanese troops in Siberia as the intervention of a single Power directed by the forces of world-capitalism against Soviet Russia.²¹

This relationship had naturally developed from the approval given by Moscow in May, 1920, to the plan adopted at the conference at Verkhne-Udinsk. This in turn had led to the development of a government at Chita which had addressed a declaration of policy to the principal Powers, and on April 17, 1921, had adopted a constitution.²² A treaty with Soviet Russia which had been signed December 30, 1920, was announced; Kamchatka was turned over to Moscow; and thus the new boundaries of the Far Eastern Republic were drawn. At the same time, assurance was given by the Communist organization in Chita to the Central Committee of the Communist Internationale that the "personnel of the Chita government and of its organs of secondary importance as well, is above suspicion and fully meets the views of the

Centre'' [Moscow].²³ The Trade Unions of the Far Eastern Republic also declared:

Considering themselves an integral part of the All-Russian trade union movement, forced by political circumstances to a formally independent existence, they are building up their organization and are carrying on their work on the model of the All-Russian Union, having adopted completely the status of the latter.²⁴

The very important co-operative movement also took the same line of development.²⁵ Communists controlled the majority of the National Assembly at Chita; and in response to requests for aid Soviet Russia entered into a "fraternal" connection with the Far Eastern Republic. This was even closer than a formal alliance against a common enemy. Soviet troops crossed the territory of the eastern government freely to operate in Mongolia; and at Moscow Trotsky spoke loosely of the "federation" of the Far Eastern Republic with Soviet Russia.²⁶ During the summer of 1921, the official press of the Soviet government teemed with articles on the Far East. This was only natural, as the authorities at Moscow took special interest in the forthcoming Washington Conference and rightly laid emphasis on the fact that it was to deal with Far Eastern problems.

THREE CONFERENCES: DAIREN, WASHINGTON, AND CHANGCHUN

Within a year the evacuation of eastern Siberia by Japanese troops was a subject of discussion at three international conferences. At Dairen in September, 1921, began negotiations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic which were drawn out till after the Washington Conference had ended in February, 1922. Then at Changchun, in September, 1922, came another Far Eastern Conference at which Soviet Russia was officially represented. Here again the negotiations broke down. Meanwhile, Japan had announced that she would voluntarily withdraw her troops from the mainland of Siberia by the end of October, 1922. There remained, therefore, the unsettled dispute as to northern

Sakhalin and the broader issue of the negotiation of a trade agreement between Japan and Soviet Russia.

Until after the Washington Conference, Soviet Russia played a waiting game, expecting that other disputes between the United States and Japan might flame into war. As early as March, 1921, the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party in Russia had clearly hoped to profit by such a conflict. According to the plan advocated at that time, Soviet Russia would remain neutral until the proletariat in both belligerent countries should show signs of revolt. In any event, such a war would be to the advantage of Russia.

The argument for the inevitable nature of such a struggle was presented in didactic form by Vilensky, who had become the Far Eastern expert of the *Izvestia* and who writes under the name of "Sibiriakov." At the Third Congress of the Third Internationale at Moscow in July, 1921, he gave the theses of this view and linked them with an approaching opportunity for a proletarian upheaval which would include the Far East. He concluded his argument baldly by stating:²⁷

For the next ten years the Pacific basin of the Eastern Hemisphere will be the main area for the development of capitalistic possibilities of North America. The latter is the main focus of this development into the sphere of which will inevitably be thrown all countries and peoples, both of the Asiatic continent and of North America, and Australia, and all Pacific Islands. The main rival of the United States in the struggle for hegemony in the Pacific basin without question is imperialist Japan, which cannot give up its Pan-Asiatic aims, for a struggle for dominance on the Pacific, which is the basic premise for the success of Japanese plans to get possession of the Eastern Asiatic continent.

The economic development of the United States will not allow it to renounce the establishment of its dominance on the Pacific, and the United States of course will not allow the development of Japanese imperialism at the expense of Asiatic peoples who inhabit the Eastern Asiatic continent. If this dispute will not be decided in favor of the United States by the recognition of the policy of "open doors" in China, then the United States will not refuse to face the possibility of settling this dispute by force of arms.

Consequently, he added, the approaching conflict would directly affect the peoples of the Far East. "The toiling

masses of China and of the other oppressed countries of the Asiatic continent are filled with national hatred toward Japanese imperialism." They will rise against this proposed "imperialistic slaughter" and thus create "the actual possibility for an active intervention of the Third Internationale in the approaching conflict of imperialists in the Eastern Hemisphere." Such arguments were supplemented by Eidus,²⁸ another important political writer, who explained in an article on "Our Policy in the Orient" that "Asiatic sympathy with Soviet Russia" was due "to the methods of our foreign policy." This made use of its renunciation of Tsarist concessions to declare the rights of "self-determination of peoples" and of a "free, independent existence for all nations" in the Orient. "The peoples of Asia, oppressed by various imperialists, know that in Soviet Russia they will find at any time an ally and well-wisher." Naturally at this time, such expressions were directed chiefly against Japan—"that young Asiatic robber."

Officially, Chicherin addressed a note to the United States, Great Britain, France, China, and Japan regarding the Washington Conference to which Soviet Russia had not been invited.²⁹ He denied to the Powers any right to represent Russian interests and, though he welcomed naval disarmament, declared that "the Russian Government will regard the decisions of the Conference as null and void, and will reserve to itself full liberty of action" in view of the ostracism aimed at the Soviet authorities. This declaration, however, did not imply indifference. Thus the *Izvestia*, on August 18, 1921, engaged in an attack on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and all "such pilfering alliances which bring to the peoples of Eastern Asia not peace but the possibilities of new, bloody conflicts."

Meanwhile, at Dairen, the conference between the Far Eastern Republic and Japan took place. This finally came to a deadlock on the issue of statements submitted by Japan as necessary conditions for Japanese military evacuation of Siberia. They included, as became apparent from later statements, which are given in the footnote, a sweeping economic program and demilitarization of the Pacific coast.³⁰

Such conditions were in fact strongly reminiscent of the original unofficial proposals of Japan to General Horvath early in 1918 when Japan was bargaining with him and with the Allies as to the price of an exclusively Japanese, anti-Bolshevik intervention in Siberia. In all these negotiations during September and October, Japan was undoubtedly following the same policy as with China regarding Shantung. For at this time, the endeavor was made to discover bases of agreement which would prevent both Siberia and Shantung from intruding at the Washington Conference. As Sibiriaikov expressed it: the Dairen Conference is an effort to "create a thick diplomatic smoke-screen to cover the political situation in the Far East in order to place Japan in a most favorable position for the game at the green table of the Washington Conference."³¹ As in the case of Shantung, this was a failure.

In these Dairen negotiations, Soviet Russia was at first unrepresented. Later, Chicherin declared that the Far Eastern delegation needed assistance and sent Markhevsky to act as an unofficial observer and to hold the fort.³² At the same time, Paikes was sent to Peking at the head of a Soviet trade delegation to start negotiations with the Chinese Republic for *de facto* recognition.

Further to illustrate the active interest of Moscow in Far Eastern affairs, there was the discussion of a plan for still another international conference. At first the proposal was made for a rival to the Washington Conference—a meeting of representatives of Asiatic states. The Soviet authorities, however, gave this plan up and turned the affair over to the Communist Internationale. The result was a Congress of the Peoples of the Far East which met at Moscow in January, 1922. Here the Washington Conference was attacked as a failure, as it did not protect "the working masses and enslaved colonial peoples" from the menace of an "armed capitalistic peace." The Four Power Treaty was denounced as a "quadruple alliance of bloodsuckers." Zinoviev, the president of the Third Internationale, declared that his organization had "written on its flag the watchword 'World

Revolution' and not simply 'European Revolution.'” If the peoples of the Far East would realize that they had “a director, namely, the Communist Internationale [at Moscow], then many of us will live to see the actual victory of the world-revolution.” At Washington and at Genoa “sit the rulers of today,—or better, of yesterday; in Moscow are sitting the masters of tomorrow to whom the future belongs.” Such was the language of the party leaders and of the official Soviet press.³³ Indeed, Chicherin, in a note of protest on the eve of the Washington Conference, had declared that it “will inevitably be a source of new conflicts and new interventions. Not peace, but discord, enmity and hate will come of it and it will only stir up new calamities for the whole world.”³⁴ But enough of such jeremiads!

In spite of these views, the possible usefulness of the Far Eastern Republic at the Washington Conference had attracted the attention of Moscow some months before. Soviet Russia was not to be represented at the Washington Conference. Might not the new government at Chita win a way to present the Russian case against Japan and thus also leave an open door for further diplomatic developments between Moscow and Washington? American observers in Siberia had reported favorably as to the start made by the new government. There was the known American criticism of Japanese methods and policies in the Far East, and Siberia was on the agenda of the Conference. At all events, there was an optimistic despatch in the *Izvestia* of August 24 which spoke of probable American recognition of the Far Eastern Republic. Finally, a request was made through the American Legation in Peking that representatives of the Far Eastern Republic should be admitted to the approaching Conference at Washington.

In response to this request, the United States pointed out that the Far Eastern Republic had not been recognized by any government in the world. Secretary Hughes furthermore, in a statement already quoted, adroitly added a declaration of policy regarding Russian affairs. That, in effect, closed the door to official representation of the Far Eastern Republic

while it also recorded general principles as to Russia to which the United States had already subscribed.³⁵ Later, permission was granted to a special delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to visit the United States and unofficially to present its case at Washington.³⁶

While the Washington Conference was in session, this delegation issued memoranda and other documentary material for an elaborate study of the entire situation in Siberia. The result was that through the press the Siberian problem received a much-needed airing. This was important, for the action of the Conference was a disappointment to many who had hoped for more positive and hasty results than were then achieved. The indirect results, however, were noteworthy. During the Conference the United States went as far as it could then have gone, by means of the methods which were adopted, to place before the Japanese, in the eyes of all the world, the American conviction that they ought to withdraw from Siberia. Both in the Committee on the Far East and in a plenary session of the Conference, Secretary Hughes spread upon the records the facts in the case, including essential quotations from the exchange of notes between the United States and Japan as to Siberia.³⁷

At that time Ambassador Shidehara declared that it was "the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions." The withdrawal of Japanese troops, he implied, was conditional on a number of things including a commercial agreement, the protection of Japanese citizens in Siberia, the restoration of order, the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda from over the Siberian border, and the establishment of a responsible authority in Siberia with whom Japan could negotiate regarding satisfaction for the massacre of Japanese citizens.³⁸

With this exchange of views and record of policies, the Washington Conference dropped the Siberian question. The

Dairen Conference ended after many adjournments in April, 1922. Nothing had been accomplished. The issue flared up in angry fashion for a moment at the Genoa Conference, but decision as to Japanese evacuation was largely dependent on domestic policies at Tokyo. There a new cabinet was organized with Admiral Kato at its head. The impressions he had gained during the Washington Conference now had their effect. The occupation of Siberia had been expensive and so far it had not been profitable for Japan. The gradual conviction spread that sound Japanese policy was based on whole-hearted international co-operation for peace. In short, early in the summer of 1922, Japan was "looking for an occasion to withdraw from Siberia."³⁹ This certainly was a marked success for the methods used at the Washington Conference.

Toward the end of June the Far Eastern Republic formally proposed to the Japanese government to re-open negotiations and to allow a representative of Soviet Russia officially to participate. A little later Japan announced that she proposed to evacuate her troops from the mainland of Siberia by the end of October, 1922. Under these circumstances, another Conference began at Changchun in Manchuria in September, with Soviet Russia at the table in the person of Joffe, the new envoy to Peking.

This gentleman had participated in various diplomatic negotiations for the Soviet government since the time of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He had been expelled from Germany for his revolutionary propaganda and was looked on as combining admirably the qualities of press agent and politician. With him was now associated Janson, the Foreign Secretary of the Far Eastern Republic. The Japanese were represented by Matsudaira, who had from the first conducted these negotiations as to Siberia. At the outset the prospect was good for an agreement. Indeed, in an inspired article, Radek had written suggesting that Soviet policies in the Far East were to shift and that, instead of playing China against Japan, Russia was now ready to bid for an agreement with Japan.

This article in the *Izvestia*, of July 30, 1923, began with a recital of the facts and a warning that Japan was storing

up against herself both the jealousy and opposition of other capitalistic Powers and the hatred and opposition of native populations in the Far East. It concluded on a friendly note as follows:

Soviet Russia is the only country on earth that really makes no distinction of race and color. She will give the Japanese the same opportunities and rights as she will any other foreigners for the utilization of their skill and labor on Russian territory. In spite of the fact that she does not intend, for the sake of any capitalistic Power, to change the laws which she considers basic and inalterable, she hopes that, if the Japanese Government will really give up its policy of enmity toward her, permanent peace and close relations between the two peoples will become possible, and peace and progress will thus be established at least in one portion of the Pacific.

In a later article,⁴⁰ Radek stated that "representatives of the Far Eastern Republic have always frankly declared: that they did not even think of a separation from Russia; and that the Far Eastern Republic merely represents a buffer state, created in order to avoid a possible encounter between Soviet Russia and Japan." This agrees with personal statements of the delegation of the Republic at Washington, for they always said that they were first of all and at all times *Russians*. The net issue Radek clearly defined as an attempt in this new conference at Changchun "to come to a compromise between the Workmen's-Peasants' Russia, the first country of the victorious world's revolution and one of the countries of international capitalism. This compromise is absolutely necessary for both sides in view of the present situation. . . . Only transactions profitable to both sides can be beneficial transactions."

In the course of the negotiations, this aspect became clearer. The first disagreement arose when the Soviet representatives claimed that any territorial settlement concerned Soviet Russia, that all outstanding questions were involved, and that negotiations could not be limited to the agenda of the Dairen Conference or to questions affecting only the resumption of relations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic. Soon a compromise was reached on the surrender of munitions at

Vladivostok; Japan agreed to a later conference with Soviet Russia; and Russia accepted the Dairen agenda as a basis for a new agreement. Rapid progress was made on other commercial topics until on September 19 the Soviet representatives raised the question of the immediate evacuation of northern Sakhalin as well as of the mainland. This Japan refused to do until compensation had been settled for the massacre of Japanese troops at Nikolayevsk in March, 1920, and until after the present agreement had been signed. Furthermore, the Japanese insisted that this agreement was to relate only to the Far Eastern Republic. In an appendix there might be clauses which touched Soviet Russia. Thus the Conference came to a deadlock and adjourned on September 25. Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic put forward the refusal to evacuate northern Sakhalin as the main reason; in reality, though that issue was important, the fundamental factor was Japan's unwillingness at that time to negotiate broadly and directly with Soviet Russia.⁴¹

In refusing to continue negotiations, Joffe took a chance that the Japanese might refuse to evacuate Vladivostok and might destroy the munitions assembled there. This did not happen, and true to her scheduled promise Japan withdrew her troops at the end of October. A way was left open to resume these negotiations even in the language of the note of protest which Joffe addressed to Japan on November 11.⁴² This objected to the continued occupation of northern Sakhalin by Japanese troops, but pointed out "that Japanese interests in Sakhalin could be satisfied in another way, say by Japan being granted concessions in the northern part of this island." The Japanese, in December, also held out hopes of an agreement, for the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Washington declared that he was "confident that this matter also will be settled in a spirit of justice and fair play."⁴³

Thus the adjournment of the third international conference on Siberia within a year left the situation still uncertain, but immeasurably better than in September, 1921. The next step in Soviet diplomacy was the ending of the independent existence of the Far Eastern Republic. During October, So-

cialists, who might have objected to Bolshevik rule at Chita, were arrested and conveyed into western Siberia. Everywhere the flag of Soviet Russia began to displace the flag of the Far Eastern Republic. On November 13, the National Assembly peacefully voted all power to a revolutionary committee directed from Moscow. The triumph of Soviet policies was practically complete as the rule of Moscow once more extended to the open waters of the Pacific. This was possible only because Japanese policies had been so altered during the course of 1922 that international co-operation rather than competition on purely national lines had won the day. The victory of such methods marked a long step forward toward peace in the Far East. For Soviet Russia the day was dawning for the resumption of the historical responsibilities in the Far East of that vast domain that now extended from Petrograd to Vladivostok.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND CHINA

Joffe, when he impetuously broke off negotiations at Changchun on September 25, 1922, departed in belligerent and spectacular fashion for Peking. He was content to await the course of events as to Siberia, for he must now resume the main duty of his Far Eastern mission. This was to negotiate a treaty with China and to restore if possible the dominant position of Russia at Peking. He had gambled at Changchun on the success of his hectoring methods; at Peking he was to cajole and to warn. Above all, at a great capital he could employ the barrage of the press in a fashion impossible at the remote provincial town of Changchun.

Throughout these six years since 1917, Soviet Russia had carried on a series of negotiations with China. The long joint border of Mongolia had been the occasion of many disputes. Above all, in China there was inflammable material which the spark of Soviet propaganda might set ablaze. The civil confusion in China, the conflict of personalities as well as of parties at Peking, lent themselves to the development of typical Soviet methods. To fish in troubled waters had been the method of Moscow during these stormy years.

The particular questions which were at issue with China had developed from a background of Tsarist diplomacy in years before the War. In 1917, Russia, from her possession of Siberia, held a dominant position in northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. This had already been the subject of secret treaties with Japan. Russia also had preferential rights in Chinese Turkestan and rights and claims as to railways and as to navigation on Chinese rivers. These had been established by treaties dating back for half a century. Immediately, on the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolt, these rights and claims became the subject of debate. The use of Chinese troops at Harbin to protect life and property aroused Trotsky in December, 1917, to order Soviet interference. This, however, raised immediately the entire question of Soviet competence to represent Russia. The Chinese authorities were between the devil and the deep sea. On the one hand were Soviet representatives claiming to speak for Russia; on the other was Semenov whose troops were interfering with traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Allied pressure was strong on the Chinese to refuse recognition to the Soviet officers; and at a conference at Chita in April, 1918, the Chinese made it plain that they were not masters in their own house. Furthermore, Russians who had long been engaged in trade in China and Mongolia were hostile to the Soviet authorities. The result was a futile war of protests against alleged violations of neutrality, grain embargoes, and seizures of goods. Thus the year 1918 wore away. The Allied Expeditionary Force dominated the situation, and early in 1919 the Inter-Allied Railway Technical Board took over the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Intervention had placed all Russian rights in China in abeyance.⁴⁴

The course of events in China now had effect in directing the attention of the Soviet authorities to the possibility of "boring from within." If the government at Peking were now completely under the influence of the Allies, might not the revolutionary movement in southern China offer a field for Soviet intervention? This possibility was noted by a meeting of a so-called "Chinese Working Men's Association"

at Moscow in early January, 1919. At this meeting a resolution was passed to send propagandists to China and to ask assistance from the Soviet authorities.⁴⁵ Such proposals fitted in with the publication on March 9 of a letter from Chicherin to Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Canton revolutionary government. This was dated as of August 1, 1918.⁴⁶ In this cordial letter Sun Yat-sen was hailed as the persistent leader who had "continued to march at the head of Chinese Democracy against the northern Chinese and foreign imperialistic governments of oppression." At a time when the "Peking government, which is the puppet of foreign bankers, is ready to join these robbers"—the imperialistic governments—"the Russian laboring classes appeal to their Chinese brothers and call them to a common struggle. For our success is your success. Our defeat is your defeat. . . . Long live the union of the Russian and Chinese proletariat!" That this language was in accord with the views of the Third Internationale was made clear in May, 1919, by the discovery at Shanghai of a center for the distribution of Bolshevik literature.

The close connection of such propaganda with the purposes of the Soviet Foreign Office became clearer as Voznesensky, the chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, announced that hundreds of thousands of copies of a manifesto in Chinese had been distributed throughout the Far East.⁴⁷ Certainly, this manifesto of the Moscow government on July 26, 1919, addressed to "the Ministers, Civil Governors, Bureaus, and People of the Chinese Republic" had a new diplomatic flavor. With very important qualifications, its principles have recently been reaffirmed by Joffe at Peking. This appeal of Moscow in 1919 came at a time when Chinese public opinion had been affronted by the Allies' decision as to Shantung at Paris. Apparently, "self-determination" did not extend to Asia and "secret treaties" had the right of way over the Fourteen Points. In the Versailles Treaty each of the Allied Powers had set out to secure for itself all that was possible. In short, it was a policy with which the Chinese had long been familiar in their dealings with European states and with Westernized Japan. Then from

Moscow came a new doctrine in language that plain men could understand.

The Soviet government declared that "all people, no matter whether their nations are great or small, no matter where they live, no matter at what time they may have lost their independence, should have their independence and self-government, and should not submit to being bound by other nations." All secret treaties were specifically denounced; and a new basis of negotiation between Russia and China was proposed as follows:

1. The territory seized by the former Imperial Russian Government to be returned to you. . . .

2. The Russian Government will restore to the sovereignty of China the Chinese Eastern Railway and the mines and forests appropriated by the former Imperial Russian Government, and it will not ask one cent therefor. . . .

3. This Government will not accept the Boxer indemnity payments. . . .

4. The special privileges for Russian subjects established by the former Imperial Russian Government and China are null and void. All extra-territorial privileges are also cancelled. . . .

5. In addition to the matters noted above, all agreements made by the former Russian Imperial Government, acting independently or with Japan, or with the Entente Powers, with the envoys of China, in which there are unfair points, will be null and void."

Certainly this was sweeping charity. To the Chinese it sounded like a new diplomatic Magna Carta. On the one hand was the recent treaty of Versailles which placed Japanese control paramount in Shantung. On the other was this generous proposal from Moscow. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that this document had a great influence on Chinese public opinion, particularly as the hated extra-territorial privileges were abandoned by the Soviet government. The experience of the next three years, however, was to modify seriously the effect of this manifesto. Especially did the course of events and Soviet policy as to Mongolia give pause. In any event, the publication of Chicherin's letter to Sun Yat-sen had determined the Peking authorities to "wait and see."

Alongside of such manifestos was the attempt during 1919-20 to stir up trouble for the Japanese by aid given to the Korean revolutionary group and by direct attempts to foster incipient social disturbances in Japan. The *Izvestia* boasted editorially that "in the Far East there are Koreans, Chinese, and Indians, and to the south there are Persians, Caucasians, Turks, and Egyptians who do not show very much loyalty to European Imperialists."⁴⁸ This was part of the attempt to utilize Asiatic unrest and to attack capitalistic states in the reserves of their strength, in regions from which they drew a part of their power through the exploitation of undeveloped regions. As revolutionary movements in western countries failed to develop, the attention of authorities at Moscow was directed more than ever to the Far East. We have seen the campaign which was launched in connection with the Baku Conference in September, 1920. Now all along the line the same sort of a campaign took on strength in the Far East. Emphasis was laid on the enormous revolutionary force latent in the population of China. "China is between Japan and Soviet Russia and must choose one or the other as an ally."⁴⁹

The theory of Bolshevism was spread in pamphlets under the Oriental titles of "The Almanac of Enlightenment" and "The Precious Mirror of the Workers." A local Communist group was formally announced from Shanghai.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the Bolshevik experiment was first of all planned as a remedy for the ills of Western industrial society; many of its notions ran directly counter to fundamental Chinese concepts of society; and the essential conservatism of China was poor soil for these strange, Western ideas of revolution. These were all factors which inclined many observers in China to laugh at some of these crude attempts to stir the Chinese to revolt. Gradually, however, the character and type of Bolshevik propaganda in the Far East altered. The earlier appeals had been in the dialect of the proletarian revolution. The later attempts aimed to make use of anti-foreign sentiment, to draw all nationalist agitation to the capacious bosom of the Communist Internationale. An attempt was made even to utilize anti-Christian feeling in an attack on "foreign

capitalists who are aiming at enslaving Chinese millions under the shield of Christianity." A variation of this method was the insertion among the pages of copies of the Gospel of St. Luke, in Chinese, of Bolshevik leaflets, evidently written by an accomplished Chinese scholar.⁵¹

Joffe himself has maintained a press bureau ever since his arrival at Peking in August, 1922. At a dinner to Chinese journalists, he proclaimed the rôle of a triumphant Soviet Russia, destined in the future to support weaker countries politically and economically. The common interests of China and of Russia lay, therefore, in their struggle for national and economic independence against schemes of the imperialistic Powers.⁵²

Moreover, in educated Chinese circles there is at present opportunity for this sort of talk to win a hearing. At the National University in Peking are professors and students to whom the appeals of the Soviet Envoy are not unwelcome. Many Chinese students are suffering from a ferment of Western philosophies which have not as yet been assimilated. Add to this a natural sophomoric burst of hurried nationalism and the result is explosive. Meanwhile, throughout China the continuance of civil disturbances gives additional opportunity for spreading revolutionary ideas.

Across this uncertain trail of agitation there came toward the end of 1920 an attempt to start direct governmental relations between Peking and Moscow. In this the Far Eastern Republic, as a vassal of Moscow, took an appropriate rôle. Yourin, who had been in Soviet service, was sent to Peking to represent the subordinate government. Later, the Chinese reported that they found papers showing that under his diplomatic immunity he aimed at Russian revolutionary propaganda. At all events, on his departure from Peking he returned to Russian Soviet employ. To emphasize the unity of this endeavor by both the Moscow government and the Far Eastern Republic to renew Russian relations with China was an article in the *Izvestia* of November 4, 1920, by Janson, who was soon to be the new Foreign Minister at Chita, on "Our Proposals to China." This reviewed the course of events and

cited particularly the manifesto of July, 1919, which had been renewed in September, 1920. It declared that these "principles of a new foreign policy, of new relations, to the peoples of the Orient and in particular to China, which have as their aim not the oppression but the liberation of these peoples were proclaimed in our appeal, and aroused enthusiastic sympathy in all circles of the Chinese people. China understood that her only sincere and unselfish friend was Soviet Russia."

The Chinese government, however, was more cautious. In view of the large amount of traffic, which in normal times crossed the long Russo-Chinese frontiers, some arrangements were needed to restore commercial life and to enable the collection of customs. Consequently, in early September, 1920, a local and simple commercial agreement was worked out by a Bolshevik representative of the government at Tashkent and the Chinese Civil Governor of Sinkiang to provide for the restoration of orderly trade across the border of Chinese Turkestan. This was approved at Peking, but care was taken to deny that it had any political significance or that it was in any way connected with the Yourin mission which was just arriving at Peking. At Moscow, however, this agreement was announced with a flourish on the eve of the arrival there of an official Chinese mission to negotiate regarding the settlement of outstanding disputes.⁵³

The Chinese government also made plain the fact that only the need of a *modus vivendi* to regulate trade and to protect Chinese interests in Siberia was responsible for this exchange of missions. As a preliminary, the Chinese government would require guarantees, notably against Bolshevik propaganda in China. The confusion existing in China regarding the status of previous Russian representatives also prompted the decision on September 23, 1920, to end the official representation in China of previous Russian governments. "Official relations between China and Russia are temporarily impossible of resumption." The Chinese mission to Moscow was essentially, therefore, a scouting body.⁵⁴

Meantime, Semenov had been driven out of Chita; his bands fled eastward and southward. Some of them crossed the Mon-

golian frontier and began to recruit their forces in territory nominally under Chinese jurisdiction. These events were to provoke a renewal of friction between China and Russia reminiscent of Tsarist days. Mongolia lies as a huge border province separating organized China from Siberia. Inner Mongolia had already been divided by a line drawn to separate Russian from Japanese spheres of influence by a secret Russo-Japanese treaty of 1912. Outer Mongolia, with its long northern boundary dividing it from Siberia, had gradually become a region where the interests of three nations met.⁵⁵

SOVIET RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA

The Mongols of ancient stock, boasting historical descent from the great medieval empire of Jenghis Khan, now faced the dangers of foreign control from two sides. On the one hand was the steady encroachment year by year of patient Chinese agriculturists who were pushing forward into the pastoral lands of Mongolia. The Chinese government sought also to assert its suzerain authority at Urga. There a Living Buddha, incarnate with the virtues of his predecessors, reigned with the tacit support of the great Dalai Lama of Lhasa in innermost Tibet. On the other hand were the restless Russians eager to trade and ready to fight.

Moreover, in such a situation there was also involved the ever-important element of oriental prestige. What happened in remote Mongolia was resilient throughout the Far East. Mongolian affairs had been simmering since 1881 when a Russo-Chinese treaty had given the Russians valuable rights of economic penetration into Mongolia, of which they had not been slow to avail themselves. This policy later involved disputes with Chinese traders in Mongolia. Then came the Chinese revolution of 1911. Immediately, the Hutukhtu or Living Buddha at Urga declared his independence as Emperor of Outer Mongolia. In the dispute which followed between Urga and Peking, the Russians saw their opportunity.

An agreement of 1912 between Russian and Mongolia pledged Russian assistance to maintain Mongolian autonomy. This at once stirred deep resentment in China where "auto-

mony" was taken to mean independence. This was remedied in part by a Russo-Chinese agreement of 1913 by which Russia specifically recognized the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia. There followed a tripartite treaty of 1915 by which China and Russia agreed to refrain from interference with the internal administration of Outer Mongolia, the suzerainty of China was acknowledged by Mongolia, and Russia's right to free trade in Outer Mongolia was confirmed. In particular, Mongolia was not to negotiate political treaties with foreign Powers and China was to consult with Russia and Mongolia as to political and territorial questions. The result was a sort of rough joint protectorate by Russia and China over Outer Mongolia.

This arrangement naturally endured a severe test during the long period of disorder and civil war in Siberia which ensued on the Russian revolution and on Allied intervention, 1917-20. In 1919, however, the Chinese Republic ended this agreement by formally including Outer Mongolia within Chinese territory. This was followed by the irruption into Mongolia of the civil disorder which was devastating Siberia. Bands of Russian counter-revolutionists made Urga a base for attack on Soviet Russia and its satellite the Far Eastern Republic. Both Mongolian and Chinese authorities were helpless before this outbreak of war. From a military point of view, the Soviet authorities felt compelled to intervene in Mongolia with the result that these counter-revolutionary forces were partially dispersed.

The Chinese government promptly made emphatic protest against this alleged violation of sovereignty and declared that it had "taken all precautions for the defense of the Mongolian frontier and needed no outside assistance."⁵⁶ Such protests, which were largely anticipatory in January, 1921, were swept aside by the force of events during the spring and summer. Baron Ungern, a counter-revolutionary leader, now made his appearance at Urga and, asserting that he had become a Mongolian citizen, made ruthless war. This development has been charged against the Japanese who are supposed to have fostered the plan to set up a stronger Mongolia which would be

independent of both Moscow and Peking and yet dependent on Japanese support. The evidence, however, is not sufficient.⁵⁷

In any event, a joint military expedition by Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic swept down on Urga and demolished Ungern and his forces. This result was due to the success with which the Soviet authorities adapted a method which had been used in the Caucasus. A revolutionary movement in Mongolia was engineered which asked Moscow for assistance. Chicherin himself declared later that this "People's Revolutionary Mongolian army was created on Russian territory;" and thus the direct intervention of both Soviet and Chita troops in the internal affairs of Mongolia gained force. This new government asserted its power on July 10, 1921, and exactly a month later issued another appeal to Moscow asking that Russian troops should remain in Mongolia. Such a request naturally was not refused, with the result that Urga became practically an outpost of Soviet authority.⁵⁸

The economic argument in defense of this policy was summarized by Boris Stein, the clever expert of *Economic Life*, on August 10, 1921. He pointed out that the geographical situation of Mongolia made her "quite naturally tend toward Russia. Mongolia's trade with Russia is carried out more easily than with any other country." In particular he declared that:

Outer Mongolia alone can supply yearly two million puds of meat, one-half million puds of wool, and hundreds of thousands of other skins. Her entire export of course could easily be absorbed by the Russian market which for Mongolia is the only market free from exploitation. On the other hand the comparative primitiveness of the Mongolian market allows Russian industry, even in its present state, to satisfy its demands. Those goods, which are most popular on the Mongolian market, such as powder, lead, metal products, textile products, and footwear, Russia can import into Mongolia, furnishing these goods on better conditions than can European trade. The only rival of Russia on the Mongolian market is China, which would cease to be a rival if it freed itself from the foreign capital which now stands behind its back. The agreement between the Far Eastern Republic and China should include an agreement on mutual relations between China,

the Far Eastern Republic and Soviet Russia with respect to the economic policy in Mongolia.

Such arguments did not need repetition in Russia where the policy of "economic retreat" had not as yet produced satisfactory results. In Mongolia a declaration was issued guaranteeing the establishment of the "open door and equal rights for all" and at the same time welcoming Soviet military intervention. A month later on November 5, 1921, a treaty was signed between the People's Revolutionary government of Mongolia and Soviet Russia. This document in sweeping fashion states that "all the previous agreements and treaties concluded between the former Tsarist government of Russia and the former government of autonomous Mongolia, which was forced to sign such treaties by the cunning and predatory Tsarist policy, have become null and void owing to the new state of affairs in both countries." The new government in Mongolia is now the "only legal government." There is a reciprocal agreement against hostile "governments, organizations, groups or individuals" who may seek to develop power in the territories of either Soviet Russia and its allies or of Mongolia. The most-favored-nation clause will control in commercial matters and Russia surrenders all telegraphic equipment in Mongolia for which a later postal and telegraphic convention shall be negotiated. Furthermore, there was no mention of China in the treaty.⁵⁹

Such an agreement when it became known at Peking naturally aroused protests, particularly as Mongolian representatives at Moscow later declared that "no treaties, neither political nor economic nor of any other kind, exist between China and Mongolia."⁶⁰ In the meantime, Soviet authorities sought to renew relations with China which had been interrupted for nearly a year by these events in Mongolia. Paikes, a man of conciliatory type, had been sent to Peking to start negotiations.⁶¹ He found, however, that the Peking authorities were much incensed at the turn of affairs and received the following abrupt Chinese note on May 1, 1922:

According to the recent report of General Li Yuan on the subject of the Russo-Mongolian Treaty, we asked you about this mat-

ter when you first arrived in Peking and you replied that it was entirely untrue. However, during a recent conversation with you I again put the question to you, owing to the recent publication by the papers of the text of the treaty, and you admitted the truth of this report.

The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared to the Chinese Government: "that all previous treaties made between the Russian Government and China shall be null and void, that the Soviet Government renounces all encroachments on Chinese territory and all concessions within China, and that the Soviet Government will unconditionally and forever return what has been forcibly seized from China by the former Imperial Russian Government and the Bourgeoisie.

Now the Soviet Government has suddenly gone back on its own words and secretly and without any right concluded a treaty with Mongolia. Such action on the part of the Soviet Government is similar to the policy the former Imperial Russian Government assumed toward China.

It must be observed that Mongolia is a part of Chinese territory and as such has long been recognized by all countries. In secretly concluding a treaty with Mongolia, the Soviet Government has not only broken faith with its previous declarations, but also violates all principles of justice.

The Chinese Government finds it difficult to tolerate such action, and therefore we solemnly lodge a protest with you to the effect that any treaty secretly concluded between the Soviet Government and Mongolia will not be recognized by the Chinese Government.

You are respectfully requested to transmit this note to the Soviet Government at Moscow.⁶²

JOFFE IN THE FAR EAST

Under these circumstances, Joffe was sent to Peking in August, 1922, to deal with the entire situation. In connection with this mission there began a steady stream of articles in the press designed to stir up revolutionary sentiment in China. Among these articles were many directed against American influence in China, for the Soviet authorities recognized clearly that the position and teachings of Americans constituted an element hostile to the success of their campaign. The criticism which was formerly directed against Japan was now turned against the United States. In this much was made of radical Young China. Sibiriakov, for

example, declared that "the turning toward Soviet Russia is a sort of anti-American anti-toxin by means of which Young China is now carrying on a great internal struggle in China." He asks: "For what is America to China? A menace of merciless exploitation. Russia, on the contrary, is the incarnation of victorious revolution whose example must be followed."⁶³ Even at Peking, Joffe's press bureau began to inquire why protests were made as to the presence of Russian troops in far-away Urga when American and other foreign governments were permitted to maintain legation guards at the capital of China. On top of such thrusts came a dinner at which the Chancellor of the National University at Peking toasted Joffe and made a flattering speech pointing out the value of the Russian revolution as a lesson for the Chinese people."⁶⁴

In this atmosphere of cordiality, Joffe thought at once that the time had come to break through the official hostility which had hitherto met his endeavors. He had returned to Peking from the Changchun Conference to negotiate a trade agreement and to secure recognition from China. In repeated notes he demanded that "White Guard" bandits should be broken up in Manchuria, that a commission of enquiry be appointed to deal with the Chinese Eastern Railway, and that tariff questions should be discussed. In the meantime, Soviet troops were to remain at Urga. In reply the Chinese Foreign Office insisted that, as a preliminary to any negotiations, Russian troops should be entirely withdrawn from Outer Mongolia. Here matters are at a deadlock; and, as long as the Chinese government continues its present stand, the Mongolian question will remain a stumbling block in the way of treaty negotiations.⁶⁵

Under such circumstances the claims of Soviet Russia to a voice in the affairs of the Chinese Eastern Railway have received only a preliminary hearing. In general, however, they rest on the assertion that by decree of the Bolshevik government railways were nationalized in 1918 as was also the Russo-Asiatic Bank. Consequently, the five million rubles of Railway shares held by that Bank became state property.

Furthermore, since by the railway decree of 1896 the shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway were to be held jointly by Russia and China, if the Russo-Asiatic Bank were really a French corporation, it could not hold the railway shares in any case. Charges were also brought against the present railway management.⁶⁶

These contentions raised at once the full meaning of the famous declaration of renunciation of rights in China on the part of the Soviet government which was first made in 1919. It is here that some of the important qualifications appeared, for in a recent note Joffe pointed out that by that declaration Russia

renounced the predatory and violent policy of the Tsar's Government and promised to renounce those rights which had accrued to Russia from this policy. But firstly, until all these questions will have been settled by a free accord between Russia and China, Russia's rights in China will not have lost their strength; and secondly, that declaration did not at all annul Russia's legal and just interests in China.

In particular, for instance, even if Russia vests in the Chinese people her title to the Chinese Eastern Railway, this will not annul Russia's interests in this line which is a portion of the Great Siberian Railway and unites one part of the Russian territory with another.⁶⁷

The note concluded with the threat that, if the Chinese government should continue to ignore Russian interests Russia would "consider herself free from those promises which she has voluntarily given." To make it plainer, Joffe, in a note of November 14, 1922, denied that the proclamation of 1919 had surrendered Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway. He quoted from Karakhan's declaration of September 27, 1920, that conditions were attached to the renunciation of Russian concessions in China. Those conditions, which related to the treatment of counter-revolutionary bands, Joffe claimed the Chinese government had not fulfilled. This practically tore up the declarations of 1919 and 1920.⁶⁸ As a pro-Soviet paper in Harbin tried to explain the matter:

While Karakhan two years ago determined to relinquish the (Chinese Eastern) Railway in favor of China, in order to show

the sincerity of the Soviet Government, this dramatic gesture was caused on the one hand by particular impulses on the part of the young Government, while on the other hand it had no legal force, for China could accept such a gift only from an acknowledged Government.⁶⁹

Thus the entire program became "an exhibition of temperament," not even a political gesture. The Soviet press took up the cry that China was in great danger from Japan and must needs come to terms with Russia.⁷⁰ Finally, Joffe, somewhat shaken in body, went south to Shanghai on his way to Japan. At Shanghai he had long interviews with Sun Yat-sen; a joint statement was produced that agreed on the desirability of a Russian-Chinese Conference while nothing was said as to the necessity of evacuating Mongolia.⁷¹

To this frank statement of policy and interpretation can be added the gossip of responsible people, friendly to Soviet Russia, who say that in these negotiations with China the Soviet Foreign Office is urging the right to move troops along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway in case of any emergency. On the whole, therefore, Soviet diplomacy as regards China, whether from the point of view of Communist propaganda, of Mongolia, or of railway matters, threatens a vigorous return to an active Russian policy.

The departure of Joffe for Japan was frankly put forward by the Moscow authorities as reason for proposing that negotiations should be transferred to Moscow. Meantime, from Japan Joffe has been issuing statements attacking the Chinese government. The time had now come for negotiations looking to the establishment of commercial relations with Japan. This matter is now under discussion; its culmination may, however, be broken by Joffe's return to China to endeavor to force and understanding as to the Chinese Eastern Railway.⁷²

From the first of the Bolshevik régime in Russia, both the Soviet and the Communist Internationale have paid a vast amount of attention to Asiatic affairs. There has developed a steadfast determination that, under the leadership of a handful of zealots at Moscow, whether by revolutionary incitement or by the evolution of national policy, Russia should

once more play a dominant rôle in Asia. At present, Soviet authorities are playing to the gallery of radical Young China and are also trying to negotiate with Japan. At the same time, they are voicing historical plans and desires for influence and power. Opportunist in method, Russia aims to "come back" in the Far East.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

1. Saburi, "Public Opinion and World Peace as it affects Japan," in *Public Opinion and World Peace* (Chicago, 1923), pp. 215-16.
2. At the time of Semenov's visit to New York in the spring of 1922, when he was arrested in a civic suit, the daily press gave abundant testimony as to his activities in Siberia.
3. Documents relating to this arrangement were published by the Department of State, *American Assistance in the Operation of the Trans-Siberian Railway; Russian Series No. 4*, (Washington, 1919), pp. 1-4.
4. *Japanese Intervention*, p. 27. A telegram of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee protesting against this policy is quoted. Further documents are cited in *To the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments*. (Memorandum of the Special Delegation of the Far East Republic), (Washington, 1922), pp. 5-6.

Note on Railway Policy—The Russian Tsarist government had come to look on their railway system as a goal in itself. Siberia was to them a frontier province, a gateway through which they might pass to their real end and desire. That was the Chinese Eastern Railway and the territories which were tributary to it. Japan had also long desired to extend a South Manchurian Railway as far as Harbin and had been in negotiation with the Tsar's government just before the Revolution. After the Allied intervention, the Japanese General Staff aimed to take control of the entire Chinese Eastern Railway. This plan, however, was blocked by the Japanese Foreign Office, when after long delays they signed the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement early in 1919. The tale of railway policy in the Far East is a long story—too long to do more than refer to it here. To the Japanese as to the Russians the control of these lines meant more than is at once apparent. It would not be too far-fetched to claim that Japanese policy became at times consciously a railway policy.

5. Reported in *Izvestia*, March 31, 1920.
6. *Japanese Intervention*, p. 37.
7. The Russian version of these events is to be found in *A Short Outline of the History of the Far Eastern Republic*. (Published by the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America) (Washington, 1922), pp. 16-18 and *Japanese Intervention*, pp. 36-42, 108-115.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 44; *Short History*, etc., pp. 14-15. The Declaration of Independence is on p. 42.

9. The circumstances are noted in Pasvolsky, pp. 65-69, where a speech by a non-Bolshevik leader is quoted. Chicherin recognized the Far Eastern Republic by a note of May 14, 1920. *Short History*, etc., p. 44.

A rather different version is given by Maiski, of the Soviet Foreign Office, who boasts frankly of the deceptive character of the Far Eastern Republic. He places the suggestion of its creation at the first of 1920 by the Japanese, who thought that they would play a dominant part in the new buffer state. He continues:

"From the very start the Soviet government looked upon the Far Eastern Republic merely as a make-shift creation, designed to protect it from Japan and in this way to afford it a needed breathing space. But in order that the Far Eastern buffer state should not be used as a base for the organization of counter-revolutionary forces, the Soviet Republic had to secure for itself there a dominating influence. In this it was really successful, for the buffer state which, according to the scheme of the Japanese imperialists, was to be the knife at the heart of Soviet Russia, became a base of operations for the Workers' and Peasants' Republic in its struggle against Japanese aggression. In this way history sometimes plays a joke. . . . The Far Eastern Republic has fulfilled its mission and may now terminate its further existence. Soviet Russia needs it no longer. Its liquidation is, of course, only a question of time and, we believe, a short time at that."—Maiski, *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 1917-1922*. (In Russian) (Moscow, 1923), pp. 177-79.

10. *Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic*, April 17, 1921. Art. i; Art. iii, sec. 2; Art. iv, sec. 1, sub-sec. 2; Art. v, sec. 1 and sec. 3, sub-sec. 1.
11. *Moscow Wireless News*, Oct. 24, 1920.
12. *Dalnevostochnoye Obozreniye (Vladivostok)*, April 29, 1920. Quoted in Pasvolsky, p. 68.
13. *Short History*, etc., chaps. ii and iii. The documents are in *Japanese Intervention*, pp. 115-27.
14. *Short History*, etc., pp. 13-14; *Japanese Intervention*, pp. 30-34. Cf. my article in *New York Times*, June 4, 1922. The Japanese "continue in practical control of the sea coast, and the Pacific terminals of Siberia. The Japanese government had also set up a civil administration in the northern half of the Island of Sakhalin and is enforcing Japanese orders and regulations. These apply to the ordinary concerns of private citizens. Today in Sakhalin a man may live only as the

Japanese authorities direct and even when he is dead he can be buried only in accordance with Japanese regulation."

15. *Japanese Intervention*, pp. 133-42.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-60.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-51. *Short History*, etc., pp. 51-64.
18. *New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1922.
19. *The Second Congress of the Communist International*. (Washington, 1920), pp. 29-30. Cf. also the *Pravda*, Petrograd, July 30, 1920, on colonial and national policies.
20. *Moscow Wireless News*, Oct. 24, Nov. 11, 1920, and Feb. 15, 1921.
21. *Izvestia*, June 3, 1921. This note is translated in Pasvol'sky, pp. 170-74.
22. *Short History*, etc., p. 51. *Moscow Wireless News*, April 11, 1921.
23. *Short History*, p. 47; *Moscow Wireless News*, April 14 and 17, 1921; *Izvestia*, May 31, 1921; and *Commerce Reports* (Washington), June 6, 1921, p. 1331. Cf. for official text *Sbornik*, II, p. 78. In the *Izvestia*, Dec. 8, 1920, Trotsky had already pointed out that the proposed grant of concessions by Soviet Russia in Kamchatka to Washington Vanderlip, the American promoter, would tend to embroil the United States and Japan. A further and more elaborate treaty of economic alliance between Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic was signed Feb. 17, 1922, *Sbornik*, III, p. 23.
24. *Trud*, July 14, 1921.
25. *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn (Economic Life)*, Aug. 31, 1921.
26. *Izvestia*, Aug. 12, 1921; *Rednota*, Aug. 15, 1921; and *Petrograd Pravda*, Aug. 31, 1921. Cf. "Russia after Genoa and The Hague," in *Foreign Affairs*, I, p. 153. Here the Far Eastern Republic is spoken of as "a member of the Russian Federation." Technically this was incorrect, but practically this admission is significant. *Moscow Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1921, speaks of an invitation to the Far Eastern Republic to attend an All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the same terms as the federated governments, the Ukraine, the Caucasian Republic, etc.
27. *Izvestia*, July 13, 1921.
28. *Ibid.*, July 17, 1921.
29. *Moscow Wireless News*, July 21, 1921.
30. The alleged seventeen points were published in September, 1922, by the *Chita Telegraph*, but an abridgement had already appeared in the *Japan Times*, May 17. Briefly they were alleged to be as follows: 1. The Far Eastern Republic was to change Vladivostok into a purely commercial port under

foreign control. 2. The Russo-Japanese fishing convention was to be revised, increasing and extending Japanese rights. 3. Postal and telegraph convention to be made after the commercial treaty was signed. 4. Mutual freedom of trade communications, etc., on the basis of the most-favored-nation clause. 5. A tariff convention was to be made. 6. Protection of citizens and private property. 7. Reciprocal freedom of citizens in trade and occupation. 8. Freedom of travel. 9. Hostile propaganda and organizations were to be mutually stopped. 10. The Far Eastern Republic was to promise to maintain rights of private property and never to introduce a Communistic régime. 11. On the principle of the open door, Japanese citizens were to be admitted to "any extracting industry"; Japanese were to enjoy freedom of navigation on the Amur River under the Japanese flag; and the Far Eastern Republic was to notify China that Japanese were to enjoy the same rights on the Sungari River. This was to be an exclusive right of the Japanese and was not to be granted to other foreigners. 12. Exchange of representatives with rights of legation. 13. All old treaties were to be recognized and all rights given to the Japanese by former Russo-Japanese treaties were to remain. 14. The Far Eastern Republic was to tear down or blow up all fortifications along the whole Pacific coast, in the region of Vladivostok, and along the Korean frontier and never to re-establish the same. No military operations were to be conducted along the Korean and Manchurian borders. Japanese military missions and officers were to be admitted freely throughout the territory of the Far Eastern Republic. 15. The Far Eastern Republic pledges the lease of northern Sakhalin for eighty years in compensation for the Nikolaievsk massacres. 16. The treaty was to be effective on ratification. 17. Russian and Japanese were to be the official languages.

In addition, the following secret articles were included: 1. In case of war between Japan and a third Power, the Far Eastern Republic was to remain neutral. 2. Japan was to evacuate the Maritime Province at her convenience. 3. Northern Sakhalin was to be evacuated after it had been received in lease. The *Izvestia*, Oct. 4, 1921, contains a veiled reference to these points.

This list, however, seems to be somewhat extravagant. The *London Times* of May 19, 1922, had already quoted from the *Izvestia* of May 10, 1922, the principal Japanese demands made at Dairen. These included the conversion of "Vladivostok into a free port, the acceptance by the Republic of

the principle of private ownership, the extension of the rights of Japanese fisheries, the granting of the right to Japanese subjects of acquiring landed property, and the free use of the river Amur for navigation. The Far Eastern Republic is to undertake to raze to the ground all the fortifications along the coast of the Pacific, not to reconstruct them at a future date, and to recognize all agreements made by Japan with former Russian Governments." The Japanese Foreign Office, in a statement made to the press and published in the *Japan Advertiser* of April 21, 1922, had said:

"Our demands were confined, besides matters necessary to the establishment of commercial relations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic, to those about which not only had Chita made formal declaration on many occasions but had offered informal propositions to Japan.

That is—First, the non-enforcement of communistic principles in the Republic against the Japanese.

Second, prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda.

Third, abolition of menacing military establishments in old Russia.

Fourth, adoption of the principles of the open door in Siberia.

Fifth, removal of industrial restrictions on foreigners.

Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement so as to withdraw troops as soon as possible. Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. She presented a draft military agreement acceding to the Russian desire that a military agreement be concluded simultaneously with a basic agreement. The Russian demand that the committee on the revision of fishery agreement be held with participation of representative Soviet Government was also acceded to.

Though from the outset of the negotiations Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of the Nikolaievsk affair and, while Japan was equally desirous for a speedy settlement, the intention and competence of Chita regarding the matter were not clear and therefore the latter at first urged the advisability of excluding the Nikolaievsk affair from the present negotiations. Japan, however, eventually entertained Chita's request and agreed to take up the Nikolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of a basic agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair, Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, that troops be speedily withdrawn from Saghalien after the settlement of the affair, and that Chita's wishes regarding the transfer of the property now in custody of the Japanese authorities be met."

In the face of this statement, Antonov, at Tokyo, for the Far Eastern Republic, issued a declaration in the *Japan Advertiser*, April 21, 1922, which on certain points contradicted the Japanese statement, but which in any case did not go so far as the statement in the *Chita Telegraph*. The Japanese specifically deny that they proposed to put Vladivostok under "foreign control," that the Japanese were to have an "exclusive right" of navigation on the rivers, that "no military operations were to be conducted along the Korean and Manchurian borders," that Sakhalin ever figured in the negotiations, and that "in case of war between Japan and a third power the Far Eastern Republic was to remain neutral." If we take the Japanese Foreign Office statement, we can see that many of the points made in the *Chita Telegraph* would fall under their headings. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the points specifically denied by the Japanese were actually included in their demands.

31. *Izvestia*, Sept. 30, 1921.
32. *Ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1921. Cf. *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1921, where Petrov, the Far Eastern Republic representative, said he must consult and accept the direction of Moscow.
33. The references to this Congress are scattered. Cf. *Izvestia*, Aug. 2, Sept. 30, Nov. 23, 1921, Feb. 8, 1922; *Moscow Pravda*, Sept. 1, 1921; *Moscow, Wireless News*, Dec. 30, 1921, Jan. 25 (containing Zinoviev's speech), Feb. 8, 1922; *Novy Put*, Jan. 28, 1922. Cf. also Pasvol'sky, chap. viii. *Izvestia*, Nov. 23, 1921, reports a meeting of "Toilers from Japan, China, and Korea" who speak of great progress and increased sympathy in their respective countries toward "the center of world-revolution, Red Moscow." This meeting was held in the building of the Club of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, thus indicating an official sympathy for the work of the Third Internationale.
34. *Petrograd Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1921. This note of Nov. 2, is translated in *Soviet Russia*, Jan., 1922. Cf. *New York Times*, Jan. 15, 1922.
35. *Statement to the Press by Department of State*, Sept. 17, 1921.
36. *Izvestia*, Oct. 20, 1921.
37. *Statement to the Press*, Jan. 23 and 24, 1922. *Tientsin Times*, Feb. 1, 1922, and *China Press*, Feb. 2, 1922, comment editorially and favorably on Mr. Hughes's technique as to Siberia. Cf. an article by Michael Pavlovich (Weltman) the eastern expert of the Third Internationale in *Novy Vostok*, I, 1922—"The Pacific Problem," by M. P.
38. *Statement to the Press*, Jan. 23 and 24, 1922.

39. Cf. my article in *New York Times*, June 4, 1922.
40. *Moscow Pravda*, Sept. 10, 1922. The correspondence between Russia and Japan arranging for the Conference is in the *Nation* (N. Y.), Sept. 6, 1922.
41. The daily press of Moscow, Tokyo, and Peking for the period, Sept. 4-25, is full of despatches from Changchun. In particular the *Izvestia* of Sept. 23 and 28, 1922, contains the Russian case and the Japanese *Advertiser* of Sept. 27 contains the full official statement of the Japanese Foreign Office. Cf. *Public Ledger*, Sept. 21, 1922, and *New York Times*, Sept. 24, 26, 1922.
42. *Peking Daily News*, Nov. 14, 1922. Cf. also a despatch from Duranty, at Moscow, *New York Times*, Sept. 25, 1922.
43. Saburi in *Public Opinion and World Peace*, p. 216.
44. The treaties relating to Russian rights in China are either given in *extenso* or are referred to in MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*. Note particularly for Chinese Turkestan, treaties of 1851 and 1881; for Mongolia, treaties of 1881, 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1915; for railway rights, treaties of 1858, 1860, and 1912. *Memoirs of Count Witte*, pp. 83 *et seq.* and Izvolsky, *Reflections of a Russian Statesman*, chap. ii, contain valuable accounts. Cf. also for earlier history Wright, *Asiatic Russia* (New York, 1902), 2 vols., and Weale, *Manchu and Muscovite* (New York, 1904). The more detailed exchange of notes, etc., for 1918, can be traced in the Soviet press as follows: *Izvestia*, Dec. 25, 1917, and *Pravda* (Moscow Evening edition), Dec. 29, 1917, *Izvestia*, Jan. 24, 1918, on the use of Chinese troops at Harbin; *Ibid.*, Jan. 31 and March 20, 1918, on denials as to use of armed war prisoners; *Ibid.*, March 19, April 5, and April 13, 1918 and *R. A. R.*, pp. 173-77 on negotiations as to Semenov; *Izvestia*, Feb. 21, 23, March 5, May 16, June 4, 1918, on railway embargoes; and *Ibid.*, May 22, 23, June 6, 1918, on other complaints.
45. *Rosta* (Official wireless service), Jan. 8, 1919.
46. *Izvestia*, March 9, 1918.
47. *Golos Rossii*, Sept. 16, 1919. Voznesensky had been in the Russian consular service in China in Tsarist days. The text of this manifesto is a translation of the original manifesto in Chinese as it was distributed throughout China in the autumn of 1919. Later, its provisions were embodied in a formal note signed by Karakhan on Sept. 27, 1920. It is to this note that Joffe refers in 1922. Its provisions were summarized in a Peking despatch to the *Public Ledger*, Jan. 30, 1921. Cf. for this paragraph and other statements in this

chapter my article on "Russian Policy in the Far East" in *North American Review*, March, 1923.

48. *Izvestia*, Dec. 17, 1918. *Moscow Wireless News*, Dec. 14, 1919; Jan. 23, 1920. *Izvestia*, Jan. 30, 1920; and *Moscow Wireless News*, March 12, 1920, all refer to Korean and Japanese revolutionary groups. *Izvestia*, Jan. 12, 1921, reports a recent conference of Socialists in China to which representatives came from Japan, Korea, China and Formosa. *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1921, speaks with pleasure of Japan as "on a volcano."
49. *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1920. Cf. also *Pravda*, July 30, 1920, where a Korean delegate at the Second Congress of the Third Internationale declared that the "victory of the social revolution is impossible so long as Western bourgeoisie can draw on its resources in the Orient for its struggle against the proletariat." Cf. *Izvestia*, Sept. 1, 1920, and Jan. 12, 1921; *Russian Press Review*, Oct. 8, Dec. 15, 1920, on general plans for Asiatic propaganda.
50. *Izvestia*, June 22, 1920, Bukharin appealed for the organization of labor forces in China; Petrograd *Pravda*, July 30, announced such organization in Shanghai; and Dec. 14, 1920, the distribution of pamphlets is spoken of.
51. Peking and Tientsin *Times*, March 21, 1922. One leaflet declared that the "abolition of the government and the abolition of capital" were the greatest problems of the time. Cf. also an article by Walter Littlefield in *New York Times*, June 11, 1922.
52. Peking *Daily News*, Aug. 19, 1922. Protests against the Bolshevik propaganda and press bureau are to be found in *North China Standard*, Aug. 16, 19, 26, 30, and 31, 1922, and in Peking and Tientsin *Times*, Aug. 19 and 25, 1922. A summary of the situation is in a Peking cable, *Washington Star*, Aug. 26, 1922. Cf. *New York Times*, Aug. 20, 1922.
53. *Izvestia*, Oct. 9, 1920. Cf. an article on Chinese-Soviet Russian relations in *Soviet Russia*, Nov. 27, 1920. *Russian Press Review*, Nov. 26, 1920.
54. *Department of State statement to the Press*, Oct. 2, 1920. *Moscow Wireless News*, Sept. 16, 1920.
55. For the review of Mongolian diplomatic history cf. Williams, "The Relations between China, Russia, and Mongolia," in *American Journal of International Law*, X (1916), pp. 798-808. Cf. Noyet, "Les traités asiatique de la Russie des Soviets et la question, russo-sino-mongole," in *Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Etudes coloniales*, XXIX, pp. 393-443, 469-524. Brussels, 1922. The treaties are to be found in *British Parl. Papers, China*, No. 1 (1882). Cd. 3134, pp. 13 et seq. (treaty

- of 1881); MacMurray, I, p. 919 (treaty of 1911); MacMurray, II, p. 992 (treaty of 1912); MacMurray, II, pp. 1038, 1066 (treaties of 1913); MacMurray, II, p. 1239 (Tripartite treaty of 1915). Cf. Korff, "Russia in the Far East," in *American Journal of International Law*, April, 1923.
56. *Moscow Wireless News*, Oct. 9, Nov. 10, 13, 1920; *Izvestia*, Jan. 5, 1921.
 57. Cf. *Letters captured from Baron Ungern in Mongolia*. (Published by the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic, Washington, 1921.) The story is summarized in Pasvol'sky, pp. 111-21.
 58. The despatches on this matter are scattered. In *Izvestia*, June 11, 1921, an article by Peters declares that China welcomes Soviet intervention in Mongolia; *Moscow Wireless News*, July 26, states that the Revolutionary government took power on July 10; *Ibid.*, Aug. 10, appeal of the Mongolian "Red" government for aid; *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, Chicherin's reply; *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 17, and *Moscow Wireless News*, Sept. 14, further notes; *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, the friendly co-operation of Far Eastern Republic and Soviet troops in Mongolia; *Ibid.*, Sept. 27, as trouble with China threatens Siberiakov writes of his hope for the success of the revolutionary movement by Sun Yat-sen; *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, the Mongolian "Red" army "received assistance in organization from the government of Soviet Russia" in July, 1921; *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, the Declaration of the Revolutionary government of Mongolia; *Ibid.*, Oct. 20, events in Mongolia; *Ibid.*, Nov. 6, Chicherin's statement as to the "Red" army which is significantly omitted in a translation of this interview in *Soviet Russia*.
 59. *Sbornik*, II, p. 29.
 60. *Izvestia*, May 31, 1922. *Ibid.*, June 17, announces the conclusion of a telegraphic convention with Mongolia.
 61. *Moscow Pravda*, Nov. 6, 1921.
 62. This is the unofficial translation of a memorandum by the Chinese Foreign Office to Paikes. *Peking Daily News*, May 6, 1922.
 63. "Behind the Great Chinese Wall," in *Izvestia*, Aug. 18, 1922.
 64. *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 20, 1922. Cf. for this general press campaign, *Izvestia*, July 8; *North China Daily News*, Aug. 1; *Novosty Jizni* (Harbin), Aug. 10; *Izvestia*, Aug. 12; Aug. 18 (an important article on "Hands Off China," which is reported also in a Duranty despatch in *New York Times*, Aug. 20); Joffe's *Information Bureau Statement to the Press*, Aug. 21; *Peking Daily News*, Aug. 24, where Joffe declares that the evacuation of Mongolia cannot be considered aside from an


agreement as to the Chinese Eastern Railway; North China Standard, Aug. 31, a Russo-Chinese banquet. Cf. New York Times, Sept. 9, 1922. On Nov. 4, 1922, appeared at Shanghai in English the first number of a pro-Soviet periodical, *New Russia*, whose motto is "the revival of the world through Russia."

65. *Izvestia*, Aug. 22, Sept. 16, 1922; Peking and Tientsin Times, Aug. 26, Nov. 13; Moscow Pravda, Sept. 22; North China Standard, Oct. 17; Peking Daily News, Oct. 23. Each of these papers marks a stage in the course of events.
66. The argument is taken from *Izvestia*, Oct. 26, 1922. The charges against M. Oustroumov, the present Chief Engineer, are in a note of Nov. 3 published in Peking and Tientsin Times, Nov. 8. The text of the original railway agreement of 1896 is in MacMurray, I, p. 74 *et seq.* There does not seem to be anything to confirm officially the statement in the New York Times, March 20, 1923, regarding the signing of an agreement between Soviet Russia and China in respect to the Chinese Eastern Railway.
67. Note of Nov. 6, in Peking and Tientsin Times, Nov. 13, 1922. Just before April 1, 1920, the Chinese government received a document from Karakhan, signed by Janson, who was to be the Foreign Secretary of the Far Eastern Republic, stating *inter alia*: "The Soviet Government restores to the Chinese people without any compensation the Chinese Eastern Railway, the mining and forestry concessions, and other privileges which had been seized by the Tsar's Government, the Kerensky Government, and the brigands Horvath, Semenov, Koltchak, the Russian ex-Generals, lawyers, and capitalists." *Current History*, XIII, Part 2, p. 47. This is in even more positive language than the earlier document.
68. *Rosta News Agency*, Peking, Nov. 15, 1922.
69. *Novosti Jizni*, the leading Harbin paper, quoted by Peking and Tientsin Times, Nov. 21, 1922.
70. *Izvestia*, Dec. 28, 1922.
71. *Rosta News Agency*, Shanghai, Jan. 27, 1923, and *New Russia*, Jan. 27, 1923.
72. *Rosta News Agency*, Peking, Jan. 31, 1923; North China Star, Feb. 22, 1923. Cf. New York Times, Feb. 14, April 29, 1923.

THIRD INTERNATIONAL

ABOUT JANUARY 1, 1921

▲ Moscow ○ Financial G.H.Q. Stockholm □ Soviet Representative
 ⊗ G.H.Q. West ○ Propaganda Center X Soviet Diplomat
 — Boundaries of Districts of Western European Division of Third International
 ← Routes of Propaganda



CHAPTER XIII

THE THIRD INTERNATIONALE

We are revolutionists from head to foot; we always were revolutionists; we are that to-day; and we shall remain that to the end.—TROTSKY, *Zadatchi XII Siezda R.K.P.*, Moscow, 1923.

Comrades, now in the fifth year of the World War the general collapse of Imperialism is an evident fact; now it is clear that the revolution in all belligerent countries is unavoidable. . . . Our forces must grow every day, and this constant growth will give us the guarantee, as before, that international Socialism will be the victor.—LENIN, *The International Revolution*.¹

What we shall attain with decisive success (of this there can be no doubt) is the preparation of revolutionary forces, in order to take advantage of the revolutionary crisis which indisputably is at hand, which grows throughout the entire world, and which lacks only decisiveness, consciousness, and organization.—*Lenin's Speech before the Second Congress of the Third Internationale*.²

In the history of the world-struggle against oppression, with the bringing in of the colossal masses of oppressed people, a new phase begins. And one of the immortal services of the Communist Internationale will always remain the fact that it was the first openly to raise the flag of this struggle, and to call to this flag all the oppressed peoples and the entire organized international proletariat.—*Editorial by Stecklov*.³

The Communist Internationale must become the actual general staff of the awakened international proletariat army, which is growing stronger before our very eyes. The International Communist movement will grow like an avalanche of snow. The international proletariat revolution is growing. . . . The task of the Communist Internationale is not only to prepare for the victory and lead the working class during the period of the conquest of power; it is also its task to direct the entire activity of the working class after the conquest of power.—ZINOVIEV, *The Communist Internationale, Past and Future*.⁴

IN this geographical and regional survey of the foreign policies of Soviet Russia, we have traveled from Helsingfors

to Tokyo. There has been evident, throughout, the dominant idea and the original purpose of the Soviet authorities—the World Revolution. They hold it forth as the goal of their achievements and as the reward for their hardships. A revolutionist has to be an optimist; otherwise he would be out of his job. So the Soviet government has continued to hope and to work for a change in the course of events which would result in the extension of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the setting up of a series of related Soviet republics, the world over.

In 1917, any one, who could have foreseen that the Soviet authorities would still be in power in Russia six years later and at the same time could have foretold that a world revolution would not have taken place, would have been looked on as an extremely subtle agent of a new form of counter-revolutionary, or anti-Bolshevik, propaganda. If he had expressed such ideas in Moscow in 1918, he would probably have been shot at once.

The importance of the world-revolution has diminished as months have gone by; but it has never been abandoned as the ultimate end of society. This is because of the fact that the Soviet authorities are members of the Russian Communist party. That party in turn belongs to the International Socialist Communist party which has organized itself as the *Third Internationale*. Its headquarters are at Moscow; and it is to Moscow, as the center and head of the movement, that all other Communist parties, wherever located, must turn for direction and guidance. To this end are the annual meetings, the propaganda, the development of secret lines of communication, the division of the world into districts, and the highly intensified and organized bureaucracy of the party. The Bolsheviki, therefore, look to the development of a new world in which Moscow will be the new Rome. This they have continuously preached.

In a lively organization of this sort, with its tentacles reaching out across frontiers, constantly touching the daily life of millions, and consciously aiming at the social reconstruction of the world, it is only natural that differences of opinion

should develop. The fact remains, however, that apart from the schism that originally divided all Socialists the world over, the authority and power of the Third Internationale has never been seriously questioned within its own sphere. A great deal of confusion, much unnecessary and unwarranted persecution would have been avoided if people in authority could have understood that between Snowden in England and Longuet in France on the one hand, and, on the other, Zinoviev and other members of the Communist Internationale, a division existed which was all the more effective and bitter because it spelled civil war among Socialists. The British Labor party has again, in 1923, refused membership to the British Communist Party by a decisive and tremendous vote.) We all know of the vitriolic war that Gompers and Spargo have both waged against the Communists in America and in Russia. Indeed, in Russia the Social Revolutionary Party has suffered as dire attacks from the Bolsheviki as have any other elements in Russian society. The Third Internationale, therefore, is not to be confused with any other Socialist body, particularly not with the "Yellow" Internationale, as it contemptuously terms the International Federation of Trade Unions, whose headquarters are at Amsterdam, nor with attempts to revive the organization which we have known for years as the Second Socialist Internationale. (The Third or Communist Internationale is "Red"; and it believes in and preaches World Revolution.)

Furthermore, the Third Internationale is not the Soviet government of Russia; technically, their difference is complete. One is the organization of an international propaganda body; the other is the political organization which governs Soviet Russia. Moscow is the center for both; members of the Russian Communist Party, which is in sole control of the Soviet government, are represented in the Third Internationale. There exists therefore an interlocking membership and an interlocking directorate between the two. The Soviet Foreign Office is constantly reminding us that it is not the Third Internationale and, by inference, that it is not responsible for the work and the mistakes of that body. The fact

remains that it is at times almost impossible to separate the activities of the Foreign Office from the activities of the Third Internationale. At times, as in the case of Litvinov, the same person has held important posts abroad under both organizations. Consequently, it is impossible to keep the two apart in any study of this sort. For this reason we use the plural and speak of the Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia.

How completely unified or how different these policies may be, the reader can judge for himself. I set down the facts in the case only on the authority of the official statements of the parties concerned. I am not a Bolshevik, but it would be a prostitution of the science and art of history were I consciously to permit that fact to influence the study of this subject. In this connection, even the press censorship which exists so rigidly in Soviet Russia is itself a help to the student.

For the Bolshevik press must be considered as an official press, in that all papers follow the direction of the Political Press Section attached to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. All that is printed, however, is not actually official; but if a paper should print news or articles that were harmful to the government it would be promptly dealt with. The *Izvestia*, under the editorship of Steklov, is the official *News* of the Central Executive Committee. The *Pravda* (Truth) of Moscow is the organ of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party under the editorship of Bukharin. There are other *Pravdas* published in various cities, notably Petrograd, which to a less degree are also official organs. The *Communist Internationale* is the semi-official organ of the Council of People's Commissaries. The Foreign Office has published frequent bulletins and reports including its *Foreign Press Review* and *Vestnik. Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life) is a rather serious daily paper which has been particularly useful during the last two years. In addition, there is *Rosta*, the official Russian Wireless Service through which the wireless news despatches from Russia are available to all who will or can receive them.

TO THE FIRST CONGRESS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONALE

Naturally, with the enormous task of the revolution in Russia on their shoulders, the active preaching by Communist leaders of its gospel outside of Russia was not at first effective. On December 23, 1917, two million gold rubles were voted for propaganda in Western Europe; as we have seen, the *Fakel* or *Torch* was planned to start revolution in Germany. But the rigor with which the authorities of both Germany and Austria dealt with such attempts prevented any success.⁶ It was wartime and generally in those days people in belligerent countries had no time for such matters. They were fighting, working, or struggling to get sufficient food. They could not stop to talk as the Russians had done.

Nevertheless, in spite of the tremendous burden of reorganizing Russia, of combating anti-Bolshevik plots and foreign foes, a start was made in the preaching of doctrines of Communist World Revolution. For this purpose the writings and speeches of Lenin and of Trotsky were a source of undiluted strength. Later, regular propaganda schools were set up to train students for propaganda both at home and abroad. We need not note the schools which were established in each province in Russia. At Moscow was a propaganda college where foreign agitators were trained. Here some seventy students who could use foreign languages were trained in successive courses, each lasting about three months. In the case of the Orient, there was later a sort of university to train propagandists in the languages and customs of Asia.

For immediate needs, however, attempts were made to make use of the large prison camps where were gathered troops who soon would be returning to Central Europe. Before these prisoners the gospel of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution was preached with vigor by men who could speak the language of their audiences. Add to this the persistent individual work of soldiers and sailors who had suddenly become revolutionary agitators. Thus Bela Kun, formerly the editor of the Magyar newspaper *Social Revolution*, and later to be the head of the

Hungarian Bolshevik uprising, addressed, on April 14, 1918, a monster meeting of war prisoners in Moscow:

You, who have suffered and struggled, who have borne on your shoulders the heavy cross of this war, go back and set the whole country ablaze from one end to the other! Sweep all obstacles from the path for the liberation of the enslaved, turn into ashes all castles, all palaces, to which your wealth flows and from which poverty and hunger are spread broadcast over the country. . . . Give full sway to all your hatred and respond by revolt, for nothing can be done without armed revolt. . . . I do not say that it is bad to kill, but you must know *whom* to kill. . . . Turn your weapons against your officers and generals and against the palaces. Let every one of you be a teacher of revolution in his regiment! 7

It was in repeated meetings of this sort that prisoners were prepared for repatriation. Indeed, there were protests from the Central Powers regarding the calling of prison congresses and the preaching of radical doctrines. The practice of enlisting "international war prisoners" continued, however; at some of the concentration camps, organized "Red Guard" detachments were set up prepared to become pioneers of the revolution in their own countries. Others, only a few in number, were freed and sent back at once to preach the new gospel.⁸

Lenin portrayed "the triumphal march of Bolshevism," the establishment of a "new type of statehood, incomparably higher and more democratic than the best of the bourgeois parliamentary republics" in that it provided for the "dictatorship of the proletariat"; and he appealed to the workers of the world to start revolutions everywhere.⁹ So with stark simplicity and force Bukharin in his little book—*Program of the Communists*—stated the principles of the cause.¹⁰

"The program of the 'Communist' Party is not only the program of liberating the proletariat of one country; it is the program of liberating the proletariat of the world." There must develop a feeling of solidarity on the part of the proletariat against the bourgeois world of predatory powers. "We do not speak of the right of self-determination of nations; we have only the working classes in view. . . . The situation of the Soviet Republic is quite an exclusive one. It is the only state organization of the proletariat in the whole world

amongst the robber organizations of bourgeois." It must fight for its existence, leading the "army of the universal proletariat against the universal bourgeoisie. The leading fighting slogan of this struggle is now quite clear. It is the International Soviet Republic. The overthrowing of imperialistic Governments by armed uprisings and the organization of Soviet Republics is the way of international dictatorship by the working class. . . . This international Soviet Republic will free from oppression hundreds of millions of inhabitants of colonies. . . . European civilization has been maintained by exploitation and by robbery of these small peoples in distant lands. . . . Therefore, the program of our party, which is the program of international revolution, is at the same time the program of complete liberation of the weak and the oppressed."

Such a statement from an educated and able Russian became the definite *credo* of the Communist Party. Others like Radek followed it up with a wealth of illustration and economic observation.¹¹ Zinoviev (Apfelbaum), who was to become the president of the Third Internationale, made an appeal to the workmen of belligerent countries to strike for the world-revolution.¹² Podvoisky pointed out that force was the only method;¹³ and in November, 1918, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, confident that with the end of the war the time for revolt was coming, spoke of "the victory of the world-proletariat over the exploiters, and imperialists of all countries."¹⁴ Lenin, at the close of a powerful speech, declared: "No matter what happens, no matter what misery imperialism may cause, it shall not save itself; imperialism is lost and the international Socialist revolution will conquer!"¹⁵

The propaganda of the day ran the gamut of the passions and ransacked history for its illustrations.¹⁶ The Communist party blared out its proclamations;¹⁷ and Joffe, Soviet Envoy at Berlin, who had been expelled from Germany for his propaganda, made no bones about it all. He said:

Having accepted this forcibly imposed treaty [Brest-Litovsk] revolutionary Russia of course had to accept its second article, which forbade "any agitation against the state and military insti-

tutions of Germany." But both the Russian Government as a whole and its accredited representative in Berlin never concealed the fact that they were not observing this article and did not intend to do so.¹⁸

To make this the more evident, a letter from Lenin to the "Workers of Europe and America" and the call, signed by Lenin and Trotsky for the First Congress of the Communist (Third) Internationale to meet in Moscow were issued on January 24, 1919.¹⁹ This was at the time of the proposals for the Prinkipo meeting to pacify Russia, which were sent out by wireless from Paris.

The Congress met in March at about the time that Bullitt was in Moscow on his ill-fated mission. It was not largely attended by any save Russians; its chief work was the election of officers, most of whom were also Russians in Moscow, and the issuing of a long manifesto or platform. This manifesto urged the working people to understand the "actual anarchical character of capital," resulting in the "monstrous Imperialistic World War" between "predatory states." So comes the "epoch of the dissolution of capitalism." The proletariat must save the world from chaos, for "the final victory of the world-proletariat will mean the beginning of the real history of liberated mankind." Thus the "conquest of political power by the proletariat means the destruction of the political power of the bourgeoisie." All must be swept from office and power in order that they may be compelled to serve the Communistic state. "The famous general 'will of the people' is a fiction." "The Soviet system guarantees the possibility of actual proletarian democracy, a democracy for the proletarian and a democracy directed against the bourgeoisie." The triumph of Communism in the Soviet state is the triumph of the working class. It leads eventually to the establishment of a genuinely proletarian Communist Internationale," which "will support the exploited peoples of colonies in their struggle against imperialism. . . . The Communist Internationale calls on the entire proletariat of the world to take part in this last struggle. Arms against arms! Force against force! Down with the imperialistic

conspiracy of capital! Long live the international republic of proletarian Soviets!’’²⁰

Could anything be plainer? Such was the conviction, the religion of Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Chicherin, Rakovsky, Radek, Litvinov, Joffe, Bukharin, and the entire group. Some of these were Jews, but the majority of the Communist leaders were Russians, many of them people of education and intelligence. The character of the revolution they led was essentially Russian. They planned the leadership of Russia in the crusade for World Revolution, and it is as a Russian movement that we must judge it. Indeed, many of the characteristics of the Bolsheviki, which seem most incomprehensible and offensive to Western nations, are in the last analysis Russian characteristics.

DISTURBANCES ABROAD

1. *Hungary*.—With the collapse of the Central Powers, conditions developed which favored the growth of Bolshevism outside of Russia. Lenin was apparently doubtful in 1918 as to when the revolution would start in Germany. In 1919, however, the unexpected happened. It was not in industrial Germany or Austria that the chance came, but in agrarian Hungary. This was due to a variety of causes, but chiefly to the shortsighted policy of the Allies. When, in March, 1919, the decision was made to require certain districts of Hungary to prepare for possible annexation to Rumania, the Karolyi government collapsed.

This government had been in office since October 31, 1918; on November 16 Hungary was declared a republic. Karolyi, a wealthy Hungarian nobleman who had been in exile, and who was a pronounced liberal, temporarily assumed the direction of affairs. On all hands during the next few months, thrones were falling and kingdoms were being cut up. The Hungarians seemed likely to fare badly; what was first national disgust at defeat became despair as the weeks went by. The result was a spirit of recklessness and a desire to take the chance which a further revolution might always give. Thus when Karolyi gave up, the Socialists were the only al-

ternative at least for a time; and in point of fact, it was the Communists who came to power. Add to this the propaganda which returning prisoners from Russia brought with them, and conditions were ripe. The entire movement which led to the establishment of a Bolshevik government at Budapest under Bela Kun was, however, also due to the fact that Russia had planned to take advantage of just such an opportunity. In that sense the Bela Kun régime was planned from Russia. The direct incitement to change came from the treatment accorded to Hungary by the Allies. The lack of spirit which permitted Communists to seize power was due to Hungarian despair and to the weakness of Karolyi himself. The result was the establishment of the first foreign Soviet government outside of Russia. To many it seemed as though the world-revolution had begun.²¹

Karolyi did not even sign the resignation which was submitted, written by one of his Jewish secretaries, and published over his signature. Because of the nonchalance of a magnate, a conscientious scruple, or a final regret for power, Karolyi refused. But he got out; and the world went on without him. Bela Kun, who was in the hospital nursing a fractured skull, which he had gained in a recent disturbance, was quickly in the saddle. Out of twenty-six commissaries of his prompt appointment, eighteen were Jews. In a storm of enthusiasm the first Bolshevik government was set up at Budapest on March 21, 1919.

This is not the time and place to consider its domestic legislation nor its domestic atrocities in Hungary. Bela Kun was Foreign Secretary and his first step was to send a wireless message to Lenin. From that moment Budapest became an outpost of Moscow. The only inquiry from Moscow was as to the genuinely Communistic character of the new government. Mere Socialists were taboo. Then, reassured on that point, Moscow gave its wholehearted support and quickly spread its agents to prepare for the next opportunity in some nearby country for another Soviet revolution. Bela Kun had come to Budapest on the staff of a Russian mission to repatriate prisoners; he brought with him money to engage in

propaganda. Originally a Jewish journalist of no importance in Hungary, he had been captured during the war. In a Russian prison camp he met Radek. Together they had risen to importance in the days of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Bela Kun handled much money for propaganda among the prisoners. His advent in Budapest, therefore, was according to plan. His opportunity came sooner than he or anyone had expected. Now he was the new Messiah! Chiefly he thought of himself as the messenger of Lenin to whom he paid the most complete devotion.²³

Meanwhile, at Paris, the Allies hesitated, and a French order even went as far as Vienna to invite Bela Kun to Paris. It was countermanded by telephone to Budapest just as it was to be delivered. General Smuts was sent to parley, but without success. Finally, a labor revolt against Bela Kun broke out at Budapest, and on August 1 he fled by special train to Vienna. Thence he escaped to Germany; his extradition was refused and he got away to Russia. His day had come and gone.²⁴ A further element in the collapse of his government had been the delay of food supplies to Soviet Hungary by the Hoover organization for the relief of Europe. Later, this aroused the bitterest sort of comment in Bolshevik circles. The facts seem to be that Gregory, who was in charge at Vienna for Mr. Hoover, refused to supply food to a Bolshevik government. Finally, he became interested in a conspiracy by Hungarian liberal and labor elements to oust Bela Kun. Gregory then offered to sell food to Bela Kun agents for cash. The money was forthcoming; but at the critical moment the conspiracy against Bela Kun proved to be successful. The result was that the food trains rolled into Budapest as Bela Kun fled. At last Rumanian troops were marched in and occupied Budapest; this was to the huge disgust of patriotic Hungarians. The Rumanians were finally withdrawn as the Hungarian nobility and more conservative groups seemed now able to handle the situation. Indeed, on a lesser scale, a "White Terror" began in revenge for the "Red Terror" of the Bela Kun régime.²⁵

So we turn to a more careful review of Russian Soviet

policy in the entire episode. When the news reached Moscow on March 22 that a Soviet Republic had been set up in Hungary, the enthusiasm was intense. A telegram was sent to Bela Kun from the Third Internationale, signed by Zinoviev as president, and another from the Russian Communist Party, signed by Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others. This read: "We are convinced that the time is not distant when Communism will conquer throughout the world. The working class of Russia will come to your aid in every way possible. The workers throughout the world will, with bated breath, watch your further struggle and they will not permit the imperialists of any country whatsoever to make any attempts against the new Socialist Republic."²⁶ Lenin was at once called to the wireless and in spite of interruptions, which it was alleged were due to the interference of Paris wireless, a series of communications were inaugurated between Bela Kun and his leader at Moscow. Most of this talk was conducted in code, the key to which was later destroyed; this, however, has not entirely defied those who were interested in its decoding; but many of the messages were lost or burnt at the time of the fall of the Hungarian Soviet government. Enough is available, and other evidence as well, to prove that Bela Kun was eager for an offensive and defensive alliance with Soviet Russia. He declared: "Our Hungarian foreign policy is the same as your Soviet Russia's foreign policy."

Lenin, from the first, seems to have urged moderation in Hungary and the avoidance, as far as possible, of terroristic methods. In warning Bela Kun to avoid the mistake Russia had made in using such methods, Lenin seems to have had in mind the effect on public opinion in other countries. Steps were at once taken to establish mutual diplomatic representation and to plan for the next step.²⁷ This, as we have noted earlier, was probably with a view to taking advantage of unrest in Italy. Vienna could follow after. To create a diversion in the Rumanian rear, orders were sent to the Ukraine to press the attack of the Red army,²⁸ and Chicherin sent a wireless urging Bela Kun to deny that his forces were turning to the south against the Jugo-Slavs.²⁹ Soon, an extremely

irregular aeroplane service was set up from Russia to Budapest, and messages and people went back and forth.³⁰ On the whole, therefore, the connection of Russia with the Hungarian outbreak was abundantly established both by friend and foe. The influence of Lenin is shown throughout. Later, in the endeavor to secure the escape of Bela Kun to Russia, in the exchange both of hostages and of prisoners, and in the transfer to Vienna of special agents and activities which were originally planned for Budapest, the hand of Soviet Russia is seen.

2. *Germany*.—As we have already seen, in October, 1918, the sense of impending disaster and the restlessness of German society had prompted Joffe to engage in vigorous propaganda from the Russian Embassy in Berlin. On November 5, he gave to Cohn, of the German Department of Justice, a large sum of money to be used as might seem best. His own activities were soon stopped and he was sent out of Germany by the new German government which had seized power early in November, 1918. The "bloodless revolt" of the German people, and the abdication of the Kaiser, which was announced even before it took place, came just in time to check the minor and local revolts which broke out all over Germany at the end of October and in the first part of November. In some cases, as in Bavaria, elements of separation were at work alongside of the liberal revolt led by Kurt Eisner. His power fell with his assassination in the end of December. A few days later the murder of Liebknecht and of Rosa Luxemburg deprived the German Spartacists, or Communists, of leaders.³¹

This was at a time when foreign aid was particularly needed by the German Bolsheviks. Miliukov asserts that a secret agreement providing for an alliance between Soviet Russia and a Bolshevik Germany had been signed by Radek and Liebknecht.³² Whether this is true or not, the fact was that Liebknecht was rampant for revolution during November and December, 1918. "A dictatorship of the proletariat, the definite initiation of Socialism, an alliance with proletarian Soviet Russia, revolutionary war if necessary, and the struggle for international revolution—these are aspects of the second revo-

lution indicated by Liebknecht. . . ."³³ Joffe declared on January 1, 1919:

Truly revolutionary methods of the truly revolutionary struggle are to deceive one's class enemy, to violate and destroy a treaty [Brest-Litovsk] imposed by force, but never to sin against the revolutionary proletariat and never to violate the obligations assumed with respect to the revolution.³⁴

Under such circumstances, the new German government was alive to the danger of the union in arms of Russian Bolsheviks and German Spartacists. The new government at Berlin consisted in the main of a group of liberal intellectuals, among whom rested the strong conviction of the danger to Germany from Russia. They were of the same mind in this respect with the Germans of 1914 and 1915, whom many of us recall in Germany as preaching the danger to Germany of the untold millions of Slavs to the east, who by sheer numbers might overwhelm Teutonic culture. They were anti-Bolshevik and they were also anti-Slav. Thus they protested against Russian assistance to the Spartacist movement:

There were discovered irrefutable proofs that this movement was supported by official Russian resources and Russian organs and that Russian citizens took part in it.³⁵

To this Chicherin entered a general denial, but acknowledged that Radek was in Berlin,³⁶ and as usual in such affairs, countered by charges that German officers were opposing Soviet rule in the border states.³⁷ During March, the wires were kept busy trying to free Radek, who had been appointed, while still in prison, Ukrainian envoy at Berlin.³⁸ Finally, with strikes and demonstrations breaking out all over Germany, on April 7, 1919, a Bavarian Soviet government was set up for a brief time. To this news Chicherin promptly wired a congratulatory message:

We may rest assured that the day is not far off when the revolutionary Socialistic allies will join forces with us and will similarly give support to the Bavarian Republic against every attack. Every blow aimed at you is aimed at us. In absolute unison do we carry on our revolutionary struggle for the weal of all workers and exploited peoples.³⁹

The Third Internationale sent a similar message. At the same time, Chicherin complained that the German government at Berlin was sending out "distortions of the truth" regarding the pacific intentions of Soviet Russia toward Germany. He appealed for the support of the workers of Germany to prevent further attacks by the German government on the truthfulness of the Russian Soviet government.⁴⁰ The Bavarian Soviet failed and, as the Spartacist movement in Germany quieted, the news from Moscow sank back into the normal propaganda aiming to persuade the German workmen that their interests were identical with those of Soviet Russia.⁴¹ Later in 1920, as we shall see, the lines were gradually drawn that led to the Rapallo treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany in April, 1922. *Realpolitik* was once more in the saddle.

Throughout these months the ideal of world-revolution was dominant. Germany was the key to the situation and only those of us who anxiously debated the question as to whether Germany would or would not turn Bolshevik, while the stories of Spartacist uprisings came in over the wires, can understand how serious the situation was.

3. *England*.—There were no serious disturbances in England at this time, but the general situation was far from bright. The condition of affairs gave those in authority great anxiety. As one who lived through these months in England, I am tempted to digress for a moment to comment on certain phases of the situation in order to point out how the insular character of British life was her best protection and how feeble, in 1919, were the endeavors of Soviet Russia to affect a change in Great Britain. In 1920, the state of affairs was different, at least in that there was much more Russian money for propaganda. But the psychological moment had passed. That was in February and March of 1919.

There was, in the first place, the feeling that Russians were "foreigners." The instinctive insularity of British life had not broken down during the War, and to no man whose language he did not understand and whose name he could not pronounce would the British workingman submit for leader-

ship or guidance. Consequently, the propaganda of the world-revolution and of the Third Internationale, which proposed the leadership of Moscow, fell on deaf ears in England. In the second place was the uncomfortable notion that the lives of thousands of British lads might have been saved if Russia had only "stuck it out" in the War. The failure of Russia to continue fighting had, I think, a profound effect in diminishing the respect of the British for the Russians. After all, the British had fought to the end and had won. The victory of November 11, 1918, was as much that of the British hand in a munitions factory as it was that of the proudest duke or of the humblest subaltern. From the British point of view it was a British victory. The French had helped, the Belgians had had a rotten deal, and the Americans had come in at the end. The rest were not within the workmen's horizon. The Briton is not fundamentally a pacifist nor on the other hand does he hate for long. But he does not fancy a "quitter."

There were, however, elements in Great Britain that were anxious for an opportunity to cause industrial disturbance. Early in 1919, one labor leader told me that he daily drank a silent toast to the "British Soviet." The Shop Stewards' movement, the Rank and File movement, and others were all contributing to the general idea that following the War a general social rearrangement was coming. In addition to this labor unrest, there was the confusion incident to demobilization. This at first was carried out rather badly. The one idea seemed to be to get men out of the army helter-skelter. There was consequently a temporary glut in the labor market. There were stupid mistakes as to orders and hardships as to service regulations. Thirdly, there was the "hooligan" element, which was always ready for trouble. Under such conditions, therefore, if England had had a few really able revolutionary leaders, trouble might have come. The great body of British Labor was not in the least revolutionary. Great meetings might be held to denounce certain abuses, but when it came to anything more there was left but a handful of extremists.⁴²

The danger lay in the opportunity which genuine industrial unrest gave to revolutionary leaders to use an economic situation for their own political ends. "Unless we pull something off within the next few months, the chance will have gone, for business will have drawn men back to their ordinary jobs." That was the remark to me of a leader, or at least of a "would-be" leader, in a general social revolution in England. His prophecy turned out correctly, for he was speaking at the end of January, 1919, and nothing did happen to give the desired opportunity during the next six months. Then it was too late.

It was one of my duties at the American Embassy to read copies of all intercepted Bolshevik letters which had been collected by the far-reaching British mail censorship. From Peking to South Africa, from Buenos Aires to San Francisco, and from Moscow to Calcutta came a general wail. It was as though, in 1919, the entire world was in travail. Everywhere there was trouble and everywhere men waited for the day of action which would translate their economic distress and social unrest into political revolt. The failure of Soviet propaganda to make headway in England probably saved the situation.

There were meetings and demonstrations which looked as though they might make trouble. There were sentimental appeals, and an increasing supply of funds from Russia; but in the main, in spite of one or two ugly strikes, the results were small. Indeed, it was at one time the multiplicity of small, unauthorized strikes, brought about without thought or co-ordination, that helped to prevent the general strike, which many dreaded. Later in 1920, when the threat of a Triple Alliance strike—that is, of Miners, Railwaymen, and Transport workers—seemed to be real, the entire movement collapsed like a house of cards. The Triple Alliance was made of straw; in any case there was no political motive behind even such a threat. In general, therefore, the lack of a political revolutionary motive was the main reason why the industrial distress of England did not lead to serious trouble. The endeavor to profit by British economic disturbance for the benefit of Soviet Russia was clear on several occasions—notably at the Albert Hall meeting on February 6, 1919. This

was a "hands-off Russia" demonstration that sought to use the desire for a social upheaval in England to compel the government to abstain from sending more troops to Russia. Such meetings, however, together with the so-called Councils of Action, which were set up to oppose the policy of the government, did not amount to much in the long run. Finally, and in part because of the strong labor feeling on the subject, the Supreme Council at Paris decided to lift the blockade of Russia. Since then there has not been so much talk about Russia in England. On the whole, one reason was, of course, the discovery by British Trade Unions and Socialists that Lenin's régime was essentially opposed in spirit to the motives of the British. A second and potent reason was the ending of the dream that the new Communist experiment in Russia would afford comfort and prosperity. The main idea of British labor in 1921-23 was to leave Soviet Russia alone.

In each country in Europe and in the United States there were disturbances of one sort or another. On the whole, however, they did not seem to be definitely connected with Russia. In them the Third Internationale rejoiced as it always rejoiced at trouble anywhere. Often it proclaimed that Bolshevik ideas were involved. This, however, was for purely propaganda purposes. In general, therefore, the situation depended on Central Europe. When that did not turn Bolshevik in 1919, people in authority everywhere heaved a sigh of relief.⁴³

1920—THE YEAR OF ASSAULT

Toward the close of 1919, as the victories over Yudenitch, Denikin, and Kolchak approached their culmination, the general tone of the Bolshevik press and of speeches and wireless messages was one of triumph. And small wonder! The Soviet authorities had almost freed Russia of civil war. They were immeasurably stronger at home than they were two years before. To be sure, the failure of the Hungarian and Bavarian revolts had shown that they could not as yet take Europe by storm. But the Third Internationale now settled down to a period of vigorous propaganda carried on by agents in all

parts of the world. For this funds were available in large sums; the methods of intrigue and espionage were freely used; and the variety of their lines of attack was evident. Unrest of any description was to be fomented; strikes and labor troubles were hailed with delight. Wherever there was trouble of any sort, the Bolsheviki hoped to see an opportunity for their program.

Thus Zinoviev proclaimed:

The Proletarian Revolution is moving forward with powerful steps. In the unprecedented wave of strikes, which has started in Europe and America, the old rotten trade organizations and their "leaders" struggle helplessly. . . . Our Third Internationale now already represents one of the greatest factors of European history. And in a year or two the Communist Internationale will rule the whole world.⁴⁴

There was a sarcastic and belligerent tone to the humblest papers. Thus—"It is time to bring this criminal diplomacy before the court of the people and pass a severe pitiless sentence on it. Brothers! Take to your arms . . . and defend the rights of the people against violence and profanation."⁴⁵ Or again—"But with you, Messrs. Imperialists, we shall carry on conversations just as you do with us. Behind every word—force; behind every condition—force; behind every demand—force. We are on guard."⁴⁶

Propaganda trains were sent east and south in the newly recovered parts of Russia to distribute literature and to organize the work of the revolution.⁴⁷ Encouraging messages were claimed from Korean revolutionaries, from Buenos Aires, Mexico, and Spain.⁴⁸ "Petrograd and Moscow are becoming the Mecca and Medina of Moslems"; "Soviet Russia has become the lighthouse, the source of hope and the call to move forward for the proletariat of the whole world."⁴⁹ The wireless telegraphers and sailors were appealed to in order to forward messages of propaganda from Russia.⁵⁰ Thus the year 1920 was hailed as the year in which "omnipotent Soviets of Workmen's and Red Army Deputies" would bring the victory of Communism "in Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and Rome!"⁵¹

Such extravagant claims must not, however, obscure the fact that throughout Europe the misery and distress which the World War brought in its train effectively prepared the ground for Bolshevik propaganda by making the people in almost every country dissatisfied with existing forms of government and conditions of life and ready to accept almost any schemes of social reform, no matter how wild and impracticable they might be, provided that they broke away from the political and diplomatic traditions of the past. Nor was such unrest confined to Europe. We can all of us recall temporarily unstable conditions as shown by the Winnipeg strike in 1919 and the I. W. W. strike in Oregon. The whole world had been at a terrific "party," on a debauch of war, which affected every aspect of social life. Now came the "morning after."

The Bolsheviks hoped by propaganda and by "boring from within" to prepare for more sympathetic relations with the working class in Western Europe. At the same time, by championing the rights of subject peoples in Asia, they fostered native sentiment and even religious bigotry. Thus, as we have seen, they proposed to incite against the European races the antagonism of a continent. At the same time, restoration of normal relations with the rest of the world was becoming increasingly important on economic grounds. For this reason the Soviet Foreign Office sought to disassociate itself from the propaganda of the Third Internationale. As we shall see, it became an extremely important matter in 1921-23.

Along these lines was the plain statement of Radek. He defended Joffe for his propaganda in Germany in defiance of the Brest-Litovsk treaty on the ground that Russia "destroyed the treaty because it was based on robbery and violence" and because Joffe "was only doing his duty" since Imperial Germany was working for the suppression of Soviet Russia. He went on to say:

If our capitalistic partners abstain from counter-revolutionary activities in Russia, the Soviet Government will abstain from carrying revolutionary activities in capitalist countries; but we shall

determine if they are carrying on counter-revolutionary agitation. There was a time when a feudal state existed alongside capitalist states. In those days liberal England did not fight continuously against serf-owning Russia. We think that now capitalist countries can exist alongside a proletarian state. We consider that the interests of both parties lie in concluding peace and the establishment of the exchange of goods, and we are therefore ready to conclude peace with every country which up to the present has fought against us, but in future is prepared to give us in exchange for our raw materials and grain, locomotives, and machinery. The guarantees which our enemies are demanding from us lie in the interests of both parties.⁵²

This was a bid for trade and by inference showed that the Soviet Foreign Office was in command of the activities of the Third Internationale. On the other hand, at the same time Lenin declared by the victory of Soviet Russia in the recent civil war, that

this proved the invincible and inexhaustible source of our strength, permitting us to say that as soon as we accomplish Communism in our own country by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat and by means of a concentration of strength in the leading party; then we can expect world-revolution.⁵³

"The moral victory of the proletarian revolution over bourgeois society" was felt in the increasing curiosity of the world regarding what was going on in Russia.⁵⁴ "It is one of our principles that Communism must come from within each different country. We should only retard the development of Communism if we tried to force its adoption from without." Thus Chicherin.⁵⁵ But Bystriansky ten days later said: "The world is round, once wrote Karl Marx to Engels, and, therefore, the workmen's revolution for its victory must encircle the entire globe."⁵⁶ Certainly, at the time of the Polish war, Russian leaders had no hesitation in appealing to the nationalist patriotic spirit and at the same time declaring: "The Red Army took up arms not for seizures and annexations, as it is the army of the triumphant social revolution, which triumphed in Russia and which must win out also in Poland."⁵⁷ So also the reverse was true in Persia where it was charged that the British failed because they were un-

able to command their own laboring class to unite for the extension of British power.⁵⁸ All of these cross-currents of opinion and expression were drawn into one stream as the Second Congress of the Third Internationale met at Moscow in July, 1920.

Here was reaffirmed the essentially belligerent character of the Third Internationale. Its autocratic control became apparent in its twenty-one Theses and Statutes.⁵⁹ The tone of the speeches and the range of topics all showed clearly that the World Revolution was still at the forefront. Soviet Russia's endeavor to remodel society on lines that had already been laid down by Lenin and Trotsky and the rest of the small group, who were responsible for the direction of policy, still stood out as the dominant motive. "The Soviet Republic of Russia is proud of the fact that it is guarding the world revolution and that the Red army is defeating all enemies, and thereby clearing the way for the victory of the world-proletariat."⁶⁰ That was the keynote and the fact that Russian armies in July, 1920, were rapidly advancing on Warsaw did not diminish the tone of triumph.

To put the subject in popular form Kamenev wrote:

The international proletariat through its best representatives now discusses the plan and tactics for the overthrow of the bourgeois Governments of Europe and America. . . . This international organized army of the progressive proletariat of Europe and America has enormous reserves. These reserves are the people of the Orient, oppressed by colonial, imperialistic slavery. . . . The Third Internationale is the general staff of this world-army which has started to move and is marching to victory.⁶¹

Lenin said the task of the Congress was "that of leading on to the victory of the world-revolution and to the establishment of an international proletarian Soviet Republic."⁶² Again on July 26 he said: "The Soviet idea is spreading everywhere, even in the most backward countries. . . . One must abandon scientific prejudices that each country must pass through capitalistic exploitation; the power of Soviets . . . can be established in those countries in which capitalist development has not attained any serious proportions."⁶³

Thus he annexed to the field of endeavor of the Third Internationale the outermost regions of the world. "Not only must you speak of revolution in the colonies . . . but you must assist by action every colonial revolutionary movement."

In every way the importance of propaganda was emphasized; its effective distribution and the co-operation of other local Communist groups in various countries were the theme of repeated discussions. Finally, after the Congress adjourned, preparations were made to reorganize the districts and to stimulate distribution of propaganda in Western Europe.

PLANS FOR REORGANIZATION

It is difficult to tell how far these plans for reorganization were actually put into effect. The Bolsheviki were forever optimistic and often drew plans on paper which they were incapable of putting into effect. Furthermore, changes were continually being made. It is therefore impossible to say that the map of propaganda routes opp. p. 339 was ever in point of fact a completely true map. Rather it is a potential and approximate map of the activities of the Third Internationale in early 1921. The centers of activity were of course fixed; their relative importance shifted from time to time as did occasionally the frontiers of the districts. Thus Vienna has taken on in 1922-23 an importance that was formerly Berlin's; though Berlin still remains a strategical post for that general district.

During the latter part of 1920 there had been considerable friction among the agents of the Third Internationale, particularly in Germany. There was confusion as to orders, and complaint was made with regard to the distribution of funds and with regard to agents who seem to have been sent out independently from Moscow. The number of agents in general was also materially increased toward the end of 1920, and an extremely active propaganda and system even of *agents provocateurs* were developed, especially in Northern Europe.

The Central Executive Committee at Moscow was the head

of the organization. There "Comintern" (an abbreviation of the Communist Internationale) had its G. H. Q. This was divided into branches which kept in touch with various sections of the work, for example, Bureau of Organization, Press Bureau, Editorial Bureau, School for Propaganda, the Red Cross, Prisoners' Bureau, etc. Under the Bureau of Organization there were District Bureaus; under each in turn were a series of Local Organizations. In most cases these Local Organizations reported back to the District Bureau, but in each district there were others which reported directly to the Bureau of Organization or even to the Central Executive Committee. In the case of agents, much the same system was used. Many of the agents, however, remained in ignorance of each other; they often worked independently of any Local Organization. In some respects, the system as a whole was modeled on that employed by Germany in her espionage work before and during the War. It was an improvement on it, however, in that by the different methods of reporting it was impossible to put out of commission the entire system of a district through the arrest of the headquarters people. The destruction of the machine was thus rendered less likely by a distribution of responsibility and by the fact that in any given district there were always a certain number of agents who were, at least in theory, in ignorance of all other agents. Variations of the entire system were of course to be found from time to time.

We have already seen that steps were taken in 1920 to reorganize the work in the Near East and to extend in more effective ways propaganda and intrigue among the Muhammadans of Central Asia. This was now supplanted by the development of work in the west among Oriental students and Oriental nationalist clubs in various European cities. Furthermore, there was a considerable activity among Communists in Western Europe at the end of 1920 which seemed to indicate that far-reaching plans were under way to inaugurate a better co-ordination of the entire movement. The rigid standards set up in the twenty-one Theses as to admission to the Third Internationale were the subject of much discussion. The

indirect purpose of these requirements was, however, to purge the party as a whole of those who did not accept the doctrinaire attitude of Moscow. In the long run, the authority of the Central Executive Committee of the Third Internationale was increased, though at the expense of a decrease in the membership of Communist parties throughout Europe. There was profound disappointment in Bolshevik circles regarding the failure of the idea of world-revolution to materialize. Consequently, those who favored more radical action were much stirred. On the whole, however, the drift toward the right in 1920-21 was apparent. More conservative counsels prevailed even in the Third Internationale. Certainly, the need of economic reconstruction in Russia became apparent. Later, as we shall see, this was to result in the compromise of the New Economic Policy which was launched in Russia in the spring of 1921. The need of commercial organization, the development of trade agreements, and the struggle for recognition abroad were to modify in practice the radical attitude of the Third Internationale. Thus the prophecies of a co-ordinated world-wide revolt of radical forces which had been so frequently made came to nothing. Soviet Russia was thinking more and more of bread and butter and less of revolution. The Red army was increased in efficiency and decreased in size. It became a threat, an instrument of policy, and less and less an active army in the field. However, we have wandered beyond our dates; now we must return to the close of 1920.

At the end of December, 1920, a meeting was held near Bremen of representatives of the Western European Propaganda Secretariat of the Third Internationale. A report of this conference is available which, when checked up, gives a fairly accurate notion of the plans and facts then discussed.⁶⁴ It was evident that considerable internal friction existed and complaints were vigorous as to the failure of Moscow to support propaganda properly. In the case of London and Berlin, the cry was the need of securing more funds and of freeing the agents of the Third Internationale from the restraining influence of the Soviet commercial and diplomatic missions.

The plan was drawn for the division of Europe into six main districts instead of five. These were to be, as indicated on map facing p. 339. 1. Central European (Berlin) including Germany (except Upper Silesia, East Prussia, and the region on the Rhine under Allied military occupation), the Tyrol, and the German-speaking part of Switzerland. 2. Prague district including Czechoslovakia, Poland, Upper Silesia, East Prussia, German Austria, Hungary, and former Hungarian territory now annexed to Rumania. 3. Paris District including France, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and Ireland, Belgium, Holland, and the occupied districts on the Rhine. 4. Southern Europe, with centers both at Rome and Milan, including Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and the remainder of Switzerland. 5. The Near East, with a center at Adrianople, or in Bulgaria, which later might be shifted to Constantinople, including European Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and the remainder of Rumania. However, there is no evidence that Adrianople was ever a center of this district. 6. Scandinavia, with centers at Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Helsingfors, including Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland. No direct provision was made for the other Baltic states, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They were presumably to be in this district, though as former parts of Russia the propaganda was directed from Moscow by special sections of the Communist party.⁶⁵

It will be noticed that the boundaries of these districts pay small attention to national frontiers; they are in fact based in part on language, on cultural elements, on ease of communication, and on other features which make for convenience of organization. Such was the plan which in the main agreed with that already in effect. Reval was the G. H. Q. of the entire system, reporting directly to Moscow. Litvinov had been temporarily placed as Soviet Envoy there to direct and co-ordinate the entire work. He apparently was both an official of the Soviet Foreign Office and at least unofficially a representative of the Third Internationale. Through his hands passed all funds to Stockholm which was the financial and banking center. Consequently, all figures were given in Swedish kronen. Practically no treaty could control such a

propaganda system, for on the staff of each trade delegation there was at least one representative of the Third Internationale. Later, Krassin objected to this with reference to his mission in London, and the Propaganda Section for England was made separate.

There followed during the early months of 1921 a lively contest at Moscow as to control over the entire foreign system and policy of Soviet Russia. Chicherin demanded that Soviet representation and policies abroad should be entirely in the hands of the official diplomatic agents of the Foreign Office. The Bremen Conference had asked that the work of the Third Internationale should be left free from the restrictions and more cautious bureaucracy of the official representatives of Soviet Russia. In particular, the dispute traveled beyond to fundamental issues of the greatest importance as to whether a general vigorous assault on Western Europe should be undertaken in 1921. The victory of Lenin and Chicherin in favor of the authority of the Foreign Office was fairly complete, but care was taken to free the Foreign Office from technical and official responsibility for the activities of the Third Internationale.

That this is possible in point of practice is extremely doubtful. The net result of this dispute, which involved nearly every one of importance in Soviet circles, was a demonstration of the power of Lenin. Even Zinoviev, who was much alarmed by serious disturbances at Kronstadt, came over to the side of moderation. These disturbances further handicapped Trotsky, for the Red army was forced to take an active part in their suppression. The decision, therefore, to subordinate the work of the Third Internationale was of far-reaching consequence. It is probably responsible for the amicable settlement of disputes which broke out in May, 1923, between Soviet Russia and Great Britain. This, however, does not mean that the ideal of world-revolution was given up or that the Third Internationale was deprived of vitality. On the contrary, throughout 1921-23 its propaganda kept up and its organization attempted to move steadily toward its own goal. But the actuality of world-revolution is delayed.

However, in 1922, the abolition of the Cheka, or Extraordinary Commission, gave opportunity to its successor, the State Political Administration, to develop along lines which were often close to those of the Third Internationale. The State Political Administration, or to use the Soviet abbreviation of its unwieldy title, the *Gospolitupra*, or G. P. U., was charged as the secret political police of Soviet Russia with fighting counter-revolution both at home and abroad. Its organization is under Dzerjinski (at home) and it is in close touch with Comintern where Radek also acts as liaison with the Foreign Office. Under its Foreign section there are representatives in practically all states. Local headquarters are maintained at Berlin (Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), Stockholm (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark), Helsingfors (Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), Sofia (Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Turkey, and Jugo-Slavia), Paris (France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, and Great Britain and Ireland), Tashkent (Afghanistan, Persia, India, the Dutch East Indies, and Indo-China), Peking and Shanghai (China and Japan), and New York (the United States, Canada, and Australia). This far-reaching organization is for ever active; it represents directly the Soviet régime at Moscow; and it is in touch with the Russian colonies in each part of the world. At times it seems to have undertaken work that ordinarily might be left to the Third Internationale. Certainly, it is in a position to help and assist that organization through its direct and powerful machinery. It orders the Foreign Office to provide places for its agents in foreign missions; and it supervises the action and behavior of the messengers of the Comintern. The Cheka is gone; but in its place is a body which is more powerful and which in its scope is an instrument of Soviet interests throughout the world.

THE WORLD REVOLUTION IN ABEYANCE

In March, 1921, the Anglo-Russian trade agreement was signed. The negotiations had been long drawn out, but the victory of the Soviet authorities was clear. Great Britain had recognized Soviet Russia as a *de facto* government, and it was

hoped by both sides that trade would revive. To this policy, which extends far beyond England, Chicherin had bent every effort. On the occasion of signature, however, a letter from Sir Robert Horne to Krassin was published.⁶⁶ In this document it was evident that the British government was aware of the propaganda work of the Russians particularly in Asia. Horne demanded that it should stop in so far as it looked to world-revolution, "in the regions of Afghanistan and India" and thereby endangered British interests. How far the Soviet authorities kept to this understanding may be judged later. The fact at present is that this demand coincided with the general policy which Chicherin, from the point of view of the material interests of Russia, had been advocating himself.

How did the Third Internationale take to this attitude and to the general policy of economic compromise which, as we shall see, Lenin was advocating under the name of the New Economic Policy? It seemed at first as though the natural results of such a policy must put the Third Internationale "out of business." During the year it had interfered in Germany and Italy and France to split the local Socialist parties on the issue of acceptance of its authority.⁶⁷ Was the Third Internationale now to give up, or to hold in abeyance, its revolutionary propaganda in order that the economic restoration of Russia might proceed by tactics of compromise with capital? Such was the problem involved.

At the July Congress of the Third Internationale, much time was devoted to the airing of differences and to the attempt to solidify the authority of the Central Executive Committee. Radek, in a speech which was clearly inspired by the Soviet Foreign Office, devoted his attention largely to the thesis that the masses had not as yet been reached and that by the capture of local trade unions it was the duty of the Third Internationale further to extend its power. He concluded:

The Communists must work only in the ranks of the wide masses of the proletariat, in the trade unions and at works and factories. Let theoretical Communism remain the lot of small groups of propagandists who are wasting their revolutionary energy.⁶⁸

In similar fashion, Eidus, in an article in the *Izvestia* after

the Congress had adjourned, spoke of the sympathy of Soviet Russia for Oriental countries in their "enslavement by European or other imperialists." He was careful to deny that their alleged adherence to the general leadership of Russia was due to propaganda, and confined himself to saying: "The peoples of Asia, oppressed by various imperialists, know that in Soviet Russia they will find, at any time, an ally and well-wisher."⁶⁹ Chicherin, however, was quick to deny the assertion that the Third Internationale had issued an appeal saying that the Soviet government by its compromise with capital was trying "to emerge from a blind-alley" of revolution. He commented: "At the present time a very large number of forged documents have been circulated."⁷⁰ In this he was undoubtedly correct; it is one of the difficulties of a careful student to distinguish and reject papers, which would be of greatest interest, but on which the slightest doubt rests. As we shall see, this issue was raised in September, 1921, by a dispute between the British Foreign Office and Chicherin as to charges that Soviet Russia was violating its agreement in March to abstain from hostile propaganda in the Near and Middle East.

It was clear, however, that the New Economic Policy, as advocated by Lenin, was carrying the day. A resolution was passed favoring concessions to foreign capital in return for facilities for foreign trade and investment of capital in Soviet Russia.⁷¹ Such a victory for Lenin and Chicherin was accompanied by the decision, already suggested, that the Third Internationale must take into consideration the special circumstances of the time, must not oppose the foreign policies of the Soviet government abroad, and must further the alleged impression in foreign countries of the independence of the Soviet Foreign Office from the Propaganda Section of the Third Internationale. At home in Russia, the mention of world-revolution became almost parenthetical as the task of reorganizing the economic life of Russia absorbed the attention of the government. Thus Lenin in December, 1921, said:

Our great asset, our enthusiasm with which we broke our enemies and which we will be remembered by in history, is now useless.

to us. It is in fact a drawback and the new economic policy cannot work with these old methods. Now we need patience and perseverance.⁷²

The work abroad took on new forms as the shift in emphasis became plainer. The Russians continued assistance in 1922-23 to 298 publications in 24 different languages. The Internationale kept on its way with Radek and Pavlovich (Weltmann) as prominent members. For other sections of Russia and for the East a separate division had been installed. Attached to it was a sort of university of agitation which numbered 587 students on January 1, 1922; 94 of these were women. There were also separate organizations such as the so-called "Donner group" under Bronski at Vienna; this was a terroristic group for work in the former Hapsburg states and in Italy. In general, the attempt was made to set up a new "united front." This consisted of "the union of laborers, Communists, Anarchists, Social Democrats, non-party workers, Independents, and Christian Democrats, against capital."⁷³ Such a combination, as suggested at Berlin in April, 1922, at once produced violent discussions as to the authority of the Third Internationale. The determination of the Communists to win a way to influence the great masses of workmen was in part checked by the "yellow leaders"; but the contest still continued.⁷⁴ On the issue depends the question as to whether the plans of the Third International can march successfully toward revolution. The realization is plain, however, that the rehabilitation of Russia must precede, for the time, the active revolt of the world. As Radek wrote in the *Pravda*:

International bourgeoisie and its international flunkies, the Social Democrats, are talking about the failure of Communism, because the Russian Communist party which exists in a deserted peasant country, on all sides surrounded by enemies, deprived of all support, has in the course of five years failed to consummate the grandest of revolutions in the history of mankind, to create a Communist régime on the ruins of capitalism. . . . We have only just set to work on our task—the struggle for a Communist régime. We are doing our task unsatisfactorily, for it is very difficult. . . . Our comrades, the Communists of Western

Europe, are still too weak. They have not yet succeeded in digging your grave. But you, yourselves dig it. . . . Go on digging, so that the hands of labor may soon tackle the task of reorganizing the world! ⁷⁵

We notice, however, that neither in this extract nor in hundreds of others is there the same *élan*, the same faith in the prompt coming of the world-revolution. Not even in the violent proclamation of May 1, 1922, which placarded the walls of Moscow, were the words "world-revolution" used.⁷⁶ Such a thing would have been impossible a year or two earlier. It demonstrates again the authority of the Soviet government over the Third Internationale and indeed in every branch of Communist endeavor. The idea and the ideal is there; but it is no longer proclaimed from the housetops. Thus Trotsky:

Rally closer to the mass reserves! Whatever storms—harbingers of proletarian victory—there may come, the Soviet frontier is the trench line beyond which the counter-revolution shall not pass and on which we shall remain at our posts until the reserves will arrive and the Red Flag of the European Socialist Union of Soviet Republics as forerunners of the World Federation of Proletarian Republics shall be hoisted to the mast! ⁷⁷

It is the expression of hope, not of determined, aggressive intent. Trotsky is more recently quoted as abandoning the United States as a field for world-revolution propaganda. However, a proclamation also recently asks the question:

The Communist Internationale is unswervingly fighting against capitalist robbers in all countries of the world. Could it then sanctimoniously turn away from national liberators in the struggle of colonial and semi-colonial countries? ⁷⁸

The Third Internationale is always ready for trouble; its propaganda is always available; the world-revolution is only in abeyance. Meanwhile, the Soviet Foreign Office is in control with its policy of commercial negotiation and political recognition.

Thus in the Ruhr disputes and in the present chaotic conditions in Germany there has been vigorous difference in Russia as to the policy to be pursued. The Foreign Office has opposed action which might check the restoration of more

normal economic conditions. The Third Internationale, on the other hand, has advocated violent measures. In a proclamation of January, 1923, the Third Internationale addressed German workmen as follows:

All of you are now being threatened by the danger of being dragged into a new butchery for the interests of capitalism. Therefore, oppose your Government with your will to fight against capital; to fight for the power of labor and for the European league of Socialist republics. The bourgeoisie is ready to murder millions of working people, to tear them to pieces, to make them cripples in a fresh struggle over the division of millions in profits. So unfold the mighty banner of universal war by all the exploited ones upon the exploiters, the kings of finance, and the diplomats. . . . Down with the new imperialist war! Long live the Government of the workers and peasants! Long live the revolutionary league of Socialist Governments! Long live the proletarian revolution! ⁷⁹

The situation, therefore, resembles that of 1919 with this difference, that in 1919 the solid middle class in Germany was opposed to "Red revolution"; in 1923 it is a question whether that middle class any longer exists. It remains to be seen whether those German Socialists who are opposed to the Third Internationale can control the situation to extend their own political and social power. It is doubtful if the German Communists are numerically strong enough to gain power; and without their assistance the Third Internationale will be unable to exert more than a benevolent attitude toward disorder and bloodshed. However, the Soviet press continues to assume that France will intervene to suppress disorder in the interior of Germany and that such intervention will provoke war with Russia.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

1. An address by Lenin given Oct. 22, 1918, in *The Proletarian Revolution in Russia* (edited by Fraina), pp. 449-53.
2. Petrograd *Pravda*, July 21, 1922 (in *The Second Congress of the Communist International* (Washington, 1920), p. 25).
3. *Izvestia*, Aug. 11, 1920. (In *Ibid.*, p. 124.)
4. *Communist Internationale* (Petrograd), July 19, 1920.
5. Cf. Pasvolsky, "Yellow and Red Trade Unions," in *North American Review*, May, 1922, pp. 621-32. Cf. *New York Times*, May 25, 1923.
6. Cf. Chapter ii, footnote 12.
7. *Izvestia*, April 17, 1918.
8. *Ibid.*, March 23, 30, April 21, 1918.
9. *Ibid.*, March 12, 1918.
10. Bukharin, *Program of the Communists* (in Russian) (Moscow, 1918), chap. xix.
11. *Izvestia*, Sept. 6, 1918.
12. *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1918.
13. *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1918.
14. *Znamia Trudovoi Kommuny*, Nov. 9, 1918.
15. *Ibid.*, Nov. 9, 1918; cf. *Current History*, IX, pp. 215-19.
16. *The Call* (in English), Moscow, Dec. 14, 1918.
17. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Dec. 26, 1918.
18. *Izvestia*, Jan. 1, 1919; cf. *Izvestia*, Jan. 10, 1919.
19. *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1919.
20. *Ibid.*, March 6, 1919. Cf. *Severnaya Kommuna*, March 8, 1919; *Pravda*, March 8, 1919; *Nation* (New York), May 31, 1919.
21. Cf. Gratz, *Compendium of Bolshevism in Hungary* (in Magyar) (Budapest, 1921); *From Behind the Veil* (Budapest, 1920); Kraft, *Terror in Hungary* (The Hague, 1920); Haller, *Sozialistisch-Kommunistischer Schrifbruch* (Budapest, 1920) (typewritten); Tharaud, *Quand Israel est Roi* (Paris, 1921).
22. Professor Philip Marshall Brown (who was in Budapest in these days) has a temperate article in *New York Times*, July 27, 1919; Tharaud, pp. 191-98.
23. Gratz, pp. 76-78, 104-7, 115, 125, 143-48, 179, 197, 781. Cf. Huszar, *What Bolshevism Has Made of Hungary* (Budapest, 1920).
24. Petrograd *Pravda*, Nov. 29, 1919; *Uz Nemzedik* (Budapest), Jan. 30, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 28, Dec. 30, 1920; Feb. 26, 1921; *Wireless News*, Budapest, Nov. 11, 1920.

These messages chiefly concern the exchange of hostages and of war prisoners. At the time of the Genoa Conference, there was a foolish story that Hungary and Soviet Russia had made

- an alliance; in the *Pester Lloyd*, May 5, 1922, there is a very clever editorial denying the entire story.
25. *Current History*, X, Part 1, pp. 416, 446; Part 2, pp. 77, 268. Gregory, "Overthrowing a Red Régime," in *World's Work*, June, 1921. The money paid by the Bolsheviks for food was cash seized by them in Budapest.
 26. *Investia*, March 23, 26, 1919.
 27. *Ibid.*, April 1, 1919; *New York Times*, July 27, 1919.
 28. *Izvestia*, May 11, 13, 1919.
 29. *Ibid.*, April 1, 1919.
 30. *New York Times*, June 12, 1919.
 31. Cf. *Current History*, IX, Part 1, pp. 386-87, 398; Part 2, pp. 52, 302. Cf. for the entire German movement, Dennis "Germany and the Third Internationale," in *North American Review*, Oct., 1923.
 32. Miliukov, *Russia Today and Tomorrow* (New York, 1922), p. 102.
 33. Fraina, *The Social Revolution in Germany* (Boston, n. d.), p. 26.
 34. *Izvestia*, Jan. 1, 1919.
 35. *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1919.
 36. *Ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1919.
 37. *Ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1919.
 38. *Ibid.*, March 7, 28, April 1, 10, 1919. Cf. Radek, *The Collapse of German Imperialism and the Tactics of the Working Class* (in Russian) (Moscow, 1918).
 39. *Izvestia*, April 9, 10, 1919. Cf. *Current History*, X, Part 1, pp. 227 et seq.
 40. *Izvestia*, April 23, 1919. At the same time, as though in bravado, a wireless message was sent out from Moscow, April 2, purporting to give a belligerent report by Radek on the work of the Third Internationale.
 41. *Wireless News*, Petrograd, Sept. 11, 1919.
 42. The situation on the Clyde at Glasgow was fairly serious in February, but I doubt whether there were more than twenty-five thousand real Communists in Great Britain at this time.
 43. Later in 1921, an attempt was made to fasten intrigue with Russia on Sinn Fein leaders in Ireland. This was by the publication in a *White Paper* (Cd. 1326) in June 19, 1921, of papers discovered in 1920. These included the Irish draft of a proposed treaty between Sinn Fein and Soviet Russia. It proposed: mutual recognition; the promotion of recognition by other states; Ireland was to use her influence to prevent the hostile shipment of munitions to Russia; Ireland was to represent Roman Catholic interests in Russia; the promotion

of Irish commercial interests in Russia; medical relief for Russia; both countries were to end imperialism by the development of a new League of Nations. The Russian Trade delegation in London later denied that any such document had ever reached them (*New York Times*, June 13, 1921), nor is there evidence available to show that the trip of Dr. McCarten from America to Russia did anything for Ireland. An article in the *Pravda*, April 18, 1920, was full of mistakes, and the publication of the alleged treaty in the *Patriot, Supplement*, Feb. 9, 1922, was distinctly in favor of the Ulster party. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that the Irish Labor Party was strongly sympathetic to the Bolsheviks. The *Watchword of Labor* favored the Third Internationale (Sept. 11, 1920), and as early as Jan. 21, 1918, Sinn Fein Socialists presented a long typewritten memorandum to Litvinov declaring their sympathy with Soviet Russia and denouncing the British in Ireland. The Irish Transport and General Workers Union is much more radical than the average British union and it was free in its vocal support of Soviet Russia. On the whole, however, the Russians missed a chance in Ireland in 1920 to stir up more trouble for the British. In 1921, the signature of the Trade Agreement with Russia put an end to the possibility of legitimate Soviet interference in Irish affairs. Cf. *New York Times*, July 30, 1922.

44. Petrograd, *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1919.
45. *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 17, 1919.
46. *Trud*, Nov. 10, 1919. (This newspaper is a weekly of the Petrograd Soviet of Trade Unions.)
47. *Wireless News*, Sept. 9, 1915 (via London), 1919; *Wireless News*, Tashkent, Dec. 6, 1919; *Wireless News*, Moscow, May 4, 1920. Caravans were also locally used.
48. *Ibid.*, Moscow, Dec. 14, 1919.
49. Petrograd, *Pravda*, Dec. 7, 1919.
50. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Sept. 2, Oct. 23, Dec. 31, 1919; by *Ibid.*, Moscow, Sept. 4, 1920, a report was made as to the remarkable value of the wireless for propaganda. Cf. *Ibid.*, Moscow, March 22, 1920, *Izvestia*, Oct. 19, 1920 ("The Speaking Trumpet of the Republic"); *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 28, 1921. The militarization of the press is urged in *Wireless News*, Moscow, Feb. 11, 1920; on March 11, 1920, a message was also sent requiring the registration of all who could speak foreign languages and who could typewrite in at least one foreign language. Cf. Petrograd *Pravda*, March 12, 1920.
51. *Ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1919. Cf. *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Jan. 1, 13, 1920.
52. *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 3, 1920.

53. *Pravda*, March 30 and 31, 1920.
54. *Izvestia*, April 3, 1920 (editorial by Steklov).
55. *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 11, 1920. Cf. *Ibid.*, April 22, 1920.
56. *Petrograd Pravda*, April 20, 1920.
57. *Ibid.*, May 14, 1920. Cf. *Social-Demokraten* (Copenhagen), May 12, 1920, reprinted in *Political Review* (London), No. 4, June 4, 1920.
58. *Wireless News*, Moscow, June 23, 1920.
59. The Twenty-one Theses and Statutes were published in the *Nation* (New York), Oct. 13, 1920, *New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1920; *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 16, 1920; *Washington Star*, Jan. 24, 1921; the *American Labor Year Book*, 1921; and in *Theses and Statutes of the Communist Internationale*, Moscow, 1920.
60. *Wireless News*, Moscow, July 15, 1920.
61. *The Second Congress of the Communist Internationale*, p. 111.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 39. Cf. *Petrograd Pravda*, July 28, 1920.
64. *Times* (London), Feb. 1, 2, 4, 1921; *Chicago Tribune*, Feb. 2, 3, 4, 1921; *New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1921; *Sevodnja* (Riga), Feb. 27, 1921. *Ost-Information*, Berlin, Nos. 90, 91, 93, 99.
65. Maps were undoubtedly prepared in various places in Europe. Charts were published in various newspapers; cf. *L'Excelsior* (Paris), March 14, 1921 and in the *Boston Evening Transcript*, Sept. 27, 1922. The map in the text is not based on any of these.
66. *Times* (London), March 17, 1921.
67. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 5, May 24, 29, 1921; *New York Call*, May 30, 1921; *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Jan. 11, 1921; *Pravda*, March 23, 1921; *Izvestia*, July 22, 1921.
68. *Wireless News*, Moscow, July 2, 1921.
69. *Izvestia*, July 17, 1921.
70. *Wireless News*, Sept. 25, 1921. Cf. *Ibid.*, Moscow, Oct. 18, 1921. *Izvestia*, Oct. 19, 1921, Steklov refers to the stories as to the use of Soviet propaganda to promote revolutionary propaganda as "a stupid fairy-tale."
71. *New York Tribune*, July 13, 1921. Cf. *New York Times*, June 23, 1921; *Izvestia*, June 25-26, 1921, for general accounts of the Congress.
72. *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 24, 1921.
73. *Pravda*, April 22, 1922.
74. *Rabotchakaya Moskva*, May 14, 1922.
75. *Pravda*, Aug. 22, 1922.
76. This was the "Keep your powder dry!" proclamation.

77. *Izvestia*, Dec. 29, 1922. Cf. *Trud*, Aug. 31, 1922, where the Executive Committee of the Trade Unions Internationale declares: "We stand for the union of revolutionary elements with the masses of the labor organizations already existing. This would help the laboring classes to realize the idea of a united front against their blood-thirsty enemy—against American capitalism." Cf. *New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1922.
78. *Izvestia*, Feb. 14, 1923. This was in a protest against the alleged persecution of Turkish Communists at Angora.
79. *New York Times*, Feb. 11, 1923.

CHAPTER XIV

THE POLICY OF TRADE AGREEMENTS

Our latest victory is the conclusion of a Trade Agreement with England—up till now the very soul of the anti-Soviet coalition. The change came because we have proved to the entire world that our victorious Red Army will frustrate all attempts on the part of foreign capitalists to choke Soviet Russia by armed force.—*Rakovsky's Speech at Sevastopol.*¹

Whatever view they might in other circumstances possibly have taken of such provisions of money and munitions to Afghanistan, His Majesty's Government are compelled in the present instance, bearing in mind the avowed desire of the Soviet Government to overthrow British rule in India, and the fact that Russia has no possible commercial or other interests in eastern Afghanistan, to regard these proposals on the part of Soviet Government as anti-British measures pure and simple.—*Letter of Sir Robert Horne to Krassin.*²

We must turn backward and beat a retreat. The concessions we have made are insufficient. Commerce by way of exchange has not succeeded. The private market has triumphed over us. Let us then draw back in order to continue our offensive. Let us recognize our mistakes. We must look the danger in the face, and we must not conceal from the working class our march to the rear.—*Lenin's Speech at the Communist Party Conference, December, 1921.*³

THE evidence of changes in European policy toward Soviet Russia become clear towards the end of 1919. Then victory marked the Soviet cause in opposition to the anti-Bolshevik armies of Yudenitch, Denikin, and Kolchak; the notion that the Bolsheviki could neither be starved out nor beaten began to gain headway. General Smuts, in July had written of leaving Soviet Russia alone; later, Lloyd George had spoken to much the same effect. The British were tired of expensive and useless armed intervention. Gradually, the policy of the *cordon sanitaire*, as urged by the French, had broken down.

At the same time, the industrial and labor situation in England combined to suggest a change. Post-war Europe had need of commerce, and the British were anxious regarding the restoration of economic life in Central and Eastern Europe to provide a market for British goods.

The restoration of commerce with Soviet Russia was, however, a difficult matter. Could the world exist part capitalist and part Communist? Were the Bolsheviki to be trusted? What was to be the rôle of the Third Internationale, with all its bellicose propaganda, in the establishment of more friendly relations? Such matters required consideration. In Soviet Russia as well as in Western Europe and America there were strong forces arrayed against even a *de facto* recognition of the revolutionary government at Moscow. In Russia the idea was still strong that the capitalistic world might be taken by storm. As we have seen, 1920 was to be "the year of assault." On the other hand, in the domain of capital and of credit there were those who declaimed against bargainings with the devil of revolution. The morals of the issue were raised as the more conservative groups in Europe inveighed against dealings with Lenin and Trotsky.

Nevertheless, in the opportunism rather than in the liberalism of Lloyd George came the prospect of success. Always quick to value the breeze of surprise, audacious, alert, and eager to rid himself of the annoyance of constant attacks by the leaders of the Labor Party, Lloyd George finally found the way to a new policy toward Soviet Russia by an appeal to the commercial instincts of the British. That trade did not promptly revive as the result of the inauguration of trade relations with Russia has nothing to do with the matter. The point is that the thing was done. Great Britain recognized the government, which was responsible for the murder of the Tsar, as the *de facto* government of Russia. That cleared the way on the part of Soviet Russia for other negotiations, for trade agreements with other countries. The fact that because of the economic ruin of Russia, because of the famine, and because of the vacillation of the Communists' régime little came of this restoration is beside the mark.

Russia was a gold mine; on that gold mine rested a vast scrap heap of things and of men. To clear away this débris took time; and yet it was essential if Russia were once more to buy and sell as ordinary nations do. There were also serious questions as to the organization of machinery to restore the commerce of Russia, profound economic problems as to credit, as to capitalism, and as to obligations. Such intricate problems required time, good will, and honesty for their solution. Russia had been plunged from a feudal state to the depths of revolution. She must now, out of the wreckage, assume a position in which normal men could engage with security, with profit, and without too much interference by the state, in the daily business of life. Could this result come through the policy of trade agreements? In this problem, both the economics of diplomacy and fundamental political issues were involved.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

On November 8, 1919, at the Lord Mayor's banquet, Lloyd George spoke on the international situation. His speech indicated that Great Britain was through with intervention in Russia. The policy of assisting civil war and of attempting by arms to force out Bolshevism was done with. He did not indicate what his alternative policy might be, but the results of 1919 had been *nil*. It was time to try another line. Thus he said:

I should feel much happier if I knew that the Russian tangle were in course of being cleared up. You cannot have peace until you have peace in Russia, and the outlook is not pleasant. . . . I dread an interminable series of swaying campaigns, laying waste some of the most fertile lands in the world, devastating a country which is essential to the prosperity of the world. That is what I fear. . . . It means that you have got war in half Europe and nearly half Asia as well. . . . Civilization cannot afford a distracted and desolate Russia. . . . Our troops are out of Russia—frankly I am glad. Russia is a quicksand. Victories are easily won in Russia, but you sink in victories, and great armies and great empires in the past have been overwhelmed in the sands of barren victories.⁴

The Prime Minister closed with the pious hope that something would soon happen to promote peace in Russia. In the House of Commons he also spoke of Russia as "one of the great resources for the supply of food and raw material," of the effect on the life of the world of continued high prices, and of the danger of civil war. He again raised the menace of Germany in connection with Russian employment of German demobilized officers and men. Finally, he proposed that the entire question of Russia should soon be discussed by the Supreme Allied Council at Paris.⁵

To this new line of Lloyd George, Chicherin was quick to respond. On November 20, 1919, he sent a wireless message saying:

Relations with Russia are quite possible in spite of the profound differences between Britain's and Russia's régime. . . . The British customer and purveyor are as necessary to us as we are to them. Not only do we desire peace and the possibility of internal development, but we also feel strongly the need of economic help from the more fully developed countries such as Great Britain. We are ready even to make sacrifices for the sake of a close economic connection with Britain. . . . I, therefore, gladly welcome the declaration of the British Premier as the first step towards such a sane and real policy corresponding to the interests of both countries.⁶

In London the Independent Labor Party and the Trade Unions demanded the ending of the Allied blockade and the establishment of trade relations with Soviet Russia. This was hailed in Russia as the start of diplomatic relations with the "British Proletariat."⁷ Meanwhile, at Copenhagen, negotiations went on between O'Grady and Litvinov regarding the return of British prisoners in Russia.⁸ A further line of communication were conversations between representatives of the Russian Co-Operative Organization and officials of the British Food Administration. Through these and other channels Lloyd George was finally convinced of what he had been hinting at. The unjustifiable blockade was to go and the attempt was to be made to reform Russia by "civilizing" her instead of by fighting her. Trade was to be the means, and instead of

a *cordon sanitaire* a pipe-line was to tap the resources of Russia for the benefit of British business.

In this fashion, the British government confessed that at the Peace Conference Russia had been tabled; Bolshevism instead of being the platform merely of a party was in reality a principle of Russian life as it existed at the time. Lloyd George was ready to make peace with Soviet Russia in spite of the £100,000,000 that had been recklessly squandered during the past year in the support of various anti-Bolshevik armies in Russia. It is important, therefore, to imagine if possible the line of reasoning that prompted the negotiations which were thus inaugurated. To do this we must recall the alleged facts and the point of view of 10 Downing Street in 1920. Opposed to these was the attitude of many officials and of some members of the British Foreign Office. It appeared during these months as though there were two foreign offices in England. One was the official Office and the other was at the Prime Minister's residence. Added to this was uncertainty as to the policy of the War Office. The result was confusion; but in the end Lloyd George had his way.

The reasons which had weight in this result had first of all to do with foodstuffs; second, the chance for British manufactured goods; third, the effect of the Russian situation on Central Europe; fourth, the need of raw materials from Russia; fifth, the great desirability of doing something to allay complaint by British Labor; and sixth, the general results of the restoration of Russian trade on relations with the United States. In 1912, the export of grain and flour from Russia had totaled 8,898,000 tons, of which wheat alone was nearly one-fourth of the total world-production. To restore that trade would relieve high prices and would help to feed both England and Central Europe. British manufactured goods to the value of twenty-seven million pounds had in 1912 been sold to Russia. Both German and American competition might soon cut in on this trade. Unless trade with Russia were restored, the Russian market might be lost. In any case, its renewal would assist business and unemployment in England. In Germany, with the recovery of production, the re-

sults of a renewed German-Russian economic combination would soon be evident. German goods would soon be in successful competition with all others in the Russian market. German technical advisers would again manage Russian factories and the restoration of German economic life might lead to political adventures along the same lines.

There was also the need of flax, of timber, and of petroleum from Russia. British interest in Russian oil-fields had been largely as an investment; but even that had to be considered. The blockade, it might be argued, was against international law; certainly it was unpopular and awkward. Its efficacy was doubtful as the Baltic states were now about to make peace. It should be abolished at once, and it is possible that the undemonstrative pressure of the English Quakers to that end was a factor in its abolition. In this, British labor would agree, for meetings were being held to denounce the blockade as a moral blight and as contrary to the laws of humanity. Moreover, if Russian foodstuffs began to come into the market, their competition with American grains might bring the American government to better terms as to credit. In any case, prices would come down and exchange would improve. This was a potent element as the bottom seemed to be reached in the end of January, 1920, with the pound at below \$3.30 in New York instead of at \$4.86. The effect on American grain shipments to Europe which had almost trebled of late would also relieve shipping. The release of tonnage would improve the general shipping situation materially. In this fashion we can see the sort of economic reasons which, in a cumulative way, were urged in favor of the abolition of the blockade and the restoration of trade with Russia.

At the same time, it was evident that such a policy would meet with opposition from those who were concerned at the violence of Russian propaganda against British interests in Teheran, Herat, Kabul, and towards India. Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bokhara were reported as Soviet centers for such business, and, as we have seen, were soon to become extremely active. Tales of Bolshevik success in the Caucasus filled the British press; and in mid-January orders were actually issued

for the departure from Malta of British naval forces bound for the Black Sea.⁹ In spite of all this, the Supreme Council at Paris voted on January 16, 1920, to abolish the blockade and to give facilities to the Russian Co-operative Organizations to restore commerce and to secure the export from Russia of surplus stocks of grain. At the same time, the Allied governments said that there was no change of policy regarding Russia!¹⁰

The notion that Western Europe could trade with the Russian Co-operatives and not have dealings with the Soviet government was of course absurd. As Joffe promptly said at Dorpat, "trading with the Co-operative Societies independently is an impossibility."¹¹ In the process of nationalization, the Co-operative agencies were included, after a struggle; for in Soviet Russia nothing could exist on which the hand of Communism was not laid. The Co-operative Organizations were recognized as an official means of trade, but the control of that trade was vested in the government. In fact, it soon became evident that the Co-operative Societies were in reality Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, in spite of this difficulty, even the moderates among the Labor Party rejoiced at the abolition of the blockade and demanded on the part of Great Britain a policy of complete and immediate peace with the Soviets.¹² Lloyd George defended his policy in a rather naïve fashion on February 10, 1920:

We have failed to restore Russia by force. I believe we can do it and save her by trade. Commerce has a sobering influence in its operations. The simple sums in addition and subtraction which it includes soon dispose of wild theories. . . . He [the Russian] is short of locomotives, wagons, and lorries for his business and the whole of Europe is short of what he can give them in return. . . . The corn bins of Russia are bulging with grain. . . . We must fight anarchy with abundance.¹³

Thus the Prime Minister conjured arithmetic to oppose the Third Internationale and held forth the prospect of profitable trade as a substitute for revolution. Word soon came that at last the agreement for the return of British prisoners in Russia had been signed at Copenhagen by Litvinov and O'Grady.¹⁴

This was followed by a polite statement by the Peace Conference which had met in London on February 24, that the Baltic states were to be encouraged to make peace with Soviet Russia and that the League of Nations was to be invited to send a commission to Russia to inquire into the situation. It was also plain that Nitti for Italy had favored direct political negotiations with the Soviet authorities. Such a step was, however, rejected as being too hasty.¹⁵ In fact, the Allies misjudged the state of affairs, for Soviet Russia rejected the proposal of the League of Nations and in the meantime prepared for war with Poland, while she ejected the British from Baku.

How the Soviet authorities looked at the situation is best seen in the *Izvestia*. There Steklov said:

The bourgeoisie of the Entente countries is forced to change its attitude toward Soviet Russia because only through such a change of policy can it remain alive itself. Proofs accumulate that one of the chief reasons why the Allies have lifted the blockade was in order to obtain possession of Russian raw materials. . . . Just now Lloyd George begins to say that he hopes to civilize us by means of commerce. . . . There is no doubt that in this case by being "civilized" Lloyd George means affording the bourgeoisie an opportunity to make profits by means of noble commerce.¹⁶

In truculent fashion, but with a clearer eye to the needs of Russia, Radek proclaimed:

Knowing Greeks to be Greeks, we are not afraid of their Trojan gifts. Soviet Russia is ready to make peace not only with the British Co-operatives but with Lord Curzon himself.¹⁷

Chicherin himself was milder in his statements welcoming the prospect. He said:

There may be differences of opinion as to the duration of the capitalist system, but at present the capitalist system exists, so that a *modus vivendi* must be found in order that our Socialist State and the capitalist states may co-exist peacefully and in normal relations with each other. This is a necessity in the interest of all.¹⁸

The direct and emphatic refusal of the British government to admit Litvinov to England delayed the opening of negotiations. However, Krassin was made head of the delegation

and arrived in London on May 26, 1920.¹⁹ Meanwhile, there had been sharp internal disputes within British labor circles. Attacks on Lansbury, of the *Daily Herald*, for alleged receipt of a subsidy from Russia were justified.²⁰ In the Independent Labor Party the plan to unite with the Third Internationale was beaten, but there were signs of evolution toward a more radical policy.²¹ Under the circumstances, the return of the British Labor Party delegation from Russia and their emphatic repudiation of Communism cleared the air.²² At the same time, the acceptance of the principles of agreement between the two governments also assisted.²³ The summer, however, was rudely interrupted by the events of the Russo-Polish war. The course of events, as we have already seen, necessitated delay in the negotiation of the trade agreement and cost the Russian delegation the presence in London of Kameney, who was requested not to return to England because he had deceived the Prime Minister as to Russian terms with the Poles.²⁴

The long exchange of contentious notes finally led in September to the drafting of an agreement which was published in the *Times*, October 5, 1920. Throughout these negotiations, however, questions of propaganda, of the release of prisoners, and of Soviet policies in Asia were subjects of acrimonious correspondence. Nor did Soviet Russia at the Baku Conference in September, nor in a variety of other ways, show herself inclined to moderate the language of the Third Internationale or the habits of her diplomats. Thus a wireless message from Zinoviev was addressed to "the Miners and Champions of the Revolution in England;"²⁵ and in Asia, as we have seen, there was no cessation in propaganda against British influence or interests. On December 31, 1920, Chicherin wrote: "it is certainly not for the British but for the Russian Government to exact proofs of good faith," but, he went on to say that, he was willing "to let bygones be bygones and to open a new chapter of peace and trade for the whole world."²⁶

To this Lord Curzon in a long note replied on January 6, 1921, reviewing the course of negotiations since the abolition

of the blockade in the previous January. He recited the fact that owing to Soviet pressure a change in the constitution of the "Centrosoyus" or Co-operative Organizations had been made in February which more definitely involved the Soviet government as the authority with which arrangements had to be conducted. He mentioned the decision of the Supreme Council at San Remo to discuss with Russian delegates means to resume "peaceful trade relations with a desire to find a solution in the general interests of Europe." This Great Britain had been doing despite the Polish war and despite delays due to Russia's unwillingness to carry out the principle already accepted "to desist from propaganda or hostile activities directed against the British interests or the British Empire." It was necessary to specify the areas within which such propaganda must stop. Instead, therefore, of a continuation of this "barren polemic" the British government invited the Soviet authorities to sign the agreement as "the first step toward the reconstruction of the material prosperity of Eastern Europe."²⁷

The comment of the *Izvestia* was in an editorial on "The Sore Spot in British-Russian Negotiations"; it objected that by agreeing not to engage in propaganda in the Near East and Middle East Russia was in effect turning over these regions and populations "in advance" to Great Britain.²⁸ Krassin, the head of the Russian delegation in England, also made plain that it was this preamble or preliminary pledge that stuck in Russia's throat.²⁹ The exchange of notes continued until finally a formula was decided on and the agreement was signed on March 16, 1921. Russia, as we shall see, gave way on the preamble; but on the general principle of trade agreements the Soviet authorities had won a notable victory. It remained to be seen whether it was also a profitable victory.³⁰

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN TRADE AGREEMENT

On March 9, 1921, in the House of Commons, an interesting debate took place. It was stated that "in a Communist community you find that each individual will only produce that which he himself requires to consume, and therefore there will

be no surplus to export to the rest of the world." Sir Robert Horne agreed, but added: "There is a way of getting payment just now and that is by way of gold. You may say it is tainted, polluted, or stolen gold. But at least there is gold in possession of the *de facto* government. . . . I believe this gold will become a means of exchange as soon as the matter has been determined. I am all for trade with Russia." This question of Russian gold and of the power of the Soviet government to nationalize property was to come up again in the courts. But the fact was plain, as Lloyd George was soon to say: the Trade Agreement recognized the Soviet government as a *de facto* government, "which it undoubtedly is." Once recognized, no British court could call in question its power to do what it wished with its own, to confiscate, to nationalize, to trade as it saw fit. It was clear, therefore, that the agreement would have an effect beyond its actual terms. Objections "on the grounds of international morality" were invalid; claims that "there was nothing to be got out of it" were futile. As Major Barnett said: "To sell one's soul was bad enough; to sell it and not get the money was pitiful." Such was the criticism directed against the trade agreement.³¹

This agreement provided that it was "subject to the fulfillment of the following conditions." These were:

(1) That each party refrains from hostile action or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda direct or indirect, against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Republic refrains from any attempt, by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda, to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the independent State of Afghanistan. The British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the countries which formed a part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent.

(2) That all British subjects in Russia are immediately permitted to return home, and that all Russian citizens in Great Britain or other parts of the British Empire who desire to return to Russia are similarly released.

It is understood that the term "conducting any official propaganda" includes the giving by either party of assistance or encouragement to any propaganda conducted outside its own borders.

The parties undertake to give forthwith all necessary instructions to their agents and to all persons under their authority to conform to the stipulations undertaken above.

The blockade was abandoned and trade was made free. Shipping was mutually to receive the usual facilities; and Russian shipping was to receive "the rights of free navigation on the high seas." Both parties were to assist in the clearing of the seas from mines. Each party was to nominate a certain number of its own nationals to give effect to the agreement as to trade and to permit them to reside in the territory of the other, provided that any person who is not *persona grata* or who violates the agreement may be refused such permission. Either party may appoint one or more official agents who shall enjoy immunity from arrest and search and who shall have access to the authorities. These agents shall enjoy the privilege of communication by courier or "by post, telegraph or wireless telegraphy in cipher." These agents are to be exempt from taxation or service and are to enjoy such privileges in these respects "as are accorded to the official representatives of other foreign Governments." Renewal of freedom of communication was granted; passports and certified documents for the purpose of trade were to be recognized "as if they were issued or certified by the authorities of a recognized foreign Government."

The British government stated that it would not "attack or take possession of any gold, funds, securities or commodities," except those belonging to it, which may be exported from Russia in payment for imports. Nor would it seek to restrain the import of gold from Russia into the United Kingdom. In return the Russian Soviet government made no claim on property in England of previous Russian governments. This matter might be dealt with in a later or final treaty, provision for which was made in the preamble. Merchandise under this agreement was not to be subject to requisition; patents, trademarks, designs, and copyrights were to be left to the final

treaty. The agreement was to continue in force as long as the conditions were observed, provided that at the end of a year notice might be given to terminate it at the end of six months and provided also that no money or goods imported into Great Britain should be attached by order of the court "on account of obligations incurred by any government in Russia"; in that case the Soviet government could end the agreement at once. In a "declaration of recognition of claims" all claims of either party or of its nationals "in respect of property or rights or in respect of obligations incurred by the existing or former Government of either country" were referred to the future treaty. In principle, however, the Soviet government recognized its liability "to pay compensation to private persons who have supplied goods or services to Russia for which they have not been paid."

On the day of signature, Sir Robert Horne also addressed a letter to Krassin stating that "activities on the part of the Soviet government in the region of India and Afghanistan which are inconsistent with the stipulations of the agreement" must "at once be brought to an end." The "main object of their [Russian] recent policy is the overthrow of British rule in India"; specific instances were cited: "an Army Order issued by the Soviet authorities has announced the unfurling of the Red Flag on the Pamirs as an indication to the people of India that their deliverance is at hand"; and the demand was made that in good faith such hostile methods should come to an end.³²

To Russia the signature of the agreement came as welcome evidence of her stability. The Kronstadt revolt in March had been a serious matter; and in the teeth of what was to be a wide-spread conspiracy came this British evidence of belief in the Soviet government.³³ Merely by coincidence there followed quickly the announcement of changes in the economic system of Soviet Russia. Lenin declared for freedom of trade for the farm products of peasants. In a speech of April 16, 1921, he said: "The Soviets are powerful and strong enough both to admit their mistakes of the past and to overcome all new difficulties to save Communism by paying the price of

renunciation of certain theoretical principles.”³⁴ Lomov of the Committee on Concessions said:

As we shall be increasingly dependent upon the good will of the concessionaires, they may feel sure that we will be scrupulously careful to respect our obligations toward them. No political guarantees can be more potent than our own self-interest.³⁵

Lenin again said on April 24, 1921:

“Of course, free trade means the introduction of capitalism, but you cannot escape that. Capitalism, however, is no danger to us if most of the factories, transportation, and external trade are in our hands. Concessions also will mean a state of capitalism that will help us to improve our economic condition which we alone cannot do.”³⁶

It was largely because of such welcoming statements that charges regarding propaganda, which promptly appeared, were not permitted to affect the agreement at the time. Of more importance was the decision by the courts as to the protection which the agreement afforded to goods imported into England. This was tested in the *Sagor* case.³⁷ By this decision, goods formerly the property of a British company in Russia which had been nationalized could now be sold in Great Britain by the Soviet authorities. The act of nationalization was a sovereign act by a government, recognized by the Foreign Office as a *de facto* government, and as such was not subject to the jurisdiction of a British court. Against the effect of such decisions the French government protested; but the British government replied that it was unable to agree that the questions as to the resumption of trade with Russia and the recognition of Russian debts should not be dealt with independently. The British had safeguarded the question of claims; on the question of trade the agreement was now in force. This did not prevent actions in the British courts, but it seemed probable that judgments would be given against such claims.³⁸ This was certainly cold comfort to the French.

In Russia there were less satisfaction and less positive result from the agreement than had been expected. Bitter attacks by Zinoviev and Bukharin had preceded its signature.³⁹ This was probably because the blockade had been a useful instru-

ment of propaganda and its abolition together with the signing of the trade agreement deprived the Third Internationale of a welcome means of appeal. Nor as time went on did trade pick up. Thus Sir Robert Horne, in defending his policy, confessed that "to send goods to Russia is to make a present of them and we are not in a position to make presents to anybody." In spite of failure, which he said was due to propaganda, famine, and lack of transportation, he maintained that "the world will never recover until Russia is producing grain. . . . The best way to break down Bolshevism is to penetrate that great country with honest commercial methods." ⁴⁰ Krasin, on the other hand, defended Soviet policies by writing:

An abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade would lead to the destruction of the sovereignty of our country. Occidental imperialism, having abandoned the idea of armed intervention, is now making endeavors to pierce our commercial front, but in this they will not succeed. Soviet rule considers as the bed-rock of its policy—the nationalization of transport, large industry, and foreign trade.⁴¹

So Radek, who was close to Chicherin, declared in November, 1921:

— We are certain that foreign capital, which must work in Russia on such conditions as we propose, will inevitably be digging its own grave; with each additional shovelful of coal, with each bucket of oil, which we shall obtain with the aid of foreign technical methods, foreign capital will only be digging for itself its own grave.⁴²

— Under the circumstances, it was small wonder that foreign capital refused to dig. The British Trade Agreement at the end of its first six months had not benefited either party to it. Furthermore, there was already taking place a violent correspondence between the two Foreign Offices with respect to charges as to propaganda in violation of the agreement. This began on September 20, 1921, with a British note charging that in a number of specified ways Soviet Russia was responsible for activities directed against British interests in Afghanistan and India. In his recital of alleged facts, Lord Curzon may have laid himself open to charges that he was depending on docu-

ments which had been peddled about from one Foreign Office to another. Certainly, there were a series of forgeries of this description that were offered privately for sale just prior to September. Later, Lord Curzon denied that he was indebted to any of these; but there was a certain lack of precision in some of the charges and errors in others that did not bear out his case. It is probable that, while many of the charges were substantially correct, some of them could easily be refuted and thus discredit thrown on the attack as a whole. The correspondence ran to pages, and in view of the vehement denials of the Soviet government there is no purpose in examining them in detail.⁴³ Specifically, however, the Soviet authorities denied that the Third Internationale and Soviet government were one and the same either in fact or juridically. As we have already seen it is unnecessary to argue this matter. For *Gospolitupra*, or the Department of State Political Administration, the successor of the Cheka, has very possibly undertaken some of the work that formerly was rather bunglingly done by the Third Internationale. *Gospolitupra* is actually an organ of the Soviet government, and any assertion by the Soviet authorities that they are not responsible for activities of propaganda conducted under its auspices are false. In any case, the charges were in substance repeated in May, 1923, on new evidence and were much more feebly and less effectively denied by the Soviet government. The entire controversy served to show, however, that the Trade Agreement did not stand on solid ground. What, perhaps, weakened Curzon's attack in September, 1921, was the failure to denounce the agreement if he had finally accepted himself all of the charges put forth against the Russian government. There also came as a surprise Lloyd George's proposal for an economic conference at Genoa to discuss among other matters, the status of Russia. This in itself would have postponed a decision in the matter.

This controversy, however, lost interest in view of the appalling famine which overwhelmed Russia in the summer of 1921. The dispute still rages as to how far the Soviet authorities were responsible for some of its results. Certainly

it is true that because of the breakdown of economic life in Russia, because of the system of requisition of grain, and because of the lack of facilities for foreign trade the surplus grain of Russia had disappeared. The "bursting granaries" of which Lloyd George had spoken so glowingly only a year before were now empty wrecks. Even if they had ever existed, the famine would have demanded all their stock. The work of the American Relief Administration and of other organizations was able to reduce the loss of life so that in July, 1923, its administration could be withdrawn. As we shall see, the famine bore a part in foreign policy. For the British, however, it further postponed the prospect of the recovery of the Russian market and quite definitely prevented the sale of Russian produce at reduced prices in Western Europe at least until the autumn of 1923. That the drought was an act of God no one can deny; that it was much more severe in its effect because of the results of Soviet rule few will question.

Trade has, nevertheless, now improved. As Soviet Russia by successive compromises with capitalism has restored in part the energy of the individual, commerce has become more possible. That this is due to the Trade Agreement may be doubtful. Certainly, the United States without recognition and without any agreement has been doing a much better business with Russia than has Great Britain. The facts are that in 1922 trade between Russia and Great Britain nearly doubled, rising from £6,085,964 to £12,893,000. Of the latter figure Russia exported to Great Britain goods to the value of more than £8,000,000, which was about twice the value of British exports to Russia. Since March, 1921, when the agreement was signed, the total turnover has been about £20,000,000 worth. This is £5,000,000 less than is estimated by Arcos, Ltd., the buying and selling agency of the Soviet government in England. The United States in 1922 enjoyed the largest trade with Russia; this, however, included supplies shipped to the A. R. A. Germany was second and Great Britain was third. In 1913, British trade with Russia was five times that of the United States, being £27,694,000.⁴⁴

In May, 1923, the old question of propaganda in the East

once more came to the front. This time it was in more serious form because it was complicated with other matters,—claims for damages for the death and the imprisonment of British citizens, the rights of British trawlers outside the territorial waters of Russia, and the language of notes addressed to the British government by the Soviet Foreign Office. On all of these points the British protested and on May 2 gave ten days as the time limit for a satisfactory reply; otherwise the Anglo-Russian trade agreement would be terminated. With regard to propaganda, the note was specific and quoted sentences from documents said to have been sent from the Russian Legations in Teheran and Kabul. After several exchanges of notes, the danger of a break became less and finally was concluded by a statement that Russia had essentially met British demands.

The Soviet governments agreed to the complete withdrawal of the objectionable notes, to pay damages to Mrs. Stan Harding and to the widow of Davison, both British citizens, and to refer the question of the trawlers to an international conference, in the meantime freeing British ships which had been seized. As to propaganda, Raskolnikov was transferred from Kabul in the ordinary course of the diplomatic service, but the envoy at Teheran was retained. Furthermore, the scope of the mutual guarantee was enlarged by the pledge on the part of Moscow to abstain from propaganda in British "dominions, colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories," Great Britain giving the same pledge as to hostile designs against Russia on the part of Russian emigrés. The solution arrived at was undoubtedly due to the unwillingness of Soviet Russia to sacrifice the prestige and material advantage coming from the Agreement and also to the effect it would have "in the present state of Europe," which "would threaten far more than the Russo-British trade agreement." Such a breach, as Chicherin said, would be a "political disaster."⁴⁵

NEGOTIATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

The British trade agreement served as an introduction to the commercial life of Western Europe. Thanks to it, the

banking facilities of London were open to Soviet Russia, and it was also a model for other agreements. But even before commerce had assumed the importance that it did later, the problem of the repatriation of war prisoners gave opportunity to Soviet Russia to establish offices in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, and elsewhere. These offices became the open door to other matters. Thus, out of negotiations relating to the conclusion of war, steps were taken which prepared for peaceful intercourse. Full political recognition was the ultimate goal of Soviet policy. Furthermore, an office for the exchange of prisoners gave play for propaganda and led to opportunities for intrigue in the domestic politics of the country concerned. In the case of allied states, especially France, the way was also open to protest regarding the treatment of the Russian battalions who were still held in 1919 practically as prisoners. To many of these the opportunity of returning home to revolutionary Russia seemed almost like Hobson's choice. Yet almost anything was preferable to their wretched and anomalous condition in post-war France.

1. *France*.—The correspondence with France is scattered through the earlier years; particularly in 1919, the Russian Red Cross Mission to relieve Russian troops in France was the cause of much trouble. From the first, Manuilsky, the head of the mission, does not seem to have been efficient, nor on the other hand did the French government free itself from the strong prejudice and suspicion with which it regarded the entire matter. Charges were made that Russian troops were subject to political persecution in France, and complaint was made regarding the arrest of members of the French military mission in Russia.⁴⁶ As late as January, 1920, long after the repatriation of most of the troops, the treatment of Russians in foreign countries is made the subject of resolutions and of propaganda by Zinoviev at Petrograd. Thus:

The German, French, English, and Austrian bourgeoisie turn Russian prisoners of war into slaves. They make Russian prisoners of war die of hunger. They force them to do the heaviest kind of work. They turn them into beasts of burden. They try to recruit for cannon fodder for Tsarist generals.⁴⁷

Such complaints unfortunately did not lead anywhere. Indeed, it was not till 1922 that the unofficial commercial mission of Herriot, the Mayor of Lyons, cast a ray of light on the situation. Then, following the abortive meetings at Genoa and the Hague, Herriot, himself a Socialist, undertook a personal trip to Moscow, largely as he said in the interest of the Lyons fair. "I go on the principle that there are situations which cannot remain abnormal perpetually, that one cannot walk indefinitely on one's hands." Therefore, he went to Moscow to see for himself and to combat the possibility that German business might profit by the situation, which he said would be "an ostrich-like policy" for France.⁴⁸ Nothing political has resulted from this expedition, but many more Frenchmen have made the same trip; so far the commercial development has been small. Herriot says in March, 1923:

I believe, then, that in the near future, especially if Russia has a good harvest in 1923, if it can export and consequently obtain some capital, relations between it and France will quietly be renewed. . . . But this reconciliation between the two nations is desired by both peoples. It will be accomplished.⁴⁹

In February and March, 1923, there seemed to be considerable chance that France would inaugurate trade relations with Soviet Russia. The course of events and the complications in the Ruhr district have, however, postponed future official action.

2. *Germany*.—In connection with the negotiation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, there were repeated sessions on war prisoners. These at first were interrupted by Radek's protests regarding the arrest of independent Socialists in Germany and regarding the deportation of Polish workmen and the inhabitants of occupied territories. Long delays followed, but the repatriation took place, with the assistance of Scandinavian Red Cross societies, until in 1921 the exchange of those who wished to return was practically complete.⁵⁰

Radek, in April, 1918, became for a time head of the Central European Division of the Russian Foreign Office.⁵¹ Later, as Joffe was expelled from Germany, Radek went to Germany, there to be interned himself for many months during 1919.

Throughout the entire period he became the directing expert of Russian policy regarding relations with Germany. On his release in January, 1920, he published at once an article on "Germany and Soviet Russia."⁵² This was capped by an interview in *Vorwaerts* with Kopp, the head at Berlin of the Russian mission for the exchange of prisoners.⁵³ The burden of these was the mutual need of closer relations between Soviet Russia and Germany. These should be along business lines. The harder the Allies pressed Germany the more ready the Germans were to turn toward Soviet Russia. Even the temporary victory of more conservative groups in Germany was welcomed by Radek, as he believed that the inevitable reaction from conservative rule would lead toward world-revolution. To this end the air was kept full of wireless messages and propaganda, though Russian disappointment at the lack of German enthusiasm was marked. Communists in Germany wanted to be prosecuted or persecuted. When neither happened they were depressed.⁵⁴

This did not prevent the signing of a new agreement regarding repatriation of prisoners in the spring of 1920.⁵⁵ In the meantime, Kopp kept up his missionary work and took advantage of the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian agreement, finally to secure a similar agreement with Germany. This was signed at Berlin on May 6, 1921, only after Great Britain had completed her arrangements.⁵⁶ In the summer the German commercial mission arrived at Moscow under Wiedenfeld, while Maltzan, a pro-Russian, became head of the Eastern Division of the German Foreign Office. Radek also continued to write articles from Moscow which in the main aimed to promote better relations.⁵⁷ During the winter of 1921-22, these traveled rapidly until at Genoa, in April, the obvious step was taken of full diplomatic recognition. If we may believe the press, only Lloyd George and the editors were surprised. The treaty of Rapallo, however, belongs to a later period.

3. *Austria*.—Austria-Hungary did not receive a Soviet envoy in 1918, particularly as the experience of Germany showed the Russian mission there was largely for propaganda.⁵⁸ Later, repatriation missions were sent to both Vi-

enna and Budapest which were promptly accused of stirring up trouble.⁵⁹ In the case of Bela Kun, as we have seen, this was true. The obstacles placed in the way of exchange by the Russian authorities and their propaganda to fan the racial antagonisms of the Dual Monarchy were the subject of violent correspondence. After the establishment of the republic in Vienna, a Russian agency was set up which succeeded on July 5, 1920, in signing an agreement nominally dealing with war prisoners but which, in the pledge given by Austria to remain neutral in the event of war, went beyond even commercial negotiation.⁶⁰ Later, on December 7, 1921, a more formal commercial agreement attempted to translate the general convention of Copenhagen (July 5, 1920) regarding repatriation into practical political recognition.⁶¹ This treaty is the basis of the exchange of diplomatic representatives and of the *de facto* recognition of the Soviet government. Like Berlin, Vienna signed this agreement only after the Anglo-Russian agreement had been concluded. During these years, Bronski, who first went to Vienna in 1920, has been repeatedly accused of propaganda, and the importance of Vienna as a center for the Third Internationale has increased.

4. *Czechoslovakia*.—We have already seen the importance of the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia. Its departure eastward was aided by the presence of Dr. Masaryk at Petrograd early in 1918. Later, as severe fighting led to the capture of Czechoslovak prisoners by the Russians, the problem of repatriation became important. In January, 1919, there was an exchange of notes by which, at the same time, Czechoslovakia was noted as an independent state and protests were laid by Soviet Russia regarding the arrest of Russian agents in Czechoslovakia. In 1919 Hillerson was sent to Prague at the head of a Russian Red Cross mission in charge of repatriation. From the moment of his arrival, propaganda among local Communists took on a violence that greatly alarmed Czech leaders.⁶² President Masaryk was forced to appeal personally to his people; finally, in November, 1920, the more radical elements were put down by force. The Russian Co-operatives were also accused of undue political activity in Prague.

During 1921, the effect of bad conditions in Russia told on the minds of Czech radicals to such an extent that despite the allotment of large sums to Hillerson at Prague, the campaign for world-revolution rapidly fell off. The Third Internationale was much disappointed and attempted a reorganization of the Czech Communist party in November, 1921; this, however, did not result in much, as attention was now turned to the promotion of commercial relations. An exchange of unofficial missions between the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia had taken place in the summer of 1921, and telegraphic communication was opened with Soviet Russia in July. The importance of Russia as a market was clearly recognized, but the Foreign Office was very suspicious. There was not a story regarding the activity of the Red army that was not quickly passed on to the west. Indeed, Benès, the Czechoslovak Premier, at times seemed to be almost a scare-monger. However, the negotiations for a commercial treaty, which began in 1921, finally came to a head with the signature on June 5, 1922, of an agreement modeled on the lines of the Anglo-Russian document. It has been evident that with characteristic energy the Czechoslovaks, now secure under this document, have set to work to develop trading relations on a sound basis.⁶⁴

5. *Norway*.—In the case of Norway, a commercial agreement was signed on September 2, 1921. Prior to this, however, during September and October, 1920, a vigorous correspondence had been going on with reference to its negotiation. An *impasse* was reached because the Norwegian government refused, even by implication, to recognize Soviet Russia *de jure* and because Norway insisted on her full right to reject or to eject from Norway people sent from Moscow to be members of the Russian commercial delegation at Christiana.⁶⁵ Litvinov was compelled, following the acceptance of such terms by Soviet Russia in the Anglo-Russian agreement, to agree to similar terms being specified in the preliminary agreement with Norway. Throughout the negotiations, the Norwegian government proceeded cautiously and hesitated even to permit Litvinov to go to Christiana to negotiate.⁶⁶ The language of the agreement follows the British model closely, but in Ar-

ticle XI there is the specific statement that "the monopoly of foreign trade—as far as Russia is concerned—belongs to the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. which works through the Commissariat of Foreign Trade and its organizations." The monopoly of trade, therefore, forbade all attempts at private trade. A precise supplementary statement was also signed prohibiting any members of the respective delegations from engaging in political propaganda or from interfering in the internal affairs of the country.⁶⁷ Under this agreement, the chief object of dispute has been the endeavor of Soviet Russia to extend her territorial waters in such fashion as to prohibit Norwegian fishing boats from engaging in their trade within twelve miles from the coast.⁶⁸ At present the discussion continues.

6. *Sweden*.—Sweden, on the contrary, signed a commercial agreement with Soviet Russia which afterward failed of ratification by the Swedish Parliament. The matter of trade and banking, however, has gone on without any special difficulty: Indeed, as early as May, 1918, the Swedish Legation at Petrograd began to look for trade with Russia;⁶⁹ later in 1920, Krassin signed a private treaty with a Swedish Exporters' Association, which enjoyed a monopoly of trade.⁷⁰ This, however, had no official character as regards the Swedish Foreign Office. The endeavor to translate the private agreement into a public document hung fire for a long time. This was due to hesitation by the Swedish government, and to the fact that Stockholm, without the protection of any agreement, had become the financial G. H. Q. for the Third Internationale, and in many other respects had assumed an importance that lasted till the end of 1921. Then as Soviet authorities began to bank in Copenhagen, in London and elsewhere, the question of a trade agreement became more important. This was signed on March 9, 1922, and rejected on June 1. The Branting government did not press strongly for its ratification and refused to resign on its defeat. Chicherin charged that French banking interests, the opposition of Swedish exporting interests who were already engaged in a practical monopoly, and general conservative feeling incident to the failure of the Genoa

Conference, were responsible. On the whole its rejection does not seem to have made any special difference.⁷¹

7. *Denmark*.—Copenhagen remains as always "the whispering gallery of Europe"; with the Russian Revolution it also became a clearing post. Here came the first refugees and here gathered the army of secret service agents of all countries. In particular in the winter and early spring of 1920 the negotiations with the British passed their first stage. Wise, of the British Food Administration, who had been responsible for the earlier negotiations with Berkenheim of the Russian Co-operatives met Krassin at Copenhagen in April, 1920.⁷² Litvinov was faced with the bitter disappointment of the absolute refusal of the British to permit him to enter England. He, therefore, remained at Copenhagen; later he went to Reval.⁷³ Such negotiations had largely familiarized the Danes with the possibilities of Russian trade; their Red Cross had played no small part in arranging for the exchange of prisoners and in 1919 was the last Western European delegation to quit Soviet Russia. The Danish government had attempted to arrange for trade in 1918;⁷⁴ and in April, 1920, a private agreement was drawn up at Copenhagen between Danish banking and industrial elements and Krassin. This was not a public document; but the famous Landmand's Bank became heavily interested in various Russian ventures. Copenhagen, therefore, aimed to become the clearing house for Russian trade. Unfortunately, owing to the famine and to the lack of Russian exports, the Landmand's Bank failed in 1922 with a crash that sounded across the world. The result has been that the revival of interest has been slow. Recently, in 1923, however, a commercial agreement has been signed by the Danish government with Soviet Russia. This is again on the British model.

8. *Italy*.—Italy was early marked down by Soviet authorities as a field for Third Internationale propaganda; but the split among Italian Socialists, which was fomented from Moscow, did not result in a decided gain for the Communist cause. The need for Russian grain was, however, a potent factor in leading the Italian government in 1920 to enter into negotia-

tions with the Russian Co-operatives. Nitti, the Prime Minister, had shown himself favorable to the matter, and in December, 1920, the Ukrainian Soviet began to ask for direct relations.⁷⁵ Vorovsky came to Rome in 1921 and on December 26, preliminary commercial agreements were signed between Italy and Soviet Russia and Italy and Soviet Ukraine.⁷⁶ These are directly based on the British Trade Agreement with Soviet Russia. During the winter, further negotiations took place, and on March 19, 1922, Sforza, the Italian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced that a more formal commercial agreement was also to be signed with Soviet Russia. This was done on May 29, 1922, but the *Izvestia* of June 16 announced that it had failed of ratification. This was in spite of the fact that it was signed by Chicherin himself at Genoa. The ground given was that it "was in open contradiction to the resolution of the last session of the Central Executive Committee." The text of the agreement has not been made public. If we are to judge both from Russian and Italian sources, the supplementary agreements at least went much beyond anything previously negotiated.⁷⁷ They apparently included grants of lands to Italy in the Caucasus or southern Russia, spoke of oil concessions, and of an Italian shipping service. It was also charged that these economic interests were to be in the hands of special Italian firms; so there was criticism in Italy as well. Nothing further has developed regarding the matter. Vorovsky remained at Rome as unofficial Russian agent until he went to Lausanne to be shot there in May, 1923.

This completes the list of European countries with which commercial agreements have been signed. Such documents are almost entirely due to the initiative taken by the Supreme Council in 1920. In fact, nearly every one is a close copy of the British Agreement. None of them seems to provide trade, nor does trade seem to depend on them. They undoubtedly give business interests a sense of security, but in the case of the United States, which has done the largest amount of trade with Russia, no commercial agreement has been signed. In the case of France, no agreement exists and on November 9, 1921, the French government definitely refused to make one.

Nevertheless, Frenchmen are trading on a small scale in Russia. The entire question of trade depends in large part on the restoration of productivity in Russia. That in turn has been stimulated by the adoption of the New Economic Policy or N. E. P. How far remote such a policy may still be from the requirements of capital and credit may be judged in the next chapter. Certainly, in the trade agreements, Soviet Russia retained her monopoly of foreign trade; it remains to be seen whether with the policy of "mixed companies," she can induce foreign loans or foreign credit.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

1. *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 16, 1921.
2. *Times* (London), March 17, 1921.
3. Quoted in *Current History*, XVII, p. 957.
4. *Times* (London), Nov. 9, 1919.
5. *House of Commons Debates*, Nov. 13, 1919.
6. Summary of *Wireless News*, Moscow, Nov. 20, 1919.
7. *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 18, 1919.
8. *Soviet Russia*, Jan. 17, 1920.
9. *Times* (London), Jan. 6 and 20, 1920.
10. *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, Feb. 4, 1920.
11. *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1920; "The Co-operatives and Trade," in *Soviet Russia*, Jan. 31, Feb. 7, also April 24, May 15, 1920; Hibben, "Co-operation—Russia's Latest Panacea," in *Current History*, XVI, p. 101.
12. *Times* (London), Jan. 29, 1920.
13. *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1920.
14. *Sbornik*, I, p. 120 (translated in English in *Soviet Russia*, April 17, 1920).
15. *Times* (London), Feb. 25, 1920.
16. *Izvestia*, Feb. 15, 1920.
17. *Ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1920 (quoted by Pasvolsky, *New York Tribune*, June 6, 1920).
18. *Chronicle* (London), April 3, 1920. Cf. *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 14, 1920; *Soviet Russia*, April 24, 1920.
19. *Current History*, XII, pp. 635, 748; *House of Commons Debates*, June 7, 1920.
20. *Daily Herald*, March 22, 27, 31, 1920; *Soviet Russia*, March 26, 1921, p. 319 (Chicherin's note of Jan. 9, 1921, refers to "the subsidies which were offered to the newspaper, *The Daily Herald*, by the Executive Committee of the Third Internationale").
21. *Daily Herald*, April 3, 5, 6, 1920; *Times* (London), April 7, June 11, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, May 25, 1920.
22. *Times* (London), Nov. 22, 1920.
23. *Wireless News*, Moscow, July 7, 9, 1920.
24. *Soviet Russia*, Aug. 14, Sept. 11, Oct. 30, 1920; *Pravda*, Sept. 3, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Aug. 25, 1920; *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 12, 1920.
25. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Sept. 4, 1920.
26. *Times* (London), Jan. 7, 1921.
27. *Ibid.* (London), Jan. 27, 1921.
28. *Izvestia*, Jan. 14, 1921.
29. *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1921.

30. *Sbornik*, II, p. 18; *Times* (London), March 17, 1921; *Commerce Reports*, No. 74, March 31, 1921; *Current History*, XIV, p. 257. The extension of the agreement to Canada was made on July 3, 1922. *Sbornik*, IV, p. 15; *Izvestia*, Sept. 20, 1922. *Pravda*, March 9, 1921, announced that Centrosoyus (The Co-operatives) became an official agency to "spread the idea of the Third Internationale among Co-operative groups of Western Europe." This was vehemently denied by *Wireless News*, April 9, 1921; *Russian Press Rev.*, May 4, 1921, and by *Soviet Russia*, April 23, 1921, in the endeavor to prevent the notion that Soviet Russia was immediately violating the Trade Agreement.
31. *House of Commons Debates*, March 9, 1921.
32. *Times* (London), March 17, 1921.
33. *Current History*, XIV, pp. 182, 255.
34. *Ibid.*, XIV, p. 522.
35. *Ibid.*, XIV, p. 522.
36. *Ibid.*, XIV, p. 522.
37. *Soviet Russia*, August, 1921; *Current History*, XVI, p. 677.
38. *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement. Russia No. 2* (1921), Cd. 1456, London, 1921.
39. *Current History*, XIV, p. 876.
40. *Times* (London), Oct. 13, 1921.
41. *Novy Put*, Sept. 10, 1921.
42. *Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1921.
43. *Times* (London), Sept. 21, 27, Oct. 8, 1921; *Wireless News*, Sept. 21, 1921 ("Britain's note is a tissue of forgeries, fantastic stories, and incredible divagation"), Sept. 23, 24, 25, 28, 1921; *Soviet Russia*, Dec., 1921; *Izvestia*, Sept. 30, Nov. 18, 1921; *Ost-Information*, Sept. 24, Oct. 5, 1921.
44. *Statesman's Year Book*, 1923; Glasgow "Foreign Affairs," in *Contemporary Review*, June, 1923.
45. *Correspondence with the Russian Soviet Government respecting the Imprisonment of Mrs. Stan Harding in Russia, Russia No. 1* (1922), Cd. 1602, London, 1922; *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government respecting the murder of Mr. C. F. Davison in January, 1920, Russia No. 1* (1923), Cd. 1846. London, 1923; *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government respecting the relations between the two Governments, Russia No. 2* (1923), Cd. 1869, London, 1923; *Reply*, etc. (in continuation), Cd. 1974. London, 1923; *New York Times*, May 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, June 1, 13, and 14, 1923.

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46. *Izvestia*, March 14, April 6, 10, 17, May 11, 1919.
47. *Petrograd Pravda*, Jan. 1, 1920.
48. Herriot, "Vues sur la Russie," in *L'Exporteur Français*, Aug. 28, 1922; *New York Times*, Aug. 18, 19, Oct. 5, 18, 19, 1922; *World*, Oct. 16, 1922; *Public Ledger*, Oct. 19, 1922; *Izvestia*, Sept. 21, 1922.
49. Herriot, "A French View of Russia," in *Current History*, XVII, p. 958.
50. *Izvestia*, Dec. 2, 1917; Jan. 2, 5, 10, 11, 12, 31, Feb. 14, 17, June 5, 1918; *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Feb. 19, 1918; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Dec. 29, 1919.
51. *Izvestia*, April 11, 1918.
52. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 27, 1920; *Izvestia*, Feb. 17, 1920. *Soviet Russia*, April 17, 1920.
53. *Vorwaerts*, Feb. 20, 1920. Cf. *Izvestia*, Feb. 19, 1920.
54. *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, March 20, 31, 1920; *Pravda*, March 16, 20, 1920, *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 15, 1920; *Rote Fahne*, Dec. 4, 19, 1920; *Kreuzzeitung*, Dec. 8, 1920; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Dec. 8, 1920.
55. *Sbornik*, I, pp. 128, 131, 133; II, p. 89.
56. *Ibid.*, II, p. 91.
57. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Feb. 2, 1921; *Wireless News*, Nauen, July 29, 1921; *New York Times*, Dec. 25, 1921; *Pravda*, Nov. 11, 1921; *Izvestia*, Nov. 17, 1921; Feb. 4, March 25, 1922; *Living Age*, May 6, 1922. Cf. Radek, "Die auswärtige Politik Sowjet Russlands" (*Bibliothek der Kommunistischen Internationale*, No. 11) (Hamburg, 1921).
58. *Izvestia*, April 26, May 11, 17, June 12, Oct. 19, 24, 1918.
59. *Ibid.*, March 15, 1919.
60. *Sbornik*, I, p. 117; *Current History*, XIII, Part 1, p. 46.
61. *Sbornik*, III, p. 29.
62. *Izvestia*, Jan. 11, 1919.
63. *Wireless News*, Prague, Oct. 13, 1920; *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 1, 1921.
64. *Izvestia*, June 14, 24, 1922; *Gazette de Prague*, July 12, 1922.
65. *Social Demokraten*, Nov. 19, 1920.
66. *Wireless News*, Moscow, July 28, 1920.
67. *Sbornik*, II, p. 32; *Storthing Pep.*, No. 189 (1921), *Bilag I*.
68. *Wireless News*, Christiana, Sept. 7, 1921; *Pravda*, July 21, 1922.
69. *Izvestia*, May 23, 1918.
70. *Times* (London), April 9, 1920.
71. Text of the rejected agreement in *Nation* (N. Y.), April 5, 1922; *Soviet Russia*, April 15, 1922; *Swenska Dagbladet*, June 9, 1922.

- 72. *Times* (London), April 9, 1920.
- 73. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Dec. 6, 1919; *Social Demokraten*, March 11, 1920.
- 74. *Izvestia*, May 4, 1918.
- 75. *Wireless News*, Nikolaiev, Dec. 14, 1920. Cf. Landau-Aldanov, "La Politica Estera dei Soviets" (Roma, 1921), (pamphlet).
- 76. *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 22, 1921; texts of the agreements in *Soviet Russia*, Feb. 1, 1922, and in *Current History*, XV, p. 1034.
- 77. *Nation* (N. Y.), Aug. 2, 1922; *Il Mondo*, June 7, 1922; Cf. *Public Ledger*, Sept. 25, 1922; *New York Times*, Dec. 6, 1922.

CHAPTER XV

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD

If the former visitors wish to untangle the knot in order to avoid complete chaos and a new world-war, they must forget Versailles and Washington and convene a new world-conference at which will be represented all peoples and Powers. This conference will differ from previous ones in that it will have to take into account from the very beginning the three following facts. (1) That America is the richest country in the world. (2) That Russia once more exists as a world Power, having reunited all its lands from the Pacific Ocean to the Beresina. (3) That the former victors will hasten their ruin if they continue the attempts to put on Germany and on Russia the unbearable burden of economic obligations instead of re-establishing the economic life of the world by common efforts.—RADEK, Nov. 30, 1921.¹

The second lesson (of the new economic policy) has been that we can test the comparative merits of state and capitalist enterprises. Actual competition is being established now between capitalist methods and our own. . . . Until now we only wrote programs and made promises. In its own time this was absolutely indispensable. Without a program and promises it was not possible to start a world-revolution. . . . Now, however, matters stand so that we have to provide a really serious test for our work, not the kind of test made by control agencies established by the Communists themselves, but one that will meet the demands of national economy.—*Lenin's Speech at the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party.*²

THROUGHOUT the negotiations, which took place during 1920-21, regarding the British Trade Agreement, we see the gradual shift in the foreign policies of Soviet Russia. There is in the Russian press at first, in early 1920, rejoicing over the abolition of the blockade by the Allies. The importance of the Red army in securing this victory is everywhere proclaimed. The picture drawn of the divisions and futilities

of anti-Bolshevik Europe and America is a real one; the essential features of European economic disorganization were described. The appreciation of the prostrate condition of Russia was, however, not evident.³ Thus Lenin said in the end of January, 1920:

We have come out victorious from the first two years of civil war, which were the most difficult years, as we were ruined by the imperialistic war and cut off from grain and coal. But now we have grain and fuel in abundance. . . . It is true that we cannot export it immediately, but transportation is disorganized in all Europe. . . . We have already oil. . . . We are making an inventory of all this and are getting ready to transport it. . . . Formerly [people] said: "Each for himself and God for all" and how much sorrow resulted. We shall say: "Each for all and we shall manage to get along without God."⁴

That remained to be seen. The task of restoring trade was to be enormous. As we have seen, one difficulty came immediately to the front. It was quite impossible to carry on exchange of goods with Centrosoyus or the Co-operative Organizations. In spite of their emphatic messages that Centrosoyus would be responsible, the Soviet authorities very quickly asserted the power of the government and successfully insisted that the Co-operatives were entirely under their control.⁵ A second difficulty lay in the natural suspicion felt by the Soviet leaders toward proposals from the Allies. Thus Litvinov said on January 19, 1920, in a wireless message to Chicherin:

The importance of the Paris decision [as to the removal of the blockade] depends on the sincerity of intention and on the Allies' general policy toward Russia. If this policy remains unchanged, declaration is mere lip-service to popular demand. Northcliffe and Churchill are trying to frighten British people with accounts of the "enemy" approaching the borders of the British Empire. . . . Suspicions between nations are full of danger. In the case of Russia, suspicions will continue to exist until Britain gets rid of all misunderstandings by making unreserved peace.⁶

Litvinov continued to warn of the dangers of French intrigue in Poland and Rumania. This turned out to be true during the Polish war which was renewed with vigor in the

spring of 1920. The Moscow Communist Committee also declared that the policy of the Allies was "without the slightest intention of helping Russia in the economic sphere."⁷ Lenin, in talks in mid-February, gave a view of the self-sufficiency of Russia that implied a misunderstanding of the economic fabric of the world.⁸ Steklov, curiously, was more moderate, but he wrote of "an alliance between German and Russian workmen that suggests the music of the future."⁹ He was confident of the political recognition of Russia, to be brought about by the pressure of popular opinion. Radek summed up the situation in sarcastic vein:

Russia intends to pay her debts in order to receive peace from the gracious creditors of Nicholas II. But the English Stock Exchange will hardly agree that the French rentier have a monopoly on the exploitation of Russia. If the English business world wishes to receive Russian raw materials, then it must curb the zeal of its French colleagues and explain to them that if the horse is to pull the cart one cannot get along without expenditure for oats.¹⁰

Chicherin took a saner view of the situation. He said: "There is no reason why we should not resume trade relations and offer concessions to capitalistic nations without sacrificing Communist principles. The problem offers complications, but they can be solved. The Soviet Government does not contemplate world-wide propaganda, regarding as the best propaganda a demonstration that economic industrial development can be carried on."¹¹ Had that pious hope been realized, it would certainly have quickened commerce. On the question of payment of debts Chicherin stood as he did in 1918. In a signed statement of March 7, 1920, he said:

The Soviet Government have not the least intention of abandoning the Soviet system and of returning to bourgeois parliamentarism. That would mean capitulation; we repudiate such an idea. About the annulment of debts, the degree of our concessions will be decided when we negotiate and will be on a less generous scale if the other party delays an agreement.¹²

In the refusal by Soviet Russia of the plan for a League of Nations commission on Russia,¹³ in proposed negotiations for

oil, in the long-drawn-out bargaining at London and Moscow, and in the vigorous fighting across the plains of Poland, which all crowded the balance of 1920, there was the sad fact of Russia's inability to do business with the Western world. There was also the failure of Western Europe to convince Russia that against Communism the outside world must be closed. The tragedy of the situation for the sick and dying in Russia lay in the almost humorous announcement by wireless from Petrograd: "The blockade has been broken through. A truck of cod liver oil has arrived."¹⁴ With the return of winter, with the conclusion of peace with Poland, and with the signing of the British Trade Agreement, there was again opportunity to take stock of the state of affairs. The result was the announcement of N. E. P.—the New Economic Policy. This program is still in evolution. It lies at the basis of the new orientation of Soviet foreign policy.

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

The complaint was made as early as September, 1920, that "the partial opening of the frontiers found the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade absolutely unprepared." It was plain that "in a sea of bourgeois appetites and imperialistic desires" Russia would, as a Socialist state, be in a very difficult position. As the writer said: "It will be necessary to export what we need ourselves simply in order to buy in exchange that which we need even more. For every locomotive, for every plow, we shall be obliged in the literal sense of the word to use pieces torn out of the body of our national economy."¹⁵ In October, the situation was little improved, for "to date we have paid for the goods secured abroad for the most part in gold and of course we have not such a large quantity of this."¹⁶ The export of lumber was expensive and disastrous from the point of view of the destruction of forests on which Russia was dependent to protect the distribution of moisture.

The main export of Russia in time past had been grain. Now the Soviet authorities were face to face with the fact that they were without their stable export. The peasants had

rejoiced at the nationalization of land and at the division of the large estates. The Soviet conception of production had, however, included a "grain levy." The peasants had therefore, reduced production; now they had given up planting and harvesting more than they needed for themselves. Their reserves of grain were exhausted and Russia, by the summer of 1921, was to be in the bony hands of famine. It was in vain that *Pravda* proclaimed that Russia:

"is starving and cold; it is in rags and barefooted, but it will gloriously finish this struggle for its independence. The slogan of Soviet Russia is: "Let us defeat the remaining enemies, and create a new life."¹⁷

In vain also were cheerful telegrams and propaganda distributed broadcast. The truth was: Russia had scarcely a thing to export; her transportation system was a wreck; her fuel supplies were at a standstill; her textiles were negligible; the peasants were revolting in various provinces in 1920; and her entire agricultural and industrial life was "shot through and through." Add to this the fact that Great Britain and Germany, with both of whom she was starting commercial relations, were themselves to enter a period of strikes and economic distress. The ruble daily sagged in value till gold alone was available for foreign purchases. Her finances were in profound confusion and no relief was in sight. Then, in February and March, 1921, came the Kronstadt revolt which threatened the life of the Soviet state. The seriousness of this domestic event was the climax which hastened the adoption of remedial measures. Lenin, in March, announced a new economic program which was promptly enacted on April 7, 1921.¹⁸

This had been preceded by many and often bitter discussions. The gamut of Communism was under discussion. Trotsky talked without avail of the Communist Party as "the party of action."¹⁹ He favored the militarization of labor and spoke of drastic action. But you cannot drive more than 130,000,000 stolid peasants, who are themselves indifferent to political issues. Slowly the conception came that

some radical concession must be made to restore individual endeavor, in order to increase production, and thus to provide the means by which the necessities of economic life might be secured. These were the months in which the Foreign Office was fighting for a reorganization of its authority. The Third Internationale was urging a more vigorous propaganda abroad and the control of Russia's foreign policies was at stake. It was necessary to bring Soviet power to the test and to assert the will and the conviction of its leader—Lenin.

Unfortunately, we have not as yet the authentic story of those days. The various versions which have reached me, often in some detail, do not warrant in a book of this sort more than a mere summary. The Soviet government may believe in open diplomacy, but the full story of these controversies on sound authority does not travel abroad at present. That Lenin won as the result of repeated conferences and finally by virtue of his candor, his tact, and his will, is now evident. In March, 1921, he addressed the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party at Moscow. He defined the problem which confronted Soviet Russia and the Communist Party as arising from the difficult transition from war to peace. He quickly acknowledged errors in calculation and conduct as to demobilization, the Polish war, and the supply of food and of fuel. The present crisis was due to the failure of the harvest and to the deterioration of agriculture now going on. The progress of the idea of international revolution must continue, he maintained; "but if we were to suggest that in a short time help is coming from that quarter in the shape of a proletarian revolution we should be mad, and I am sure that no one in this hall would make such a suggestion." Then turning to constructive proposals, he said:

We must have real trade relations. . . . In this connection is the question of concessions. . . . This is necessary because we are unable by our own efforts to re-establish our ruined industry without equipment and technical assistance from abroad. The mere importation of this equipment is not sufficient. We can give concessions on a much wider basis in order to secure for ourselves the installation of equipment according to the last word in tech-

nique. In this manner we may be able to catch up to some extent at least with the modern syndicates of other countries. . . . Of course, these trusts on their part are not merely rendering us a service. They are doing this only for the sake of colossal profits. Modern capitalism is not like the capitalism of the previous normal periods. It makes hundred-per-cent profits by taking advantage of its monopolist position in the world-market.²⁰

The fundamental question, however, was that of production of grain. Sweeping aside the theories of Communism as to the right and power of the state to levy "a grain requisition," he proposed that in the future the "grain levy" should be abandoned for a time and in its place there should be laid a definite tax. Instead of collecting all the harvest that was not to be actually used by the peasant, a fixed amount was to be collected and then the individual peasant was to be free to sell himself the balance of his production. In that way individual initiative would be restored. As Lenin described it:

In the transition from war to peace amidst conditions of economic crisis, we must remember that it is easier to carry out the work of constructing a proletarian state in a country with a large production than in a country where small production prevails. We must recognize the necessity for concession, for buying machinery and appliances for agriculture in order that, in exchanging them for grain, we may establish such relations between the proletariat and the peasantry as will secure the support of the latter in peace conditions.²¹

On that foundation, but with a variety of modifications, the N. E. P. went into effect. The relation of this new and partial retrocession from the full scope of domestic communism to foreign policy can best be studied in a remarkable article signed by Chicherin which appeared in *L'Humanité* of August 15, 1921. Under date of July 24, Chicherin says the combination of foreign and domestic policy in Soviet Russia leads to one end. "It is the development of production: that is the alpha and omega of our present policy." He reviews historically the course of the Revolution and states that since the signature of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (when he became Foreign Secretary), Soviet policy has been directed toward

"the slow and organic consolidation of our existence." He was ready to pay foreign capitalists for their assistance in the economic restoration of Russia. He goes over in some detail the accusations as to propaganda which he asserts are totally false. He tries to prove too much and therefore partially fails in these sections of his statement. In general, he bids France to hurry up and enter into direct relations with Russia lest England get the better start. "The basis of our foreign system is the economic collaboration of Soviet Russia with capitalistic states." Here we have the gist of the policy which later was to lead to the Genoa and Hague conferences.

Two months later, in September, Duranty, of the *New York Times*, got a despatch through from Moscow, with the approval of the Soviet censor, in which the following passage occurs:

Though in a sense the Communist Internationale is a part of the Bolshevik Government—one might call it a sister company with an interlocking directorate—it is quite distinct as far as the really subtle business of governing is concerned. The Communist Internationale is far too fanatic to be subtle. But the realists at the head of the Soviet Government are quite willing to let the Communist fanatics blow off the steam engendered by the economic change, etc.²²

In other words, the Soviet government really permits the propaganda of the Third Internationale to serve its own domestic or foreign purposes. The censor must have nodded, for Duranty is, by Soviet authority, a fine correspondent. His description of the relations of the Soviet government to the Third Internationale is excellent and fits in with much that is available to me. The entire program of the N. E. P. as outlined by Lenin and Chicherin was forced through in the face of fanatical opposition. There remains a further development: this is with respect to foreign debts as given by Chicherin on October 28, 1921. It leads directly to the calling of the Genoa Conference.

Chicherin took as his text the resolution of the Brussels Financial Conference which read: "The Russian Government must recognize existing debts and other obligations arising

from established claims." He addressed the British government stating:

The Soviet Government declares its firm conviction that no people is bound to pay the price of chains fastened upon it for centuries. But in its unmistakable determination to arrive at an entire agreement with the other Powers, the Russian Government is inclined to make several essential and highly important concessions in regard to this question. It will thus meet the wishes of the numerous small holders of Russian bonds (especially in France) for whom the recognition of the Czarist debts is a matter of vital importance. For these reasons, the Russian Government declares itself ready to recognize the obligations towards other states and their citizens which arise from state loans concluded by the Czarist Government before 1914, with the express proviso that there shall be special conditions and facilities which will enable it to carry out this undertaking.

This was not a recognition of the debts; it was a plan by which Russia, under unnamed conditions, might be provided with the means to pay a portion of the debts. The note also stated:

From the beginning of its existence, economic co-operation with the other Powers has been one of the principal aims of the Soviet Government's policy. It has always declared its intention of assuring an adequate return to foreign capitalists who would assist in developing the natural wealth of Russia and in re-establishing her economic machinery. . . . From the point of view of the permanent interests and of the ever-present needs of all States and all peoples, the economic restoration of Russia is an absolute necessity not only for herself but for them. . . . The Soviet Government has re-established private trade, the private ownership of small undertakings, and the right of concession and lease with regard to large ones. It gives to foreign capital legal guarantees and a share of profit sufficient to satisfy its requirements, and to induce it to take part in the economic work of Russia. . . . For this purpose [settlement as to debts] the Russian Government proposes as a matter of urgency the calling of an international conference to deal with the above questions, to consider the claims of the Powers against Russia and of Russia against the Powers, and to draw up a definite treaty of peace between them.²³

To this note, which proposed the definite political recognition of Soviet Russia, the British replied asking for more

information. It is evident, however, that the genesis of the future conferences is Russian; Lloyd George picked up Chicherin's idea and tried to enlarge on it. In the meantime, Soviet Russia began to urge on the Baltic states the fact that "their vital political and economic interests lie in the plans of closest economic association with Soviet Russia" which has no "predatory aims" and which "aims exclusively to re-establish its productive forces."²⁴ This development of productive forces was now strengthened by the adoption of "mixed trading companies" where side by side with the representatives of foreign capital the Soviet government could enter into the work of these commercial companies and concessionaires.²⁵ The difficulty lay in the suspicions of the Soviet authorities, the greed of some of the capitalists, and the inefficiency and dishonesty of Soviet officials. Early in December commotion caused by stories of the proposed organization of a huge syndicate to treat Russia as a domain for capitalistic exploitation. Its importance does not warrant inclusion in the text, but it was in any case an index of many hitches which were to take place in the re-establishment of trade and investment in Russia.²⁶

On December 13, 1921, the first public semi-official announcement was made of the plan for a general international conference. The *Daily Chronicle* wrote strongly in favor of the plan and it was rightly judged to have the support of Lloyd George.²⁷ In some respects it followed lines already printed by Radek on November 30 in the *Pravda* advocating "a new world-conference at which will be represented all peoples and Powers." On December 16, Steklov took his cue in the *Izvestia* from the *Chronicle*, and urged the conference as Russia must have the support of foreign capital, and is prepared to make serious sacrifices and concessions, and to guarantee that she will not put any obstacle in the way of general peace and of a serious agreement.²⁸ Small wonder, therefore, that the *Pravda* was jubilant, pacific, and bellicose all in the same breath:

The great capitalistic Powers *cannot do without us*. . . . There is a universal *fear* of war in the whole of Europe. . . . And the

economics of the situation forces the capitalists to *trade* with us. Under such conditions we, as a country which has left the circle of imperialistic connections, acquire a tremendous significance and tremendous *power*, far out-stripping our immediate economic, technical, and military strength. . . . *We shall not permit anyone to rob us. . . . We shall not permit anyone to play with us. . . .* And such defence may, *under the present conditions*, break the backbone of some of our strongest enemies.²⁹

In view of the circumstances, Chicherin hastened to accept the invitation to Genoa before it was sent. Had not he personally won a great victory? The Genoa Conference was Russia's idea; the notion was formulated months earlier; and he had officially proposed it to Lloyd George's government two months ago. Now Great Britain followed the Russian lead! From the Russian point of view, the Genoa Conference was to be a great occasion!

THE PLANS FOR THE GENOA CONFERENCE

The origin of the Genoa Conference was Russian; Lloyd George tried to enlarge the plan and made the Conference possible. In view of the facts in the case, I am unable to accept the bald statement of Saxon Mills, in his book on the Genoa Conference, that "the Genoa Conference had its origin in the sessions of the Supreme Council at Cannes in January, 1922."³⁰ The correspondence cited and the entire weight of Soviet press comment, weeks prior to those sessions, make such a statement misleading. There were, however, many difficulties to be met, and the formulation of the proposal was to occupy the attention of Lloyd George and of other statesmen and diplomats, during the first quarter of 1922.

How difficult the situation was can be seen by the speech of Zinoviev on December 22, 1921. He concluded his address to the Communist Party by saying:

I ask you, comrades, to make clear that the new economic policy is only a temporary deviation, a tactical retreat, a clearing of the territory for a new and decisive attack of labor against the front of international capitalism.³¹

So also Radek and other Russian writers declared that the

new conference was "to forget Versailles," to inaugurate a new order. On the other hand, it was the lot of Lloyd George to face a France that was determined to maintain and to enforce the treaty of Versailles. Thus both on the basis of domestic policies in Russia and of international relations there was a fundamental opposition both in spirit and in fact. Meanwhile, on January 3, 1922, the *Izvestia* proclaimed:

The deciding voice concerning our [Russia's] interests belongs exclusively to us. Let our prospective business agents elaborate tentative conditions. We will reject them if unsuitable. Soviet Russia will not permit juridical recognition to be a pretext, and means of putting a noose round Russia's neck.

The terms of the Genoa Conference were settled on January 6, 1922, at Cannes by the Supreme Allied Council. It was proposed that an "Economic and Financial Conference" should be called to which all the European states, "including Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria should be invited to send representatives." Later, the United States was also asked to attend. The fundamental conceptions underlying the program were defined as: 1. The right of each nation to regulate its own domestic affairs. 2. The need of assuring foreign capital that it would be assured of its rights and profits. 3. The conditions of such security for investment were defined (a) as the recognition of all public debts and obligations "as well as the obligations to restore or compensate all foreign interests for loss or damage caused to them when property has been confiscated or withheld"; and (b) the establishment of a legal and juridical system which will enforce contracts. 4. Financial and currency conditions must provide security. 5. "All nations should undertake to refrain from propaganda subversive of order and the established political system in other countries than their own." 6. A united pledge against aggression upon their neighbors. In case Russia should meet these conditions the Allied Powers would meet the request for recognition in order to develop trade in Russia.³²

At later meetings of the Supreme Council, March 8, 1922, was tentatively fixed for the date of meeting at Genoa; an

invitation was formally sent to Russia (which by a telegram of January 8 had already been accepted); the agenda were fixed in outline; and the Supreme Council approved the establishment of an "International Corporation with affiliated National Corporations for the purpose of the economic reconstruction of Europe and the co-operation of all nations in the restoration of normal prosperity." The plans for this international consortium, which was to have a capital of £20,000,000, had been already adopted at Paris on December 30, 1921, and it was directed to report to the Genoa Conference.³³ Thus the stage was officially set for a conference of boundless scope and opportunities. In the fields of both international and domestic economics and in the general field of public finance, the project was gigantic. In the effect it might have on the reconstruction of Europe, "the basis of a stable and enduring peace," it at once opened up the possibilities both of regional understanding and of plans for disarmament. Neither of these was, however, specifically included. Practically, it was a test to see whether confidence, international morality, and commercial honesty could come into effect as the result of a Conference.³⁴

The terms precedent to the admission of Russia were in general those which had been suggested by American notes relating to Soviet Russia. The question of American participation belongs more properly in the next chapter, but it may be noted in passing that as the Conference was postponed till April, the American reply in early March declining to attend was based on a much more careful study of the situation than was possible in the hurried sessions of the Supreme Council in January. At all events, there was immediate protest against American attendance at Genoa, and in the press and elsewhere there were vigorous arguments for and against the plan. What told much more directly on the future of the program was the fall of the French Cabinet. On January 13, 1922, Briand's Ministry was succeeded by that of Poincaré. From the point of view of Lloyd George, all the work now had to be done over again. In particular, both on questions of reparations and of disarmament, the French demanded and received as-

surances that neither question was to be included at Genoa. In preliminary conferences and in exchange of notes, France made it plain that she stood for the treaty of Versailles.³⁵ Under such circumstances, in view of domestic crises in both Italy and England the postponement of the Conference till April was necessary. In the meantime, everyone had his say. Throughout it became more apparent that Lloyd George was an idealist; he had a vision of a new heaven and a new earth and sought to point out his vision to mankind. Whether he was justified or not, Russia suffered in the minds of the public.

Not so with the Bolsheviks, however. To them it rightly seemed their greatest opportunity. The Genoa Conference was theirs in its conception as a means to restore Russian prestige and Russian trade. The *Izvestia* called it "Our Victory."³⁶ Nevertheless, there was battle at Moscow between the right and left wings of the Communist Party. Lenin as a conservative leader, as a member of the right, won the day, and the work of preparing for the Conference went on under the direction of Chicherin as the delegate of Lenin.

It is impossible to follow in any detail the flood of discussion and of suspicious comment that clogged the Russian press during these weeks. Only a few points and stages stand out to illustrate the situation and to mark definite steps. Thus the *Pravda* said on January 12, 1922:

The inviting of Soviet Russia to an international conference is the victory of our Revolution. This is not the end of the struggle, but the first success on the new front and with new methods. The struggle continues, and further successes will depend on military power, internal stability, and the economic successes of the Soviet Republic. . . . The sickle and the hammer triumphed at the conference at Cannes, although there was not a single representative of Soviet power at this conference.

Trotsky represented himself and the fanatical opinion of the army when in a sarcastic fighting speech he asked:

What is the Supreme Council? The Supreme Council is a fist directed especially against us. We certainly recognize this fist no matter what name it has from the point of view of international law. A fist is a fist. The League of Nations is merely the shadow

of this fist. . . . The army is the concrete instrument of power of every Government. . . . Those who say that the army is outside of politics lie. . . . We on the contrary say, the Government power is side by side with the Red Army. . . . If the spring will give us peace, we will welcome it; if we must fight, we will fight and fight to the end.³⁷

In similar but more vigorous vein was a proclamation of February 8, 1922, to "workers of the Far East" denouncing "hypocritical American imperialism" and declaring "a life and death struggle against Japanese, American, English, French, and all other world-pirates."³⁸ As stories of postponement of the Conference came, Trotsky ordered the officers and men "particularly to bear in mind that the actual independence of the Soviet Federation and the inviolability of her Socialist constitution depend on the intelligence, co-operation, and bravery of the Red Army and Navy."³⁹ The Third Internationale prepared to try to use the Conference and the general interest in all things Russian as a sounding-board, to spread the doctrines of Communism abroad.

As the time for the Conference was fixed, Chicherin took up the cause of Turkey and later protested in vain against the exclusion of Turkey at Genoa.⁴⁰ With reference to Germany, as the date approached for the signature of the treaty of full recognition, there was a friendly discussion as to German economic interests in Russia. "Instead of collaboration with British capital, there should be collaboration with the national economic life of Russia. . . . An independent German economic policy in Russia will open the road to a national employment of German capital, not only in Russia itself, but further to the East, the road toward which lies through Russia." The argument was to produce agreement "before Genoa or at Genoa itself."⁴¹

With reference to the choice and organization of the Russian delegation at the Conference, the full federative character of Russia was clearly recognized. A plan was adopted that, in some respects, was modeled on the British Empire delegations at the Paris and Washington Conferences. There was to be a single Russian delegation, which was to include representa-

tives of both economic and territorial interests.⁴² A protocol was signed at Moscow by which the delegates to Genoa agreed:

To entrust to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic to represent and defend at this Conference the interests of the eight republics indicated below, and to conclude and to sign their name to whatever agreements may be worked out at this Conference, whether separate international treaties or agreements of any kind connected directly or indirectly with this Conference.⁴³

This agreement was signed by representatives of the Far Eastern Republic, Ukraine, Bokhara, Khorezm (Khiva), White Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Thus, solidarity of interests was proclaimed and political and diplomatic unity was reaffirmed. The name of Janson, Foreign Secretary of the Far Eastern Republic, was given on the delegation, but actually he was unable to be present.

At a meeting of the Moscow Soviet, instructions, in general terms, were issued to the delegates to the Conference. These read as follows:

The Moscow Soviet entrusts the delegation to bear in mind that: (1) They are the representatives of the Russian working class (at this general conference) who have overthrown the yoke of property and capital and therefore represent the country. (2) The working classes of Russia are more than ever in need of peace for the development of their economic construction and will drive back all attempts to restore the old régime. (3) The union of the Soviet Federation of 130,000,000 population under Soviet power is the only existing government of Russia and cannot allow the smallest attempt against her freedom. (4) They are deeply convinced that only a complete going-over to the Communist system of property is the way to avoid all sorts of repression and cruelty from the domination of capital and they entrust their delegates with the duty of carefully noting any suggestion which may give relief to the laboring classes of the world.⁴⁴

Thus, theoretical Communism stood firmly against capitalism. Practically everyone in Russia was convinced of the real power of Russia. This was based on three elements—the enormous significance of Russian economic resources for the economic system of the world, the military strength of the Red army, and the political influence of Russia in Asia. The

Bolsheviki, therefore, repudiated any attempts to keep them waiting on the door-step at Genoa, and repeatedly warned their delegates against attempts to encroach on Russian sovereignty and against attempts to exploit Russia economically. That exploitative schemes were "on the carpet" can be seen in the discussion as to the formation of Anglo-German plans for the development of Russia and in repeated reports as to the proposals of the French economic experts for the establishment of zones in Russia which were to be rehabilitated by separate foreign groups. This smacked strongly of economic colonization, the exploitation of fixed areas by foreign capital in such fashion that the economic partition of Russia might follow. No wonder the Soviet authorities were disturbed.⁴⁵

The views of the Soviet leaders, meanwhile, were reflected in various ways, chiefly in economic questions. Thus greater liberty was soon to be permitted the Co-operatives in securing permits to buy and sell abroad from the Foreign Trade Commissariat. This body, with the approval of the authorities, proposed to organize special stock companies to attract foreign capital. All such companies were "to act under the control of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade" and the partnership of the state was assured in a variety of ways.⁴⁶ The sagacity of Lloyd George was praised, and innumerable discussions took place as to the counterclaims which Russia was to put in at Genoa to balance the foreign debts. Elaborate figures were formulated to prove that to Russia were due damages from the Allies for their support of civil war. These were to more than counter-balance the old Tsarist debts.⁴⁷

An acute foreign observer commented that in all the talk about the relaxation of Communism, he could not observe that Russia was in reality abandoning either Communism or the Soviet plan of government. The dictatorship of the proletariat continued; the Cheka was abolished in February, but in its place was the reality of *Gospolitupra*. It was possible that the world-revolution might be given up practically (theoretically it could not be), but there was small sign of the abandonment of the revolution at least as far as Asia was concerned. The hard economic facts of practical experience

might wear down the system of economic Communism, but at any moment it might be enforced again in full vigor.

In this connection was the speech by Lenin at the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March, 1922. He at first spoke contemptuously of the unnecessary space given in the press to the forthcoming Conference. It was as though he wished to warn Russia to expect defeat. Then he turned to the New Economic Policy.

We go to Genoa not as Communists but as merchants. We must trade and they must trade. . . . Actual competition is being established now between capitalistic methods and our own. . . . We need a real test, one that will take into account actual facts of the national economy. . . . In the course of this year we proved with absolute clearness that we are not able to manage things as well as are the capitalists. . . . The time has passed when it was sufficient to draw up a programme and call upon the people to carry it out. Now you must prove that you really know how to do things. . . . We have been retreating a whole year. Now we ought to say in the name of our party "Enough!" The object aimed at by the retreat has been achieved. Now another object—the regrouping of forces—confronts us. . . . This other condition of success—in building Communism with non-Communist hands—is to find that contact with the peasantry which will satisfy the latter to a point where they will be able to say: "No matter how hard our lot, no matter how terrible our hunger, still we see that we are deriving some benefit from this government, even though we be not accustomed to such a government." We have to see to it that through the hands of these elements which are co-operating with us there shall be created something which is useful to Communism.⁴⁸

It is in such a speech, of which inadequate quotation has been made, that the spirit and vision of the man shines through. He recognizes his own mistakes, the futilities of inefficient men, the nervous lack of discipline, his own grim determination to maintain authority, the danger of panic, and the instant need of common action to protect the situation. Ultimately, he hoped to safeguard and maintain Communism. That was his religion. It was in such a spirit that the Russian delegation went to Genoa; in practice, they were both to bargain and to stand for Soviet Russia.

THE GENOA CONFERENCE

On March 15, 1922, Chicherin sent a telegram to Great Britain, France, and Italy protesting against the exclusion of Russian representatives from the preliminary meetings of experts, and against the campaign of misinformation regarding Russia which he proposed should stop. He believed that in spite of the fundamental differences which existed between the Russian Soviet régime and that of the bourgeois states it might be possible to come "to an agreement which will lead toward fruitful collaboration between them in the economic field." To this end he recited at length the achievements of the Soviet government in the field of the New Economic Policy. These included the extension of the "rights of private persons in matters of property and economic activity limiting meanwhile considerably the rights hitherto, during the war period, enjoyed by the departments of the executive. Several decrees and legislative Acts guarantee the freedom of labor, of movement within the country and the secrecy of private correspondence." The rights of foreigners in the courts were now protected by new codes. "Special decrees guarantee the freedom of trade within the country, while the monopoly of foreign trade is reserved for the State." Participation in trade and in concessions were now secured to private capital.⁴⁹ In short, Russia came to the Conference with her goods on the counter. The facts in the case were undoubtedly a surprise to many; but the French commented: "What about the five billion dollars Russia owes us?"⁵⁰

The Russian delegation included Chicherin, Krassin, Litvinov, Joffe, Vorovsky, Rakovsky, and others. Of Lenin's absence there had never been any question. Under the presidency of Facta, the Italian Premier, the Conference got quickly under way. The reports and the work of the Conference are already well known; it is essential, therefore, to note only those aspects of it which apply to the subject—the foreign policies of Soviet Russia.⁵¹

On April 10, 1922, the opening session began. There was prompt evidence of the tension under which the French dele-

gates were suffering when they protested successfully against the suggestion by Chicherin that the Conference should add to its agenda the subject of disarmament, and plans for both a universal congress and periodical conferences. The Russian challenge on these points was met by Lloyd George who commented that the Conference was already carrying a heavy cargo. It would be dangerous for Chicherin to remove its load line; "if he does he may sink the ship and perhaps find himself among the drowned."⁵² Thus the incident passed with tacital honors for Russia. The Conference organized to deal with four subjects: Russia, Finance, Economics, and Transport. To the first commission were referred the findings of a committee of experts which had been sitting in London.⁵³ As no Russian was familiar as yet with this report, there was naturally delay while the Soviet delegates studied it. In the meantime, there began a series of informal discussions at Lloyd George's headquarters at which Italy, France, Belgium, and Russia were represented. The fact that these conferences included lunch, with the British as hosts, helped to make them the clearing house of the negotiations. Their exclusive character served on the other hand to arouse alarm and suspicion on the part of the Germans and other delegations.

The report of the London experts was a far-reaching document in extremely compact form. Briefly, it proposed the principle that "the Russian Soviet Government should accept the financial obligations of its predecessors" and should "undertake liability for all actual and direct losses, whether arising out of breach of contract or otherwise, suffered by nationals of other Powers, due to the action or negligence" of Russia. A Russian Debt Commission was proposed to deal with the matter and to set up mixed arbitral tribunals to settle all claims; these should be met by the issue of new Russian bonds. Furthermore, elaborate and definite provisions as to the administration of justice were proposed. Complete freedom of trade and freedom of labor were declared to be necessary for the restoration of Russia; and the residences and establishments of foreigners in Russia should be subject to a system of "capitulations" protecting the foreigner from ar-

rest and search except with the consent of his Consul. Taken all in all, the system proposed was in opposition to the government of Soviet Russia and at variance with Russia's historical position as an independent state. It might be necessary from a certain point of view, but it placed Russia in a position of tutelage. It was certain that Russia would refuse it.⁵⁴

The delay, needed both for these private conferences and for the study by the Russians of this report, told on people's nerves. They were, therefore, ready to jump at the bang of a door. On April 16, a door was slammed by the signature of Rapallo of the long-heralded Russo-German treaty. This, as we have seen, had been the subject of many conferences during the past four months. There had been information regarding it in every Foreign Office in the world and its content was not in itself so alarming. The fact of its signature at this precise moment was, however, a surprise; Lloyd George and practically all other delegates, save the Russians and the Germans, chose to regard it as an affront to the Conference and as a menace for the future. Even cynical journalists like Simonds wrote: "it is impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the present hour, when once [more] the whole future of Europe is in the balance."⁵⁵ Barron in the *Wall Street Journal* wrote from Genoa that "there never has been an intimation of such a thing."⁵⁶ In general, both delegates and editors seemed to lose their heads.

The facts in the case, however, seemed plain enough. "The calling of the Genoa Conference delayed rather than hastened the renewal of formal relations between the two countries."⁵⁷ We have already watched the background of the treaty and no one had any right to be surprised or shocked at its signature. The surprise arose from the fact that it should be announced at Genoa. Yet even this is explicable by the treatment which Germany was receiving. Her moral isolation at Genoa was complete; she was unable to learn what was being done; and she, in common with Soviet Russia, expected that some fine morning they might both be asked to sign on the dotted line a document for which they were in no way respon-

sible. Under the circumstances, they determined to sign their own document which they had already prepared. This at least no one could take away from them. The *Izvestia* quoted from a feuilleton entitled, "The Genoa Conference": "The Russian-German Alliance—Nestor in his *Chronicle* speaks of this Alliance saying, 'While the parents were looking for a husband, the daughter had a child.' (How immoral!)"⁵⁸ Better still was the cartoon depicting the Allies at table; the hostess (France) looking out of the window cries out to her guest (John Bull), "Mon Dieu! The cook has gone off with the butler!"

The signature of the treaty was, however, unquestionably "an exhibition of bad international manners." Genoa marked the return of both Russia and Germany to the European council table. They chose to celebrate the fact by a return to *realpolitik* of Bismarck's day, and fancied that they had done a big thing. The net results of the treaty have not been great; probably German trade in Russia would have been just about the same to-day in any case. Let us, however, get rid of the persistent notion that connected with this treaty there is another secret military pact. That idea has been repeated with variations in practically every large newspaper in the world. There is nothing in it. If there is a secret agreement, it is independent of the treaty; it is between the General Staff of the two armies or it is guaranteed by them and it relates to the supply of munitions for Russia. That maybe covered by a commercial transaction.

The vaporings of the *Daily Mail* and of the French press, stories of a new secret triple alliance between Russia, Germany, and Turkey, and every other diversion of the tale fall to the ground. As Rathenau, who was German Foreign Secretary at the time, said in private conversation: "Why should we sign a secret military alliance with Soviet Russia? The Russians would be so pleased that they would at once tell everyone." Both the German and the Russian governments have categorically denied the existence of any such secret agreement between the two governments. A very careful examination of all available evidence has been made. To my mind,

that myth has been dispelled.⁵⁹ The fact remains, however, that the menace of Russo-German accord is a real one, once either government has endured a revolution. If Germany should go to the left or if Russia should turn to the right, the results of union of an angry Germany with a hungry Russia might have far-reaching results. So far no such revolution has developed.

By the terms of the treaty, full diplomatic relations were restored for both countries. In anticipation of the treaty, the Tsarist Embassy in Berlin had already been surrendered to Soviet Russia in March, 1922. The agreement wipes the slate clean as to mutual compensation for war expenditures and war damages; it provides for reciprocity in the treatment of merchant vessels captured by either party; and abandons all claims for their respective expenditures for war prisoners. Germany renounces all claims arising from the Soviet régime which are or may be made by German nationals, "provided that the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. does not satisfy similar claims of other States." Diplomatic and consular relations are to be resumed. Most-favored-nation treatment shall apply to commercial and economic relations, with the provision that this shall not extend to privileges granted by Soviet Russia to any other Soviet republic or any state formerly a part of the Russian Empire. Article V provides:

The two Governments shall mutually assist, in a spirit of good will, in supplying the economic requirements of the two countries. In the event of this question being settled in principle on an international basis, they will undertake to have a preliminary exchange of views. The German Government declares itself ready to facilitate as far as possible the conclusion and execution of economic contracts between private enterprises in the two countries.⁶⁰

This treaty caused at once the liveliest indignation on the part of the delegates; a note of protest was sent; and Germany was ordered either to withdraw from the commission on Russia or to repudiate the treaty. She chose to do the former. It will be noted, however, that there was no proposal to bar Russia. The Powers reserved the right to declare "null and void any clauses in the Russo-German Treaty which may be

recognized as contrary to existing treaties." The French were inclined to believe that the treaty violated articles 243 and 260 of the Versailles treaty relating to Allied rights as to war reparations. This, however, was found not to be so by the Reparations Commission and the matter was closed officially.⁶¹ In the course of the incident and in view of later developments, it became plain that France was apparently bent on maintaining her "war psychology" and that in various ways the conduct of the French government was endangering the continuance of the Conference. However, such matters lie outside this review. The Rapallo treaty was ratified by Germany on July 17, 1922.

In all this turbulence the Russian delegates had not failed to dissect the proposals of the London report. They now countered by filing claims which they asserted made Russia a creditor nation. The damages done to Russia during the years 1918-20 by civil wars and by Allied intervention totaled three hundred billion gold francs (this they scaled down later to one hundred twenty-five billion gold francs); Chicherin, therefore, demanded a payment of two billion gold francs and a loan for economic reconstruction. This was, of course, quite aside from claims and counter-claims as to damages or seizures of private property. Rakovsky asserted that Russia had suffered more than the nationals of foreign states in this respect, but proposed to settle the matter by agreement to the figures put forth by Chicherin. As a result the chairman of the commission wisely decided to adjourn the session. Such stupendous figures did not promote understanding; and the Conference seemed to be "bound for the rocks."⁶²

The habits of the Russians for "oriental bargainings" continued in spite of the fact that Lloyd George plainly told Chicherin that the Russians must give up such fantastic claims; they must recognize the pre-war debts of Russia and their responsibility for sums borrowed during the war; and they must recognize the liability of the Soviet government for nationalized property which was owned by foreigners.⁶³ To this, on April 20, Chicherin returned answer to Lloyd George. He pleaded the need of a foreign loan and said that if that

were forthcoming and Russia were recognized *de jure* that Russia would recognize her debts if they were written down. In that case,

the Russian Government would be willing to restore to its former owners the use of property nationalized or withheld or where this was not possible, then to satisfy the just claims of the former owners by mutual agreement with them. . . . Foreign financial help is absolutely necessary for the economic reconstruction of Russia, and as long as there is no prospect of this reconstruction, the Russian delegation can not see their way to put upon their country the burden of debts which could not be discharged.⁶⁴

In these respects the document was clear. It was not "to restore or compensate" as the Cannes resolution had it, but "to restore to its former owners the use" of property which had been taken from its former foreign owners or "to satisfy the just claims" of such owners. In other words the property which had been nationalized was to remain the property of the state; but by analogy, with the usage of English leasehold property, it could be leased for a long term of years. This proposal, of course, did not touch the question of the administration of the courts or agree to the mixed arbitral tribunals of the London report. It was, however, the nearest point to agreement which the Conference was to reach. On every other proposal and to every other claim the Russians presented either a dialectic which few could fathom or a series of detailed chafferings that bore hardly on time and patience. It became necessary, therefore, to try to force the issue and to come to some conclusion. This was to be in the form of an Allied "ultimatum." In the course of drawing up this document, the Allies found their own difficulties too great for unity. The Belgian delegates now insisted that property which had been nationalized should be "restored" and not merely compensated for. On this point they stuck, though the French were reported to have adhered to the Cannes formula. Until the French heard from Paris their decision was in abeyance. The Allied memorandum went to the Russians on May 3.⁶⁵ In the meantime, the indirect cause of Belgian and conse-

quently also of French objection became apparent. It was a quarrel about oil.

Petroleum and the economics of diplomacy blocked the way; Genoa became as excited about oil as though it were a new oil field, and the sudden developments regarding an alleged contract of the Royal Dutch Shell combination with the Soviet government became a matter of deep interest. The result was the *impasse* which confronted the Conference. In brief, the story runs as follows: Oil had been nationalized under the Soviet régime; the result was huge investment losses to foreign as well as to domestic companies. The effect of nationalization and of civil war was to decrease the Russian output of oil. There was now a slight improvement, and as oil properties could be easily handled on the leasehold system, the Soviet authorities had sought to interest foreign capital. The danger was, of course, that they might offer properties which had been foreign-owned and that these properties might fall into hands other than those of their former owners. This, according to the views of American business interests, would be dealing in stolen goods. Consequently, their suspicions with reference to the entire situation were aroused.

The Belgian property interests in Russia, which had included a certain amount of oil lands, amounted to about seven hundred million francs. It was reported that the former owners of these oil properties brought strong political pressure to bear at Brussels. In addition, at Paris, in the excitable state of the public mind, there were rumors that other properties were at stake. The French banks had loaned money on certain Russian oil properties on which they expected to recover if the Soviet system should fall. In ways that are still confidential or obscure these influences quickly found support in both Paris and Brussels for the idea prevailed that the Soviet authorities were trying to dispose of some of these properties. Notwithstanding the press comments of the world, I do not believe after careful investigation that Standard Oil exerted any real influence at the Genoa Conference. What seemed to lend strength to the notion that the British government was in some way connected with the Royal Dutch Shell inter-

ests was the language of a section favored by Lloyd George in the memorandum of May 3.⁶⁶ A skilful use of discreet publicity very quickly sent French and Belgian temperatures high. It was in vain that the British authorities correctly and honestly protested that they did not have anything to do with any oil contract. The result was already accomplished.

The United States naturally took the position it has always taken, that it would not have anything to do with property which was not the property of its own nationals and declared for the open door. In the meantime, publicity had blocked the possibility of a Royal Dutch Shell contract with Russia; both France and Belgium had been alarmed; and the Allied memorandum of May 3 was shorn of its full authority. In addition, the atmosphere of Genoa was embittered and the Conference was once more on the verge of failure. In this sense only, there is, therefore, some truth in the Soviet contention made months later, that American interests were responsible for the break-up of the Conference. In reality, it was to fail chiefly because the Allies would not agree to make a loan; Soviet Russia thereupon reverted to an unyielding position.⁶⁷

If we now return to the Allied memorandum of May 3, to which neither France nor Belgium finally gave adherence, we find in the first place that in spite of Chicherin's request there was no mention of a loan. There was talk, in the introductory paragraphs, of the International Corporation which had been organized and approved; but in the thirteen clauses of the memorandum there was not a word regarding financial assistance to Russia.⁶⁸ From May 3 to May 11, the Russians studied this memorandum while the storm regarding oil waged in Genoa. The relations between England and France became more strained. Nearly every delegation was thinking of home; and in the Conference a series of questions were discussed on each of which friction developed. May 1 had come and gone in Russia with its usual and fervent demonstrations. In fact, later, Lloyd George attributed to these the unyielding defence of Communism presented by the Russian delegation.

The reply of the Soviet authorities on May 11 which was much less yielding than that of April 20, was a long document of more than six thousand words. In it they withdrew from the position they had taken earlier. They said that at Genoa the complete triumph of capitalistic individualism is sought. The Soviet Delegation has refused, and still refuses, to introduce into current discussion any kind of political tendency, but they must point out that the efforts to secure at Genoa the triumph of a party, of a social system, is contrary to the spirit of the first condition of the Cannes Resolution. . . . Russian sovereignty becomes the sport of fortune. It is at the mercy of a mixed arbitral tribunal composed of four foreigners and one Russian. . . . Russia is still ready to make important concessions, but only in return for corresponding concessions. . . . The task of considering the solution of these difficulties must be entrusted to a mixed Committee of experts appointed by the Conference. Such Committee to work at a time and place to be agreed on.⁶⁹

This "shrewish document," as Lloyd George called it, contained many paragraphs which were totally unacceptable even to friends of Russia. It seemed to close the door. Yet Lloyd George saw in the Russian suggestion of a committee of experts a way to continue negotiations. He, therefore, proposed that at the Hague, during June, such a commission should sit, and that the United States should be invited to attend. As we shall see, this invitation to the United States coincided with another private proposal by the French that the United States be represented on a committee of experts to investigate the facts as to Russia. To the French invitation, the American reply was favorable; but to the invitation to attend the meetings of The Hague commission the United States replied in effect that the sessions at The Hague would merely be a continuation of those at Genoa and consequently declined. Later, nothing came of the French proposal. Meanwhile, a pledge was given at Genoa to abstain from separate treaties with Russia until after The Hague Conference and to abstain from aggressive action against Russia.⁷⁰

At the final plenary session, there was a small passage-at-arms, when Chicherin replying to Lloyd George, said:

The British Premier tells me that if my neighbor has lent me

money, I must pay him back. Well, I agree, in that particular case, in a desire for conciliation; but I must add that if this neighbor has broken into my house, killed my children, destroyed my furniture, and burnt my house, he must at least begin by restoring to me what he has destroyed.⁷¹

Thus ended the Genoa Conference.⁷²

THE RELATIONS OF THE HOLY SEE AND SOVIET RUSSIA

In all the hurly-burly of Genoa, one phase of the extra-Conference activities deserves at least passing notice. This was the possibility of a religious accord between the Papacy and Soviet Russia. Across the politics and economics of the day there lay the wide-reaching policy of the Papal Curia—a policy always important and often neglected. Naturally, with the collapse of Russia in 1917 and the consequent abandonment of the plan for a Russian Constantinople, the Vatican profited in that the prestige and power of the Russian Orthodox Church had failed at the same time that the policies of Tsarist Russia had collapsed. The Russian Church was not to celebrate a triumphant service in Sancta Sophia. As the years of revolution and of war passed was there not now an opportunity for the Holy See to make possible the spread of Catholicism in lands which for centuries had been outside Papal influence? Was it possible to establish a Papal concordat with Soviet Russia?

At all events, as the program of the Genoa Conference opened, as men thought of the possibilities that lay within that program for world-peace and world-restoration, it was only natural for the Pope to address himself in a letter of wisdom and spiritual power to the Archbishop of Genoa. The Conference, indeed, seemed to suggest the remote analogy of an Ecumenical Council, for all Europe and Japan as well were there gathered. In the letter the Pope wisely pleaded for charity. "It should not be forgotten that the best guarantee of security is not a hedge of bayonets but mutual trust and friendship." Again, on April 29, the Pope wrote to Cardinal Gasparri urging the need of peace and of "public prosperity." Later, on May 9, the Pope ordered that a mem-

orandum should be sent to the Conference requesting that it should consider in any final agreement with Russia three important questions: (1) freedom of worship; (2) freedom of religious instruction; and (3) the restoration of all church property in Russia. On May 10, the last clause was withdrawn on the advice of those who feared to complicate the already tangled negotiations with Russia and who pointed out that they were already negotiating regarding the restoration of all foreign properties. As no final document was produced at Genoa and as relations were continued at The Hague, still without result, nothing came of this proposal by the Vatican, which had as its object the expansion and protection of religion.

Later, as the assertion of Bolshevik power in respect to religious instruction became more vigorous, the entire position of the Church in Russia was involved. In March, 1923, the condemnation of Roman Catholic prelates aroused the most vigorous protests in Christian Europe and in America. The fervor of these protests, however, does not seem to have had any result. Certainly, it is unlikely that Chicherin could have willingly been a party to those persecutions. But in the contemptuous replies then made to British protests there was evident the same sort of anxiety to maintain the sovereignty of Russia that prompted the language used in the memorandum of May 11 at Genoa. The Vatican has of right the feeling that *de facto* relations may be established in the future; in the meantime, it can only hope and pray for a better day for the Russian people.⁷³

THE HAGUE CONFERENCE

The Genoa Conference had failed of its ultimate objects. It remained, as Trotsky said, to see whether Russia could succeed in "the policy of explaining by facts and experiences to the capitals of Europe and America that the Soviet government is a fact, that it is built by its own methods and on its own principles, which must be considered and which should be respected."⁷⁴ At Berlin, the returning Russian delegates issued a defiant interview in which they welcomed private

foreign capital on the basis of Soviet laws and in spite of the fact that they were Communists.⁷⁵ Announcement was also made at Moscow that Asiatic states could trade without permits at the coming fair at Nijni Novgorod.⁷⁶ The truth was that everyone was tired after Genoa. Chicherin retired to a sanitarium to rest. He had borne the full strain of the Conference; as a moderate in politics he might hope that Russia would progress conservatively, but he understood that time was necessary. Radek indignantly repudiated the terms proposed at Genoa for, he said, "they would inevitably throw Russia into colonial enslavement."⁷⁷

Meanwhile, France and Great Britain clashed in an exchange of notes regarding the meeting at The Hague. Poincaré urged that as a preliminary Russia should be held to a rigid inquiry as to whether she proposed to pay her debts or no. The French press intimated that France might not attend the meeting. The British, on the other hand, said that they would not join such an inquiry and declared again that in respect to private property which had been nationalized either leases or compensations were within the right of a sovereign Russia. Such exchanges did not add light but heat to a situation which was already tending toward a breach of the friendly Anglo-French relations of the war period. England and France were at loggerheads with respect to German reparations and in the Near East. It was not surprising that they should dispute as to the proper methods to be followed with regard to Russia.⁷⁸ ;

At The Hague there were two commissions of experts—one Russian and one non-Russian. These met from time to time and as the organization developed the non-Russian commission was divided into three sub-commissions on private property, on debts, and on credits. The opening of the Conference was heralded first of all by some interesting press comments at Moscow. The subdued tone that the Soviet press had generally taken during the latter part of the Genoa Conference was marked. Apart from the first outburst of joy over the Rapallo treaty and the determination to maintain Communism intact there were few comments in the press that deserve

special attention. As The Hague Conference progressed, vigor of tone returned and in some cases a clearness of vision that showed the earnest attention paid to the international situation by Moscow. Thus Radek, on June 17, commented that "the firm language of the Soviet delegation has finally convinced England that Soviet Russia is not old Turkey or old China." He pointed out that even though Russia were unable to pay cash for her debts, none of the Allies was able to maintain its "holy rights" by arms. He anticipated, what turned out to be true, that as the governments held back from dealings with Soviet Russia, private capitalists would try their luck at bargaining for concessions. He summarized the situation by pointing out:

First, the Soviet Governments, having no fat purse, filled with gold, will not agree to the restoration of private property to the foreign capitalists. . . . Second, this return is economically impossible in many cases and . . . it is not expedient from a technical point of view. . . . Third, the question of the return of property, as well as the question of debts, appears [to be] a question of the possibility of the solvency of the Soviet Government in the future. . . . Fourth, in the question of debts it is necessary to talk in concrete language and consider concrete facts. Russia is a financial bankrupt. The bankrupt pays but a part of his debts, and those are not immediately [paid] but after a postponement, and his creditors help him to get on his feet. . . .⁷⁹

Krassin contented himself by saying that "we shall have to deal with the matter of a loan, and our negotiations there [The Hague] will depend on the extent to which the representatives of the European states are prepared to meet us in this respect." Unless something along these lines should develop, The Hague also would be "without results." Whether or no these negotiations were successful, he concluded, "I am fully confident that some Genoa or Hague will yield that result, and that the day is not far distant."⁸⁰

Steklov, in the *Izvestia*, also built his castles for the future. He pointed out that Russia was an agricultural country and that one or two good harvests would set it on its feet, that it was also a country of raw materials, and that the basis of agreement with the outside world was reciprocity. But in no

case did he regard reciprocity as involving compensation for nationalized property or the payment of debts.⁸¹ Bukharin's paper, the *Pravda*, seemed to take a perverse enjoyment in the multiplication of difficulties throughout the world. "Thus, in spite of mournful calls to be sensible again, which come from liberal philosophers, the imperialistic bourgeoisie is gradually approaching its end—slowly but persistently and inevitably. That is why, no matter what the outcome of The Hague gambling might be, we are fully confident that we stand on a rigid and strong basis."⁸² There spoke the Third Internationale, those unswerving, unreasoning Communists, who looked with suspicion on the New Economic Policy and prayed for bloody revolution!

It is impossible, and indeed unnecessary, to follow in detail the course of negotiations at The Hague. The gist of the entire Conference came in a passing remark of Litvinov who said that if the Soviet government should restore any nationalized property, it would be not as a matter of right but as a matter of expediency in order to secure a loan.⁸³ This frankness on the part of Litvinov nearly wrecked the Conference at the outset, for the French, Belgian, and Italian delegates at once protested and even Sir Philip Lloyd Graeme for Great Britain pointed out that such views would not advance the Russian cause. In particular, as the Allied delegates pressed for concrete facts, the edifice of communist theories slowly gave way and the dire aspect of the facts in the case became plain. Russian industry was dead. Before the war, industry had existed behind a wall of tariffs and subsidies. The war and the revolution, had knocked these artificial props flat. The revolution had furthermore brushed aside the habit of work. The lack of social discipline had become a serious danger to the economic life of the country. The fabric as well as the technical directors of industry had disappeared.⁸⁴ Now Litvinov and others proposed to restore all this by a mere loan. It was not only a loan that was needed; it was a restoration and reconstruction of the entire system of industrial life in Russia. This the Soviet authorities could not see; they continued to bargain and to disregard the plain lessons of life in

every industrial country. Money was undoubtedly necessary; but trained men and honest workmanship were also needed.

The Hague Conference became, therefore, a struggle in which the rudiments of finance and of industry were opposed not so much by the theories of Communism as by the ignorance of men who did not understand the fundamentals of business. This was unfortunate in itself; it was doubly unfortunate in that it gave encouragement to private speculators and to those who thought that in such a turgid stream they might fish for a fantastic catch. It gave reason also for those sincere Communists who were actuated by love of Russia and by dread lest she might fall into the hands of exploiting capitalists to wax indignant and to appeal to the proletariat of the world against the greed of "capital."⁸⁵ That Russia was not for sale wholesale the Soviet delegation had shown; it remained to be seen whether it was to be disposed of in retail, by private bargaining and stealthy chaffer.

Naturally, the Russians laid the greatest emphasis on the sub-commission on credits. They spoke repeatedly of the fact that Russia was an agricultural country; they asked for credits to the amount of 3,200,000,000 gold rubles (about \$1,700,000,000) to restore Russian industry and commerce; but they rested their arguments on the return of good harvests and on the fact that with their crops they would ultimately be able to pay their own way. Time was an important element. Time, transportation, and agricultural machinery were the elements in the situation plus the technical commercial and banking facilities incident to the moving of these enormous harvests of the future. As Boris Stein, the extremely able correspondent of *Economic Life*, said:

Without foreign credits, we shall cover the distance to economic prosperity on a passenger train (probably even on a freight train). With foreign credit—on an express train. We are willing to pay for the speed. But if for an express train we have to wait too long, or have to pay an unheard-of fare—then Russia will prefer to take a freight truck. The more so since it is used to it.⁸⁶

From the British point of view the most important sub-commission was that on private property. Krassin pointed

out that it would do the former owner no good to restore his property to him since he was "surrounded by the Government of Soviet Russia," since the means of transportation, supply of raw materials, etc., were entirely in Soviet hands. It would, therefore, be necessary for the former owner to enter into a treaty or contract with the government which would be equally profitable to both. This contract would be in fact a concession; it would be based on a lease of the property and the former owner would be obliged to respect the new laws and regulations of the revolutionary government. Such a statement was a fair and square recognition of the existence of the revolution, of the fact that former owners must accept it politically, economically, and socially. Otherwise, there could be no question of the restoration of property. This statement was in any case contingent on the *de jure* recognition of Russia, on a diminution of pre-war debts, and on the granting of credits. Russia would not restore private property on other terms than those, and The Hague Conference was practically ended.⁸⁷

In the sub-commission on debts, which was under the presidency of Alfant, the French delegate, the result was the same. Russia refused payment on all war debts, proposed the reduction of pre-war debts and a moratorium, and then refused to accept the principle of an independent mixed commission to settle the matter. The Russian delegation said that the "world is divided into Russia and non-Russia, into a Soviet and non-Soviet system, into a Third Internationale and a League of Nations. It is ridiculous to attempt to find an institution or a person who would be 'impartial' in dealing with these divisions of the world."⁸⁸ A proposal was made for consolidation of the debt; but it was not discussed. The unsatisfactory result was due in part to the fact that at The Hague the non-Russian experts presented a much more solid front than at Genoa. On the other hand, the fact that Litvinov had so much to say at The Hague, for Chicherin was not present, made for propaganda rather than for serious agreement. It was an open secret that Litvinov was in hopes of succeeding Chicherin and that part of his talk at The

Hague was for home consumption. Certainly, the moral value of Russian declarations at The Hague suffered from Litvinov's prominence. Thus his endeavor at the end to deal directly with the small holders of Russian bonds was a play to the gallery. On the other hand, it was plain in many ways that with the ending of the Conference on July 20, 1922, a new period of separate and private negotiations had set in. This was made evident by the British who at once began separate bargaining which later emerged into an agreement with Leslie Urquhart for the restoration of his mines.

An endeavor was made to warn speculators of the danger of such steps by a statement to the press by the United States on lines which had already been the subject of a resolution in the Conference.⁸⁹ The press statement read:

The Government of the United States does not countenance any arrangements by its citizens with the Soviet authorities that would jeopardize or prejudice the vested rights of the citizens of other countries in Russia and that the United States has complete confidence that the other governments concerned will adhere to the same policy.⁹⁰

The Urquhart concession did not fall under this category; it was for the restoration of his own property which had been nationalized in 1918. But all of his endeavors came to naught in the autumn, when the Soviet government rejected his proposals on political grounds, because of the rigid views of the British Foreign Office forbidding full participation to Russia at the Lausanne Conference. Urquhart in any case found it impossible to do business with the Soviet authorities.⁹¹ In the meantime, at Berlin, negotiations were in full swing trying to turn the Rapallo treaty into a concrete fact and to draw capital from the German industrials to restore by patches the fabric of Russian economic life. Few of these proposed concessions have come to anything.⁹²

At Moscow the failure of The Hague Conference had been anticipated. On July 23, the Third Internationale published a long and partisan defence of Russian policy. It said in part:

The Soviet rule, which was conceived in the womb of the pro-

letarian revolution, is the vanguard in the war of liberation of the international proletarian, and has remained true to the commandments of the proletarian revolution. . . . It has refused to bring the Russian laboring classes back under the yoke of capitalism. . . . The fact that the capitalists so obstinately refuse to grant credit to Soviet Russia is due to their fear that the development of Russian State industry will reduce to cinders all their assertions about the impracticability of Socialism. . . . Long live the united front of the proletariat to defend the positions already conquered by the world-revolution and to conquer new ones.⁹³

The official reports as to the Conference are singularly unsatisfactory. In particular, the Russian report is a brief summary of events. But one point was made which has at least a dialectical value. The Russian delegation proposed, at one stage of affairs, to inquire from its own government "whether it was ready to renounce the question of credits to be granted or guaranteed to the Russian government as a result of the Conference" in return for *de jure* recognition which would aid in "the getting of the necessary credits, not from Governments, but from individuals and private groups." The non-Russian Commission did not accept this proposal in principle and nothing came of the matter. Naturally, Litvinov made play with this and claimed that the failure of the Conference was due in large part to this refusal.⁹⁴

The point of view of the Allies was clearly expressed in a speech by Commander Hilton Young on July 14, 1922. He concluded: "It is with infinite regret that we are prevented by obstacles erected by the Russian Government from finding such a means. I am confident that in course of time those obstacles will be cast down. It is impossible for a nation, which desires to share in modern civilization, indefinitely to reject the common basis of credit and financial confidence upon which as a foundation modern civilization is constructed."⁹⁵ It is a question, however, how far Russia wishes to share in modern civilization. It may prefer "to take a freight truck" as Stein put it. At all events though they had failed of concrete results Genoa and The Hague had been educational to both sides. Russia had also gained through the mere fact of her participation. Now came the attempts at separate nego-

tiation. Was Russia to be offered to the retail market? Or were the Soviet authorities by use of gold, by payments of capital, to purchase the bare necessities, and then, with the return of good harvests, slowly to worry along as trade began in sporadic fashion, here and there? On these points we can tell only what is before us.

FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS

In an interview of August 8, 1922, Krassin, who was the head of the Russian Trade Delegation in London, commented on The Hague Conference. He pointed out that Europe was now divided into two groups—France and Belgium on the one hand, and England and Italy on the other. In this division the question of the treatment to be accorded to Germany was the test. Germany was no longer a free agent and was bound to regard economically the policies to which she would be subjected. England and Italy were much more reasonable in their views regarding Russia, but hesitated to break away because “a rupture at The Hague would have been regarded as a betrayal of capitalism in general,” for which, of course, they were not prepared.⁹⁶ Whether this is a correct view of the situation or no, it certainly leaves out of consideration the fundamental conditions which must precede the development of satisfactory economic relations with Russia. Of these Krassin is himself thoroughly aware, for he is a practical business man of tested ability.

Furthermore, these conditions are the subject of constant study by the leaders in Soviet Russia. In an acute article, Radek warned Russia to maintain her military strength; but in view of the situation which was developing in Germany, as France made preparations for the occupation of the Ruhr, also to remember that capitalistic society was preparing its own ruin. “What is going on in Europe is the process of slow dying off of the Versailles treaty.” Every attempt at reform and at peace in Europe has failed—all of which demonstrate “the bankruptcy of bourgeois pacifism.” Russia must, therefore, be ready to use “the arguments” of mili-

tary force if need be.⁹⁷ Trotsky likewise pointed out that "capitalism has lost all ability." He continued:

Yes, I am bold enough to hope that a nation of one hundred and fifty millions will not perish even if no foreign credit is forthcoming. Of course, if what practically amounts to an economic blockade will continue, the development of Russia will proceed at a slower rate. Hardships and difficulties will be more acutely felt. But also the hardships of Europe and the whole world are increased so long as Russia is excluded from world-economic intercourse. Nevertheless, we are going ahead. The tremendous creative forces which have been awakened in the nation by the revolution are now arraying themselves, are now crystallizing, are performing all the indispensable preliminary work and the results will be visible in time.⁹⁸

This might be called whistling to keep up your courage. Thus in a later interview Trotsky said: "*We intend to work and wait.* Europe and the rest of the world need Russia not less than Russia needs Europe."⁹⁹ This sublime confidence is, however, not providing the sinews of commerce. Krassin has pointed out that very slowly the volume of trade is improving. Thus in 1920, Russia imported 5,371,000 poods and exported 676,000; in the first six months of 1922 these had increased to 98,194,000 and 14,963,000 respectively. The importance of export trade was evident; without an improvement along these lines Russia must still continue in the main to live on capital and to pay cash. Imports have gone through the hands of the Russian foreign trade monopoly and undoubtedly millions have been saved the Soviet government by the concentration of management.¹⁰⁰ Chicherin, finally, also was impressed with the confused state of international politics. "Everywhere, there is instability and the seeking for new ideals. Many processes of tremendous reach and moment are only just discernible in their roughest outlines. The world-crisis is developing in a thousand unheard of, painful, and complex forms."¹⁰¹ Of one thing he was sure—that the relation of politics and economics was vital. "The safety of our borders and the development of our production" were essential. For such reasons, the activity of the Foreign Office

was wrapped up with the life of the Supreme Council of the People's Economy.

The wretched industrial condition of Russia perhaps appeals most conspicuously to the average foreigner. In reality, however, the agricultural situation is still more important. Lenin appeals to the workers to labor with all their might, as famine still faces many hundreds of thousands.¹⁰² Preparation is made to export a certain amount of grain, and there is talk of the harvests of 1923 and 1924 as supplying Russia once more with material with which to purchase needed equipment. We must above all learn and organize, he said in November, 1922, "we went too fast at first. . . . We were like an army that got too far in advance of its base." To maintain our power and to uphold the success of the revolution, we had to remain in touch with capitalism. But, he continued:

"where we have admitted capitalism, we remain its master. There are mixed companies, half state and half foreign or native capitalists, but the State retains control of them, and after using them to acquire commercial knowledge can dissolve them when it will. Thus there is no danger in this close association with the capitalist enemy."¹⁰³

It is this very uncertainty, of which Lenin boasts, that is perhaps the strongest deterrent to foreign capital. There are, undoubtedly, individual firms that have made profitable deals in the Russian market. There was a great revival of speculation and of local prosperity especially in Moscow.¹⁰⁴ Slowly the actual practice of Russian business is altering for the better. Above all, the decrease in the misery of the peasant makes possible the improvement of the entire system of Russian life. It is here that there is a chance for the future, for if the export of Russian grain can finance the state, there may be a relative stabilization of finance. At the Communist Party Congress in April, 1923, it was apparent that rather than give way to the program of selling out Russia by retail the leaders would favor a policy of slow self-sufficiency.¹⁰⁵ In such a program the farmer is king.

As for debts and the restitution of nationalized property—

it may well be debated whether Russia can ever settle in cash the total of her debts. Certainly, this would have been practically impossible for Tsarist Russia. In view of the immense losses of the revolutionary régime, it may seem even more unlikely that Soviet Russia will do so. As the process of mixed companies develops, it is possible, in the case of former foreign owners of nationalized property, that some approximate form of compensation or of restoration for use may be worked out. At present, however, what are especially needed are better men in Soviet service and better methods.

As more practical men come into control, as the inefficiency of Russia becomes less, there is a chance of real improvement. The recognition of the principle of fulfillment of international obligation is, of course, part of this improvement. Certainly, the progress of Russia is not dependent on recognition, either *de facto* or *de jure*; it is dependent on the justice of the courts, on security for life and property, on honesty, and on trade. None of these can be provided by treaty nor guaranteed by diplomacy. They depend on Russia herself.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XV

1. Radek, in *Pravda*, Nov. 30, 1921.
2. Lenin's Speech at the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party, in *Ibid.*, March 28, 1922.
3. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 18, Feb. 5, 24, March 4, 1920; *Izvestia*, Feb. 26, March 3, 1920; Stalinsky, "The Entente and the Bolsheviks," in *Pour la Russie*, March 6, 1920; *New Republic*, June 2, 1920; *Times* (London), March 10, May 18, 1920; *Living Age*, June 19, 1920; *L'Independance Belge*, May 12, 1920.
4. *Izvestia*, Jan. 28, 1920.
5. *Soviet Russia*, May 15, 1920.
6. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Jan. 19, 1920 and Message of same date from Lingby.
7. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Feb. 17, 1920.
8. *Ibid.*, Moscow, Feb. 18, 1920.
9. *Izvestia*, Feb. 19, 1920.
10. *Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1920.
11. *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 2, 1920.
12. *Ibid.*, Moscow, March 7, 1920.
13. *Pravda*, May 8, 1920; *Krasnaya Gazeta*, May 9, 1920.
14. *Wireless Age*, Petrograd, June 12, 1920.
15. Bagaev, "Our Foreign Trade," in *Economic Life*, Sept. 3, 1920.
16. Naumov, "Our Exchange of Foods," in *Krasnaya Gazeta*, Oct. 10, 1920.
17. *Pravda*, Nov. 8, 1920.
18. Cf. Levine, "Communists and Plowshares," in *Atlantic Monthly*, Nov. and Dec., 1922.
19. Trotsky and Varga, *The International Situation* (London, 1921); *Soviet Russia*, March 5, 12, 1921.
20. *Ibid.*, May 7, 1921.
21. *Ibid.* Cf. *Current History*, XIV, p. 677; *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 13, May 5, July 22, 1921.
22. *New York Times*, Sept. 28, 1921.
23. *Correspondence with M. Krassin respecting Russia's Foreign Indebtedness*, *Parl. Papers, Russia*, No. 3 (1921), Cd. 1546. London, 1921; *Soviet Russia*, Dec., 1921.
24. *Economic Life*, Nov. 2, 1921.
25. Sokolnikov in *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1921. Cf. Krassin in *Pravda*, Dec. 6, 1921; *Soviet Russia*, Dec., 1921.
26. *L'Europe Nouvelle*, Dec. 10, 1921; *L'Economiste*, Dec. 24, 1921; *Nation* (New York), Dec. 24, 1921; *Dept. of Commerce Monthly*, Jan., 1922. The best critique of the plan is by Plotnikov and Braikévitch, "The German Plan for the Ex-

ploitation of Russia," in *The Russian Economist*, II, No. 5, pp. 1596-1610. In an article in the *North American Review*, March, 1922, on the Genoa Conference, I refer to the plan: "its immorality and its political peril went hand in hand with the uncertainty of its success and the lack of sufficient accurate economic data on the matter." Stinnes and Deutsch were the authors of two similar plans; neither was adopted.

27. *Daily Chronicle* (London), Dec. 13, 1921.
28. *Izvestia*, Dec. 16, 1921.
29. *Pravda*, Dec. 25, 1921; cf. *Current History*, XIV, p. 876.
30. J. Saxon Mills, *The Genoa Conference* (London and New York, 1922), p. 9.
31. Quoted in *Ost-Information*, No. 191, Jan. 11, 1922.
32. *Resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes*, Jan., 1922.
33. *Ibid.* and *New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1922.
34. *Cf. Ibid.*, Jan. 7, 9, 1922.
35. *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Genoa Conference*, *Parl. Papers*, Misc. No. 6 (1922). Cd. 1742, London, 1922.
36. *Izvestia*, Jan. 12, 1922. Cf. an amusing skit entitled "Dialectics on a Miracle of Miracles," *Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1922.
37. *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 18, 1922. Cf. *Izvestia*, Jan. 22, 1922.
38. *Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1922.
39. *Izvestia*, March 1, 1922. Cf. *Petrograd Pravda*, March 1, 1922.
40. *Pravda*, Jan. 22, 1922.
41. *Economic Life*, March 29, 1922.
42. *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1922.
43. *Izvestia*, Feb. 25, 1922. Of course, this protocol blew away the last remote notion at Washington that still lurked in the minds of anti-Japanese and pro-Bolshevik adherents that the Far Eastern Republic was not at the beck and call of Moscow. Later in the year its formal annexation proved the fiction of the independence of the Far Eastern Republic.
44. *Ibid.* and *Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1922; *Sbornik*, III, p. 1.
45. *New York Times*, March 4, 18, 20, 1922.
46. *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1922, and *Izvestia*, March 15, 1922.
47. Cf. *Revaler Bote*, Feb. 4, 1922; *New York Times*, March 5, 1922.
48. *Pravda*, March 28, 29, 1922.
49. *Telegram from M. Chicherin, Moscow, to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy respecting the Genoa Conference*, *Parl. Papers*. Misc. No. 2 (1922). Cd. 1637. London, 1922. Cf. *Izvestia*, March 10, 1922.

50. *New York Times*, March 19, 1922.
51. Throughout the Conference the records in *Current History*, XVI, and in Mills, *The Genoa Conference*, are useful commentaries.
52. Mills, p. 69.
53. *Papers relating to International Economic Conference, Genoa, April-May, 1922. Parl. Papers.* Cd. 1667. London, 1922, pp. 5 et seq. Cf. *Nation* (New York), May 17, 1922.
54. *Papers*, etc., pp. 5-16.
55. *Boston Herald*, April 21, 1922.
56. *Wall Street Journal*, April 25, 1922.
57. Cf. my article on "Russia and Germany" in *New York Times*, April 23, 1922.
58. *Izvestia*, April 22, 1922.
59. *New York Times*, April 18, 1922; *Chicago Daily News*, May, 23, 1922; *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 29, 1922; *Daily Mail* (London), Dec. 1, 1922; Shaplen, in *New York Tribune*, Dec. 24, 1922, treats the story correctly. I omit French press comments; they are too numerous and misleading.
60. *Sbornik*, III, p. 36; *New York Evening Post*, April 18, 1922; *Living Age*, June 3, 1922; *New York Times*, May 9, 1922; *Izvestia*, April 22, 1922; *New Republic*, May 3, 1922.
61. *Papers relating to etc.*, pp. 51-57.
62. *New York Times*, April 16, 1922.
63. *Papers relating to etc.*, p. 25.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
65. Mills, chap. xii.
66. The language of this addition is in Clause VII of the Memorandum: "If the exploitation of the property [to be returned] can only be ensured by its merger in a larger group, the preceding provision [for return of the property] shall not apply, but the previous owner shall be entitled to participate in the group in proportion to his former rights." *Memorandum sent to the Russian Delegation, Wednesday, May 3, 1922. Parl. Papers.* Cd. 1657, London, 1922, p. 9. Cf. *House of Commons Debates*, May 25, 1923.
67. On the oil question, cf. *New York Times*, May 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and my article in May 14, 1922; *l'Europe Nouvelle*, May 13, June 3, 1922; *Manchester Guardian Commercial, Reconstruction in Europe, Section Four, Russia, The Oil Industry*, July 6, 1922, p. 256; *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1922, quoting *Izvestia* to the effect that the United States broke up the Genoa Conference; and private conversations.
68. *Memorandum sent to the Russian Delegation, etc.*
69. Mills, Appendix VIII.

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70. *Sbornik*, III, p. 7.
71. Mills, p. 284.
72. Among the numerous Russian press notices the following are especially worth noting: *Izvestia*, April 21, 22, 23, 28, 29; and *New York Times*, May 12 and 13, 1922.
73. Mills, pp. 31, 208, 399; *l'Europe Nouvelle*, May 6, 27, 1922; and private conversations and letters.
74. *Izvestia*, May 18, 1922.
75. *New York Times*, May 25, 1922.
76. *Ibid.*, June 4, 1922.
77. *Pravda*, June 7, 1922.
78. *New York Times*, May 28, 30, June 4, 12, 1922; *Times* (London), June 5, 1922.
79. *Pravda*, June 17, 1922.
80. *Izvestia*, June 27, 1922.
81. *Ibid.*, June 28, 1922.
82. *Pravda*, June 29, 1922.
83. *New York Times*, June 30, 1922.
84. *Ibid.*, July 9, 1922.
85. *Pravda*, July 9, 1922; *Biednota* (Moscow), July 11, 14, 1922.
86. *Economic Life*, July 18, 1922. *Papers relating to The Hague Conference, June-July, 1922. Parl. Papers. Cd. 1724*, London, 1922, p. 58.
87. *Economic Life*, July 25, 1922.
88. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1922. *Papers relating to etc.*, p. 9.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
90. *Department of State, Press Statement*, July 20, 1922.
91. *New York Times*, Sept. 17, 1922; *Current History*, XVII, p. 347; *Pravda*, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, 2, 1922.
92. *Economic Life*, Aug. 17, 1922; *New York Times*, Aug. 22, Sept. 18, 1922; *Washington Star*, Sept. 18, 1922.
93. *Izvestia*, July 23, 1922.
94. *Soviet Russia*, Sept. 1, 1922. Cf. *Izvestia*, Aug. 19, 1922.
95. *Papers relating, etc.*, p. 18.
96. *Russian Information and Review*, Sept. 1, 1922.
97. *Pravda*, Aug. 23, 1922.
98. *Izvestia*, Aug. 27, 1922.
99. *Ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1922.
100. *Economic Life*, Oct. 1, 1922.
101. *Izvestia*, Oct. 7, 1922.
102. *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1922.
103. *Ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1922; *Current History*, XVII, p. 705.
104. Merely by way of illustration, cf. *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1923. Cf. also *Current History*, pp. 100, 675, 105.
105. *New York Times*, March 19, April 22, 28, 1923.

CHAPTER XVI

THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET RUSSIA

The American President Wilson, adopting the tone of a Quaker preacher, reads to the people a sermon on higher political morality, but the people know why the United States came into the war. The people know that Americans came into the war, not in the interests of right and justice, but because of the cynical interests of the New York Stock Exchange.—*Leading article in Izvestia, Dec. 22, 1917.*

Capitalism is clearly perishing. A symptom of this was the imperialist war, which made it clear to the whole world what frightful destruction threatens mankind by the capitalist methods of solving international conflicts.—MAISKI in *Manchester Guardian*, "Reconstruction of Europe, Russia."¹

America's refusal to assist European states is action carried out in accordance with her plan for gaining supremacy. . . . America is taking advantage of Europe's critical position. . . . There is no doubt that as America's aggressive policy increases, so will the European countries, particularly England, be obliged to try to return as soon as possible to peace-time conditions. . . . —*Wireless News*, Moscow, Feb. 21, 1920.

International good faith forbids any sort of sanction of the Bolshevik policy. The property of American citizens in Russia, honestly acquired under the laws then existing, has been taken without the color of compensation, without process of law, by the mere emission of countless decrees. Such a policy challenges the very groundwork of righteous intercourse among peoples and renders [useless?] the basis of good faith everywhere in the world.—*Speech prepared by President Harding for delivery at San Francisco.*²

To Soviet Russia the United States is one of the imperialistic, capitalistic states for whose conversion to communism by the processes of world-revolution every true Bolshevik hopes and works. Attacks on American institutions and on American habits of thought have been common and frequent. Yet

even from the first, the shrewder Bolsheviki have realized that there is a difference in our attitude and policies toward Russia from those that they expected on the part of other states. Many of them have been impressed by our charity as shown in famine relief, though people like Litvinov have privately sneered at us as sentimentalists or have suspected us of ulterior and selfish motives. Only the actual, bitter necessities of the famine led Litvinov to sign the agreement under which the American Relief Administration has operated in Russia. He said in effect that such a thing had never been done before and he showed his suspicion at every turn.

Furthermore, as the conferences at Genoa and at The Hague failed to procure financial assistance for Russia, the desire for American commercial aid became more insistent. This has taken the form of welcome for those American capitalists who ventured into Russia under the auspices of the New Economic Policy. It has also been ardent in the Russian demand for a trade agreement and *de facto* recognition. Thus the Bolsheviki have neglected of late the original and sincere opinion of Trotsky, in 1917, when he scorned "recognition" and said that Russia was "indifferent" to such a "detail of diplomatic ritual."³

At present, in the United States, there is an eager group, which also looks for recognition; some of them, because of their liberal views, and others because of their own domestic opposition to the policies of both the Wilson and Harding administrations. A very few favor recognition on business grounds or because they hope for concessions and opportunity to trade. On the other hand, the great majority of Americans because of their native conservatism or their natural indifference to international questions are content "to wait and see." A considerable group is, however, actively opposed to recognition because of the steady propaganda that has gone on against the Bolsheviki. Both foreign and domestic misinformation with regard to real conditions in Russia has played a part. For this lack of knowledge and in the difficulties of separating the essential from the non-essential, the Bolsheviki are themselves largely responsible. They are Russians, the

revolution is itself a Russian revolution, and it is almost impossible for two peoples so radically different as Americans and Russians really to understand each other. The extravagant language and claims (to put it mildly) with which so many Bolshevik assertions have been clothed has shaken the faith and confidence of the average American in everything Russian.

It is, of course, only natural that a revolution should be on a high note. The *crescendo* of the motif has, however, been overdone. Obviously, the stories of horrors and suffering which have come out of Russia during the past six years have created sympathy and also resentment against the sort of government, which is, at least in part, responsible for them. To quote what I wrote nearly two years ago: "In its struggle for the world-revolution, the Soviet Government has met with a check; in the growth of the Communist Internationale, it has found that the bourgeoisie used the present condition of Russia as an argument to check strikes and revolutionary movements throughout the world. The capitalists said: 'If you wish Communism, the choice is famine, cold, and chaos—therefore, reflect!' Thus the workmen outside of Russia considered the situation, and the Soviet's temporary disintegration was then used as an argument against Communism."⁴

The fear and suspicion with which the Soviet government has regarded the capitalist world have also told against them by creating a corresponding suspicion, even a conviction on the part of many Americans, that the Soviet government had much to conceal. We Americans do not like a censored press; we are heartily in favor of free speech; we believe in the right to strike and to move about as we will; we have, on the whole, a profound respect for the justice of the courts and we depend on our laws to protect us rather than to protect an arbitrary government. We also care for youth and its proper education and instruction. On practically every one of these points there seems to be something wrong with the Bolshevik system. And on grounds such as these, unofficial, non-governmental America is quite content to wait and to watch before urging the recognition of the Soviet government.

In this purely objective attempt to explain American opinion, two points have so far been omitted—first, atrocities; and second, property. During the War and for a few years after, there was a “war psychology” that seemed to flourish on stories of atrocities. I recall a British official who warned me, at the end of 1914, that practically every story of German atrocity had also been common talk during previous wars, that much the same charges were made against the British in the South African war, and that there was undoubtedly a state of mind that fed itself on stories of horrors and bestialities. Later, there were undoubtedly authentic and true records of atrocities that horrified the world. War is not a merciful struggle and it often brings out the worst that is in man. In the case of the Russian Revolution, the cruelties of war were accentuated by the apparent element of revolutionary justice.

Throughout the “red terror” and the “massed attack” of the Russian Revolution, there were also elements of fear and of revenge. Class fear is an important factor in any revolution. Consequently, many thousands were killed probably because the Bolsheviki were afraid. Genuine revenge is, however, an even more devastating motive. The people who have not had the good things of this world, when once they get on top, strike with a venom that has been shown in every servile revolt in the history of the world. It is to this that we may also partially attribute the starvation and cruelty practised on the professional classes in Russia. Yet when we recall the French Revolution, is the Russian Revolution more terrible? I think it is. This is because it has lasted longer; it has extended over a much wider area and has affected infinitely more people. Furthermore, it came on the heels of the War, itself a horrible period. People were becoming indifferent to mere suffering, and in Soviet Russia there was a callous attitude toward the entire matter. I do not believe that atrocities have had much to do with the American attitude toward Russia. The revolution was too remote to affect the opinion of many. The reports of these atrocities have, however, convinced people that the Bolsheviki, in their grim-

ness and determination, should never have a chance to practice their methods in America. Opposition to the propaganda of the world-revolution has been intensified, and the American motto with regard to Russia became, whether rightly or wrongly, "he must have a long spoon that must eat with the devil."⁵

In the second place, there is property. We can agree with Burke that private property is that "which tends most to the perpetuation of society itself," or with Brissot that "*la propriété exclusive est un vol dans la nature*"; but it is after all in respect to property that the real test comes as to the American point of view of the Russian Revolution. An acute foreign observer once said of the March revolution that its chief effect on the world would be that in the future everyone would be obliged to give an account of what he had. That accounting went much further under the Bolshevik Revolution in November for, in theory at least, it nationalized all property and repudiated all public debts. So far as the United States was concerned, this resulted in comparatively small loss. It is probable that Russia does not owe the United States more than \$233,000,000. In addition are damages due to the United States for government property in Russia, and a bill for private property seized or destroyed that would bring the grand total up to about \$900,000,000. The reason this is not larger is, that until after the March revolution there was no public debt due to the United States from Russia. On the repudiation of Russian debts, the attitude of the average American is much the same as regards all international obligations. He thinks that he ought to be paid, but he is willing to wait and if need be to scale down.

As regards private property, he is more particular in that private property is to him a sacred institution. His attitude is like that of the British Eighteenth-century Whigs who taught him the validity of contracts and the stability of individual property. However, he does not shrink from leasehold contracts which would provide him the use of land, of factory plants, of forests, or of mines, provided the control of his business was left to him. For the American is an in-

dividualist; as compared with the European, he is much less inclined toward Socialistic legislation. In respect to public ownership or partnership, he is easily a generation or more behind the tendencies of recent European legislation. For all of these reasons, his contact with the realities of the revolution would make him less willing to accept the dictum of nationalization.

Under the circumstances, the conviction of the Bolsheviki with regard to property—that it belongs to the state—is opposed to American views. On the other hand, there are forces at work to a moderate extent in America, which tend in the direction of the socialization of certain sorts of property which is of service to the community. The morality of seizure without compensation is, however, totally contrary to American views. This is despite the Proclamation of Emancipation which the American regards both as a Civil War measure and as a moral retribution upon former slave-holders. The Volstead act he is still dubious about, though he has no doubt as to its constitutionality. His opposition to its enforcement, however, does not lead him to compensate former property holders, for he thinks the saloon was a moral blight on the community. In any case, the state did not take over that sort of property. This review of the chief issues at stake as regards the relations of the United States and Soviet Russia leaves us with the facts on the table. Until Soviet Russia, of its own initiative, takes steps toward the American point of view, the subject remains controversial; but it is by no means incapable of adjustment as time goes on. In the earlier chapters of this book, much that was said as to the relations of Soviet Russia to the Allies applies also to the United States.

TROTSKY'S OFFER TO THE UNITED STATES

The first few months of Bolshevik rule in 1917-18 were marked by many senseless stories and a revolutionary readiness and fervor in believing every suspicion. Thus in early December the story was circulated in Petrograd that all supplies for Russia were to be stopped by the United States.⁶ The facts were that on November 1, 1917, the War Trade Board at

Washington forbade the export of controlled commodities to Russia except with the approval of the Russian Supply Commission in New York. On November 19, all unlicensed trade was forbidden, and in February, 1918, the permission of the Department of State was required in order to secure a license.

In similar fashion, the Kalpaschnikov affair figures largely in the Soviet press. Kalpaschnikov was a former colonel in the Russian army, a man given to dark suspicions and well known for his anti-Bolshevik views. In Rumania were American Red Cross officials who gave themselves to the idea of assisting Queen Marie of Rumania to flee from the Germans in Rumania *via* Rostov, the Caucasus, and Mesopotamia. They wished for motor cars in quantity to make the expedition and sent word to Raymond Robins and to Ambassador Francis asking for the cars. Robins was opposed, but finally the caravan of cars was placed on board a train and Kalpaschnikov with a permit from Francis was in charge. He was then arrested by Bolshevik authority. The clamor aroused by this event was out of all proportion to its importance, for the Bolsheviks claimed that Kalpaschnikov was caught conveying cars to Kaledin's headquarters at Rostov; and Kaledin and his troops were in opposition to Soviet rule. The story was circulated that the American mission in Petrograd had been caught meddling in an anti-Bolshevist plot, which was of course untrue. The circumstances were such that in view of Robins' known objection to Kalpaschnikov he was regarded with special favor by the Soviet authorities. His position as head of the American Red Cross in Russia and his kindly feeling toward the Soviet leaders made him obviously a useful contact with them.⁷

Out of the opportunities thus offered and because of the exaggerated importance given to Robins by the Soviet authorities, there arose the incident of Trotsky's offer to Robins to block the acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk treaty in March, 1918. The story has been given in full by Hard in his practically verbatim record of Robins' version of the episode. It is now worth consideration in view of facts which must have been known to Robins but which are entirely absent from the

record as given by Hard. On January 8, 1918, Lenin, as we have seen in Chapter II, gave before a secret meeting of Soviet leaders his reasons for advocating the signature of a treaty of peace with Germany. On March 8, 1918, those same opinions were published in the *Izvestia* in the form of twenty-one theses as arguments for signing the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Lenin's opinions were therefore on record. They had been well known to Bolshevik leaders for two months. Trotsky, however, had advocated breaking with Germany; he himself had refused to sign the treaty. Chicherin had done that in his place on March 3, 1918, and was soon to take the position of Commissar for Foreign Affairs, which Trotsky had vacated. On March 5, Robins was in Trotsky's office at Petrograd and received from him the proposal that if the United States would help Russia, the approval of the treaty could be blocked. Lenin came into the conversation and at 4 p.m. a document was given to Robins for transmission to Washington. This document was approved both by Lenin and Trotsky, and Lenin said in case of an affirmative answer by the United States he would oppose the ratification of the treaty at the coming meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets at Moscow.⁸

The proposal was as follows:

In case (a) the All-Russian Congress of Soviets will refuse to ratify the peace treaty with Germany or (b) if the German Government, breaking the peace treaty, will renew the offensive in order to continue its robbers' raid, or (c) if the Soviet Government will be forced by the actions of Germany to renounce the peace treaty, either before or after its ratification, and to renew hostilities—in all these cases it is very important for the military and political plans of the Soviet Power for replies to be given to the following questions:

1. Can the Soviet Government rely on the support of the United States of North America, Great Britain, and France in its struggle against Germany?

2. What kind of support could be furnished in the nearest future and on what conditions—military equipment, transportation, supplies, living necessities?

3. What kind of support would be furnished particularly and specially for the United States?

Should Japan—in consequence of an open or tacit understanding with Germany or without such an understanding—attempt to seize

Vladivostok and the Eastern Siberian Railway, which would threaten to cut off Russia from the Pacific Ocean and would greatly impede the concentration of Soviet troops toward the East about the Urals—in such a case, what steps would be taken by the other Allies, particularly, especially by the United States, to prevent a Japanese landing in our Far East and to insure uninterrupted communications with Russia through the Siberian route?

In the opinion of the United States, to what extent—in the above-mentioned circumstances—would aid be assured from Great Britain through Murmansk and Archangel? What steps could the Government of Great Britain undertake in order to assure this aid and thereby to undermine the foundations of rumors of the hostile plans against Russia on the part of Great Britain in the nearest future? *

To Lockhart, who was acting as British High Commissioner in Petrograd, Robins showed this message; and Lockhart at once cabled Lloyd George urging that an affirmative reply be given him.¹⁰ No answer is, however, available from Lloyd George. On March 8, Robins went to Vologda where Ambassador Francis was. The message had already gone by War Department code to Washington. Now on March 9 it was sent to the Department of State in code together with a cable from Francis stating, in his opinion, if the danger of Japanese intervention in Siberia could be prevented that the Congress would probably reject the treaty.¹¹ On March 13, Robins was in Moscow and Lenin asked him whether he had heard from his government. The meeting of the Congress had already been postponed from March 12 to March 14. On March 14, Lenin asked the same question. Each time Robins said: "Not yet" and found the second time that no answer had come from Lloyd George either. The debate on the peace began on March 15; on March 16, late at night, the vote was taken and the peace was ratified, for Lenin spoke strongly in favor of the ratification.¹² No reply from Washington had come to Robins and none ever came. Instead, the Department of State sent a strong message to Francis stating its disapproval of a proposed Japanese intervention in Siberia and declared that "it does not feel justified in regarding Russia either as a neutral or as an enemy, but continues to regard her as an ally. There is in fact no Russian government to deal with." The Soviet government has never been recognized; but "we should con-

tinue to treat the Russians as in all respects our friends and allies against the common enemy." ¹³

In addition, a message from President Wilson dated March 11, was read to the Congress. This read as follows:

May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincerest sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia?

Although the Government of the United States is, unhappily, not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty, and independence in her own affairs, and full restoration to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world.

The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic Government and become the masters of their own life. ¹⁴

This message was, of course, not exactly a reply to the inquiry sent through Robins. It is credibly reported, however, that the President said that he considered his own message a sufficient answer to that. Thus ended this episode. The fact remains that Lenin adhered to his opinions as given in January and as printed on March 8. Of these there is no mention made by Robins in the story he gave to Hard later in America in the early summer of 1918. It is, of course, possible that Lenin might have reversed himself on March 16 and have spoken against the treaty, thus defeating it, in case he had received an affirmative reply from Lloyd George. What Lenin was after was the preservation of the revolution; and whether it was by peace with Germany or by war, he was determined to try to protect the Bolshevik movement. Throughout this period he was, however, in favor of peace; Trotsky was opposed, and the offer was in reality his plan to which Lenin had acquiesced. The decision of President Wilson not to send any further affirmative reply freed Lenin from an awkward position; he simply remained in support of peace as he had been since January.

The Congress of Soviets, however, passed a resolution in reply to President Wilson's message which reads in part as follows:

The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets takes advantage of President Wilson's communication to express to all peoples perishing and suffering from the horrors of an imperialistic war its warm sympathy and firm belief that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a Socialistic state of society, which alone is capable of securing just and lasting peace, as well as the culture and well-being of all laboring people.¹⁵

Thus the Congress, by this curt resolution, expressed the hope that American material ruin and the destruction of our institutions might be speedily accomplished! As Zinoviev boasted two or three days later: "We slapped the President of the United States in the face."¹⁶ All mention of this part of the story is also omitted by Robins.

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1918-20

Two months later, in May, 1918, Raymond Robins went back to America. He took with him the project for the establishment of commercial relations between Soviet Russia and the United States which had been drawn up in the Council of National Economy and which was given to him by Lenin.¹⁷ There had been stories in Soviet circles that Robins was to return to Russia as American Ambassador in place of Francis. In any case, the Soviet authorities had confidence in Robins. This plan did not touch on politics at all and consisted of a purely economic review of the situation. It pointed out that "the War changed the entire picture of Russo-American commerce." During the War, the imports of agricultural machinery and other necessary manufactures had greatly decreased; but trade with the United States had increased, and it was now possible for the United States to take the place which Germany had held prior to the War as the chief source of manufactured imports to Russia. According to the plan, to the United States could

be exported much raw material including lumber, flax, hemp, manganese, platinum, hides, furs, and oil. In addition, American business firms could participate in fisheries, mining, the improvement of transportation, the digging of canals, agriculture, and lumbering. The machinery for all of these enterprises was also needed. Furthermore, the munitions now in Russia would not be sold to Germany, and Russia could transfer to the United States all war materials in England and America which had been manufactured for Russia.

This plan Robins gave to the authorities at Washington with a report urging the appointment of an Economic Commission for Russia which should have sole authority to assist in the adoption of some such plan as a war measure. He urged that the International Harvester Company had actually increased its output in Russia under Soviet rule and wrote most encouragingly of the general prospect.¹⁸ Later, of course, the plants of the Harvester Company and others were practically compelled to stop work owing to the interference of the Soviet government and to the general decay of economic life. The summer of 1918 in Washington was full of such plans. The difficulty was that the President did not appoint men who had knowledge of the situation and who were not already overburdened by other labors. There was no one in authority with sufficient energy to push the matter. Thus for these and for political reasons as well, nothing came of such projects. Most of them were undoubtedly sincere and it is barely possible that some one of them might have worked out successfully.

It became evident, however, as the year advanced, as the decision was made to occupy Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok, and as the "Red Terror" came on with its arrests, its interference with diplomatic communications, and its massacres, that events were traveling too fast toward an open rupture. It remains to note the special efforts to combat German influence and to persuade the Russian people that the United States was sympathetic with them and was opposed "to intervention in the internal affairs of Russia." To this end, cables from the State Department and announce-

ments by the American Embassy were made in the Russian press.¹⁹ On June 1, 1918, Francis said:

The policy of my Government consists in non-intervention in the internal affairs of Russia and in giving the opportunity to the people of this great country to select their own form of government, make their own laws, and elect their own officials.²⁰

Trotsky had, at first, welcomed the landing of troops at Murmansk. His attitude toward the British was very friendly during April and May, 1918. He had requested that Allied officers should co-operate in the reorganization of the Red army, that British naval officers should assist to save the Russian Black Sea fleet from the Germans. In a variety of ways, both as to general facilities and as to the guardianship of supplies, he had shown himself not to be "a pro-German agent" but to be in favor of a policy of Allied intervention. The relations of the British and the Bolsheviki were cordial in the spring of 1918.²¹ In the case of Archangel, the landing of American troops was due to the need of protection of supplies; in the case of the landing at Vladivostok, as we have seen, the plight of the Czechoslovaks was the reason so carefully stated by the United States. Chicherin, himself, noted with regard to such intervention:

We have adopted a different attitude with regard to the Americans to which measures of retaliation do not apply. Although the Government of the United States has been obliged to consent to the intervention, this consent is merely formal. Therefore, it occurs to us it can be revoked.²²

At the same time during June-October, 1918, there were sharp protests made by the Soviet authorities with regard to the presence of American or Allied troops at Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok; and appeals were made to the United States to secure their withdrawal.²³ Such events have already been noted, as well as the appeals to President Wilson during the autumn and winter of 1918-19.²⁴ Radek, however, continued his attacks in the press. He termed the Fourteen Points "a very deliquescent program of political rascality," called the President the "prophet of American imperialism," and foretold the victory of Lenin in the coming struggle

against Wilson. Such a conflict would be between "the flag of the most powerful capitalistic state and the flag of the first workers' revolution."²⁵ Furthermore, during the winter of 1919, the attempt was made to distribute Bolshevik propaganda among American troops which was designed to provoke mutiny and revolt.²⁶ Thus also Joffe made an attack on American ideas when he wrote of President Wilson as "the greatest of the rascals of Imperialism;"²⁷ and Lenin in "A letter to the Workman of Europe and America" wrote that:

the exploiters of the whole world have not sufficient strength to hold back the victory of the world proletarian revolution, which is liberating mankind from the yoke of capital, from the constant threat of long imperialist wars that are inevitable under the capitalistic régime.²⁸

During this period, the main activities of the State Department were concentrated at Paris; but certain regulations with regard to trade deserve mention. On February 14, 1919, the export or import of rubles or the transfer of funds for their purchase was forbidden. On June 26, 1919, only Bolshevik Russia was left under the regulation that forbade the export of bullion, coin, and currency; and on August 8, 1919, all restrictions on the export of rubles, except to Bolshevik Russia, were removed. These had been war measures which were now relaxed as regards the rest of the world, but retained as regards Soviet territory in view of the civil war and Allied intervention. In similar fashion, the State Department issued a warning to American business men that "any concessions from the Bolshevik authorities probably would not be recognized as binding on future Russian governments." Such regulations were due to the conditions which prevailed during the latter part of 1919, as Kolchak's forces were gradually being forced back. Later, in February and March, 1920, the United States recommended the removal of all restrictions on Russian trade, but refused to protect Americans who might engage in it.

On June 12, 1920, Colby, who had become Secretary of State, stated that, in point of fact, there was no licensed or regular trade with Soviet Russia; but on July 7 all restrictions,

except with regard to munitions, were removed. The final attitude of the Department was contained in an instruction to all diplomatic and consular officers, that while all trade with Russia, except in munitions was legal, they were to "take no action which officially or unofficially, directly or indirectly, assist or facilitate commercial or other dealings between American citizens" and persons in Bolshevik Russia. In spite of this discouraging language, trade with Russia has, as commercial statistics indicate, increased in volume. On December 20, 1920, the restrictions as to the export of moneys and as to exchange or credit were removed; it was also explained in February, 1921, that the restriction as to munitions was not a prohibition but could be met by a special license. Finally, on March 3, 1921, all restrictions originating in war legislation were removed. In the Treasury, however, the Mint was warned not to buy Soviet gold because of possibly defective title; the Assay office can, however, purchase gold from "lawful owners" and gold from friendly recognized Powers has been bought. As there is no such restriction, for example, in Sweden, it may be possible for Russian Soviet gold to enter the Assay office through purchase from Sweden. Thus to all intents and purposes, trade with Russia is now entirely free but at the owner's risk. Technically, the United States did not maintain a blockade against Russia; until 1920 the purposes of a blockade were secured in other ways.²⁹

In 1919, the Soviet government attempted to accredit Martens to the United States as representative of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Martens, on March 19, 1919, sent his credentials to the Department of State together with a memorandum.³⁰ To this the Department returned no answer. Later, Martens demanded the surrender from Boris Bakhmetev, the Kerensky Ambassador in the United States, of the Russian Embassy in Washington, and he addressed the Secretary of State protesting against a raid conducted under the authority of the State of New York on June 12, 1919, on the premises of his office in New York City. He also protested against "unwarranted persecution and cruel treatment" which he said were accorded to Russian citizens in

the United States. Later, on January 10, 1920, there began hearings before a Senate Committee as to the activities of Martens. As the result of these and other investigations, the deportation of Martens was ordered in December, 1920. He, therefore, returned to Russia.³¹

In the course of these hearings, as well as hearings conducted in the previous year, in 1919, before the Senate Committee of which Senator Overman was chairman, a mass of facts and of charges was placed on record regarding the propaganda activities of Bolsheviks in the United States.³² The Overman hearings contain a lot of irrelevant material and do not contain much that is pertinent to our subject. The hearings as to Martens, however, seemed to indicate very clearly that it was practically impossible for a sincere Communist, such as Martens was, to fill a diplomatic post in America and to refrain from doing things or being a participant in meetings and in the publication of materials which were directed to the criticism and ultimate overthrow of the American government.

Chicherin might say, as he did on January 31, 1920, that the "Soviet Republic is in its essence a peaceful republic of labor. Our arms are not the sword, but the hammer and the sickle."³³ But at the same time there was issued on January 21, an appeal inciting the workmen of Europe and America to world-revolution, which was signed by Lenin. Martens might declare that the idea of world-revolution "has disappeared"; but Zinoviev, only two months earlier, in December, 1919, had issued a fiery appeal stating that the "pitiable pigmies of capitalistic countries" were "unable to stop the powerful rush of the waves of proletarian revolution" in Europe and America. When Martens attended meetings at which his lieutenant, Weinstein, was permitted without protest to say that "we have come here to tell Comrade Martens that we intend to prepare to take over this great country just as the working class has taken over Russia," the possible diplomatic usefulness of Martens was at an end.³⁴

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SOVIET RUSSIA, 1919-21

At the Peace Conference in May, 1919, the United States joined with the Allies in giving Kolchak a *quasi* or tentative recognition. This proved to be unavailing and Kolchak later was captured and shot by Soviet authority. In the meantime, Lenin has termed the American expedition in Siberia a "shameless, criminal, bandit-like invasion." As we have seen, the United States was soon to withdraw its troops from Siberia, in view of the completion of our task which was to secure the release of the Czechoslovak troops. Since that time and since the withdrawal of our troops in northern Russia, there has not been the slightest attempt on the part of the United States to intervene in Russia. Indeed, such temporary occupations were either directly or indirectly purely war measures directed against the Central Powers and designed to assist the Russian people.

In October, 1919, there came, however, a problem of a different sort. This was the plea for the recognition of the independence of Lithuania. To the request a sympathetic reply was sent which stated that "it has been thought unwise and unfair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of orderly, constitutional government in Russia the principle of Russian unity as a whole." The development of autonomous Lithuania was safeguarded, but recognition was withheld.³⁵ This was to be American policy for the next three years with regard to Esthonia and Latvia as well. Independent Finland and Poland were recognized as states, but as in the case of Bessarabia the United States has refused recognition of the new frontiers until these frontiers have been recognized by Russia. In the case of Armenia, recognition was given; but the northern frontier, it was stated, could be determined only in connection with Russia. Likewise, as a general principle of policy, the Secretary of State said to France that:

This Government is convinced that no arrangement that is now made concerning the government and control of Constantinople and the Straits can have any elements of permanency unless the

vital interests of Russia in those problems are completely provided for and protected, and unless it is understood that Russia, when it has a government recognized by the civilized world, may assert its right to be heard in regard to the decisions now made.³⁶

Such statements were in accordance with that made by President Wilson in a letter to President Hymans of the League of Nations Assembly on January 18, 1921. The President believed that the

sine qua non of an attempt at pacification of Russia must be a public and solemn engagement among the Great Powers not to take advantage of Russia's stricken condition and not to violate the territorial integrity of Russia nor to undertake themselves any further invasion of Russia nor to tolerate such invasions by others.³⁷

Lenin had said on February 18, 1920: "Let American capitalists leave us alone. . . . The future belongs to the Soviet's system, all the world over."³⁸ This attitude was accompanied by repeated references to the aggressive character of American policy. Of more coherent and less beligerent tone was a statement by Radek who said:

We think that now capitalist countries can exist alongside a proletarian state. We consider that the interests of both parties lie in concluding peace and the establishment of the exchange of goods and we are, therefore, ready to conclude peace with every country which up to the present [1920] has fought against us, but in future is prepared to give us in exchange for our raw materials and grain, locomotives and machinery.³⁹

On the whole, therefore, the year 1920 was a year of tricks and starts as regards Soviet Russia. The Soviet authorities still had revolutionary manners; but occasionally, as in the case of Radek, the real facts of politics and economics came out.

In the case of the Polish war, there was further opportunity given to explain the attitude of the United States toward Soviet Russia. In the course of diplomatic correspondence, it became evident that the United States was opposed to recognition of the Soviet government and was also opposed both to aggression on the part of Poland, which might unite

patriotic Russians in support of the Soviet régime, and to the recognition and support of Wrangel in southern Russia. As regards Soviet Russia, the Secretary of State said in response to an inquiry from the Italian government:

It is not possible for the Government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained. This conviction has nothing to do with any particular political or social structure which the Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace. It rests upon a wholly different set of facts. These facts, which none disputes, have convinced the Government of the United States, against its will, that the existing régime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals. The responsible leaders of the régime have frequently and openly boasted that they are willing to sign agreements and undertakings with foreign Powers while not having the slightest intention of observing such undertakings or carrying out such agreements. This attitude of disregard of obligations voluntarily entered into, they base upon the theory that no compact or agreement made with a non-Bolshevist government can have any moral force for them. They have not only avowed this as a doctrine, but have exemplified it in practice. Indeed, upon numerous occasions the responsible spokesmen of this Power, and its official agencies, have declared that it is their understanding that the very existence of Bolshevism in Russia, the maintenance of their own rule, depends, and must continue to depend, upon the occurrence of revolutions in all other great civilized nations, including the United States, which will overthrow and destroy their governments and set up Bolshevik rule in their stead. They have made it quite plain that they intend to use every means, including, of course, diplomatic agencies, to promote such revolutionary movements in other countries.⁴⁰

The note also explained the attitude of the United States in refusing to recognize the Baltic states, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Later, Colby went on to explain why the United States was debarred from taking an active part in European affairs and commented by citations on the charges made against the Soviet government.⁴¹ To these charges Chicherin made reply on September 10, 1920. He criticized the histor-

ical basis of the American note and attacked both parliamentary and capitalistic institutions thus:

In the so-called democratic states the apparent freedom of the press, of meetings, and of unions is in fact only a manoeuvre of the leading financial groups, which is carried out by a sold press, sold political workers, sold judges, sold writers and priests. . . . The Communist Party, which carries out this merciless fight against the exploiting classes of the entire world, is ruling in Russia only because the labor masses themselves recognize that this rule is the only safe weapon for a successful fight against the mortal danger threatening them on the part of world-capital. . . . Even the Brest-Litovsk treaty which was forced upon Russia, the Soviet Government intended to fulfill. . . . If the Russian Government promises to refrain from distributing Communistic literature, all its representatives will observe this promise absolutely and they are herewith instructed to categorically declare this. . . . The Russian Government . . . trusts that very soon normal relations will be established between the United States and Soviet Russia, as well as between England and Soviet Russia, in spite of the divergence of their respective régimes.⁴²

In this note, Chicherin undertakes the defense of the Communist Party, though he denies that the use of force in other countries to promote revolution is part of its campaign. His statement regarding the Brest-Litovsk treaty is categorically denied by Joffe and Radek and others. His instructions as to the distribution of Communist literature is a confession that hitherto such practices have been permitted. And finally he continues his attack on capitalism and all its works at the same time that he hopes to make peace with it. If Colby's note was too sweeping in its charges, Chicherin's reply is in agreement with some of them.

The Russian government was wrong when it stated that without *de facto* recognition "trade relations are impossible."⁴³ The fate of concessions alleged to have been granted to Washington Vanderlip was shown by their repudiation only a short time afterward.⁴⁴ In particular, charges circulated by the League of Free Nations in October, 1920, just prior to the presidential elections, were false in substance and specious in presentation. This was shown in a letter from Norman Davis, Acting Secretary of State, to Judge

Parker. To this the League of Free Nations replied and the State Department again answered. The correspondence is too long for quotation, but the falsity of the charges by the League of Free Nations was clearly shown.⁴⁵ That is not, however, necessarily to approve the policy of the Department or the language of Colby's letter. It had become evident that there was a group of people in the United States who were determined to force the question of Russian recognition to the front. These have increased in number, and the problem is now tending, as we shall see, to become a live issue in practical politics.⁴⁶

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SOVIET RUSSIA, 1921-23

With the change in administration on March 4, 1921, it was inevitable that the question of the attitude of the United States toward Soviet Russia should again be raised. This was done directly through Litvinov, the Russian representative at Reval, Esthonia, who sent a message asking that trade relations between Soviet Russia and the United States should be opened and that "the relations between the two republics" should be "regularized."⁴⁷ To this the Secretary of State replied by expressing sympathy with the Russian people and by stating that "no lasting good can result" from the development of trade "so long as the present causes of progressive impoverishment continue to operate" in Russia. He concluded:

It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people and it is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition by firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contract, and the rights of free labor. If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the protection of persons and property and the establishment of conditions essential to the maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the consummation of such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations.⁴⁸

This unequivocal reply has since remained the basis of

American policy. Furthermore, it is essentially the same policy that was followed by the Wilson administration. This was supplemented later by a letter from Secretary Hughes to Mr. Gompers, the president of the American Federation of Labor, whose antipathy to the Soviet system is well known.⁴⁹ In both of these documents the United States takes the view that there is no trade at present possible with Russia because of the economic condition of Soviet Russia. As time went on, this was shown to be a mistake, for trade has developed to some extent in spite of the hardships in Russia; but it was undoubtedly true at the moment. In the matter of "the recognition by firm guarantees of private property," it is practically a requirement that the Soviet government should abandon the nationalization of property; it is, however, open to discussion whether the leasehold system as advocated at Genoa and the policy of "mixed companies" might not meet that condition. The "rights of free labor" are at present modified from the status they occupied in 1921; the clause with respect to labor was probably indirectly due to the lively interest taken in Russian affairs by Mr. Gompers. The document as a whole invites the "convincing evidence" of the necessary changes.

It was in vain that, as time went on, the Russian government insisted that ignorance was responsible for the attitude of the United States.⁵⁰ The record of the famine and the daily and weekly reports of the American relief workers as well as the careful study of the situation by the State Department, made evident that trade was as yet in its infancy. The Soviet government issued its appeal for aid from the perils of the famine on August 2, 1921. The reply was prompt as the organization, of which Mr. Hoover is president, took up its task. Congress voted money for its support. The attempt was naturally made by some to suggest that the work of the American Relief Administration in Russia was in some fashion a modification of Secretary Hughes' original position.⁵¹ This, however, was false, for the American Relief Administration was outside of international politics. The agreement signed with Soviet Russia on October 1, 1921, at

Reval applied solely to the distribution and management of supplies.⁵² On the whole, the A. R. A. and other foreign agencies as well, have accomplished, admirably, a gigantic task. Its withdrawal in July, 1923, is not evidence that the famine is entirely over. But the export of grain by the Soviet government had shown that as a charity the work of the A. R. A. was done. The argument of the need of export in order to secure much-needed machinery, while cold-blooded, was scientifically unassailable. A certain proportion of the population must suffer in order to restore means of production to a stable basis. It was, of course, conceivable that the calculations and the possibilities of such export may be mistaken; but since the Soviet government so decided and since the famine was much reduced, it seemed wiser to quit as the organization was in itself a private, civil charity.

Further expression of American policy came at the time when the Washington Conference was in preparation. In response to inquiries from the Far Eastern Republic requesting a hearing, the Secretary of State replied, denying recognition to the Republic, but stating his doctrine of the "moral trusteeship" of the Conference for Russian interests in Siberia. This document has already been quoted at the start of Chapter XII. It undoubtedly contributed materially to the success of the Conference. As we have seen, the Russian government severely criticized the Washington Conference and repudiated its conclusions in advance. In point of fact, the slow pressure of Russia undoubtedly had effect on the decision of the Japanese to withdraw from the mainland of Siberia and thus contributed also to the victory of the American desire that this should take place.

As the Washington Conference came to a close, there was the problem of American participation in the Genoa Conference. This was complicated by Washington despatches which indicated that at the White House there was a sincere hope that the end of the isolation of Russia might be speedily at hand.⁵³ At the same time, Radek expressed the view that ten or even twenty years might be needed before Russia would be trading with the rest of the world in normal fashion.⁵⁴

However, the decision of the American government not to be formally represented at Genoa was given on March 8, 1922. The essential passage is as follows:

It has been found impossible to escape the conclusion that the proposed Conference is not primarily an economic conference, as questions appear to have been excluded from consideration without the satisfactory determination of which the chief causes of economic disturbance must continue to operate, but is rather a conference of a political character in which the Government of the United States could not helpfully participate. This Government cannot be unmindful of the clear conviction of the American people, while desirous, as has been abundantly demonstrated, suitably to assist in the recovery of the economic life of Europe, that they should not unnecessarily become involved in European political questions.

It may be added, with respect to Russia, that this Government, anxious to do all in its power to promote the welfare of the Russian people, views with the most eager and friendly interests every step taken toward the restoration of economic conditions which will permit Russia to regain her productive power, but these conditions, in the view of this Government, cannot be secured until adequate action is taken on the part of those chiefly responsible for Russia's present economic disorder.

It is also the view of this Government—and it trusts that this view is shared by the governments who have called the Conference—that, while awaiting the establishment of the essential bases of productivity in Russia, to which reference was made in the public declaration of this Government on March 25, 1921, and without which this Government believes all consideration of economic revival to be futile, nothing should be done looking to the obtaining of economic advantages in Russia which would impair the just opportunities of others, but that the resources of the Russian people should be free from such exploitation and that fair and equal economic opportunity in their interest, as well as in the interest of all the Powers, should be preserved.⁵⁵

The reasoning in this note is open to criticism in the distinction drawn as to political and economic conditions in Europe. It would have been sounder fairly to have faced the statements of the Cannes protocol and said that we were not sufficiently consulted regarding them and that any act of recognition of Russia must be our own and not a joint act pledged in advance or contingent on the action of other Powers. Politics and economics are two sides of the same coin; the endeavor

to separate them is merely an excuse. If the conference were to be exclusively an economic conference, it was inevitable that the question of international debts should arise. The position of the United States was taken; whether for good or evil any European economic conference would have been tempted to include that subject on its agenda, if the United States were represented. At the time that the Genoa Conference was before the Cabinet, the attitude of the Senate as to the treaties signed at the Washington Conference was giving alarm. To have accepted the invitation to Genoa at that time might have imperilled those treaties, whose passage through the Senate was rightly judged to be of paramount importance. The refusal to attend at Genoa was, therefore, justifiable, though the language of the note was apparently misleading. The comments of the Soviet press were full of regret that America was not to be present at Genoa, and Trotsky indulged in sarcasm when he pointed out that the conditions of distress in Russia to which the United States referred were themselves due primarily to devastations of civil war, for which he claimed the United States was responsible by its support of the Czechoslovaks and of Kolchak. Thus he chose to ignore the effects of Bolshevik rule.⁵⁶

Further emphasis was laid by the statement on May 1, 1921, on the conditions which must precede the recognition of Russia. It is one of the briefest and clearest statements that had so far been made. After expressing sympathy with the Russian people, Secretary Hughes further said to the delegation of women who had appealed for recognition:

With respect to intercourse, it is quite evident that you are under a serious misapprehension. There are no legal obstacles to trade with Russia. The obstacles that exist to trade with Russia are due to the situation in Russia which is in the control of those who dominate the affairs of Russia. Some time ago I pointed out the essential conditions for a return to productivity in Russia. That was not a formula; that was not an artificial conception; that was simply a statement of fact. Russia needs credit, but it is idle to expect credit unless there is a basis for credit. That basis for credit cannot be supplied from the outside. That basis for credit has got to be supplied inside of Russia.

Political recognition follows the establishment of a sound basis for intercourse. Political recognition is dependent upon the existence of a government that is competent to discharge and shows a disposition to discharge its international obligations. This whole matter is in the control of those who dominate the affairs of Russia. We are most desirous to do what we can to aid in Russia's recuperation, but they must establish the basis for such recuperation.⁵⁷

Turning now to the Genoa Conference whose records have already been discussed. It remains to point out that on April 24, 1922, the United States officially reserved American rights in the collection of debts and stated that the payment of those debts was not to be prejudiced by any action taken by the Powers at the Genoa Conference.⁵⁸ Later, with respect to the invitation to The Hague, the United States again declined. Secretary Hughes stated on May 14, 1922:

This Government, however, is unable to conclude that it can helpfully participate in the meeting at The Hague, as this would appear to be a continuance under different nomenclature of the Genoa Conference and destined to encounter the same difficulties if the attitude disclosed in the Russian memorandum of May 11 remains unchanged.

The inescapable and ultimate question would appear to be the restoration of productivity in Russia, the essential conditions of which are still to be secured and must in the nature of things be provided within Russia herself.

While this Government has believed that these conditions are reasonably clear, it has always been ready to join with the Governments extending the present invitation in arranging for an inquiry by experts into the economic situation in Russia and the necessary remedies. Such an inquiry would approximately deal with the economic prerequisites of that restoration of production in Russia, without which there would appear to be lacking any sound basis for credits.

It should be added that this Government is most willing to give serious attention to any proposals issuing from the Genoa Conference or any later conference, but it regards the present suggestions in apparent response to the Russian memorandum of May 11, as lacking, in view of the terms of that memorandum, in the definiteness which would make possible the concurrence of this Government in the proposed plan.⁵⁹

Such a reply did not, however, mean that the administra-

tion was indifferent to the Russian problems. At The Hague, a statement was made regarding concessions which has already been noted.⁶⁰ Furthermore, during August, a proposal was made that the United States should send "an expert technical commission to study and report on the economic situation" in Russia.⁶¹ The reply of the Soviet authorities was, that this could be permitted only if a similar Russian commission could be permitted to investigate the situation in the United States. This was not accepted, as it seemed to open the way to unlimited propaganda in the United States. The comment in the Soviet press was that "the proposals of the American government concerning the sending of a special commission to Russia could not arouse any other feeling in Russia but that America, having rendered help to the starving, thinks that it can now do anything in Russia that it desires."⁶² The rebuff to the American proposal was therefore complete.⁶³

As a matter of fact, it was quite possible that such an answer was not displeasing to those Americans who were ardently opposed to recognition. It supplied them with ammunition with which to meet the attacks of Senator Borah. In the Senate on May 29, 1922, he spoke, as he did frequently thereafter, deploring the breakdown of the Genoa Conference and declaring:

Europe cannot settle down until the Russian problem is settled. So long as the Russian problem is an unsettled proposition, Europe will remain armed, uneasy, and unsettled, and the whole world will suffer. . . . Europe will not resume her purchasing power until she adjusts the Russian problem. But the present policy of refusing to deal with Russia keeps the world in turmoil and threatens another war. . . . The policy of non-recognition of Russia insures economic chaos in Europe. . . . Our policy has saved ten million lives, but our policy has starved twenty millions.

However commendable such ideas might seem to many, the fact remains as Radek stated it on June 7:

From the economic standpoint—as Hoover stated in his last speech—Russia, as a consuming market, has never played a significant rôle in American export. He gives the number of workmen, who were engaged in production for the Russian market, as thirty

thousand. Political considerations, such as the significance of Russia, in the proportion of armed forces in the system of European balance, which means so much for England, for instance, in the solution of the Russian problem, is of no importance to America, which, having no definite European policy, adopted a waiting attitude in the Anglo-French conflict as to Germany.⁶⁵

This clear and correct analysis of the situation was further emphasized by Secretary Hoover in a statement of June 11, 1922. He said:

The British have been grievously disappointed in the results of their trade treaty. Much had been made of the enormous needs of the huge Russian population so long deprived of goods. It was forgotten that need for goods does not constitute demand for goods. Demand implies ability to produce and pay.

The really important problem confronting American business men with respect to Russia is not that of trade but that of investment. Without a large investment of foreign capital as a means of restoring production, the prospects are that, at least for some years to come, there will be even less opportunity to sell goods in Russia than in 1921, for with the exhaustion of the gold reserve her means of payment will shrink to a minimum. The feasibility of investing capital in Russia depends essentially on the policy of the Bolshevik Government and on the general internal situation, and not to any important degree upon action of foreign governments.⁶⁶

Such precise statements by an engineer in politics stripped the situation to the foundations. The productivity of Russia depended on herself both politically and economically. In the meantime, on July 28, 1922, the United States recognized the governments of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania *de jure* and stated: "The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed condition of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time" of these governments "which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous population."⁶⁷ This recognition would have taken place many months before had it not been for the crowded condition of the political world. At last a vacuum existed which deprived the recognition of any connection with other or ulterior political purposes. It

was a belated act without any other political significance than the recognition of a condition of fact which had already been recognized by practically every other country in the world.

The program of the N. E. P. was now the chief concern of Russia. Would it produce results which might stimulate trade and thus secure recognition? As Trotsky said on August 30, 1922:

We intended to work and wait. Europe and the world need Russia not less than Russia needs Europe. The superficial views and the adventurous spirit of some statesmen will imply new sacrifices and new hardships, but irrepressible economic necessity will eventually carve its way through every obstacle. If *these* statesmen will not "recognize" us, then *others* will recognize us, who will come to replace them.⁶⁸

Earlier, Trotsky had also said: "Capitalism has lost all ability; the labor classes are not yet ready—such are the characteristics of the present epoch." When the imperialistic classes "saw that after the War there was no revolution, they thought that revolution would never come." Consequently, they became more implacable as regards Russia. This policy is nevertheless "furthering the revolutionary process in the labor-masses and accelerating the coming of the world-revolution by bringing about a series of consecutive catastrophic situations."⁶⁹ For such reasons, therefore, Moscow welcomed trouble the world over. Yet it was also plain that on the markets of the world must depend the victory of the N. E. P. The economic and political distress of Europe was to become a real menace to the return of productivity in Russia. Capital would not invest in Soviet Russia and it remained to be seen whether Russian harvests could be marketed in Europe. The reports of the American Bankers' Association on Russia were pessimistic. These stated after nearly eighteen months of N. E. P. that "there is very little to tempt American business men at the present time to undertake business with Russia." The report concluded:

It is earnestly to be hoped that there may be changes in policy and improvement in conditions which will make trade and invest-

ment more practicable, but for the time being, the obviously wise policy for American business, in general, is that of watchful waiting. Here and there some particular commercial transaction or industrial enterprise may possibly be undertaken with profit, but these instances are the exception.⁷⁰

The failure of N. E. P. to provide an immediate opportunity for either investment or trade left the export of grain as the slower means of restoring prosperity to Russia. The decision was made to withdraw the A. R. A. from Russia; but Secretary Hoover in a review of the economic situation pointed out:

It is impossible to picture adequately the complete impoverishment of a great nation. The war, the revolution, the blockade, the great climatic famine of last year, the trial and failure of Communism—all have combined to project a misery and impoverishment the most awful of modern history. . . .

The "economic retreat" from Communism undertaken two years ago has resulted in impulses to recovery in certain directions. It has restored a large measure of individualism and initiative in agriculture, small trades, and small industries. The agricultural population (over 90 per cent of the whole) in some measure shows a hopeful stir of improvement because of the division of the old landlord lands, the establishment of limited right of inheritance, the fixation of taxation with a graduated percentage in kind, and the freedom to market any surplus, have all in some measure restored primary self-interest in production. . . .

In large industry the shift from Communism was accompanied by the introduction of "State Socialism," by creation of several score of governmental "trusts" covering the major industries, such as cotton and textile trusts, oil trusts, etc., and by the control of all exports and imports through Government monopoly. . . .

The manufacturing industries showed last year a few per cent recuperation from the period of Communism, the production of different industries ranging from 3 to 35 per cent compared to pre-war. This production was accomplished, however, at financial loss to each trust and a diminishing of the stocks inherited from the old régime. . . .

The foreign trade is a Government monopoly, and exports for 1922 were about \$40,000,000, or about 5 per cent of pre-war. It is announced by the Soviet authorities that the export of grain now in progress is intended to purchase agricultural tools and cotton, but the quantity thus obtainable must be small compared to the needs. The few other exports, such as timber, furs, flax, scrap iron, etc., will produce some further intake of raw materials or

machinery but will not be sufficient to enable Russia's full recovery without help of inflowing capital. The finances of the Government are so low as to have caused the closing of a large part of the schools.

What Russia needs is economic reconstruction: the re-creation of productivity. Her peasants need agricultural machinery and animals. Her workmen need tools, her industries need raw materials, her factories need new machinery, her transportation needs repairs and equipment. If her large industry is to be restored, she needs skilled workmen and trained executives and the impulse of self-interest that is absent from nationalized industry.

Furthermore, for purposes of restoration, gigantic sums of capital and the professional personnel to direct reconstruction must come from abroad. No doubt a few speculators and concession hunters intent on several hundred per cent per annum will be willing to take the risks, but the great flow of capital investment at reasonable rates can not arise until the whole system is advanced to the fundamental position upon which security and confidence must rest.

It is a hopeless illusion that there will be a flow of foreign savings, business, or skill into Russia by the simple act of official recognition by our Government. Indeed, there has been no appreciable investment in Russia from the several countries which have extended recognition, although some of them are exporting capital in other directions. This is not an argument for or against recognition, but simply a statement that the question of restored productivity to large industry rests on other fundamentals, such as the security and the freedom of initiative, and these can only be created through the institutions of Russia herself. The Russian people must work out all these problems in their own way.¹¹

Such was the attitude of the Department of Commerce. From a purely selfish point of view, the possibility that the Russian harvest of 1923 and 1924 might help to supply the European market would, of course, react on the American farmer who was already clamorous over the fact that the price of wheat in America was falling as he failed to find a foreign market for his surplus grain. The price for his surplus fixed the price for his commodity; and there is now the additional fact of potential competition with Russia in the wheat market of the world. Such considerations may also have effect on foreign policy.

Economics were not in Secretary Hughes' mind when on

March 21, 1923, he again replied to a delegation of women appealing for recognition. The argument of the women rested on the alleged success of the New Economic Policy and on a misunderstanding on their part of what had taken place at Genoa and The Hague. The Secretary pointed out:

The salvation of Russia cannot be contrived outside and injected. Russia's hope lies in Russia's action. . . . Russia needs industry and trade, but industry and trade cannot be created by any formal political arrangements. . . . The fundamental question in the recognition of a government is whether it shows ability and a disposition to discharge international obligations. . . . But indulgence and proper arrangements as to debts are one thing, repudiation is quite another. . . . Not only would it be a mistaken policy to give encouragement to repudiation and confiscation, but it is also important to remember that there should be no encouragement to those efforts of the Soviet authorities to visit upon other peoples the disasters that have overwhelmed the Russian people. . . . Lenin . . . said that "the revolutionists of all countries must learn the organization, the planning, the method, and the substance of revolutionary work. Then I am convinced," he said "the outlook of the world-revolution will not be good but excellent." . . . The world we the United States desire is a world not threatened with the destructive propaganda of the Soviet authorities, and one in which there will be good faith and the recognition of obligations and a sound basis of international intercourse.⁷²

Language such as this with its emphasis on principle, on debts, and on propaganda gave small encouragement to supporters of recognition. It was open to criticism in that the world-revolution was spoken of, but the paper statements of Lenin were taken at their face value, and in that the question of debts was perhaps given undue prominence. In face of all these cumulative statements, there was, however, a persistent propaganda going on in Washington seeking to break through the wall. Occasionally, someone would reach President Harding and there would follow for a day or two headlines in the press which would suggest that a change was coming in American policy.

Finally, on July 19, 1923, the Secretary wrote in reply to Mr. Gompers, a letter that has in it the characteristics of a note and is perhaps the fullest statement of the position of

the United States. Gompers had already shown himself to be over-anxious regarding the internal condition of Russia and to be ready to attempt to define the character of government which Russia must exhibit before she could be accorded recognition.⁷³ With that point of view I am at variance. It is not the business of the United States to define the sort of government that is to exist in Russia. We have nothing to do with the motives or type of political institutions that are set up in Russia. That is entirely a question for Russia herself. It may be, as Keynes once wrote, that I am "remote from the actualities of the problems of Russia"; but I am not "remote" as to this problem of Russian government in the sense in which he used the same phrase of Mr. Gompers.⁷⁴ Nor am I "remote" from a study of the actualities of Russian foreign policies. It is, therefore, interesting to find in Secretary Hughes' letter that "we [the United States] are not concerned with the question of the legitimacy of a government as judged by former European standards. We recognize the right of revolution and we do not attempt to determine the internal concerns of other States." With that point of view I am in entire agreement.

The Secretary states:

Recognition is an invitation to intercourse. It is accompanied on the part of the new government by the clearly implied or express promise to fulfill the obligations of intercourse. These obligations include, among other things, the protection of the persons and property of the citizens of one country lawfully pursuing their business in the territory of the other and abstention from hostile propaganda by one country in the territory of the other. In the case of the existing régime in Russia, there has not only been the tyrannical procedure to which you refer, and which has caused the question of the submission or acquiescence of the Russian people to remain an open one, but also a repudiation of the obligations inherent in international intercourse and a defiance of the principles upon which alone it can be conducted.⁷⁵

The *New Republic* in editorial comment on this statement says: "These are reasonable requirements. They are requirements that the Soviet republic should have met on their own initiative."⁷⁶ Of similar intent is the comment of the presi-

dent of the New York Chamber of Commerce, Irving T. Bush, who has just returned from Russia. This statement to the press includes the following:

But there is one thing these people have to learn, which I did my utmost to put before the leaders in the most direct terms, namely, that they cannot expect American co-operation until they regain American confidence, and that to regain confidence not merely promises for the future are sufficient.

I told them that before Americans would invest time, technical experience, and money in Russia it would be necessary to have proof of Russian good faith in the shape of restitution for private American property seized in the acute revolutionary period, which is now terminated. I do not mean, of course, that Russia must immediately repay everything in cash; but some form of compensation by a funding scheme or otherwise is a *sine qua non* if they want American co-operation. I told them this straight, and I may say that the suggestion appeared less of a shock to them than I had been led to expect.⁷⁷

Thus the story of these busy years comes to an end. Throughout, we see the eager search for a new heaven and a new earth. There are Bolsheviki who are mere political adventurers, others are fanatics, and still others are criminals; but of the sincere desire of the majority of the Bolsheviki to better Russia there can be no question. As time has gone on there are also strong forces of nationalism asserting historic claims to be heard. Gradually, the hard facts of economics have made themselves felt. The present knell of Communism may be in the essential selfishness of mankind; but "a poor man that oppresseth the poor is like a sweeping rain which leaveth no food."⁷⁸ There is also, and lastly, the fundamental consideration of good faith. That, however, does not lie necessarily in the complete restoration of property nor in the full payment of debts, but in the restoration of both efficiency and morals in Russia, and in the intention of Soviet Russia to accept and abide by the standards of international intercourse.⁷⁹

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI

1. Maiski, "Development of Policy in Soviet Russia," in *Manchester Guardian Commercial, Reconstruction in Europe, Section Four, Russia*, July 6, 1922, p. 215.
2. *New York Times*, Aug. 1, 1923. This speech was never given owing to the President's illness.
3. *Izvestia*, Dec. 16, 1917.
4. Dennis, "The Genoa Conference," in *North American Review*, March, 1922, p. 293.
5. I am omitting the entire story of Bolshevik propaganda in the United States for it would carry me too far into matters which the Department of Justice may still consider to be confidential. Of the connection between the Third Internationale at Moscow and the Communist endeavors in the United States there can be no question.
6. *Petrograd Pravda*, Dec. 9, 1917.
7. *Ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1917; *Gazette*, Dec. 23, 1917; *Izvestia*, Dec. 25, 26, 1917; Hard, "Raymond Robins' Sensational Story as told to William Hard, The All-Russian Congress and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty," in *Metropolitan*, Aug., 1918. (Hereafter to be cited as Hard, *Robins.*) Kalpaschnikov, *A Prisoner of Trotsky's* (New York, 1920).
8. Hard, *Robins.*
9. *Ibid.*, *R. A. R.*, p. 81; *Congressional Record*, Jan. 29, 1919, p. 2336.
10. *R. A. R.*, p. 82.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 84-86.
12. Hard, *Robins.*
13. *R. A. R.*, pp. 98-100.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
16. Francis, *Russia from the American Embassy*, p. 230. The *Izvestia* in an editorial by Steklov, March 15, 1918, stated:

The United States cannot permit Germany to become the autocratic master of dismembered Russia and especially of her markets. The United States cannot in its own interest acquiesce in Germany's plan of turning Russia into a German colony. And it, unlike Germany, is not interested in establishing its political power in Russia. On the contrary, in view of its rivalry with Germany and Japan, the United States is directly interested to have Russia politically and economically strong and independent. Therefore, in its own interests it must come to the help of the Soviet, or any other government in Russia, in the matter of re-establishing the country's

military and economic power. . . . When the Americans shall be convinced of the stability of the Soviet Government, they will give us money, arms, engines, machinery, instructors, engineers, etc., to help us to rid ourselves of economic disorder and to create a new and strong army. . . . But in accepting this assistance Soviet Russia will by no means be tying its own hands. On the contrary . . . leaning upon the support of this powerful democracy, the United States, Russia will untie its own hands, for the re-establishment of its power. . . . We are convinced that the most consistent Socialist policy may be harmonized with the strictest realism and most level-headed practicality.

17. *R. A. R.*, pp. 204-12.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-19.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 219, the fuller story of these developments can be seen in Chapters II and III.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
22. *Severnaya Kommuna*, Sept. 6, 1918.
23. *R. A. R.*, pp. 229, 246, 249. Cf. Lenin's letter to American Workmen, Aug., 1918, in *Class Struggle*, Dec., 1918, and "Analysis of Bolshevism" (*Liberator* pamphlet), No. 4, p. 28; Ransome, "An Open Letter to America," in *New Republic*, July 27, 1918 (Radek in original English edition printed at Moscow has an interesting preface).
24. Cf. chapters iii and iv.
25. *Izvestia*, Oct. 8, 1918; Cf. *Ibid.*, Oct. 10.
26. The titles of some of these pamphlets used on the Archangel front are: "Are You a Trade Unionist?" "The Shame of being a Scab"; "Capitalist America, Soviet Russia"; "Civil War and Red Terror"; "Say! What are you?" "The Soviet Government and Peace"; "Will you be oppressors of Workers' Liberty?" Cf. *Izvestia*, March 2, 1919.
27. *Ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1919.
28. *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1919; Cf. also Chicherin note of Jan. 12, 1919 in *Ibid.*, Jan. 14 (*R. A. R.*, p. 282), and *Weekly Bulletin*, I, No. 2, March 10, 1919: also *Petrograd Pravda*, Feb. 13, 28, 1919, and *Severnaya Kommuna*, March 14, 1919 (Lenin's speech of March 12, 1919).
29. *Soviet Russia*, July 17, 1920; *State Dept. Press statement*, Feb. 11, 1921; *Russian Series*, No. 2 (*R. A. R.*, p. 351).
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 320-29.
31. *Weekly Bulletin*, I, No. 8, April 21, 1919; *Soviet Russia*, Nov. 22, 1919; *Wireless News*, Moscow, Dec. 3, 1919, Dec. 25, 1920.
32. *Bolshevik Propaganda—Hearings before a Sub-Committee of*

the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate. Sixty-fifth Congress, Third Session and thereafter, pursuant to S. Res. 439 and 469. Washington, 1919.

33. *Soviet Russia*, May 15, 1920.
34. *R. A. R.*, p. 346. *Russian Propaganda—Hearing before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Sixty-sixth Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 263, Washington, 1920, pp. 14, 18, 23, 32, 59, 108, 117, 144, 187, 207, 222, 232, 331, 394, 398, 403, 415, 462, and 467. Current History, XIII, Part 2, p. 25.*
35. *Department of State, Russian Series, No. 5 (R. A. R., p. 348).*
36. *New York Times*, March 31, 1920.
37. *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1921.
38. *Wireless News*, Moscow, Feb. 18, 1920.
39. *Ibid.*, Moscow, March 3, 1920. Cf. *Izvestia*, April 3, 1920.
40. *International Conciliation*, Oct., 1920, p. 465.
41. *New York Times*, Aug. 18, 19, Sept. 2, 3, 1920; Cf. *International Conciliation*, Oct., 1920.
42. *Pravda*, Sept. 12, 1920.
43. *Wireless News*, Moscow, April 16, 1921. Litvinov announced that without the conclusion of any agreement with the United States trade relations had already begun. This was categorically the opposite of *Ibid.*, Moscow, Sept. 10, 1920, which stated that "trade relations were impossible" without an agreement.

The figures for trade between the United States and Russia are somewhat misleading as until 1921 no distinction was made between the Baltic states and Soviet Russia. In 1921, separate figures were given; but in the case of Latvia and Esthonia these did not indicate the ultimate destination of the goods. As much that was sent to Latvia and Esthonia was only in transit to Soviet Russia, these figures should be included if one is to get a general impression as to the volume of trade. The figures given for part of 1921, 1922, and part of 1923 also include part of the supplies sent either by or under the auspices of the A. R. A. These consequently should be separated into ordinary trade and supplies. At present it is impossible to do this. The figures given below are therefore subject to modification and addition as to exports. In Russia in Asia are included the Far Eastern Republic and the Maritime Province of Siberia, though technically they were not part of Soviet Russia until November, 1922. The figures are supplied by the United States Department of Commerce.

44. *Wireless News*, Petrograd, Oct. 22, 1920; *Wireless News*, Nauen, Jan. 3, 1921.

	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923†
Russia in Europe:					
Imports to U. S. A.....	\$2,953,480	\$1,825,390	\$168,769	\$334,966	\$935,299
Exports to Russia	30,259,745	15,446,832	14,426,823	28,501,998	5,428,527
Russia in Asia:					
Imports to U. S. A.....	6,709,608	10,655,196	874,491	187,877	52,956
Exports to Russia.....	52,176,440	13,280,886	1,113,313	312,027	363,459
Latvia:					
Imports to U. S. A.....	52,041*	853,781	3,122,153
Exports to Latvia.....	715,969*	6,804,049	4,998,425
Esthonia:					
Imports to U. S. A.....	80,053*	767,174	329,391
Exports to Esthonia.....	2,911,369*	3,103,275	790,792

* July 1 to Dec. 31, 1921.

† To August 31, 1923, inclusive.

45. *Conditions in Russia—Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs—House of Representatives, Sixty-Sixth Congress, Third Session, on H. Res. 635*, Washington, 1921, pp. 148, 182-89. *New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1921. Cf. also *Relations with Russia—Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Sixty-Sixth Congress, Third Session on S. J. Res. 164*, Washington, 1921.
46. On this section and the following cf. Dennis, "American Policy Toward Soviet Russia," in *Manchester Guardian. Commercial Reconstruction in Europe, Section Four, Russia*, July 6, 1922, p. 207.
47. *New York Times*, March 24, 1921.
48. *New York Times*, March 26, 1921; *Wireless News*, Moscow, March 29, 1921.
49. *New York Times*, April 18, 1921.
50. *Izvestia*, Dec. 6, 1921: "To date the bombastic refusal of the United States to re-establish relations with Russia relied in the main on complete ignorance of our actual situation and on the prevalence of the most incorrect ideas as to our situation." *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1922, "False information about the situation in Russia successfully cultivated by old Tsarist diplomatic circles and refugees of bourgeois Russia has to date exercised a too strong influence on the American political world."
51. *Ost-Information*, No. 150, Berlin, Aug. 13, 1921; *New York Times*, July 25, 1921, gives the terms and conditions on which the A. R. A. would enter Russia. *New York American*, July 28, 1921, states the endeavors that are being made to secure the release of American prisoners in Russia. Radek in *Pravda*, Oct. 7, 1921, refers to the League of Nations as a "foul smelling corpse," but expects it to do something to relieve the famine. *New York Times*, Jan. 8 (Litinov sneres at A. R. A.) and Jan. 25, 1922 (Chicherin praises its work).
52. *Sbornik*, II, p. 152; *A. R. A. Bulletin*, Series 2, No. 17, Oct. 1, 1921. Cf. on use of the American Committee for Russian Famine Relief of Chicago for propaganda purposes in the United States, *New York Times*, Feb. 11, 1922. On the general situation as to famine relief cf. *The Russian Famines, 1921-1923*, being a summary report of the Commission on Russian Relief of the National Information Bureau, New York, 1923.
53. By way of illustration, *New York Tribune*, Dec. 28, 1921. The occasional despatches by Fox written for the *Washington Post* are of the same type.
54. Duranty interview with Radek, *New York Times*, Dec. 22, 1921.

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55. *Ibid.*, March 9, 1922.
56. *Izvestia*, March 21, 1922. Cf. *New York Times*, Jan. 19, 1922, where Trotsky predicted the failure of the Conference unless the United States attended.
57. *Ibid.*, May 2, 1922.
58. *Washington Herald*, April 25, 1922.
59. *New York Times*, May 16, 1922. Cf. *Ibid.*, May 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 1922. The confusion as to our original separate replies to the two invitations: first, to attend a committee of experts on Russia from France; and, second, to attend The Hague Conference from the Genoa Conference, is explained by me in *The Interpreter*, June 10, 1922. The second invitation we declined and nothing came of the first proposal.
60. *New York Times*, July 21, 1922.
61. *Ibid.*, August 31, 1922; *Globe* (New York), August 30, 1922.
62. *Izvestia*, Sept. 19, 1922.
63. *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1922; *New York Times*, Sept. 19, 1922; *The Interpreter*, Sept. 30, 1922. It was gossip at Berlin that Chicherin, who apparently was not consulted, was much disappointed at the fashion in which the authorities at Moscow handled the matter.
64. *New York Times*, May 30, June 1, 1922.
65. *Pravda*, June 7, 1922.
66. *New York Times*, June 12, 1922.
67. *Ibid.*, July 28, 1922.
68. *Izvestia*, Aug. 30, 1922.
69. *Ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1922.
70. *Russia, a consideration of conditions as revealed by Soviet publications*. Published by the Commission on Commerce and Marine of the American Bankers' Association, New York, 1922, p. 36. Cf. Roberts, "Russia's Experiment Analyzed," in *Review of Reviews*, August, 1922.
71. *New York Times*, March 23, 1923, and press release of Dept. of Commerce. Cf. on plans to export grain from Russia, *New York Tribune*, Nov. 30, 1922; *New York Times*, Feb. 10, 21, 24, 1923. At the end of 1922, there was also much talk of an oil concession granted to the Barnsdell Corporation. This company received a small concession in return for which they were to furnish machinery and a percentage of the oil to the Soviet government. Later, if it were found that the concession covered ground, already the property of another private corporation, it was said that the Barnsdell Corporation would make restitution. Cf. *Washington Star*, Sept. 22, 1922; *New York Times*, Sept. 24, 1922; *Barron's Weekly*, Nov. 18, 1922.
72. *New York Times*, March 22, 1923. Cf. *Ibid.*, March 23, 28,

- 29; *Washington Star*, April 3, 1923; *The Interpreter*, April 28, 1923.
73. Gompers, "The Attitude of American Labor toward the Soviets," in *Manchester Guardian Commercial, Reconstruction in Europe, Section Four, Russia*, July 6, 1922, p. 206.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
75. *New York Times*, July 20, 1923.
76. *New Republic*, Aug. 1, 1923.
77. *New York Times*, June 9, 1923.
78. *Proverbs*, 28:3.
79. Cf. Dennis, "Characteristics of Bolshevik Diplomacy," in *North American Review*, Nov., 1923.

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